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A  UTHOR: 


CHURCH,  ALFRED  JOHN 


TITLE: 


THE  STORY  OF 
CARTHAGE 

PLACE: 

NEW  YORK 

DA  TE: 

1898 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARCFT 


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Ch\irch,  Alfred  John,   1829-1912.' 

The  story  of  Carthage.     With  the  collabora- 
tion of  Arthiir  Oilman.     New  York^  G.  P.   Putnam; 
London,  T.  F.  Unwin,  1898 • 

309  p.     illus.,  plates,  maps   (2  fold.)     (The 
story  of  the  nations)  I 


1.  Carthage  -  Hist.    JL.  Oilman,  Arthur, 
1837-1909.     II.  Story  of  the  nations. 


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THE  STORY  OF  THE  NATIONS 

laMO,  ILLUSTKATED,  PBR  VOL.,  $1.50  ;  %  LBATHBR,  GILT  TOP,  $1.75 


THB   EARLIER  VOLUMES  ARB 


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STORY 


By  Z.  A.  Ragozin 


OF  GREECE.     By  Prof.  Jas.  A.  Harrisoh 

OF  ROME.    By  Arthur  Oilman 

OF  THE  JEWS.    By  Prof.  Jas.  K.  Hosmbr 

OF  CHALDEA.    By  Z.  A.  Ragozin 

OF  GERMANY.    By  S.  Baking-Gould 

OF  NORWAY.    By  Prof.  H.  H.  Bovesen 

OF  SPAIN.    By  E.  E.  and  Susan  Hale 

OF  HUNGARY.    By  Prof.  A.  VAMBfiRV 

OF  CARTHAGE.    By  Prof.  Alfred  J.  Church 

OF  THE  SARACENS.     By  Arthur  Gilman 

OF  THE  MOORS  IN  SPAIN.    By  Stanley  Lane-Pool« 

OF  THE  NORMANS.     By  Sarah  O.  Jewett 

OF  PERSIA.     By  S.  G.  W.  Benjamin 

OF  ANCIENT  EGYPT.    By  Geo.  Rawlinson 

OF  ALEXANDER'S  EMPIRE.    By  Prof.  J.  P.  Mahafpv 

OF  ASSYRIA.    By  Z.  A.  Ragozin 

OF  IRELAND.    By  Hon.  Emily  Lawless 

OF  THE  GOTHS.    By  Henry  Bradley 
OF  TURKEY.    By  Stanley  Lane-Poolb 
OF  MEDIA,  BABYLON,  AND  PERSIA. 
OF  MEDIAEVAL  FRANCE.    By  Gustave  Masson 
OF  MEXICO.     By  Susan  Hale 
OF  HOLLAND.    By  James  E.  Thorold  Rogers. 
OF  PHCENICIA.     By  George  Rawlinson 
OF  THE  HANSA  TOWNS.     By  Helen  Zimmern 
OF  EARLY  BRITAIN.    By  Prof.  Alfred  J.  Church 
OF  THE  BARBARY  CORSAIRS.    By  Stanley  Lane-Poolb 
OF  RUSSIA.     By  W.  R.  Morfill 

OF  THE  JEWS  UNDER  ROME.    By  W.  D.  Morrison 
OF  SCOTLAND.    By  John  Mackintosh 
OF  SWITZERLAND.    By  R.  Stead  and  Mrs.  A.  Hug 
OF  PORTUGAL.    By  H.  Morse  Stephens 
OF  THE  BYZANTINE  EMPIRE.    By  C.  W.  C.  Oman 
OF  SICILY.    By  E.  A.  Freeman 
OF  THE  TUSCAN  REPUBLICS.    By  Bella  Duffy 
OF  POLAND.     By  W.  R.  Morfill 
OF  PARTHIA.    By  George  Rawlinson 
OF  JAPAN.     By  David  Murray 
OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  RECOVERY  OF  SPAIN. 
OF  AUSTRALASIA.     By  Greville  Tkegarthen 
OF  SOUTHERN  AFRICA.     By  Geo.  M.  Theal 
OF  VENICE.     By  Alethea  Wiel 

OF  THE  CRUSADES.     By  T.  S.  Archer  and  C.  L.  Kingsford 
OF  VEDIC  INDIA.     By  Z.  A.  Ragozin 
OF  BOHEMIA.     By  C.  E.  Maurice 
OF  CANADA.     By  J.  G.  Bourinot 
OF  BRITISH  RULE  I.\  INDIA.     By  R.  W.  Frazbr 
OF  THE  BALKANS.    By  William  Miller 

For  prospectus  of  the  series  see  end  of  this  volume 


By  H.  E.  Watts 


©.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS.  NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 


X 
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C 

CO 

en 
O 

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|he  |toii7  fi|  ilje  I 


ations 


STORY    OS    CARTHAGE 


Dfi.C 


-  N 


\     - 


ALFRED  J.    CHURCH,   M.A. 

PROFESSOR  OF   LATIN   IN   UNIVERSITY  COr.LEGE.    LONDON,   ALTHOP.  OF 
"STORIES   FROM   HOMEK,"   ETC.   ETC. 

•V 

ty/TI/  THE  COLLABORATION  01^ 

ARTHUR    OILMAN,    M.A. 

AUTHOR  OF  "the  STORY   OF   ROME,"   "HISTORY  OF  THE  AMERICAN 

PEOPLE,"  ETC.    ETC. 


NEW  YORK 
G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

LONDON:     T.  FISHER  UNWIN 

i8g8 


,,,/'t 


Copyright 

By  G.  p.  Putnam's  Sous 

1886 

Entered  at  Stationers'  Hail,  Londoa 

By  T.  Fisher  Unwin 


I 


s 

^ 


10 


PREFACE. 


It  is  difficult  to  tell  the  story  of  Carthage,  because 
one  has  to  tell  it  without  sympathy,  and  from  the 
standpoint  of  her  enemies.  It  is  a  great  advantage, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  the  materials  are  of  a  manage- 
able amount,  and  that  a  fairly  complete  narrative  may 
be  given  within  a  mode^te  compass. 

I  have  made  it  a  rule\.  go  to  the  original  authori- 
ties. At  the  same  time  I  have  to  express  my  obliga- 
tions to  several  modern  works,  to  the  geographical 
treatises  of  Heeren,  the  histories  of  Grote,  Arnold  and 
Mommsen,  Mr.  Bosvvorth  Smith's  admirable  "  Car- 
thage and  the  Carthaginians,"  and  the  learned  and 
exhaustive  "History  of  Art  in  Phoenicia  and  its 
Dependencies,'*  by  Messieurs  Georges  Perrot  and 
Charles  Chipiez,  as  translated  and  edited  by  Mr. 
Walter  Armstrong.  To  this  last  I  am  indebted  for 
most  of  the  illustrations  of  this  book. 

I  have  had  much  help  also  from  Mr.  W.  W.  Capes' 
edition  of  "  Livy  "  xxi.,  xxii. 


337963 


'f 


X  PREFACE. 

I  have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  discuss  the 
critical  questions  which  have  been  raised  about  the 
Duilian  column  (p.  135).  The  inscription,  as  it  at 
present  exists,  may  be  supposed  to  bear  a  general, 
though  not  a  faithful,  resemblance  to  the  original. 

Hadley  Green, 

May  27,  1886. 


CHRONOLOGICAL    TABLE. 


B.C. 

Carthage  founded  by  Dido g^o 

The  Campaigns  of  Malchus               550 

The  Battle  of  Alalia r^e 

First  Treaty  with  Rome ,  qoo 

First  Battle  cf  Himera         ........  480 

Second  Treaty  with  Rome        - aaq 

Hannibal  invades  Sicily ^jq 

Third  Treaty  with  Rome 405 

Capture  of  Agrij^cnlum 406 

Treaty  between  Carthage  and  Dionysius           ....  405 

Renewal  of  the  War ^gy 

Siege  of  Syracuse  by  Himilco ^^5 

Return  of  Himilco  to  Africa 305 

Mago  invades  Sicily ngn 

Treaty  of  Peace  with  Dionysius 392 

Renewal  of  the  War ^g , 

Dionysius  attacks  Carthage 36^ 

Death  of  Dionysius 357 

The  Conspiracy  of  Hanno 340 

The  Battle  of  Crimessus ^^q 

Death  of  Timoleon ^^7 

Agathocles  defeated  at  Himera 310 

He  transfers  the  War  to  Africa 310 

He  returns  to  Sicily 307 

Pyrrhus  invades  Sicily 278 

He  leaves  Sicily 276 

Beginning  of  First  Punic  War 264 

Defeat  of  the  Carthaginian  Fleet  l)y  Duilius  at  Mylae         .         .  260 

Victory  of  Regulus  at  Ecnoinus 256 


xii  CHRONOLOGICAL   TABLE. 

Landing  of  Regulus  in  Africa 256 

Defeat  of  Regulus  by  Xantippus 255 

The  Siege  of  Lilybaeum  begun 249 

Defeat  of  the  Roman  Fleet  under  Claudius  at  Drepanum     .        .  249 

Hamilcar  Barca  comes  into  Sicily •  247 

Death  of  Hannibal 247 

Defeat  of  Carthaginian  Fleet  by  Catulus  at  JEgusa.  ...  241 

Conclusion  of  First  Punic  War 241 

War  of  the  Mercenaries 241-236 

Hamilcar  Barca  invades  Spain 236 

^  Death  of  Hamilcar 229 

Assassination  of  Hasdrubal 221 

Capture  of  Saguntum  by  Hannibal  and  Commencement  of  Second 

Punic  War 218 

Battles  of  Ticinus  and  Trebia 218 

Battle  of  Trasuraennus 217 

Battle  of  Cannae 2l6 

Hannibal  winters  in  Capua 215 

Roman  Conquest  of  Syracuse .212 

Hannibal  takes  Tarentum 212 

'    Defeat  and  Death  of  the  Scipios  in  Spain 211 

Hannibal  marches  on  Rome — Fall  of  Capua             ,         .         .  211 

Publius  Scipio  goes  to  Spain 210 

He  captures  New  Carthage 209 

Death  of  Marcellus 208 

Hasdrubal  enters  Italy 207 

His  defeat  at  Metaurus 207 

Scipio  sails  to  Africa 204 

Hannibal  returns  to  Carthage 203 

Defeat  at  Zama 202 

End  of  Second  Punic  War 201 

Death  of  Hannibal ^^3 

Roman  Embassy  at  Carthage      ....                 .         •  '74 

The  Third  Punic  War  begins          ...         1        ••  '49 

Fall  of  Carthage H6 

{ 


CONTENTS. 


PART  L 


LEGEND    AND    EARLY    HISTORY. 

I. 

The  Legend  of  Dido 

The  building  of  Carthage,  5 — Dido  and  yEneas,  7. 


n. 


PAGE 


3-8 


The  Growth  of  Carthagk 


9-18 


The  Tyrian   traders,    11— Malchus   and   Mago,   13— Treaties 
with  Rome,  15 — Carthaginian  possessions,  17. 


PART  IL 


CARTHAGE    AND    GREECE. 


I. 


Hamilcar  and  Hannibal 


21-34 

Hamilcar's  army,  25  — The  fate  of  Hamilcar,  27— Hannibal 
before  Selinus,  29— Attack  on  Himera,  31— Hannibal's  venge- 
ance, 33. 


XIV 


CONTENTS. 


n. 


i>AGB 


Carthage  and  Dionysius  (406-405)         .        .    35-45 

Siege  of  Agrigentum,  37 — Execution  of  the  generals,  39 — 
Agrigentum  evacuated,  41 — Gela  abandoned,  43 — The  plague 
at  Carthage,  45. 

ni. 

Carthage  and  Dionysius  (397)      .        .        .        46-63 

Siege  of  Motya,  47— Motya  assaulted,  49— Himilco's  ad- 
vance, 51 — Battle  of  Catana,  53 — Siege  of  Syracuse,  55— 
Plague  in  Himilco's  camp,  57  —  Himilco's  escape,  59  — 
Carthage  saved,  63. 


IV. 

The  Last  Struggle  with  Dionysius         .  64-69 

Mago  defeated,  65 — Defeat  of  Dionysius,  67— The  end  of  fhe 
war,  69. 


V. 


Carthage  and  Timoleon 


70-74 

Timoleon  declares  war  against  Carthage,  71— Battle  of  the 
Crimessus,  73. 


VI. 

Carthage  and  Agathocles        ....     75-91 

Agathocles  in  extremities,  77 — Agathocles  invades  Africa,  81 
—  Revolt  of  Bomilcar,  85  —  Pyrrhus,  89 — Pyrrhus  leaves 
Sicily,  91. 


PA  1^7  11  L 
THE  INTERNAL  HISTORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 

I. 

Carthaginian  Discoverers  ....        95-101 

Along  the  African  Coast,  97 — Gorillas,  99 — A  strange  tale,  loi. 


isummm 


CONTENTS. 


XV 


II. 


PAGE 


The  Constitution  and  Religion  of  Carthage  102-114 

Magistrates  of  Carthage,  103— Estates  of  the  realm  in 
Carthage,  105— Justice  and  religion,  109  —  Carthaginian 
Deities,  113. 


III. 

The  Revenue  and  Trade  of  Carthage    .       1 15-125 

Carthaginian  Mines,    117— Trade,    119— Ivory  and  precious 
stones,  121— Art  and  literature,  123— Wealth  and  luxury,  125. 


PAl^T  IV. 


CARTHAGE   AND    ROME. 

I. 

The  War  in  Sicily  and  on  the  Sea    .        .     129-140 

The  Romans  gain  Messana,  131— Capture  of  Agrigentum,  133 
—Battle  of  MyLx,  137— Battle  of  Ecnomus,  139. 


II. 


The  Invasion  of  Africa 


141-151 

Defeat  of  Hamilcar,  143  —  Xantippus,  145  —  Defeat  of 
Regulus,  147  —  Horace  on  Regulus,  149  —  Revenge  for 
Regulus,  151. 


III. 


In  Sicily  Again 


152-165 

Roman  Losses  at  sea,  153  —  Roman  disasters,  157  —  The 
Romans  gain  Eryx,  159— Hasdrubal's  successes,  161 — Battle  of 
yEgates  Island,  163— Conclusion  of  War,  165. 


XVI 


CONTENTS. 


CONTENTS. 


XVll 


IV. 


PAGE 


Carthage  and  her  Mercenaries        .        .        166-177 

Revolt  of  the  mercenaries,    167  —  Siege  of    Utica,    171  — 
Massacre  of  prisoners,  175— End  of  war  with  mercenaries,  177. 


V. 


Carthage  and  Spain 


•        •        .        •    170—104 

Hamilcar  in  Spain,    179— Hannibal,   181 —Siege  of  Sagun- 
tum,  185. 


VI. 

From  the  Ebro  to  Italy    ....        185-194 

Passage  of  the  Rhone,  187— Route  over  the  Alps,  189— Rocks 
split  with  vinegar,  193. 


X. 


PAGE 


Cannae 218-224 

Hannibal's  army,  219— The  struggle,  221— Will  he  march  on 


Rome  ?  223. 


After  Cannae 


XI. 


.  -  225-231 

Mago  at  Carthage,  227— Hannibal's  prospects,  229— Taren- 
tum  gained,  231. 


XII. 


The  Turn  of  the  Tide 


232-244 

Attempted  relief  of  Capua,  233  -Capua  lost  to  Hannibal,  235— 

Carthage  loses  Sicily,  237— Roman  successes  in  Spain,  239 

Death  of  the  Scipios,  241— Capture  of  New  Carthage,  243. 


VII. 

The  First  CaxMpaign  in  Italy       .        .        ,     195-205 

Scipio  retires  to  the    Trebia,    199  —  Sempronius    eager  to 
fight,  201 — The  Carthaginians  victorious,  205. 


VIII. 


Trasumennus 


206-211 


Lake  Trasumennus,  207— Slaughter  of  the   Romans,    209- 
Hannibal's  policy,  211. 


XIIL 

The  Last  Chance  of  Victory 


245-252 


The  death  of  Marcellus,  247— Nero's  gieat  march,  249— Ode 
from  Horace,  251. 


XIV 


The  Last  Struggle 


253-264 

Scipio  and  Syphax,  257 — Hannibal  recalled,  259— Zama,  261 
— Terms  of  peace,  263. 


IX. 


Fabius  and  his  Tactics 


.     212-217 

Hannibal   a   master  of   stratagem,  213 — Fabius  and   Minu- 
eius,  215— Varro  and  Paiillus  in  command,  217. 


XV. 


Hannibal  in  Exile 


265-271 

Hannibal  with  Antiochus,  267— Hannibal  in  Bithynia,  269— 
Character  of  Hannibal,  271. 


mfmm 


r 


XVlll 


CONTENTS. 


PA08 


XVI. 

The  Beginning  of  the  End       .        .        .        272-279 

Cato's  hostility  to  Carthage,  273 — Africanus  the  Younger,  275 
— Expedition  against  Carthage,  277 — War  declared,  279. 


XVII. 

The  Siege  and  Fall  of  Carthage         .        .     280-301 

The  walls  of  Carthage,  281 — The  Romans  lose  their  ally  Masi- 
nissa,  285— Scipio  in  command,  289— Attack  on  the  Me- 
gara,  293 — Kngagemcnts  between  the  fleets,  295  — Fighting 
m  the  city,  297 — Successors  of  Carthage,  301. 


LIST   OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Index  . 


303 


PAGE 

CROSSING  THE  ALPS Frontispiece 

CARTHAGINIAN  STELE   FROM   SULCI    (SARDINIA).    .           .  16 

PLAN    AND    SECTION    OF    A    CARTHAGINIAN    TOMB    AT 

MALTA 17 

PHOENICIAN  SARCOPHAGUS  FOUND  AT  SOLUNTE  (SICILY)  23 

ONE  OF  THE  TOWERS  OF   EllYX 36 

CARTHAGINIAN  PLATTER-SILVER 40 

THE   WALL  OF  MOTYA 48 

VOTIVE   BAS-RELIEF  TO   PERSEPHONE       .          .          .          .  6r 

AFRICAN  AQUEDUCT 79 

RURAL  CISTERNS 83 

PLAN  OF  THE  RUINS  OF  UTICA 87 

VOTIVE  STELE   FROM    CARTHAGE  (HIPPOPOTAMUS)          .  98 

VOTIVE  STELE  TO  TANIT I07 

A  STELE  TO  TANIT              .          .          .          .          ,          .          .  IIO 

VOTIVE  STELE  TO  TANIT  FROM  CARTHAGE    .          .          ,  III 

VOTIVE  STELES   FROM   CARTHAGE II3 

CARTHAGINIAN   COIN II5 

CARTHAGINIAN   COIN    (ELECTRUM)  .  .  .  .116 


XX 


LIST  OP  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


PAGE 

CARTHAGINIAN  COIN  (SILVER)           .          .          .          .          .  Il6 

VOTIVE  STELE  FROM  CARTHAGE 12 1 

WRITING-CASE 123 

VOTIVE  STELE  (BULL) 124 

DUILIAN  COLUMN 135 

RESERVOIRS  OF  CARTHAGE 142 

CROSS  SECTION  OF  CISTERN  WALL.     (FROM  DAUX)      .  143 

SIELE  AT  LILYBiEUM 155 

COIN:  THE  TEMPLE  AND  RAMPARTS  OF  ERYX       .  .159 

PHfENICIAN  WALL  AT  ERYX 161 

POSTERN   IN  THE  WALL  OF  ERYX  .'..162 

PLAN  OF  HARBOUR  AT  UTICA 169 

MAP  OF  PENINSULA  OF  CARTHAGE           .          ...  173 

CUOSSINC  THE  ALPS igi 

n  ALIA  SEPTENTRIONALIS 197 

TREHIA 203 

ITALIA  MERIDIONALIS 255 

THE  TRIPLE  WALL  OF  THAPSUS 281 

THE  GREAT  WALL  AT  THAPSUS 283 

PORT  OF  CARTHAGE   (FROM   SARCOPHAGI)        ...  287 

THE  HARBOURS  OF  CARTHAGE  (ACCORDING  TO   BEUL^)  290 

HARBOURS  OF  CARTHAGE   (ACCORDING  TO    DAUX)          .  29I 

ARRANGEMENTS     OF     THE      BERTHS     (ACCORDING     TO 

BEULI&) 293 

PLAN  OF  WALL  AT  BYRSA 293 

AFRICAN   COLISEUM            .......  299 


PART  I. 
LEGEND  AND  EARLY  HISTORY 

I. — The  Legend  of  Dido. 
II. — The  Growth  of  Carthage. 


I 

t. 


4 


Unfortunately  we  know  very  little  about  the  history  of  this 
peri'xi ;  and  that  little  is  difficult  to  assign  to  any  parti'^uHr 
time.  Our  chief  authorities  are  Justin,  a  writer  of  unccfiain 
date,  w»»o  wrote  an  epitome  of  an  earlier  work  composed  by 
one  Trogus  Pompeius  (B.C.  ^^5-15  ?) ;  and  Polybius,  who  gives 
us  the  text  of  the  treaties  made  between  Carthage  and  Rome. 
Of  Polybius  we  shall  have  something  to  say  hereaiter. 


ij 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


THE  LEGEND  OF  DIDO. 

"  Malgernus,  King  of  Tyre,  died,  leaving  behind 
him  a  son,  Pygmalion,  and  a  daughter,  Elissa  or  Dido, 
a  maiden  of  singular  beauty.  Pygmalion,  though 
he  was  yet  but  a  boy,  the  Tyrians  made  their 
king.  Elissa  married  Acerbas,  whom  some  also  call 
Sichaeus,  her  mother's  brother,  and  priest  of  Her- 
cules. Among  the  Tyrians  the  priest  of  Hercules 
was  counted  next  in  honour  to  the  king.  Acerbas 
had  great  wealth,  which  he  was  at  much  pains  to  hide, 
so  that,  fearing  the  king,  he  put  it  away,  not  in  his 
dwelling,  but  in  the  earth.  Nevertheless  the  thing 
became  commonly  known.  Thereupon  King  Pyg- 
malion, being  filled  with  covetousness,  and  heeding 
not  the  laws  of  man,  and  having  no  respect  to  natural 
affection,  slew  Acerbas,  though  he  was  brother  to  his 
mother  and  husband  to  his  sister.  Elissa  for  many 
days  turned  away  her  face  from  her  brother,  but  at 
last,  putting  on  a  cheerful  countenance,  feigned  to  be 
reconciled  to  him.  And  this  she  did,  not  because  she 
hated  him  the  less,  but  because  she  thought  to  fly 
from  the  country,  in  which  counsel  she  had  for  abettors 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


Unfortunately  we  know  very  little  about  the  history  of  this 
peri'xi ;  and  that  nttle  is  difficult  to  assign  to  any  par»i'^uHr 
tim^.  Our  chief  authorities  are  Justin,  a  writer  of  uncei:ain 
date,  WuO  wrote  an  epitome  of  an  earlier  work  composed  by 
one  Trogus  Pompems  (b.c.  85-15?) ;  and  Polybius,  who  gives 
as  the  text  of  the  treaties  made  httween  Carth^ige  and  Rome. 
Of  Polybius  we  shall  have  something  to  say  hereaiter. 


THE  LEGEND  OF  DIDO. 

••Malgernus,  King  of  Tyre,  died,  leaving  behind 
him  a  son,  Pygmalion,  and  a  daughter,  Elissa  or  Dido, 
a  maiden  of  singular  beauty.      Pygmalion,  though 
he  was  yet  but  a    boy,   the   Tyrians    made    their 
king.     Elissa  married  Acerbas,  whom  some  also  call 
Sichaeus,  her  mother's  brother,  and   priest  of  Her- 
cules.   Among  the  Tyrians  the  priest  of  Hercules 
was  counted  next  in  honour  to  the  king.     Acerbas 
had  great  wealth,  which  he  was  at  much  pains  to  hide, 
so  that,  fearing  the  king,  he  put  it  away,  not  in  his 
dwelling,  but  in  the  earth.     Nevertheless  the  thing 
became  commonly  known.     Thereupon   King   Pyg- 
malion,  being  filled  with  covetousness,  and  heeding 
not  the  laws  of  man,  and  having  no  respect  to  natural 
affection,  slew  Acerbas,  though  he  was  brother  to  his 
mother  and  husband  to  his  sister.     Elissa  for  many 
days  turned  away  her  face  from  her  brother,  but  at 
last,  putting  on  a  cheerful  countenance,  feigned  to  be 
reconciled  to  him.     And  this  she  did,  not  because  she 
hated  him  the  less,  but  because  she  thought  to  fly 
from  the  country,  in  which  counsel  she  had  for  abettors 


4  THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 

many  nobles  of  the  city,  who  also  were  greatly  dis- 
pleased at  the  king.     With  this  purpose  she  spake  to 
Pygmalion,  saying,  *  I    have  had  enough  of  sorrow. 
Let  me  come  and  dwell  in  thy  house,  that  I  be  no 
more  reminded  of  my  troubles/    This  the  king  heard 
with  great  joy,  thinking   that  with  his   sister  there 
would  also  come  into  his  hands  all  the  treasures  of 
Acerbas.     But  when  he  sent  his  servants  to  bring  his 
sister's  possessions  to  his  palace  she  won  them  over 
to  herself,  so  that  they  became  partakers  of  her  flight. 
Having  thus  put  all  her  riches  upon  shipboard,  and 
taking  with  her  also  such  of  the  citizens  as  favoured 
her,  she  set  sail,  first  duly  performing  sacrifice  to  Her- 
cules.    And  first  she  voyaged  to  Cyprus,  where  the 
priest  of  Jupiter,  being  warned  of  the  gods,  offered 
himself  as  a  sharer  of  her  enterprize  on  this  condi- 
tion, that  he  and  his  posterity  should  hold  the  high 
priesthood  for   ever  in  the   city    which   she    should 
found.     From  Cyprus    also  she   carried  off  a   com- 
pany  of  maidens,    that    they   might   be   wives    for 
her   people.     Now  when    Pygmalion   knew  that  his 
sister  had  fled  he  was  very  wroth,  and  would  have 
pursued  after  her  and  slain  her.     Nevertheless,  being 
overcome  by  the  entreaties  of  his  mother,  and   yet 
more  by  fear  of  vengeance   from  the   gods,   he  let 
her  go  ;  for  the  prophets  prophesied,  *  It  will  go  ill 
with  thee,  if  thou  hinder  the  founding  of  that  which 
shall  be  the  most  fortunate  city  in  the  whole  world.* 

"  After  these  things  Queen  Elissa  came  to  Africa, 
and  finding  that  the  people  of  those  parts  were  well 
affected  to  strangers,  and  had  a  special  liking  for 
buying  and  selling,  she  made  a  covenant  with  them, 


THE  BUILDING   OF  CARTHAGE,  5 

buying  a  piece  of  land,  so  much  as  could  be  covered 
with  the  hide  of  an  ox,  that  she  might  thereon  refresh 
her  companions,  who  were  now  greatly  wearied  with 
their  voyage.  This  hide  she  cut  into  small  strips  that 
she  might  thus  enclose  a  larger  piece.  And  after- 
wards the  place  was  called  Byrsa,  which  is,  being 
interpreted,  the  Hide. 

"  To  this  place  came  many  of  the  people  of  the  land, 
bringing  merchandize  for  sale  ;  and  in  no  great  space 
of  time  there  grew  up  a  notable  town.  The  people 
of  Utica  also,  which  city  had  been  before  founded  by 
the  men  of  Tyre,  sent  ambassadors,  claiming  kindred 
with  these  new  comers,  and  bidding  them  fix  their 
abode  in  the  same  place  where  they  themselves  dwelt. 
But  the  barbarous  people  were  not  willing  that  they 
should  depart  from  among  them.  Therefore,  by 
common  consent  of  all,  there  was  built  a  fair  city,  to 
which  the  builders  gave  the  name  of  Carthage;  and  it 
was  agreed  between  Elissa  and  the  people  of  the  land 
that  she  should  pay  for  the  ground  on  which  the  said 
city  was  founded  a  certain  tribute  by  the  year.  In 
the  first  place  where  they  were  minded  to  lay  the 
foundations  of  the  city  there  was  found  the  head  of 
an  ox.  Of  this  the  soothsayers  gave  this  interpreta- 
tion, saying,  *  This  signifieth  a  fruitful  land,  but  one 
that  is  full  of  labour,  and  a  city  that  shall  ever  be  a 
servant  to  others.'  Therefore  the  city  was  moved  to 
another  place,  where,  when  they  began  to  dig  founda- 
tions again,  there  was  found  the  head  of  a  horse. 
Thereupon  the  prophets  prophesied  again  :  *  This 
shall  be  a  powerful  nation,  great  in  war,  and  thi.. 
foundation  augureth  of  victory.* 


'i* 


5  THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 

"After  these  things,  the  city  greatly  flourishing  and 
the  beauty  of  Queen  Elissa  (for  she  was  very  fair) 
being  spread  abroad,  larbas,  King  of  the  Moors,  sent 
for  the  chief  men  of  Carthage  to  come  to  him  ;  and 
when  they  were  come  he  said,  *  Go  back  to  the 
Queen,  and  say  that  I  demand  her  hand  in  marriage; 
and  if  she  be  not  willing,  then  I  will  make  war  upon 
her  and  her  city.'  These  men,  fearing  to  tell  the 
matter  plainly  to  the  Queen,  conceived  a  crafty  device. 

*  King  larbas,*  said  they,  *  desireth  to  find  some  one 
who  shall  teach  his  people  a  more  gentle  manner  of 
life ;  but  who  shall  be  found  that  will  leave  his  own 
kinsfolk  and  go  to  a  barbarous  people  that  are  as  the 
beasts  of  the  field  ?'   The  Queen  reproved  them,  saying, 

*  No  man  should  refuse  to  endure  hardness  of  life  if  it 
be  for  his  country's  sake  ;  nay,  he  must  give  to  it  his 
very  life,  if  need  be.*  Then  said  the  messengers, 
*Thou  art  judged  out  of  thine  own  mouth,  O  Queen. 
What  therefore  thou  counsellest  to  others  do  thyself, 
if  thou  wouldst  serve  thy  country.*  By  this  subtlety  she 
was  entrapped,  which  when  she  had  perceived,  first  she 
called  with  much  lamentations  and  many  tears  on  the 
name  of  her  husband  Acerbas,  and  then  affirmed  that 
she  was  ready  to  do  that  which  the  will  of  the  gods  had 
laid  upon  her.  *  But  first,'  she  said,  *  give  me  the 
space  of  three  months  that  I  may  lament  my  former 
estate.*  This  being  granted  to  her,  she  built,  in  the 
furthest  part  of  the  city,  a  great  pyre,  whereupon  she 
might  offer  sacrifices  to  the  dead,  and  appease  the 
shade  of  Acerbas  before  that  she  took  to  herself 
another  husband.  Upon  this  pyre,  having  first  offered 
many  sheep  and  oxen,  she  herself  mounted,  having  a 


DiDO  AND  MN£:AS.  7 

sword  in  her  hand.  Then  looking  upon  the  people 
that  was  gathered  about  the  pyre,  she  said, '  Ye  bid 
me  go  to  my  husband.  See  then,  for  I  go.'  There- 
upon she  drave  the  sword  into  her  heart,  and  so  fell 
dead.'* 


Such  was  the  legend  of  the  founding  of  Carthage 
as  Virgil  found  it  when  he  was  writing  his  great 
poem,  the  j^neid.  He  took  it,  and  boldly  shaped  it 
to  suit  his  own  purposes.     This  is  how  he  tells  it. 

"^neas,  saved  by  the  gods  from  the  ruin  of  Troy  to 
be  the  founder  of  Rome,  comes  after  many  wander- 
ings to  the  island  of  Sicily,  and  thence  sets  sails  for 
Italy,  the  land  which  has  been  promised  to  him.  But 
Juno,  who  cannot  forget  her  wrath  against  the  sons 
of  Xroy,  raises  a  great  storm,  which  falls  upon  his 
fleet  and  scatters  it,  sinking  some  of  the  ships,  and 
driving  the  rest  upon  the  shore  of  Africa,  near  to  the 
place  where  Elissa,  who  is  also  called  Dido,  had  newly 
founded  her  city  of  Carthage.  By  her  he  and  his 
companions  are  hospitably  received.  But  this  is  not 
enough  for  Venus,  his  mother.  *  For,*  says  she  to 
herself,  *  haply  the  mind  of  the  Queen  and  her  people 
will  change  concerning  my  son,  and  they  will  deal 
unfriendly  with  him  and  the  men  of  Troy.*  There- 
upon she  devises  this  device.  She  causes  her  son  Cupid, 
or  Love,  to  take  upon  him  the  shape  of  Ascanius,  the 
young  son  of  ^Eneas  ;  but  Ascanius  himself  she  carries 
to  her  own  bower  in  Cyprus,  and  there  lulls  him  to 
sleep.  Meanwhile  ^neas  is  entertained  by  the  Queen 
at  a  great  banquet,  and  tells  the  story  of  the  fall  of 
Troy  and  of  his  wanderings ;  and  as  he  tells  it,  the  false 


8 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


Ascanius  sits  in  the  Queen's  lap,  and  breathes  into  1  ,i 
heart  the  spirit  of  love.  After  this  comes  Juno  to  Ven  xs, 
and  says  to  her:  *  Why  should  there  be  enmity  between 
me  and  thee  ?  I  love  Carthage,  and  thou  lovest  the 
men  of  Troy.  Let  us  make  an  agreement  that  these 
two  may  join  together  in  one  city  ;  and  to  this  end 
let  Dido  take  JEnesLS  for  her  husband.'  To  this  Venus 
gave  her  assent  ;  and  so  it  was  contrived. 

"But  the  thing  pleased  not  Jupiter  that  -^neas 
should  so  forget  the  greatness  to  which  he  was  called. 
Therefore  he  called  Mercury,  that  was  his  messenger, 
and  said  to  him  :  *  Go  to  the  Trojan  chief  where  he 
now  lingers  at  Carthage,  forgetting  the  city  which  he 
must  build  in  Italy,  and  tell  him  that  he  must  make 
ready  to  depart.'  So  Mercury  bore  the  message  to 
^neas  ;  and  ^Eneas  knew  that  the  will  of  the  gods 
was  that  he  should  depart,  and  bade  his  companions 
forthwith  make  ready  the  ships.  This  they  did  ;  and 
when  the  time  came,  though  it  was  sorely  against  his 
will,  iEneas  departed,  knowing  that  he  could  not  re- 
sist the  will  of  the  gods.  And  when  Dido  saw  that 
he  was  gone,  she  bade  them  build  a  great  pyre  of 
wood,  and  mounting  upon  it,  slew  herself  with  the 
very  sword  which  iEneas  had  left  in  her  chamber." 


\ 


II. 


THE  GROWTH  OF  CARTHAGE. 


I  HAVE  said  that  it  was  a  bold  change  by  which 
Virgil  sought  to  shape  the  legend  of  Elissa  or  Dido 
to  suit  the  purpose  of  his  own  poem.     Bold  indeed  it 
was,  for  he  brings  together  in  the  Queen  of  Carthage 
and  the  Hero  of  Troy,  persons  who  must  have  been 
separated  from  each  other  in  time  by  more  than  two 
hundred  years.     Ascanius,  he  tells  us  himself  in  the 
vEneid,  was  to  found  Alba,  and  at  Alba  the  kingdom 
should    remain    for    three    hundred    years,    till   the 
priestess  of  Vesta  should  bear  a  son  to  Mars,  who 
should  found  the  great  city  of  Rome.     There  must 
therefore  have  been  more  than  three  hundred  years 
between    the  coming   of  ^neas  into  Italy  and  the 
founding  of  Rome.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was 
commonly  agreed  that  Carthage  was  not  a  hundred 
years  older  than  Rome.      If  we  are  to  follow  Justin, 
from  whom  I  have  taken  the  legend  told  in  the  first 
chapter,  its  foundation  may  be  put  in  the  year  850; 
but  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  this  date  is  as  cer- 
tain as  that  of  the  Declaration   of  American   Inde- 
pendence, or  that  of  the  Battle  of  Waterloo. 

The  legend  tells  us  that  the  first  founders  of  Car- 
thage came  from  Tyre.     Very  likely  this  is  true ;  it 


10 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


L 


is  certain  that  they  belonged  to  the  nation  of  which 
Tyre  was  the  chief  city,  the  Phoenicians.  This  people 
dwelt  in  the  little  strip  of  land  (not  much  larger  than 
the  American  State  of  New  Hampshire,  or  about 
twice  the  size  of  the  English  county  of  Yorkshire) 
which  is  called  Palestine,  and  which  occupies  the 
south-eastern  corner  of  the  Mediterranean  coast.  The 
inland  tribes  of  this  people,  who  are  known  to  us  in 
the  Bible  history  under  the  name  of  Canaanites,  were 
subdued  and  nearly  destroyed  by  the  Hebrews,  when, 
after  their  escape  from  slavery  in  Egypt,  they  invaded 
the  country  about  fourteen  hundred  years  before 
Christ.  But  many  of  the  dwellers  of  the  coast 
remained  unsubdued.  In  the  south  were  the  Philis- 
tines with  their  five  cities,  almost  always  at  war  with 
their  Hebrew  neighbours,  sometimes  almost  conquer- 
ing them, I  and  sometimes,  as  in  the  days  of  David 
and  Solomon,  paying  tribute.  In  the  north,  again, 
were  the  great  cities  of  Tyre  and  Sidon.  Between 
these  and  the  Hebrews  there  seems  to  have  been 
commonly  friendship.  They  were  a  nation  of  sea- 
men and  traders,  and  they  had  to  import  the  food  ^ 
which  they  did  not  wish,  or  perhaps  were  not  able,  to 
grow  for  themselves.  For  this  food  they  paid  either 
with  the  produce  of  their  own  Lrtists  and  handicrafts- 

'  Thus  we  read  (i  Samiel  xiii.)  that  the  Israelites  were  obliged  to 
go  down  to  the  Philistines  to  sharpen  their  tools,  and  that  only  the 
king  and  the  king's  son  possessed  sword  and  spear. 

^  Thus  we  find  Solomon  pay  ng  Iliram,  king  of  Tyre,  for  the  help 
that  he  had  given  in  the  building  of  the  Temple  with  wine  and  oil.  And 
more  than  a  thousand  years  after,  the  men  of  Tyre  are  unwilling  to 
remain  at  enmity  with  King  Herod,  because  their  country  is  *'  nourished 
fr<"m  the  king's  country." 


THE   TYRTAN  TRADERS. 


II 


men,  with  timber  cut  in  the  cedar  forest  of  Lebanon, 
or  work  in  bronze  and  iron,  or  rich  purple  dyes,  or 
with  merchandize  which  they  had  themselves  im- 
ported. As  traders,  indeed,  they  travelled  very  far, 
and  while  seeking  new  markets  in  which  tC'  buy  and 
sell,  they  made  great  discoveries.  They  went  as  far 
south,  some  say,  as  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  certainly 
as  far  as  Sierra  Leone  ;  and  as  far  north  as  Britain, 
from  which  they  fetched  tin,  and  probably  copper. 
But  I  shall  have  more  to  say  of  this  hereafter.  It 
was,  however,  chiefly  the  coasts  of  the  Mediterranean 
that  they  were  accustomed  to  visit  ;  and  along  these 
it  was  that  they  established  their  trading  posts.  It 
is  the  story  of  the  most  famous  of  these  posts  that  I 
have  now  to  tell. 

The  word  Carthage — in  Latin  Carthago^  and  in 
Gr^tkKarchedofi — contains  in  another  form, changed  to 
suit  European  tongues,  the  word  Kirjath,  a  name  fami- 
liar to  us  in  the  Bible  in  the  compounds  Kirjath-Arba 
and  Kirjath-Jearim.i  Kirjath  means  "Town,"  and  the 
name  by  which  Carthage  was  known  to  its  own 
inhabitants  was  Kirjath  -  Hadeschath,  or  the  "  New 
Town " — fiew^  to  distinguish  it  either  from  the  old 
town  of  Tyre,  from  which  its  settlers  had  come  forth, 
or  from  the  older  settlement  of  Utica,  older  by  nearly 


'  These  resemblances  of  Carthaginian  and  Hebrew  names  are  very 
interesting,  and  show  us  how  close  was  the  kindred  between  the  Jews 
and  the  Canaanite  or  Phoenician  tribes,  enemies  to  each  other  though 
they  mostly  were.  The  chief  magistrates  of  the  city,  for  instance,  had 
the  title  of  Shophetim^  the  Hebrew  word  for  ''judges,"  which  the 
Romans  changed  into  Suffetes.  One  of  the  Hamilcars  again,  of  whom 
I  shall  have  to  speak  hereafter,  bore  the  surname  of  Barca^  and  Barca 
is  the  same  as  the  Hebrew  Barak,  or  "  lightning." 


12 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


three  hundred  years,  which  lay  about  fifteen  miles  to 
the  north-west. 

The  "  New  Town  "  was  built  in  a  little  bay  of  the 
great  natural  harbour,  the  finest  and  most  com- 
modious that  is  to  be  found  along  the  whole  of  the 
north  coast  of  Africa,  which  is  now  called  the  Bay 
of  Tunis.^  The  site  was  very  happily  chosen.  A 
river,  the  Bagradas  (now  the  Mejerda)  was  near.^ 
The  land  was  well  watered  and  fertile,  rich  with  corn 
and  wine  and  oil.  It  is  a  proof  of  its  natural  ad- 
vantages that  within  two  centuries  of  its  total  de- 
struction, Carthage  became  the  third  city  of  the  Empire, 
and  that  its  modern  successor  is  one  of  the  largest 
and  most  prosperous  of  all  the  purely  Mahometan 
cities  of  the  world. 

Of  the  city's  early  history  we  know  very  little ; 
indeed,  it  may  be  said,  nothing.  More  than  two 
centuries  are  an  absolute  blank.  We  hear  nothing 
for  certain  of  Carthage  and  its  doings,  though  we 
may  guess  that  it  was  busy  trading,  and  sometimes 
fighting  with  its  neighbours  and  with  the  inhabitants 
of  the  African  coast,  of  Sicily,  and  of  Spain.  Then 
about  the  middle  of  the  sixth  century  B.C.  (but  the 
date  is  quite  uncertain)  we  hear  of  a  certain  king  or 
chief  who  bore  the  name  of  Malchus.3  Malchus 
made  war  against  the  African  tribes  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  city,  and  subdued  many  of  them.     From 

'  The  present  city  of  thut  name  occupies  a  site  a  little  to  the  south- 
east of  tlie  ancient  Carth  i^e.  There  was  a  Tunis  or  Tunes  in  cla>sical 
times,  but  it  was  always  a  small  town. 

^  Its  actual  mouth  was  at  Utica. 

3  Note  again  the  Hebrew  names.  The  high  priest's  servant  whose 
eaF  Peter  cut  ofTat  Gethsemane  "  was  named  Malchus." 


MALCHUS  AND  MAGO, 


13 


Africa  he  crossed  over  into  Sicily,  and  conquered  a 
part,  doubtless  the  western  part,  of  the  island.  From 
Sicily,  again,  he  went  on  to  Sardinia.  There  he  was 
beaten  in  a  great  battle.  The  Carthaginians,  who 
were  always  cruel  and  often  unjust  to  their  defeated 
generals,  condemned  him  to  banishment.  Malchus 
refused  to  obey,  and  led  his  army  against  his  native 
city.  The  magistrates  sent  out  his  son  Carthalo  to 
intercede  with  him,  but  in  vain  ;  Carthalo  was  seized 
by  his  father,  and  actually  crucified  in  sight  of  the 
city  walls.  After  a  while  the  city  was  compelled  to 
surrender ;  but  Malchus  was  content  with  putting  to 
death  ten  of  his  chief  opponents.  Those  whom  he 
spared  not  long  afterwards  brought  him  to  trial,  and 
condemned  him  to  death. 

After  Malchus  came  Mago,  who  still  further  in- 
creased the  military  power  of  the  city.  His  reign  or 
chief  magistracy— Carthage  once  had  kings,  but  it  is 
not  easy  to  say  when  the  title  was  abolished  ;  in^ 
deed  it  is  sometimes  given  to  the  chief  magistrate 
down  to  a  late  period  of  her  history — may  be  said 
to  cover  the  latter  part  of  the  sixth  century  B.a  And 
now  for  the  first  time,  the  State  takes  a  definite  place 
in  history.  The  inhabitants  of  Phocaea,  one  of  the 
Greek  colonies  on  the  western  coast  of  Asia  Minor, 
had  fled  from  their  native  city  rather  than  submit 
to  the  rule  of  the  Persians,  binding  themselves  by 
an  oath  never  to  return  till  a  lump  of  iron  which 
they  threw  into  the  harbour  should  rise  to  the  top 
of  the  water.  But  before  they  had  been  long  gone, 
home-sickness  proved  stronger  than  their  oath,  and 
more  than  half  of  them   returned.      The  rcma.ncLi 


14 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


pursued  their  journey  with  their  wives  and  children^ 
and  settled  at  Alalia  in  Corsica,  a  place  which  had 
been  already  colonized  by  Greeks.  There  they  took 
to  the  trade  of  piracy,  a  more  respectable  employ- 
ment, it  must  be  remembered,  then  than  now.  After 
five  years  the  Carthaginians  and  the  Etruscans,  Rome's 
neighbours  on  the  north,  and  then  an  independent  and 
a  powerful  nation,  combined  against  them.  A  great 
Bea-battle  followed.  The  Phocaeans  had  the  sixty 
ships  in  which  they  had  migrated  from  their  native 
town ;  their  enemies  had  double  the  number,  half 
coming  from  Carthage,  half  from  the  sea- ports  on  the 
Etrurian  coast.  The  victory  fell  to  the  Greeks  ;  but 
it  was  a  victory  which  was  as  bad  as  a  defeat ;  for 
they  lost  forty  out  of  their  sixty  ships,  and  they  were 
compelled  to  leave  their  new  settlement  and  to  seek 
refuge  elsewhere.  This  battle  is  supposed  to  have 
happened  in  the  year  536  B.C. 

Twenty-seven  years  later  we  hear  of  Carthage 
again.  Polybius  ^  tells  us  that  he  had  himself  seen 
in  Rome  copies  of  the  three  treaties  which  had  been 
made  between  that  State  and  Carthage.  The  oldest 
of  the  three,  written,  he  says,  in  language  so  anti- 
quated that  even  the  learned  could  scarcely  under- 
stand it,  was  concluded  in  the  year  509,  the  next 
after  that  in  which  the  kings  had  been  driven  out 
from  Rome.  The  provisions  of  this  treaty  are  in- 
teresting. "The  Romans  and  their  allies  shall  not 
sail  beyond  the  Fair  Promontory."  The  "  Fair 
Promontory  "  was  to  the  north  of  Carthage.  Polybius 
thinks    that    the    Romans  were   forbidden    by  this 

*  See  the  account  of  him  in  the  Intnxiuction  to  Part  iv. 


TREATIES   WITH  ROME. 


13 


article  of  the  treaty  to  sail  southwards  to  the  country 
of  the   Little  Syrtis  (now  the  Gulf  of  Cabos),  then 
one  of  the  richest  in   the  world,  and  for  that  reason 
called  the  Markets.     It  seems   more   probable   that 
"beyond  the  Fair  Promontory"  meant  westward o[ 
it,  and  that  it  was  specially  intended  to  protect  the 
Carthaginian  markets  in  Spain.      "  Merchants  selling 
goods  in  Sardinia  and  Africa  shall  pay  no  customs, 
but  only  the  usual  fees  to  the  scribe  and  crier."     The 
Carthaginians,  it  seems,  were,  so  far,  "  free  traders." 
"  If  any  of  the  Romans  land  in  that  part  of  Sicily 
which  belongs  to  the  Carthaginians,  they  shall  suffer 
no  wrong  or  violence  in  anything."      Finally,  Cartha- 
ginians bind  themselves  not  to  injure  any  Latin  city, 
whether  it  was  subject  to  Rome  or  not.      Some  years 
later — how  many  we  cannot  tell — we  hear  of  another 
treaty  made  between    the   same   parties.     The  con- 
ditions are  now  much  less  favourable  to  Rome.     Two 
other    limits  Resides    the    Fair   Promontory   (unfor- 
tunately we  do  not  know  what  places  are  meant  by 
them)  are  imposed  on  the  Roman  traders.     These, 
too,  are  now  forbidden  to  trade  either  in  Sardinia  or 
Africa.      They  must  not  even   visit  these   countries 
except  to  get  provisions  or  to  refit  their  ships.     In 
Sicily  and  at  Carthage  they  were  allowed  to  trade. 
The  Carthaginians  claim  the  power  to  take  prisoners 
and  booty  out  of  any  Latin  city  not  subject  to  Rome. 
The  city  itself,  however,  they  must  yield  up.    In  other 
words,  they  were  not  to  get  a  footing  in  Italy.     It 
is  clear  that  in  the  interval  the  power  of  Carthage 
had   increased   and   that    of    Rome   had   decreased. 
The  latter  city  did  indeed  suffer  many  losses  during 


i6 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


the  first  hundred  years  after  the  driving  out  of  the 
kings.  So  much  we  may  see  even  from  the  flattering 
accounts  of  the  Roman  historians. 

We  can  thus  get  some  idea  of  the  power  and 
dominions  of  Carthage.  It  has  power  over  much  of 
the  coast  of  Africa,  though  it  still  continues  to  pay 
a  ground  rent  for  the  soil  on  which  its  capital  was 


CARTHAGINIAN   STELE  FROM   SULCI   (SARDINIA). 

built.  We  hear,  indeed,  of  this  payment  having  been 
refused  in  the  days  of  Hasdrubal  and  Hamilcar,  sons 
and  successors  of  Mago,  of  the  African  tribes  making 
war  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  it,  and  compelling 
the  Carthaginians  to  renew  it.  Sardinia  it  claims  as 
entirely  its  own.  This  island  is  said  to  have  been 
conquered  by  the  Hasdrubal  and  Hamilcar  mentioned 


CARTHAGINIAN  POSSESSIONS, 


17 


above,  Hasdrubal  dying  of  his  wounds  in  the  course 
of  the  war.  Of  Sicily  it  has  a  part,  of  which  I  shall 
say  more  hereafter.     Malta  probably  belongs  to  it. 


< 

o 

h 

< 


< 

X 
H 

< 
u 


O 

o 

H 

u 

Q 

< 
< 

P4 


»    1    1    t  :< 


.^'V 


Of  Spain,  which  was  afterwards  to  form  an  important 
portion  of  the  Empire,  for  the  present  we  hear 
nothing. 


i8 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


While  Carthage  was  thus  busy  extending  and 
strengthening  its  dominions,  it  narrowly  escaped  a 
great  danger  frcm  what  was  then  the  most  powerful 
empire  in  the  world.  In  the  year  525  Cambyses,  the 
second  king  of  Persia,  conquered  Egypt,  a  task  which 
he  seems  to  have  accomplished  with  great  ease.  He 
then  looked  about  for  other  countries  into  which  he 
might  carry  his  arms.  The  great  cities  of  Cyrene 
and  Barca,  lying  about  five  hundred  miles  to  the  west 
of  the  mouths  of  the  Nile,  submitted  to  him.  He 
thought  that  he  might  push  his  conquests  still  further 
in  the  same  direction  and  make  Carthage  itself  a 
tributary.  But  a  distance  of  two  thousand  miles  and 
more  was  too  much  for  his  army,  and  the  conquest 
would  have  to  be  made  by  his  fleet.  Here  he  met 
with  an  obstacle  which  he  could  not  overcome.  The 
fleet  consisted  for  the  most  part  of  Phoenician  ships, 
and  the  Phoenicians  refused  to  take  part  in  the  expe- 
dition. "We  are  bound,"  said  they,  "to  the  Cartha- 
ginians by  solemn  oaths.  They  are,  too,  our  children ; 
and  it  would  be  wicked  in  us  to  make  war  against 
them."  The  Grc  t  King  was  obliged  to  be  content 
with  this  answer  and  to  give  up  his  scheme. 


PART  11. 
CARTHAGE  AND  GREECE. 

I. — Hamilcar  and  Hannibal. 

II.— Carthage  and  Dionysius  (406-405). 
III. — Carthage  and  Dionysius  (397). 
IV. — The  Last  Struggle  with  Dionysius. 

V. — Carthage  and  Timoleon. 
Vi.— Carthage,  Agathocles  and  Pyrrhus. 


f 


Here  our  chief  authority  is  Diodonis  Siculus,  a  Greek  writer 
who  "  flourished  "  about  the  beginning  of  our  era.     He  was  a 
native  of  Sicily,  and  in  his  Universal  His-ory,  or  "  Historical 
Library,"  as  he  seems  to  have  called  it  himself,  wrote  an 
account  of  the  world  from  the  earliest  time  down  to  his  own 
day.     With  this  work  he  took  much  pains,  travelling  over 
many   of  the   countries  of  which  he   intended    to    write  the 
history,  and  collecting  the  works  of  authors  who  had  treated 
the  same  subjects  before  him.     Much  of  his  History  is  lost, 
but  the  ten  books  from  the  eleventh  to  the  twentieth  have  been 
recovered.     As  he  was  naturally  very  much  interested  in  the 
affairs  of  his  own  island,  he  seems  to  have  taken  special  pains 
with  this  part  of  his  work,  which  includes  the  one  hundred 
and  seventy-five    years  from   the  beginning  of   the  second 
Persian  war  (480)  down  to  the  year  305.     He  had  before  him 
the  best  authorities,  as,  for  instance,  Timaeus,  who  wrote  the 
History  of  Sicily  from    the  earliest  times  down  to  264   (he 
himself  died  in  256,  at  the  age  of  ninety-six)  ;  but  he  had  not 
much  judgment  in  using  his  materials.     Still,  his  book  is  of 
very  great  value  for  this  portion  of  our  story.     Fragments,  too, 
of   the   lost   books   that   followed   the   twentieth   have   been 
preserved.     Justin  also  tells  us  something  al)cut  this  time,  so 
that,  on  the  whole,  we  have  plenty  of  authorities. 


I. 


HAMILCAR  AND  HANNIBAL. 


Sicily  would  naturally  be  the  place  in  which  Car- 
thage would  first  seek  to  establish  a  foreign  dominion. 
At  its  nearest  point  it  was  not  more  than  fifty  miles 
distant ;  its  soil  was  fertile,  its  climate  temperate  ;  it 
was  rich  in  several  valuable  articles  of  commerce.  We 
have  seen  that,  in  the  treaty  which  was  made  with 
Rome  about  the  end  of  the  sixth  century  B.C.,  the 
Carthaginians  claimed  part  of  the  island  as  their  own. 
It  is  probable  that  this  part  was  then  less  than  it  had 
been.  For  more  than  two  hundred  years  the  Greeks 
had  been  spreading  their  settlements  over  the  country ; 
and  the  Greeks  were  the  great  rivals  of  the  Phoenicians. 
If  they  were  not  as  keen  traders — and  trade  was 
certainly  held  in  less  estimation  in  Athens,  and  even 
in  Corinth,  than  it  was  in  Tyre  and  Carthage— they 
were  as  bold  and  skilful  as  sailors,  and  far  more  ready 
than  their  rivals  to  fight  for  what  they  had  got  or  for 
what  they  wanted.  The  earliest  Greek  colony  in 
Sicily  was  Naxos,  on  the  east  coast,  founded  by 
settlers  from  Euboea  in  735.  Other  Greek  cities 
sought  room  for  their  surplus  population  in  the  same 
field  ;  and  some  of  the  colonies  founded  fresh  settle- 
ments of  their  own.     The  latest  of  them  was  Agri- 


? 


22 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


gentum  on  the  south  coast,  which  owed  its  origin  to 
Gela,  itself  a  colony  of  Cretans  and  Rhodians.  As  the 
Greeks  thus  spread  westward  the  Carthaginians  retired 
before  them,  till  their  dominions  were  probably  reduced 
to  little  more  than  a  few  trading  ports  on  the  western 
coast  of  the  island.  As  long,  indeed,  as  they  could 
trade  with  the  new  comers  they  seemed  to  be  satisfied. 
They  kept  up,  for  the  most  part,  friendly  relations 
with  their  rivals,  allowing  even  the  right  of  inter- 
marriage to  some  at  least  of  their  cities. 

But  in  point  of  fact  they  were  only  waiting  their 
opportunity,  and    the   opportunity   came   when   the 
Persians  invaded  Greece  for  the  second  time.     Some 
historians   tell   us  that   it   was   agreed    by   the   two 
powers  thata  combined  effort  should  be  made,  that,  while 
Persia  was  attacking  the  mother-country  of  Greece, 
Carthage  should  attack  its  important  colonies  in  Sicily. 
Others  insist  that  there  is  no  proof  of  any  such  agree- 
ment having  been  made.     It  is  not  easy  to  see  what 
proof  we  could  expect  to  find.     But  there  is  nothing,  I 
think,  improbable  about  it.     The  Phoenician  admirals 
in  the  service  of  the  Great  King  who  had  refused  to 
obey  Cambyses  when  he  ordered  them  to  sail  against 
their    kinsmen    in    Carthage,   may  very  well    have 
managed  a  matter  of  this  kind.     Anyhow  it  is  clear 
that  Carthage  knew  that  the  opportunity  had  come, 
and  eagerly  seized  it.     One  of  the  family  of  Mago, 
Hamilcar   by  name,   was   appointed  commander-in- 
chief.      He  set  sail  from  Carthage  with  a  force  which, 
when  it  had  been  joined  by  auxiliaries  gathered  from 
Sicily  and  elsewhere,  amounted,  it  is  said,  to  three 
hundred  thousand  men.    There  would  have  been  even 


it 

1  < 


pHCENICIAN  SARCOPHAGUS  FOUND  AT  SOLUNTE  (sICILY). 


HAMILCAR'S  ARMY, 


25 


more  had  not  the  squadron  which  conveyed  the 
chariots  and  the  cavalry  been  lost  in  a  storm.  The 
number  is  probably  exaggerated — the  numbers  in 
ancient  history  are  seldom  trustworthy — but  we  may 
take  as  genuine  the  list  of  the  nations  from  which  the 
army  was  recruited.  The  land-force  consisted,  we 
hear,  of  Phoenicians,  Libyans,  Sardinians,  Corsicans, 
Iberians,  Ligyes,  and  Helisyki.  The  first  four  names 
need  little  explanation.  The  Phoenicians  were 
native  Carthaginians  and  men  of  kindred  race  from 
the  mother- country  of  Phoenicia,  from  Cyprus,  and 
from  other  settlements  on  the  Mediterranean  shore. 
Sardinia,  we  know  from  its  mention  in  the  treaty  of 
509,  belonged  to  Carthage  ;  Corsica  had  probably  been 
since  acquired.  The  Iberians  were  Spaniards,  over 
whose  country  Carthage  was  gaining  some  influence. 
The  Ligyes  were  the  Ligurians  from  the  north- 
west of  the  Italian  peninsula  ;^  the  Helisyki  may 
have  been  Volscians,  neighbours  of  Rome  on  the 
south-east  and  for  some  time  its  most  formidable 
enemies. 

Hamilcar  reached  Panormus  (now  Palermo)  in 
safety  with  the  main  body  of  his  fleet  **  The  war  is 
over,"  he  is  reported  to  have  said,  thinking  that  only 
the  chances  of  the  sea  could  have  saved  Sicily  from 
such  an  army  as  his.  At  Panormus  he  gave  his  army 
three  days'  rest,  and  repaired  his  ships.  Then  he 
marched  on  H  imera.  There  he  dragged  his  ships  on 
shore,  and  made  a  deep  ditch  and  a  rampart  of  wood  to 
protect  them.  His  forces  he  divided  between  two  camps. 
The  crews  of  his  fleet  occupied  one,  his  soldiers  the 

*  The  modern  •Piedmont. 


(\ 


26 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


THE  FATE  OF  HAMILCAR, 


27 


Other.  The  two  covered  the  whole  of  the  west  side 
of  the  city.  A  force  from  the  city  which  encountered 
his  advance  guard  was  driven  in,  and  Theron,  the 
tyrant  of  Agrigentum,  who  had  been  appointed  to 
take  command  of  the  garrison  by  Gelon  of  Syracuse, 
the  most  powerful  monarch  in  the  island,  sent  off  in 
hot  haste  for  help  to  his  chief  Gelon  had  everything 
ready,  and  marched  at  once  with  an  army  far  greater 
than  any  other  Greek  state  could  then  have  raised, 
fifty  thousand  infantry  and  five  thousand  horse.  After 
thoroughly  fortifying  the  camp  which  he  had  pitched 
near  the  city,  he  sent  out  his  cavalry  to  attack  the 
foraging  parties  of  the  Carthaginians.  These  suffered 
a  signal  defeat ;  and  the  people  of  Himera  now 
grew  so  confident  that  they  actually  threw  open 
the  gateways  which,  in  their  determination  to 
make  a  desperate  resistance,  they  had  at  first  bricked 
up. 

The  conclusive  battle  was  not  long  delayed,  and 
Gelon  is  said  to  have  won  it  by  the  help  of  a  curious 
stratagem.  His  scouts  had  intercepted  a  letter  from 
the  people  of  Selinus  to  Hamilcar,  in  which  there  was 
a  promise  that  they  would  send  on  a  day  named  a 
force  of  cavalry  to  his  assistance.  Gelon  instructed 
some  of  his  own  horsemen  to  play  the  part  of  the 
cavalry  of  Selinus.  They  were  to  make  their  way  into 
the  naval  camp  of  the  Carthaginians,  and  then  to 
turn  against  their  supposed  allies.  A  signal  was 
agreed  upon  which  they  were  to  show  when  they  were 
ready  to  act.  Gelon's  scouts  were  posted  on  the  hills 
to  watch  for  it,  and  to  communicate  it  to  the  main 
body  of  his  army  in  the  plain.     The  fight  was  long 


and  bloody ;  it  lasted  from  sunrise  to  sunset,  but  the 
Carthaginians  had  lost  heart,  and  the  Greeks  were 
confident  of  victory.  No  quarter  was  given,  and  by 
night,  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  (it  must 
surely  be  an  impossible  number ! )  had  fallen.  The  rest 
fled  to  the  hills,  and  were  there  compelled  by  want 
of  water  to  surrender  to  the  people  of  Agrigentum 
Of  the  fate  of  Hamilcar  nothing  was  ever  certainly 
known.  Some  said  that  he  had  been  slain  by  the 
pretended  allies  from  Selinus  ;  others  that,  being  busy 
with  a  great  sacrifice  at  which  the  fire  was  piled  high 
to  consume  the  victims  whole,  and  seeing  that  the 
fortune  of  the  day  was  going  against  him,  he  threw 
himself  into  the  flames  and  disappeared.  His  body 
was  never  found,  but  the  Greeks  erected  a  monument 
to  his  memory  on  the  field  of  battle;  and  the  Cartha- 
ginians, thouc^h  never  accustomed  to  be  even  commonly 
just  to  their  beaten  generals,  paid  him,  after  his  death, 
honours  which  it  became  a  custom  to  renew  year  by 
year.  The  rest  of  the  story  is  curiously  tragic.  Twenty 
ships  had  been  kept  by  Hamilcar  to  be  used  as  might 
be  wanted,  when  the  rest  of  the  fleet  was  drawn  up. 
These  and  these  only  escaped  out  of  the  three  thou- 
sand vessels  of  war  and  commerce,  which  Hasdrubal 
had  brought  with  him.  But  even  these  did  not  get 
safe  home.  They  were  overtaken  by  a  storm,  and  one 
little  boat  carried  to  Carthage  the  dismal  news  that 
their  great  army  had  perished.'     The  city  was  over- 

'  Note  how  a  similar  story  is  told  of  the  return  of  Xerxes  from  Greece, 
after  his  defeat  in  the  Persian  War.  According  to  Herodotus  (on 
excellent  authority,  as  he  was  born  in  484,  i.e.  four  years  before  the  war) 
Xerxes  returned  by  land  with  a  considerable  part  of  his  army  ;  neverthe- 
less the  Roman  poet  Juvenal  writes— r 


i 


28 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


HANNIBAL  BEFORE   SELINUS, 


29 


I 


whelmed  with  dismay  and  grief.  An  embassy  was 
at  once  sent  to  Gelon  to  beg  for  peace.  Peace  was 
granted,  but  on  hard  conditions.  Carthage  was  to  pay 
a  ransom  of  two  thousand  talents,  to  build  two  chapels 
in  memory  of  the  event,  and,  one  writer  tells  us, 
to  abolish  the  hideous  practice  of  human  sacrifices. 
If  this  last  condition  was  ever  agreed  to,  it  was 
certainly  not  kept. 

It  has  been  said,  and  one  would  like  to  believe, 
that  the  great  battle  of  Himera,  by  which  the  Greek 
colonies  in  Sicily  were  relieved  from  the  pressing 
fear  of  Carthage,  was  fought  on  the  very  same  day 
on  which  the  Persians  were  defeated  at  Salamis. 

Carthage  could  not  have  been  long  in  recovering 
from  this  loss,  for  we  find  her  able  soon  afterwards 
to  dictate  a  treaty  to  Rome,  but  she  did  not  meddle 
with  Sicilian  affairs  for  many  years.  But  in  410  a 
Sicilian  town,  Egesta,  invited  her  aid  against  their 
neighbours  of  Selinus.^  Both  towns  were  near  the 
Carthaginian  settlements  ;  and  it  was  possible  that 
these  might  suffer,  if  Selinus,  which  was  said  to  be 
the  aggressor,  were  allowed  to  become  too  powerful. 
But  probably  the  desire  to  avenge  the  defeat  of 
seventy  years  before  was  the  chief  reason  why  Car- 
thage promised  the  help  that  was  asked.  It  so 
happened,  too,  that  Hannibal,  grandson  of  the  Hamil- 

*'  Through  shoals  ot  dead,  o'er  billows  red  with  gore, 
A  single  ship  the  beaten  monarch  bore." 
But  then  Juvenal  wished  to  point  the  moral  of  *'  the  vanity  of  human 
wishes." 

'  Curiously  enough  it  was  a  quarrel  between  these  same  two  towns 
that  had  been  the  immediate  cause  of  the  disastrous  expeditjoo  of 
Athens  against  Syracuse. 


car  who  had  perished  at  Himera,  was  the  senior  of 
the  two  first  magistrates  of  the  city.  He  had  been 
brought  up  in  exile — ^lor  Cisco,  his  father,  had  been 
banished  after  the  defeat  of  Himera — and  at  this 
very  city  of  Selinus.  "  He  was  by  nature,"  says  the 
historian,  "a  hater  of  the  Greeks,"  and  he  did  all  he 
could  to  persuade  his  countrymen  to  undertake  the 
war. 

After  some  negotiations  which  came  to  nothing, 
Hannibal  sent  a  force  of  5,000  Africans  and  800 
Italian  mercenaries  to  Sicily.  The  army  of  Selinus, 
which  was  busy  plundering  the  territory  of  their 
enemies,  was  surprised,  and  lost  a  thousand  men 
and  all  the  booty  which  it  had  collected.  Selinus 
now  sent  to  Syracuse  to  beg  for  help,  and  Egesta, 
on  her  part,  made  a  fresh  appeal  to  Carthage.  This 
appeal  was  answered  in  a  way  that  took  the  Sicilians 
by  surprise.  Hannibal  had  collected  a  great  force  of 
Spaniards  and  Africans.  This  he  carried  to  Sicily  in  a 
fleet  of  as  many  as  1,500  transports,  escorted  by  sixty 
ships  of  war.  It  numbered,  according  to  the  smallest 
estimate,  100,000  men,  and  was  furnished  with  an 
ahimdance  of  all  the  engines  used  for  sieges.  The 
general  lost  no  time.  Without  a  day's  delay  he 
marched  upon  Selinus,  invested  it,  and  at  once  began 
the  assault.  Six  towers  of  wood  were  brought  up 
against  the  walls  ;  battering-rams  headed  with  iron 
were  driven  against  them,  while  a  multitude  of  archers 
and  slingers  showered  arrows  and  stones  upon  their 
defenders.  The  fortifications  had  been  allowed,  during 
a  long  period  of  peace,  to  fall  out  of  repair ;  and  the 
Italian   mercenaries  were  not   long   in   forcing  their 


30 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


ATTACK  ON  HIMERA, 


31 


t 


way  in.  These  were  driven  out  again  with  great  loss, 
and  for  a  time  the  assault  was  suspended.  The 
besieged  sent  their  swiftest  horsemen  to  beg  for 
instant  help  from  Syracuse,  Gela,  and  Agrigentum. 
It  was  promised,  but  while  it  was  being  prepared 
Hannibal  was  pressing  his  attack  with  the  utmost 
fury.  A  great  part  of  the  wall  was  thrown  down  by 
the  battering-rams  ;  but  the  people  of  Selinus  still 
fought  with  the  courage  of  despair.  For  nine  days 
and  nights  the  struggle  went  on,  every  street,  almost 
every  house,  being  fiercely  contested.  At  last  the 
numbers  of  the  barbarians  overpowered  resistance. 
Between  two  and  three  thousand  of  the  armed  men 
escaped  ;  about  twice  as  many  of  both  sexes  were 
made  prisoners  ;  the  rest  were  massacred.  As  many 
as  sixteen  thousand  bodies  are  said  to  have  been 
counted. 

At  the  very  time  when  Selinus  was  taken,  the 
advance  guard  of  the  Syracusan  army  reached  Agri- 
gentum. They  tried  to  make  terms  with  the  con- 
querors. An  embassy  was  sent  to  Hannibal,  begging 
him  to  ransom  the  prisoners  and  respect  the  temples 
of  the  gods.  Hannibal  replied,  "  The  men  of  Selinus 
have  not  been  able  to  keep  their  freedom,  and  must 
make  trial  of  slavery.  As  for  the  gods,  they  have 
left  Selinus,  being  wroth  with  its  inhabitants."  To 
a  second  embassy,  headed  by  a  citizen  who  had 
always  been  on  friendly  terms  with  Carthage,  he 
made  a  gentler  answer.  The  survivors  might  return, 
dwell  in  their  city  and  till  their  lands,  paying  tribute 
to  Carthage.  The  walls  were  razed  to  the  ground,  and 
according  to  some  accounts,  the  whole  city  was  de- 


stroyed. To  this  day  the  ruins  of  the  temples  show 
the  marks  of  the  crowbars  by  which  the  columns  were 
overthrown. 

But  Selinus  was  not  the  real  object  of  Hannibal's 
expedition.  That  was  to  be  found  elsewhere,  at 
Himera,  where,  seventy  years  before,  his  grandfather 
had  perished.  To  Himera,  accordingly  (it  lay  on  the 
opposite,  ie.  the  north  coast,  of  the  island)  he  marched 
without  delay.  Forty  thousand  troops  he  posted  at 
some  distance  from  the  city,  probably  to  deal  with 
any  relieving  force  from  the  other  Greek  cities.  With 
the  rest  of  his  army,  now  increased  by  twenty  thou- 
sand auxiliaries  from  the  native  Sicilians,  he  sur- 
rounded the  walls. 

He  did  not  intend,  however,  to  wait  for  the  slow 
operation  of  a  blockade,  but  attacked  the  town  as 
fiercely  as  he  had  attacked  Selinus.  The  walls  were 
battered  and  undermined,  and  more  than  one  breach 
was  made  in  them.  At  first  he  was  repulsed.  The 
people  of  Himera  fought  with  all  the  courage  of  their 
race,  and  they  had  the  help  of  four  thousand  soldiers 
from  Syracuse  and  elsewhere.  The  Carthaginians 
were  driven  back,  and  the  breaches  repaired.  This 
success  emboldened  them  to  attack  the  besiegers. 
Leaving  a  sufficient  force  to  guard  the  walls,  they 
sallied  forth,  and  fell  on  the  hostile  lines.  Taken  by 
surprise,  the  Carthaginians  gave  way.  Their  very 
numbers  were  against  them,  for  they  were  too  closely 
thronged  to  be  able  to  act,  and  suffered  almost 
more,  says  the  historian,  from  each  other  than  from 
the  enemy.  The  assailants,  who  numbered  about  ten 
thousand,  were  roused  to  do  their  best  by  the  thought 


32 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


of  their  helpless  kinsfolk,  women  and  children  and 
old  men,  who  were  watching  them  from  the  walls. 
At  first  it  seemed  as  if  Himera  was  to  be  another 
Marathon.  As  many  as  six  thousand  of  the  besiegers 
(to  take  the  smallest  and  most  reasonable  computation) 
were  slain.  But  the  pursuit  was  pushed  too  far. 
Hannibal  brought  down  his  army  of  reserve  from  the 
hills  on  which  it  had  been  posted,  and  fell  upon  the 
victorious  Greeks.  A  fierce  fight  ensued,  but  the 
people  of  Himera  and  their  allies  were  overpowered. 
The  main  body  of  them  retreated  into  the  city,  but 
three  thousand  were  unwilling  or  unable  to  leave 
the  field,  and,  after  performing  prodigies  of  valour, 
perished  where  they  stood. 

At  this  crisis  came  twenty-five  Syracusan  ships  of 
war,  which  had  been  taking  part  in  the  war  then 
being  carried  on  between  Athens  and  Sparta.  At 
first  the  besieged  were  full  of  hope.  It  was  rumoured 
that,  besides  the  ships,  the  Syracusans  were  coming  to 
their  help  with  a  levy  e?i  masse.  But  then  came  a 
most  disquieting  report.  Hannibal  was  filling,  it  was 
said,  his  own  ships  with  the  picked  troops  of  his  army, 
and  intended  to  fall  upon  Syracuse  when  that  city 
should  be  stripped  of  its  able-bodied  men.  The 
Syracusan  commander  dared  not  stay  at  Himera  in 
the  face  of  this  alarm.  The  ships  of  war  must,  he 
said,  sail  home  at  once.  But  they  would  take  as 
many  of  the  helpless  population  of  Himera  as  they 
could  hold.  The  offer  was  accepted  ;  for  dreadful  as 
it  was  thus  to  leave  their  homes,  it  was  the  only  hope 
of  escape  that  the  poor  creatures  had.  The  ships 
were  filled  till  they  could  hold  no  more.      Then  the 


HANNIBAL'S   VENGEANCE. 


33 


.1 1 
n 


Syracusan  general  marched  out  of  the  town  in  such 
haste,  we  are  told,  that  he  did  not  even  stop  to  bury 
his  own  dead.  Many  of  the  inhabitants  who  could 
not  be  received  on  board  the  ships  accompanied  him 
on  his  march,  preferring  this  to  waiting  for  the  return 
of  the  fleet  ;  for  this  was  to  come  back  and  carry  off 
the  rest  of  the  population. 

It  was  well  for  them  that  they  did  so.  The  next 
day  the  Carthaginians  renewed  the  assault.  The 
besieged  were  sadly  reduced  in  numbers  and  weary, 
for  after  the  battle  of  the  day  before  they  had  spent 
the  night  in  arms  upon  the  walls.  Still  they  held  out. 
All  that  day  the  battle  was  kept  up.  On  the  morrow 
the  ships  came  back,  but  at  the  very  moment  of  their 
coming  in  sight  a  great  part  of  the  wall  was  broken 
down  by  the  battering-rams, and  the  Spaniards  in  Han- 
nibal's army  rushed  in.  A  general  massacre  followed, 
and  was  continued  till  Hannibal  issued  strict  orders 
that  all  that  remained  were  to  be  taken  alive.  It  was 
no  feeling  of  mercy  that  prompted  these  orders.  The 
women  and  children  were  divided  among  the  con- 
querors ;  the  men  were  taken  to  the  spot  where 
Hamilcar  had  been  last  seen  alive,  and  there  to  the 
number  of  three  thousand  cruelly  slaughtered,  an 
expiatory  sacrifice  to  the  spirit  of  the  dead.  Himera 
itself  was  utterly  destroyed.  The  walls  and  houses 
were  razed  to  the  ground  ;  the  temples  were  first 
plundered  and  then  burnt. 

The  rest  of  the  Greek  cities  in  Sicily  must  have 
trembled  lest  the  fate  which  had  fallen  on  Selinus 
and  Himera  should  overtake  themselves.  But  for  the 
time,  at  least,  their  fears  were  relieved.     Hannibal 


34 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


had  d6ne  what  he  came  to  do,  had  avenged  the 
defeat  of  Himera,  the  death  of  his  grandfather,  and 
his  father's  exile,  and  he  was  satisfied.  He  sent  the 
native  Sicilians  who  had  joined  him  to  their  homes, 
dismissed  many  of  his  mercenaries,  and,  after  leaving 
sufficient  force  to  hold  the  territory  which  he  had 
occupied,  carried  the  rest  of  his  army  to  Carthage. 
He  brought  with  him  much  spoil  and  many  trophies, 
and  his  countrymen  received  him  with  the  highest 
honours.  He  hao  won  in  a  few  weeks'  time  victories 
that  surpassed  all  that  had  ever  been  gained  by 
Carthage  before. 


11. 


CARTHAGE  AND  DIONYSIUS   (406-405). 


Hannibal's  success  in  Sicily  had  encouraged  the 
Carthaginians  to  hope  that  the  whole  island  might 
yet  be  theirs.  They  resolved  on  making  another 
expedition,  and  appointed  Hannibal  to  the  chief 
command.  At  first  he  declined  the  office,  pleading 
his  advanced  age,  but  consented  to  act  when  Himilco 
son  of  Hanno,  a  kinsman  of  his  own,  was  joined  with 
him  in  the  command.  The  two  generals  sent  envoys 
to  treat  with  the  chiefs  in  Spain  and  the  Balearic 
Islands  ;  they  went  themselves  to  enlist  troops  among 
the  African  tribes  and  in  the  various  Phoenician 
settlements  along  the  coast.  Mercenaries  were  also 
hired  from  other  countries,  and  especially  from  Italy. 
The  Italians  in  Hannibal's  former  army,  thinking 
themselves  badly  treated  by  the  general,  had  taken 
service  with  Syracuse,  and  were,  as  their  late  general 
knew,  a  very  formidable  force.  At  last  in  406 — four 
years,  i.e.,  after  the  first  expedition— the  invading  force 
set  sail.  They  numbered,  on  the  lowest  calculation, 
120,000;  one  writer  puts  them  down  at  nearly  three 
times  as  many.  They  were  carried  across  in  more 
than  a  thousand  transports ;  and  these  again  were 
convoyed  by  a  fleet  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  ships 


I 


^6 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


of  war.  The  Greeks,  taught  by  experience,  were 
resolved  not  to  be  behindhand  this  time  with  their 
preparations  for  resistance.  Forty  Carthaginian  ships 
had  been  sent  on  in  advance  to  Sicily.  Against  these 
the  Syracusans  sent  a  squadron  of  equal  strength. 
The  two  fleets   met    near    the    famous    promontory 


ONE  OF  THE  TOWERS  OF  ERYX. 


of  Eryx.  After  a  long  struggle  the  Greeks  were 
victorious,  and  sank  fifteen  of  the  enemy's  ships,  the 
rest  retiring  to  the  African  coast.  Hannibal,  hearing 
of  the  reverse,  sailed  out  with  fifty  fresh  ships.  Before 
this  new  force  the  Syracuse  squadron  retired.  It  was 
now  evident  that  the  invasion  could  not  be  prevented. 


^lEGE   OF  AGRIGENTUM, 


^7 


All  that  remained  was  to  make  the  best  possible 
preparations  for  resisting  it.  Syracuse  sent  embassies 
begging  for  help  to  the  Greeks  in  Italy  and  to  Sparta, 
as  well  as  to  all  the  communities  of  the  same  race  in 
the  island.  The  city  which  felt  itself  most  in  danger 
was  Agrigentum,  the  richest  and  most  populous  place 
in  the  island  after  Syracuse,  and,  indeed,  scarcely 
inferior  to  that.  The  Agrigentines  lost  no  time  in 
preparing  for  defence.  They  engaged  Dexippus,  a 
Spartan,  who  was  then  at  Gela  with  a  body  of  1,500 
soldiers,  and  they  also  hired  the  Campanian  mer- 
cenaries, eight  hundred  in  number,  who  in  the  former 
invasion  had  served  under  Hannibal.  It  was  in  May, 
406,  when  the  great  Carthaginian  host  appeared 
before  their  walls.  Hannibal  began  by  offering  condi- 
tions of  peace.  He  proposed  an  active  alliance  ;  if 
this  did  not  please  the  Agrigentines,  it  would  be 
enough  if  they  would  be  friendly  to  Carthage,  but 
take  neither  side  in  the  war  which  she  was  preparing 
to  wag'i.  The  Agrigentines,  unwilling  to  desert  the 
cause  of  their  countrymen,  refused  both  offers.  Then 
the  siege  began.  The  town  had  a  very  strong 
position,  which  had  been  carefully  improved.  It  was 
built  on  a  range  of  hills,  rising  in  some  places  to  the 
height  of  more  than  a  thousand  feet.  On  the  slope 
of  these  hills  a  wall  had  been  built,  or,  in  some  places, 
hewn  out  of  the  solid  rock.  Only  one  place  was 
practicable  for  an  assault.  Against  this  the  Cartha- 
ginian generals  brought  up  their  engines,  especially 
two  towers,  from  which  they  attacked  the  defending 
force  upon  the  walls.  The  fighting  lasted  throughout 
the  day  without  any  result ;   at  night  the  besieged 


9,0 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


of  war.  The  Greeks,  taught  by  experience,  were 
resolved  not  to  be  behindhand  this  time  with  their 
preparations  for  resistance.  Forty  Carthaginian  ships 
had  been  sent  on  in  advance  to  Sicily.  Against  these 
the  Syracusans  sent  a  squadron  of  ccjual  strength. 
The   two  fleets    met    near    the    famous    promontory 


[?^ 


1 

4 


ONE  OF  THE  TOWERS  OF  ERYX. 


of  Kryx.  After  a  long  struggle  the  Greeks  were 
victorious,  and  sank  fifteen  of  the  enemy's  ships,  the 
rest  retiring  to  the  African  coast.  Hannibal,  hearing 
of  the  reverse,  sailed  out  with  fifty  fresh  ships.  Before 
this  new  force  the  Syracuse  squadron  retired.  It  was 
now  evident  that  the  invasion  could  not  be  prevented. 


SIEGE   OF  AGRIGENTUM. 


57 


All  that  remained  was  to  make  the  best  possible 
preparations  for  resisting  it.  S\racuse  sent  embassies 
begging  for  help  to  the  Greeks  in  Italy  and  to  Sparta, 
as  well  as  to  all  the  communities  of  the  same  race  in 
the  island.  The  city  which  felt  itself  most  in  danger 
was  Agrigentum,  the  richest  and  most  populous  place 
in  the  island  after  Syracuse,  and,  indeed,  scarcely 
inferior  to  that.  The  Agrigentines  lost  no  time  in 
preparing  for  defence.  They  engaged  Ucxii^pus,  a 
Spartan,  who  was  then  at  Gela  with  a  body  of  1,500 
soldiers,  and  they  also  hired  the  Campanian  mer- 
cenaries, eight  hundred  in  number,  who  in  the  former 
invasion  had  served  under  Hannibal.  It  was  in  May, 
406,  when  the  great  Carthaginian  host  appeared 
before  their  walls.  Hannibal  began  by  offering  condi- 
tions of  peace.  He  proposed  an  active  alliance  ;  if 
this  did  not  please  the  Agrigentines,  it  would  be 
enough  if  tlicy  would  be  friendly  to  Carthage,  but 
take  neither  side  in  the  war  which  she  was  prcpaii ng 
to  wag'i.  The  Agrigentines,  unwilling  to  desert  the 
cause  of  their  countrymen,  refused  both  offers.  Then 
the  siege  began.  The  town  had  a  very  strong 
position,  which  had  been  carefully  improved.  It  was 
built  on  a  range  of  hills,  rising  in  some  places  to  the 
hei<rht  of  more  than  a  thousand  feet.  On  the  slope 
of  these  hills  a  wall  had  been  built,  or,  in  some  places, 
hewn  out  of  the  solid  rock.  Only  one  place  was 
practicable  for  an  assault.  Against  this  the  Cartha- 
ginian generals  brought  up  their  engines,  especially 
two  towers,  from  which  the\'  attacked  the  defending 
force  upon  the  walls.  The  lighting  lasted  throughout 
the  day  without   any  result  ;    at  night  the  besieged 


38 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


sallied  forth  and  burnt  the  enemy's  eng^ines.  Hanni- 
bal then  determined  to  use  the  stones  of  the  tombs — 
which,  as  usual,  were  outside  the  walls — to  build 
mounds  from  which  he  might  renew  the  attack.  The 
most  splendid  of  these  tombs  was  the  sepulchre  of 
Theron,  who  had  reigned  in  Agrigentum  some  eighty 
years  before,  and  had  borne  a  part  in  repelling  the 
first  Carthaginian  invasion.  While  the  men  were 
busy  in  pulling  it  down  it  was  struck  with  lightning. 
A  religious  panic  followed.  The  sentinels  declared 
that  they  were  haunted  by  the  spectres  of  the  dead 
whose  graves  had  been  violated.  A  pestilence  broke 
out  in  the  camp.  Great  numbers  died,  and  among 
them  Hannibal  himself,  and  the  prophets  declared 
that  the  gods  were  thus  sharing  their  wrath  at  the 
impiety  which  had  been  committed.  Himilco  ordered 
that  no  more  tombs  should  be  pulled  down.  As  an 
expiation  of  what  had  been  done,  he  sacrificed  a  child 
to  Saturn  or  Moloch,  and  threw  a  number  of  animals 
into  the  sea  as  an  offering  to  Neptune.  Meantime  he 
pressed  on  the  siege,  damming  up  one  of  the  rivers 
by  which  three  sides  of  the  town  were  surrounded. 
While  he  was  thus  engaged  the  relieving  force  arrived  ; 
it  comprised  auxiliaries  from  Magna  Graecia^  and  from 
most  of  the  Greek  cities  in  the  island.  The  general's 
name  was  Daphnaeus,  and  he  had  with  him  thirty 
thousand  infantry  and  five  thousand  cavalry.  A 
squadron  of  thirty  ships  of  war  sailed  along  the  coast, 
keeping  pace  with  the  army.  Himilco  sent  against 
them  his  Spanish  and  Italian  troops.     A  battle  was 

'  The  name  commonly  given  to  the  collection  of  Greek  colonies  in 
Southern  Italy.     See  *'  The  Story  of  Rome,"  page  39. 


EXECUTION  OF  THE  GENERALS. 


39 


fought  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Himera,  and  was 
obstinately  contested.  In  the  end  the  Greeks  were 
victorious,  routing  the  enemy  with  the  loss  of  six 
thousand  men.  The  whole  force  indeed  might,  it  was 
thought,  have  been  destroyed  but  for  the  caution  of 
Daphnaeus.  Remembering  how  the  men  of  Himera 
had  been  attacked  and  slaughtered  in  just  such  a 
moment  of  victory,  he  held  back  his  men  from  pursuit. 
The  same  fear  that  Himilco,  who  of  course  had  vast 
forces  in  reserve,  might  take  them  at  a  disadvantage, 
kept  the  Agrigentine  generals  from  sallying  forth 
upon  the  fugitives  as  they  hurried  past  the  walls. 
When  the  relieving  force  had  entered  the  city,  there 
was  naturally  much  talk  among  the  soldiers  about 
the  events  of  the  day.  Some  loudly  accused  the 
generals  of  cowardice  ;  others  even  declared  that 
they  had  been  bribed.  The  populace  rushed  to 
the  market-place  and  held  a  public  assembly,  be- 
fore which  the  Agrigentine  generals  were  put  upon 
their  trial.  Menes  of  Camarina,  one  of  the  leaders 
of  the  relieving  force,  was  the  chief  accuser.  The 
furious  people  would  not  listen  to  any  defence  from 
the  accused.  Four  out  of  the  five  were  seized  and 
stoned  to  death ;  the  fifth  was  pardoned  on  account 
of  his  youth. 

At  first  Daphnaeus  thought  of  attacking  the  Car- 
thaginian camp ;  but  the  place  was  too  strongly 
fortified,  and  he  contented  himself  with  scouring  the 
roads  with  his  cavalry  and  cutting  off  the  supplies. 
The  distress  soon  became  very  great ;  many  died  of 
starvation,  and  the  mercenaries  crowded  round 
Himilco's  tent,  clamouring  for  their  rations,  and  de- 


l»J 


40 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


AGRIGENTUM  EVACUATED. 


41 


daring  that  unless  they  were  satisfied  they  would 
take  service  with  the  enemy.  The  general  had  just 
heard  that  the  Syracusans  were  taking  a  convoy  of 


CARTHAGINIAN    PLATTER-SILVER. 


4 

f 


provisions  by  sea  to  Agrigentum.  His  only  hope  of 
relief  was  in  getting  hold  of  this.  He  entreated  the 
mutineers  to  wait  for  a  few  days,givingthem  meanwhile 
as  pledges  the  costly  drinking-cups  and  plate  of  the 


Carthaginian  officers.     The  Syracusan  fleet  had  no 
expectation  of  being  attacked,  as  Himilco  had  never 
attempted  to  claim  command  of  the  sea.     They  were 
taken  by  surprise  and  completely  defeated.     Eight  of 
the  ships  of  war  were  sunk,  the  others  chased  to  the 
shore,  and  the  whole  of  the  convoy  captured.     This 
event  changed  the  whole  aspect  of  affairs.     It  was 
Agrigentum  that  was  now  in  distress.     Before  long 
the  Italian  mercenaries  in  the  city  departed.     They 
alleged  that  their  time  of  service  had  expired  ;  but 
it  was  said  that  Dexippus,  their  commander,  had  been 
bribed  by  the  besiegers  to  tell  them  that  there  was 
no  food  in  the  city,  and  that  they  would  find  more 
profitable  service    elsewhere.      That    there   was    no 
food    was   too   true;    for   when    the    generals   came 
to  examine   the  stores,  they  found   that   there  was 
nothing  to   be   done  but  at   once   to  abandon   the 

city. 

That  very  night  the- plan  was  carried  out.   Guarded 
by  the  troops  from  the  pursuit  of  the  Carthaginians,  the 
whole  population  of  Agrigentum,  with  the  exception 
of  some  who  could  not  and  others  who  would  not 
leave  their  homes,  crowded  the  road  that  led  eastward 
to  Gela.     At  dawn  Himilco  entered  the  city.     It  was 
one  of  the  richest  cities  in  Greece,  and  from  its  foun- 
dation three  hundred  years  before  it  had  never  had 
an  enemy  within  its  walls.     The  houses  were  full  of 
pictures  and    statues,  of  rich  furniture,  of  gold  and 
silver  plate.     The  treasuries  of  the  temple  were  rich 
with  the  offerings  of  many  generations  of  worshippers. 
Himilco  spared  nothing.     Everything  that  was  valu- 
able, sacred  property  as  well  as  profane,  was  carried 


42 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


GELA   ABANDONED. 


43 


off.^  The  richest  citizen  of  Agrigentum,  unwilling  to 
leave  his  native  country,  had  taken  refuge  in  the 
shrine  of  Athene.  When  he  found  that  its  sacredness 
would  not  protect  him,  he  set  it  on  fire  and  perished 
in  the  ruins.  Himilco,  who  took  the  city  just  about 
mid-winter  (/>.,  eight  months  after  his  first  landing  in 
the  island),  occupied  it  till  the  spring  of  the  following 
year.  When  he  was  ready  to  take  the  field  again,  he 
levelled  the  houses  to  the  ground  and  defaced  the 
temples.  This  done  he  marched  against  Gela,  ravaged 
the  country,  which  indeed  there  was  no  attempt  to 
defend,  and  then  assailed  the  city.  Gela  was  for  the 
time  left  to  its  own  resources  ;  it  was  neither  so  well 
placed  nor  so  strongly  fortified  as  Agrigentum.  Still 
it  held  out  bravely,  the  women,  who  had  refused  to 
be  sent  away  to  a  place  of  safety,  being  conspicuous 
by  their  courage. 

Meanwhile  Dionysius,  the  Syracusan  commander,^ 
had  collected  a  relieving  force  numbering,  to  take 

■  The  most  precious  possession — indeed,  the  only  one  mentioned  by 
name— seems  to  have  been  the  famous  '*  Bull  "  of  the  tyrant  F*halaris, 
which  dated  back  to  about  a  century  and  a  half  before.  The  Bull  had 
been  made  by  Perillus,  a  native  worker  in  brass,  as  an  instrument  of 
torture  (victims  were  enclosed  in  it  and  roasted  alive).  The  artist 
is  said  to  have  been  the  first  who  suffered  in  it.  This  may  be  a  fable ; 
and,  indeed,  the  story  is  told  of  more  than  one  inventor  of  instru- 
ments of  cruelty,  as,  for  instance,  of  Dr.  Guillotine,  contriver  of 
the  machine  which  bears  his  name.  But  the  existence  of  Phalaris 
and  his  crueUy,  and  his  use  of  this  particular  engine  of  torture, 
seem  to  be  historical  facts,  for  they  are  alluded  to  by  Pindar, 
who  was  not  much  later  in  point  of  time.  We  shall  hear  of  ihe  Bull 
again. 

^  This  was  the  famous  tyrant,  the  first  of  the  name.  He  had  taken 
advantage  of  the  discredit  brought  on  his  rivals  by  the  Carthaginian 
victories  to  establish  himsell  in  supreme  power  at  Syracuse. 


the  lowest  estimate,  thirty  thousand  infantry  and  a 
thousand  cavalry,  and  accompanied  by  fifty  decked 
vessels.  With  this  he  marched  to  the  help  of  Gela, 
and  pitching  his  camp  between  the  Carthaginians  and 
the  sea,  endeavoured  to  cut  off  their  supplies.  After 
twenty  days'  skirmishing,  in  which  little  good  was 
effected,  he  determined  to  make  an  attempt  upon 
the  camp.  The  assault  was  to  be  delivered  simul- 
taneously from  three  places— from  the  sea,  from  the 
western  side  of  the  city,  and  from  that  part  of  the 
wall  which  was  especially  threatened  by  the  siege 
engines.  The  sea-front  of  the  camp  was  the  weakest : 
and  here  the  attack,  which  was  not  expected,  was 
successful  for  a  time,  and,  but  for  the  failure  of  the 
other  movements,  would  probably  have  decided  the 
day.  The  division  that  was  to  operate  on  the  west 
was  too  late,  for  by  the  time  it  came  into  action 
the  fight  at  the  sea- front  was  over.  That  which 
was  told  off  to  attack  the  siege-works,  and  was 
commanded  by  Dionysius  himself,  never  came  into 
action  at  all. 

Nothing  now  remained  but  to  leave  Gela  to  the 
same  fate  which  had  overtaken  Agrigentum  and 
Himera — to  abandon  it  to  the  fury  of  the  enemy. 
This  was  done  the  same  night,  Himilco  having  been 
put  off  his  guard  by  a  request  from  Dionysius  that 
he  would  grant  a  truce  the  following  day  for  the 
burial  of  the  dead.  All  that  had  strength  for  the 
journey  left  the  city.  Camarina  was  evacuated  in 
the  same  way.  Both  cities  were  plundered  and 
destroyed. 

It  now  seemed  as  if  the  whole  of  Sicily  were  within 


44 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


THE  PLAGUE  AT  CARTHAGE. 


45 


the  grasp  of  Carthage.  The  only  first-rate  town  that 
remained  to  be  conquered  was  Syracuse.  We  are 
inclined  to  ask,  "  Why  did  not  Himilco  march  upon 
Syracuse  after  the  fall  of  Gela  and  Camarina  .? "  just 
as  we  shall  be  inclined  to  ask  hereafter,  "  Why  did 
not  Hannibal  march  upon  Rome  after  Cannae.?" 
Doubtless  he  remembered  that,  a  few  years  before, 
the  most  powerful  expedition  ever  sent  forth  by  a 
Greek  state  had  been  destroyed  before  the  walls  of 
this  same  city.  It  must  have  been  difficult,  too,  to 
feed  and  pay  so  vast  an  army.  But  probably  his 
strongest  reason  was  the  second  breaking  out  of 
the  plague.  It  had  raged  in  fiis  camp  through  the 
summer  of  the  year  before ;  and  now  that  the 
hot  weather  had  returned  it  probably  ^  broke  out 
again.  Anyhow  we  know  that  when  he  returned  to 
Carthage  he  had  lost  half  his  army  by  sickness. 
Whatever  the  cause,  he  sent  unasked  to  Syracuse 
envoys  to  treat  for  peace.  Dionysius  was  only 
too  glad  to  listen,  ^nd  a  treaty  was  concluded  on 
these  terms  : — 

1.  Carthage  was  to  keep  her  old  settlements,  and 
those  of  the  Sicanian  tribes. 

2.  Selinus,  Agrigentum,  Himera,  Gela,  and  Cam- 
arina,  might  be  reoccupied  by  such  of  their  old  in- 
habitants as  survived.  But  they  were  to  be  unwalled, 
and  were  to  pay  tribute  to  Carthage. 

3.  Leontini,  Messana,  and  the  Sikel  tribes,  were  to 
be  independent. 

4.  Syracuse  was  to  be  under  the  rule  of  Dionysius. 

*  I  say  "  probably  "  because  the  fact  is  not  expressly  stated  by  the 
historian  (Diodorus  Siculus),  though  it  is  strongly  implied. 


5.  Prisoners  and  ships  taken  by  either  party  ^vere 
to  be  restored. 

Successful  as  the  campaign  had  been  it  ended  in 
disaster  to  Carthage.  The  army  carried  back  the 
plague  with  it.  Carthage  and  the  neighbouring  dis- 
tricts caught  the  infection,  and  multitudes  perished. 


I 


SIEGE  OF  MOTYA. 


47 


III. 


CARTHAGE  AND   DIONYSIUS   (397). 

We  have  seen  that  the  rule  of  Dionysius  in  Syracuse 
was  one  of  the  articles  of  the  treaty  of  405.  Such 
foreign  support,  of  course,  did  not  tend  to  make  him 
popular,  and  as  soon  as  he  felt  himself  strong  enough, 
he  threw  it  off.  In  397  he  called  an  assembly  of  the 
Syracusans,  whom  he  was  then  doing  his  best  to 
conciliate,  and  proposed  war  against  Carthage. 
"Just  now,"  he  said,  "  Carthage  is  weakened  by  the 
plague  ;  but  zhe  has  designs  against  us  which  she  will 
carry  out  on  die  first  opportunity.  We  had  better 
deal  with  her  before  she  has  recovered  her  strength." 
The  people  greatly  approved  the  proposal  ;  all  the 
more  because  Dionysius  allowed  them  to  plunder  the 
property  of  Carthaginian  citizens  who  where  residing  in 
Syracuse,  and  the  ships  of  Carthaginian  merchants  that 
happened  to  be  in  harbour.  News  of  what  had  been 
done  spread  over  the  island,  and  produced  something 
like  a  massacre.  Carthage  had  used  her  victory 
cruelly,  and  her  misdeeds  were  now  remembered 
against  her.  Carthaginian  rule  was  oppressive,  espe- 
cially in  the  amount  of  tribute  which  was  exacted  ;  and 
Carthaginian  habits  and  ways  of  life  seem  to  have  been 
particularly  offensive  to  the  taste  of  the  Greeks.     The 


result  was  a  rising  in  the  Greek  cities  which  had  been 
made  tributary  by  the  last  treaty.  Most  of  the  Car- 
thaginian residents  perished.  The  example  of  the 
Greeks  was  soon  followed  by  the  native  Sicilians,  and 
in  a  very  few  days  the  dominions  of  Carthage  in  the 
island  were  reduced  to  her  strongholds  on  the  western 
coast. 

All  this  happened  before  war  had  been  formally 
declared.  This  declaration  Dionysius  did  not  omit 
to  make.  He  sent  envoys  to  Carthage  with  a  message  : 
if  she  would  restore  freedom  to  the  Greek  cities  of 
Sicily  she  might  have  peace  :  otherwise  she  must  pre- 
pare for  war.  For  war  Carthage  was  but  ill  prepared. 
The  losses  of  the  last  campaign,  and  of  the  pestilence 
which  had  brought  it  to  an  end,  had  been  terrible. 
Still  it  was  impossible  to  accept  the  condition 
which  had  been  offered,  and  the  government  prepared 
to  resist.  Of  money,  at  least,  they  had  an  unfailing 
supply,  and  with  money  they  could  always  purchase 
men.  Some  members  of  the  council  were  at  once 
sent  off  with  large  sums  to  hire  mercenaries  in 
Europe. 

Dionysius,  probably  without  waiting  for  the  return 
of  his  envoys,  marched  to  the  west  of  the  island. 
His  object  of  attack  was  Motya,  the  chief  harbour  and 
arsenal  of  Carthage  in  Sicily.  He  was  joined  on  his 
way  by  the  whole  force  of  all  the  Greek  cities,  and  his 
army  numbered  eighty  thousand  infantry  and  upwards 
of  three  thousand  cavalry,  while  he  had  a  fleet  of  two 
hundred  ships  co-operating  with  him.  Motya  was 
strongly  situated  on  an  island  divided  from  the  main- 
land by  a  channel  six  furlongs  broad.    This  channel 


48 


THE   STORY   OF  CARTHAGE, 


MOTYA  ASSAULTED. 


49 


was  ordinarily  crossed  by  a  mole.  But  the  mole 
could  be  removed  in  time  of  necessity,  and  this  was  at 
once  done.  Dionysius,  after  reconnoitring  the  place  in 
company  with  his  engineers,  set  about  a  siege.  The 
harbour  and  all  the  shore  were  blockaded,  and  the 
channel,  or  at  least  part  of  the  channel,  was  filled  up, 
so  that  the  engines  might  be  brought  up  to  the  walls 
of  the  city.  On  the  other  hand,  Himilco,  who  had 
been  put  in  command  of  the  Carthaginian  force,  was 


THE  WALL  OF  MOTYA. 


not  idle.  He  sent  ten  ships  from  Carthage  to  Syra- 
cuse itself,  and  destroyed  much  of  the  shipping  in  the 
harbour.  He  then  made  a  more  formidable  attack  on 
the  besieging  force  at  Motya.  Taking  command  in 
person  of  a  squadron  of  a  hundred  ships  he  crossed  by 
night  from  Carthage  to  Selinus,  and  sailing  thence 
along  the  coast  appeared  at  daybreak  off  Motya,  sank 
or  burnt  the  blockading  squadron,  and  made  his  way 
into  the  harbour.     The  Greek  ships  were  drawn  up  on 


land,  and  Dionysius  did  not  venture  to  launch  them. 
The  harbour  was  too  narrow  for  him  to  use  his  numbers 
with  advantage.  But  he  constructed  a  road  of  planks 
across  a  neck  of  land  which  divided  the  harbour  from 
the  sea,  and  made  his  men  drag  his  ships  along  this. 
When  Himilco  endeavoured  to  interrupt  the  work  he 
was  driven  off  with  showers  of  missiles  from  the  Syra- 
cusan  force  on  land,  and  by  the  arrows  discharged 
by  the  catapults.  Catapults  were  a  new  invention  at 
the  time,  and  probably  caused  something  of  the  con- 
sternation which  is  felt  by  savages  at  the  first  sight 
of  firearms.  Himilco,  whose  fleet  was  only  half  as 
strong  as  that  opposed  to  him,  did  not  venture  to 
give  battle,  but  returned  to  Carthage. 

The  attempt  at  relief  having  thus  failed,  Dionysius 
pushed  the  siege  vigorously.  The  walls  were  battered 
with  the  rams,  while  the  catapults,  with  a  constant 
discharge  of  arrows,  drove  the  garrison  from  the  walls. 
Towers  were  wheeled  up  against  the  fortifications. 
They  had  six  stories,  each  of  them  filled  with  men, 
and  were  as  high  as  the  houses  of  the  town.  The 
people  of  Motya,  on  the  other  hand,  defended  them- 
selves vigorously.  They  raised  great  masts  with  yard- 
arms,  from  which  men,  protected  from  the  missiles  of 
the  besiegers  by  breastworks,  threw  ignited  torches 
and  bundles  of  flax  steeped  in  pitch  on  the  engines 
that  were  being  used  against  the  walls.  Some  of  these 
were  set  on  fire,  and  the  assailants  had  to  turn  their 
attention  to  extinguishing  the  flames.  Still  the  attack 
went  on,  and  before  long  the  rams  made  a  breach  in  the 
wall.  A  fierce  battle  followed.  The  Greeks  burned 
to  avenge  the  cruelties  that  h^d  been  done  to  their 


)V^ 


50 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


countrymen  ;  the  Phoenicians,  who  could  hope  for  no 

mercy,  and  who  had  no  way  of  escape  open  to  them 

either  by  sea  or  land,  resisted  with  the  courage  of 

despair.     When  they  had  to  give  up  the  walls,  they 

made  barriers  across  the  streets,  and  defended  every 

house  as  if  it  had  been  a  fort.     The  Greeks  brought 

their  siege-towers  into  the   streets,  and   from   them 

made  their  way  into  the  upper  stories  of  the  houses. 

Still  the  people  of  Motya  did  not  lose  courage,  but 

fought  with  a  resolution  which  reminds  us  of  the  Jews 

when  they  defended  Jerusalem  against  the  Romans 

under  Titus.      The  Greeks  suffered  heavily  in  this 

street  fighting.     Their  opponents  were  utterly  reckless 

of  their  lives,  and  they  knew  the  place  where  they 

were  fighting.     At  last  a  stratagem  succeeded  where 

force  had  failed.     For  several    days  the  Greeks  had 

retired  from  the  conflict  as  evening  approached,  the 

signal  for  retreat  being  given  by  a  trumpet,  and  the 

people  of  the  town  came  to  regard  this  as  the  regular 

course   of  things.     But   one  night  Dionysius  sent  a 

picked  force  to  renew  the  attack  after  dark.     This 

detachment  established  themselves   in   some   of  the 

houses  before  the  besieged  were  aware  of  what  had 

happened ;  the  rest  of  the  army  poured  across  the 

channel  now  filled  up,  and  Motya  was  taken.      One 

of  the  horrible  massacres  which  make  these  wars  so 

terrible  followed.     Dionysius  tried  in  vain  to  stop  it, 

not   so  much  from  any  feeling  of  mercy,  as  because 

prisoners  might  be  sold  for  slaves,  and  would  bring  in 

considerable  sums  of  money.     The  soldiers  paying  no 

heed  to  his  orders,  he  made  proclamation  that  such  of 

the  inhabitants  as  still  survived  should  take  shelter  in 


HIMILCO'S  ADVANCE. 


51 


the  temples.  This  was  effectual.  The  soldiers  then 
began  to  plunder.  This  Dionysius  did  not  attempt 
to  hinder.  Wishing  to  encourage  his  men  for  the 
campaign  which  lay  before  them,  he  gave  up  to  them 
all  the  booty  in  the  town.  To  the  leader  of  the  party 
which  had  surprised  the  town  he  made  a  present  of 
about  ;f400,  and  was  liberal  in  his  gifts  to  all  who  had 
distinguished  themselves. 

Carthage  meanwhile  had  been  preparing  a  formid- 
able force  with  which  to  re-establish  her  dominion  in 
Sicily.     It  amounted  to  one  hundred  thousand  men, 
taking  again,  as  being  the  most  probable,  the  smallest 
estimate.     Thirty  thousand  more  joined  it  after  it  had 
landed   in    Sicily.      Himilco   was   appointed   to   the 
command.     Aware  that  Dionysius  had  his  spies  in 
Carthage,  he  gave  to  the  captain  of  each  transport 
sealed  orders   directing  them   to   sail   to   Panormus. 
They  were  attacked  on    their  way  by  a  Syracusan 
squadron,  which  sank  fifty  of  their  number,  and  with 
them  five  thousand  men  and  two  hundred  chariots. 
Himilco  then  came  out  with  his  war-ships,  and  the 
Syracusans  retired.  The  Carthaginian  general  marched 
along  the  coast  to  Motya,  and  recovered  it  without 
any  difficulty.     Dionysius  did  not  venture  to  attack 
him,  but  retired  to  Syracuse. 

Himilco  now  conceived  a  very  bold  scheme, 
nothing  less  than  to  make  his  way  to  Messana,  in 
the  extreme  north-east  of  the  island.  It  had  an 
admirable  harbour,  capable  of  holding  all  his  ships, 
which  numbered  more  than  six  hundred.  It  was  near 
the  mainland  of  Italy,  from  which  he  hoped  to  draw 
fresh  forces,  and  it  commanded  the  approach  from 


t* 


52 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


p..  i 


BATTLE   OF  CAT  AN  A. 


53 


Greece.     He  marched  along  the  noith  coast,  his  fleet 
accompanying  him,  and  pitched  his  camp  at  Pelorum, 
the  extreme  north-eastern  point  of  Sicily,  which  was 
about  twelve  miles  from  the  city.     The  Messanians 
were  struck  with  terror.      Their  walls   were   out  of 
repair  ;  they  had  no  allies  at  hand,  and  part  of  their 
own    military  force  was   absent   at    Syracuse.      The 
first  thing  was  to  send  away  the  women  and  children 
and  the  most  precious  of  their  possessions.    Then  they 
prepared   for   defence.      Some  were   encouraged   by 
remembering  an  old  oracle,  "  The  sons  of  Carthage 
shall  bear  water  in  the  streets  of  Messana,"  which  they 
took  to  mean  that  there  should  be  Carthaginian  slaves 
in  their  city.     They  sent  a  military  force  to  the  spot 
where  Himilco   was    encamped,  with  instructions  to 
resist  any  attempt  to  occupy  the  country.     Himilco 
at  once  sent    a    squadron   of  two  hundred   ships  to 
attack  the  town,  which  would  now,  he  reckoned,  be 
almost  stripped  of  defenders.      An  opportune  north 
wind  carried  the  ships  rapidly  to  their  destination — 
more  rapidly  than  the  Messanian  soldiers  could  follow 
them.      Himilco's   hopes   were   fulfilled.      His   ships 
landed  the  troops  which  they  carried.     These  made 
their  way  into  the  city  through  the  spaces    in  the 
walls,  and  the  place  was  captured  almost  without  a 
strujiele.      Some  of  the   Messanians   fell   in   a   vain 
attempt  at  resistance ;  many  took  refuge  in  the  neigh- 
bouring forts ;  two  hundred  and  more  had  recourse  to 
the  desperate  expedient  of  swimming  the  strait  be- 
tween their  city  and  Italy.     Fifty  succeeded  in  the 
attempt.     Himilco,  after  trying  in  vain  to  capture  the 
forts,  marched  on  Syracuse, 


His  first  object  was  the  city  of  Catana,  which 
lay  on  the  southern  slopes  of  Mount  ^tna.  His 
original  plan  was  to  march  his  army  along  the  coast, 
with  the  fleet  keeping  pace  with  it.  But  this  plan 
could  not  be  carried  out.  A  severe  eruption  of  JEtna. 
took  place  at  the  very  time  of  his  march,  and  the 
stream  of  lava  which  poured  down  the  eastern  or  sea- 
ward slopes  of  the  mountain  made  it  necessary  for 
him  to  make  a  circuitous  march  round  the  western 
side. 

Dionysius  at  once  took  advantage  of  this  division 
of  the  Carthaginian  forces,  resolving  to  attack  the 
fleet  while  it  was  unsupported  by  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  army.  He  marched  with  his  own  army  along 
the  sea-coast  nearly  as  far  as  Catana,  while  Leptines, 
the  Syracusan  admiral,  sailed  alongside  with  the  fleet. 
Mago,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Carthaginian 
ships,  felt  at  first  no  little  dismay  at  the  sight  of  the 
combined  force  which  was  coming  to  meet  him.  He 
had,  however,  no  alternative  but  to  fight ;  and  indeed 
his  fleet  was  a  very  powerful  one,  numbering,  along 
with  the  transport  ships,  which  were  furnished  with 
brazen  beaks  for  purposes  of  attack,  as  many  as  five 
hundred  ships.  The  Syracusan  admiral,  who  probably 
bore  the  character  of  being  too  adventurous,  had  been 
strictly  ordered  by  Dionysius  to  keep  his  fleet  in  close 
order,  and  on  no  account  to  break  the  line.  It  was 
only  thus  that  he  could  hope  to  hold  his  own  against 
the  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy.  These  orders 
he  disregarded.  Picking  out  thirty  of  his  fastest 
sailers,  he  advanced  far  ahead  of  the  rest  of  the  fleet, 
and  boldly  attacked  the  Carthaginians.     At  first  he 


54 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


was    successful,  sinking    many    of   his    antagonists. 

But   the  numbers   which   were   brought   up   against 

him    were    overwhelming.      It    became     more    and 

more  difficult  to  manoeuvre ;  at  close  quarters,  when 

it  was  possible  for   the    enemy  to   board,  one  ship, 

however  skilfully  commanded,  was  not  much  better 

than  another.      Before   long   Leptines   was  glad  to 

escape  to  the  open  sea  with  such    of   the   ships  as 

were  left  to  him.     The  rest  of  his   fleet,  who   had 

thus   lost   the   leadership  of  their  admiral,  and  who 

came  on  in  disorder,  made  but  little  resistance  to  the 

enemy.     More  than  a  hundred  ships  were  taken  or 

destroyed.     Nor  was  the  near  neighbourhood  of  the 

army  on  shore  of  much  service  to  those  who  tried  to 

escape   from   the   wrecks.      The   Carthaginians   had 

manned  a  number  of  boats   which   intercepted   the 

fugitives,  and  slaughtered  them  in  the  water  before 

the  eyes  and  within  the  hearing  of  their  countrymen. 

More  than  twenty  thousand  men  are  said  to  have  been 

lost  by  the  Greeks  in  this  battle. 

Dionysius  was  strongly  urged  to  meet  Himilco  at 
once  before  the  news  of  the  disaster  to  the  fleet  had 
become  known  through  Sicily.  At  first  he  was  in- 
clined to  follow  the  advice.  But  more  cautious 
counsels  prevailed,  and  he  retreated  on  Syracuse. 
This  was  probably  a  mistake.  Not  only  did  he 
disgust  many  of  his  allies,  but  he  lost  an  opportunity 
of  inflicting  a  great  blow  on  the  enemy.  Immediately 
after  the  battle  bad  weather  came  on,  and  the  Cartha- 
ginian fleet  could  not  keep  the  sea.  Had  the  Greek 
army  still  occupied  their  position  on  the  shore  they 
might    have    inflicted    immense    damage    on    their 


SIEGE   OF  SYRACUSE. 


5lsi 


opponents.  As  it  was,  Himilco  came  up  with  his 
army  in  time  to  assist  his  fleet.  His  own  ships,  and 
those  which  had  been  captured  from  the  Greeks,  were 
drawn  up  on  the  shore  and  repaired.  The  men  had 
some  days  given  them  for  rest  and  refreshment ;  and 
he  then  marched  on  to  Syracuse.  Before  starting  for 
this  last  stage  he  sent  envoys  to  the  little  town  of 
iEtna,  where  the  Italian  mercenaries  of  Dionysius 
were  strongly  posted,  inviting  these  troops  to  change 
side  and  take  service  with  himself  They  were 
strongly  inclined  to  do  so,  but  could  not.  They  had 
given  hostages  to  their  master,  and  their  best  troops 
were  actually  serving  in  his  army.  They  were  thus 
compelled  to  refuse  the  offer,  and  Himilco  was 
obliged  to  leave  them  in  his  rear. 

On  arriving  at  Syracuse  his  first  step  was  to  make 
a  great  demonstration  of  force.  He  sailed  into  the 
Great  Harbour  with  all  his  fleet.  There  were  more 
than  two  hundred  ships  of  war,  which  he  had  adorned 
with  the  spoils  of  those  captured  off  Catana,  and 
nearly  two  thousand  others  of  all  kinds  and  sizes. 
The  harbour,  though  measuring  more  than  a  mile 
and  a  half  one  way  and  two  miles  and  a  half  the 
other,  was  absolutely  crowded  with  them.  The  army 
is  said  to  have  numbered  three  hundred  thousand ; 
but  this  is  doubtless  an  exaggeration.  Altogether  the 
display  of  force  was  overwhelming,  and  the  Syracusans 
did  not  venture  to  show  themselves  outside  either 
their  harbour  or  their  walls. 

The  Carthaginian  general  prepared  to  blockade  the 
city,  building  three  forts,  which  he  stored  with  wine 
and  other  provisions.      His  merchants  were  sent  at 


56 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


the  same  time  to  Sardinia  and  Africa  to  fetch  new 
supphes.  Dionysius,  on  the  other  hand,  sent  to  Greece 
and  Southern  Italy  in  the  hope  of  collecting  a  force  of 
volunteers  and  mercenaries. 

The  tide  of  success  now  began  to  turn  against 
Carthage.  One  of  Himilco's  corn-ships  was  approach- 
ing  his  camp  when  five  of  the  Syracusan  ships  sallied 
forth  from  the  Inner  Harbour  and  captured  it.  The 
Carthaginians  sent  out  a  squadron  of  forty  ships  to 
drive  off  the  assailants.  On  this  the  Syracusans  manned 
their  whole  fleet,  attacked  the  hostile  squadron,  sink- 
ing  twenty.four  out  of  the  forty,  and  capturing  the 
admiral's  ship.  They  then  paraded  their  force  in 
front  of  the  Carthaginian  position,  and  challenged  the 
invaders  to  a  general  engagement.  The  challenge 
was  not  accepted. 

And  now,  for  the  third  time,  pestilence,  the  old  ally 
of  the  Greeks,  appeared  to  help  them.     Himilco  had 
shown  himself  as  careless  of  the  religious  feelings,  not 
only  of  his  foes,  but  also  of  his  friends,  as  his  prede- 
cessors had  done.     He  had  broken  down  the  tombs 
outside  the  city  to  get  materials  for  his  forts,  and  he 
had  robbed  such  temples  as,  being  without  the  line  of 
fortifications,  had  fallen  into  his  hands.    One  specially 
rich  and  famous  shrine  had  been  thus  treated,  that  of 
Demeter  and  Persephone.'     It  was  to  this   impiety 
that  the  disasters  were  generally  attributed ;  but  the 
natural  causes  at  work  were  sufficient  to  account  for 
them.     An   enormous   force  was  crowded  together. 
It  was  the  most  unhealthy  season  of  the  year  ;  and 
the  heat  of  the  summer,  that  was  now  coming  to  an 

'  Ceres  and  Proserpine. 


PLAGUE  IN  himilco's  CAMP, 


S7 


end,  had  been  unusually  great.  The  plague  that  now 
broke  out  in  the  army  seems,  from  the  description 
that  the  historian  gives  of  it,  to  have  been  much  of 
the  same  type  as  the  disease  now  known  by  that 
name.  It  began  with  swellings,  and  ended,  after  a 
most  painful  illness  of  five  or  six  days,  almost  inva- 
riably in  death.  The  danger  or  the  fear  of  infection 
prevented  due  attention  to  the  sick,  or  even  the  burial 
of  the  dead.  We  are  told  that  as  many  as  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  thousand  corpses  at  one  time  lay 
rotting  on  the  ground.  The  marvel  is,  if  this  or  any- 
thing like  this  be  true,  not  that  so  many  died,  but 
that  so  many  survived. 

The  Syracusans  did  not  fail  to  take  advantage  of 
the  distress  of  the  invaders.  Dionysius  planned  a 
simultaneous  attack  by  sea  and  land.  Leptines,  with 
a  Spartan  officer,  was  put  in  command  of  a  squadron 
of  eighty  ships,  and  Dionysius  himself  directed  the 
movements  of  the  troops.  He  marched  out  of  the 
city  at  night,  and  delivered  an  unexpected  attack 
about  daybreak  on  the  landward  side  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian camp.  At  first  he  suffered  a  reverse  ;  but  this 
he  had  fully  planned,  for  it  enabled  him  to  get  rid  of 
a  body  of  disaffected  mercenaries.  Put  in  the  front, 
and  deserted  by  the  troops  which  should  have  sup- 
ported them,  they  were  cut  to  pieces  by  the  Cartha- 
ginians. But  when  Dionysius  advanced  in  force, 
these,  in  their  turn,  were  driven  back,  and  one  of  the 
forts  was  captured.  Meanwhile  the  Syracusan  ships 
attacked  on  the  other  side.  The  Carthaginian  ships 
were  but  ill  manned,  a  great  part  of  their  crews  having 
doubtless  perished  in  the  plague.     Anyhow  they  suf- 


58 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


fered  a  crushing  defeat,  and  the  army,  weak  itself,  and 
distracted  by  the  assailants  on  the  other  side,  could 
give  them  no  very  effectual  help.  Many  of  the  ships 
were  deserted.  To  these  the  Greeks  set  fire.  The 
flames  spread  from  vessel  to  vessel  till  nearly  the 
whole  of  the  fleet,  both  war-ships  and  merchantmen, 
was  in  a  blaze.  They  even  spread  to  the  camp, 
which  itself  was,  at  least  in  part,  consumed.  In  short, 
the  victory  of  the  Syracusans  was  complete,  and 
Dionysius  encamped  that  night  near  the  temple  of 
Zeus,  in  which  Himilco  had  lately  had  his  head- 
quarters. 

Reduced  to  these  straits,  the  Carthaginian  general 
resolved  to  open  communications  with  Dionysius 
personally,  and  without  the  knowledge  of  the  people 
of  Syracuse.  He  offered  three  hundred  talents  if  he 
would  allow  him  to  remove  to  Africa  what  was  left  of 
his  army.  Dionysius  replied  that  it  would  be  quite 
impossible  to  conduct  so  extensive  an  operation  as 
the  removal  of  the  whole  of  the  army  without  excit- 
ing the  suspicion  of  the  people.  But  Himilco  himself 
and  the  Carthaginian  officers  would  be  allowed  to 
escape.  He  was  not  anxious  to  push  the  Cartha- 
ginians to  extremities.  Their  friendship  might  be 
useful  to  him  on  some  future  occasion,  for  his  own 
power  was  not  very  firmly  established,  and  he  had 
more  than  one  proof  of  late  that  there  was  a  strong 
party  at  work  in  Syracuse  to  overthrow  it.  Himilco 
accepted  these  terms.  It  was  arranged  that  he  and 
the  other  native  Carthaginians  should  depart  secretly 
on  the  fourth  night  following,  and  Dionysius  led  back 
his  army  to  the  city.     The  money  was  duly  sent,  and 


HIMILCO'S  ESCAPE, 


59 


at  the  time  appointed,  Himilco,  with  his  officers  and 
friends,  and  such  of  his  troops  as  belonged  to  Car- 
thage, embarked.  They  filled,  it  is  said,  forty  ships 
of  war.  Their  escape  did  not  pass  unnoticed.  News 
of  what  was  going  on  was  taken  to  Dionysius.  As  he 
seemed  to  be  tardy  in  his  movements,  the  Corinthian 
ships  that  were  in  harbour  acted  for  themselves,  pur- 
sued the  fugitives,  and  captured  some  of  the  worst 
sailers  in  the  squadron. 

The  army  that  was  thus  shamefully  abandoned  by 
its  general  fared,  perhaps,  better  than  might  have 
been  expected.  The  native  Sikels  at  once  left  the 
camp,  and  thus  anticipating  the  attack  of  the  Syra- 
cusans, reached  their  homes  for  the  most  part  in 
safety.  The  Spaniards  offered  such  a  bold  front  to 
their  enemies,  that  Dionysius  was  glad  to  take  them 
into  his  own  service.  The  rest  of  the  army  surren- 
dered, and  were  sold  as  slaves. 

Himilco  did  not  long  escape  the  punishment  which 
was  due  to  his  treachery  and  cowardice.  All  Carthage 
was  plunged  into  mourning  by  the  terrible  disaster 
which  had  happened.  Every  house,  every  temple, 
was  closed  ;  all  rites  of  worship  were  stopped,  and 
private  business  was  suspended.  The  city  crowded 
to  meet  the  ships  which  were  bringing  back  Himilco 
and  his  followers,  and  inquired  the  fate  of  friends 
and  relatives.  When  the  whole  truth  was  known,  a 
cry  of  wailing  went  up  from  the  crowd.  The  general 
himself  landed  from  his  ship  clad  in  the  meanest 
garb.  Stretching  his  hands  to  the  sky,  he  bewailed 
aloud  the  disasters  which  had  fallen  on  himself  and  on 
his  country.     The  only  consolation  which  he  could 


bo 


THE  STORY   OF  CARTHAGE. 


offer  was  that  he  had  been  conquered  not  by  the 
enemy,  but  by  the  will  of  heaven.  At  the  same  time 
he  publicly  confessed  his  own  impiety,  and  took 
the  blame  of  what  had  happened  on  himself.  After 
visiting  every  temple  in  the  city  with  this  confession 
on  his  lips,  he  went  to  his  own  house,  blocked  up  his 
doors,  and,  refusing  admission  even  to  his  own  chil- 
dren, starved  himself  to  death. 

The  misfortunes  of  Carthage  were  not  yet  at  an 
end.  She  had  seemed  to  be  on  the  point  of  subduing 
all  Sicily,  and  indeed  only  one  city  remained  to  be 
taken  ;  and  within  a  few  months  she  had  to  fight  for 
her  own  existence.  Her  African  allies  and  subjects, 
with  whom  she  seems  to  have  been  exceedingly  un- 
popular, rose  by  one  consent  against  her.  An  army 
numbering  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  was 
soon  raised.  They  made  their  headquarters  at  Tunes, 
and  for  a  while,  so  superior  was  their  strength,  kept 
the  Carthaginians  within  their  walls.  For  a  time  the 
city  was  in  despair.  Besides  the  visible  dangers  that 
threatened,  the  people  dreaded  the  anger  of  heaven. 
Their  general  had  grievously  insulted  the  gods  of 
Greece.  He  had  made  a  dwelling-house  of  one  temple 
at  Syracuse,  and  had  robbed  another.  The  govern- 
ment at  once  set  itself  to  calm  these  fears.  The 
offended  gods,  especially  Demeter  and  Persephone,- 
who  had  never  before  been  worshipped  in  Carthage, 
were  propitiated  by  sacrifices  in  Greek  fashion,  which 
the  handsomest  youths  of  Greek  race  that  could  be 
found  were  appointed  to  perform.  This  done,  they 
applied  themselves  to  the  business  of  defending  the 
city.    And  indeed  the  danger  was  soon  over.     The 


V 


%iiitjru 


VOTIVF.  liAb-kliLlEF  TO  PERSEPHONE. 


CARTHAGE  SAVED. 


63 


hosts  that  threatened  them  were  nothing  more  than 
irregular  levies,  who  could  not  agree  among  them- 
selves, and  who  had  no  leaders  worthy  of  the  name. 
Provisions  soon  failed  them,  for  they  had  no  ships, 
whereas  the  Carthaginians  had  command  of  the  sea, 
and  could  import  as  much  food  as  they  wanted  from 
Sardinia.  Nor  was  it  only  in  this  way  that  their  vast 
wealth  served  them.  They  used  it  also  to  buy  off 
some  of  their  most  formidable  enemies.  In  the  course 
of  a  few  months  the  great  Libyan  army  broke  up, 
and  Carthage  was  safe. 


IV. 


THE  LAST  STRUGGLE  WITH  DIONYSIUS. 

The  power  of  Carthage  was  now  limited  to  a  small 
region  in  the  western  part  of  the  island.    But  she  was 
not  content  to  remain  within  these  borders  ;  and  she 
seized   the   first   opportunity   of  seeking   to   extend 
them.    Dionysius  had  set  himself  to  reduce  the  native 
tribes— always    hostile    to   the   Greeks,   and   always 
ready  to  swell  the  forces  of  an  invader.     The  Sikels 
(there  were   two  tribes   of   the   natives,  Sikels   and 
Sikanians)  had  established  a  new  settlement  at  Tau- 
romenium.     Dionysius  did  his  utmost  to  capture  this 
place,  but  was  repulsed  with  much  loss,  and  was  him- 
self wounded.     Some  of  the  Greek  cities  now  threw 
off  their  allegiance  ;  and   the   Sikels  generally  rose 
against  him.     The  general  in  command  of  the  Car- 
thaginian districts— Mago  by  name— who  had  been 
doing  his  best  to  make  himself  popular  among  sub- 
jects  and  neighbours,  at  once   took   the   field,   and 
ventured    to   march   as   far    eastward    as    Messana. 
Dionysius  encountered  him  on  his  way  back,  and  after 
a  fierce  battle  defeated  him,  Mago  losing  as  many 
as  8ocx)  in  the  struggle.     Carthage,  however,  was  now 
beginning  to  recover  her  strength ;  and  was  resolved 
to  make  another  effort  to  regain,  at  least,  part  of  the 


MAGO   DEFEATED. 


65 


island.     She  drew  from  her  usual  recruiting  grounds 
— Africa,  Sardinia,  and  Italy — a  force  of  80,000  men, 
and  sent  it  into  Sicily,  with  Mago  again  in  command. 
Mago  marched  through   the  country  of  the   native 
tribes,   calling   them    all   to   take   up   arms   against 
Dionysius,  but  failed  with  one  at  least  of  the  most 
powerful   chiefs.      Receiving  this   check    he   halted. 
Meanwhile,     Dionysius    had     collected    a    force    of 
20,000 ;  with  this  he  marched  against  the  invaders, 
and  making  common  cause  with  the  Sikel  chiefs,  soon 
reduced  them  to  extremities.    The  battle  which  Mago 
wished  to  force  on  him,  and  vv^hich  some  of  his  own 
followers   desired,  he   declined.     The  Carthaginians, 
encamped   as  they  were   in  their  enemies'  country, 
found    their  supplies  fall  short,  and  were  obliged  to 
sue  for  peace.     It  was  granted  ;  but  one  of  the  condi- 
tions was  that  the  Sikels,  valuable  allies  in  past  time 
to  Carthage,  should  now  be  subjects  of  Syracuse.     So 
far  the  war  ended  in  a  distinct  loss  to  the  Phoenician 
power. 

The  next  war  seems  to  have  been  provoked  by 
Dionysius.  His  position  at  Syracuse  was  now  firmly 
established,  and  his  power  had  steadily  increased. 
He  was  now  desirous  to  consolidate  it  by  finally 
expelling  his  remaining  rivals  from  the  island.  The 
dependencies  of  Carthage  were,  as  usual,  disaffected. 
Dionysius  listened  to  their  complaints,  encouraged 
them  to  revolt,  and  received  them  into  alliance  with 
himself  Carthage  sent  embassies  to  complain  of 
these  proceedings,  and  receiving  no  redress,  resolved 
upon  war.  Foreseeing  that  it  would  be  a  formidable 
undertaking,  they  made  more  than  ordinary  prepara- 


66 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


tions.     Besides  hiring,  as  usual,  a  large  force  of  mer- 
cenaries, they  also  raised  a  body  of  troops  of  their 
own  citizens,  a  most  uncommon  circumstance,   and 
indicating  their  sense  that  it  was  a  critical  time  to 
which  they  had  come.     The  war  seems  to  have  been 
carried  on— why  and  how  we  do  not  very  clearly  know 
—both  in  Italy  and  Sicily.  Of  the  operations  in  Italy 
we  know  little  or  nothing.  In  Sicily  two  great  battles 
were   fought.      The   first   was   at   Cabala.      In    this 
Dionysius  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  on  his  opponents, 
killing,  it  is  said,  more  than   10,000,  and  taking  as 
many  as  5,000  prisoners.     The  survivors  were  com- 
pelled to  take  refuge  on  a  height  where  there  was 
no  supply  of  water.     Mago,  the  general,  had  fallen 
in  the  engagement.      The   Carthaginians   began  ne- 
gotiations  for   peace.      Dionysius    replied    that   he 
would  grant  it  only  on  these  conditions,  that  they 
should  evacuate  all  the  towns  in  Sicily,  and  should 
pay  an  indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  the  war.     The 
terms  seemed  harsh  beyond  endurance ;  but  it  was 
necessary  to  temporize.     The  generals  in  command 
replied   that  they  were  not  competent  to   make  so 
important  a  treaty  on  their  own  authority,  especially 
as   the   surrender   of  Carthaginian  towns   was   con- 
cerned.    They  must  refer  the  matter  to  the  autho- 
rities at  home,  and  they  begged  for  a  few  days'  truce. 
This  Dionysius  readily  granted.    Meanwhile  the  Car- 
thaginians prepared    for   resistance.      They   gave   a 
magnificent  funeral   to  the  remains  of   Mago,   and 
appointed  his  son,  a  mere  youth  in  years  but  singu- 
larly able  and  brave,  to  take  the  command.     Every 
hour  of  the  time  was  spent  in  drilling  the  troops  and 


DEFEAT  OF  DtONYStUS. 


67 


making  them  ready  to  renew  the  war.  When  the 
truce  expired,  they  marched  out  of  their  camp  and 
offered  battle  to  Dionysius.  The  engagement  took 
place  at  Cronium,  and  ended  in  disaster  to  the  Greeks. 
Dionysius  commanded  one  wing,  and  his  brother 
Leptines,  of  whom  we  have  heard  as  admiral  of  the 
Syracusan  fleet  more  than  once  before,  led  the  other. 
Dionysius,  who  had  the  best  troops  of  the  army  under 
him,  was  for  a  time  successful  ;  Leptines  was  de- 
feated and  slain.  When  his  death  became  known 
throughout  the  army  there  was  a  general  panic.  The 
Carthaginians  gave  no  quarter,  and  by  the  time  that 
the  darkness  put  an  end  to  the  pursuit,  14,000  Greeks, 
it  is  said,  had  perished.  The  Carthaginians,  however, 
did  not  pursue  their  victory,  but  retired  to  Panormus. 
Anxious  to  secure  what  they  could  before  fortune 
turned  against  them,  they  sent  an  embassy  to  Syra- 
cuse offering  peace.  Dionysius  was  glad  to  accept 
their  terms.  These  were,  that  a  thousand  talents 
should  be  paid  by  way  of  indcrnnity,  and  that  Car- 
thage should  have,  besides  their  own  towns,  Selinus 
and  its  territory,  and  all  that  had  belonged  to  Agri- 
gentum  west  of  the  Halycus. 

This  treaty  was  kept  for  fifteen  years.  Then  Diony- 
sius saw  another  opportunity  of  attacking  his  old 
enemy.  Carthage  was  again  suffering  from  the  evils 
which  seem  to  have  troubled  her  over  and  over  again 
— pestilence,  and  revolt  among  her  African  subjects.^ 

*  Eleven  years  before  we  hear  a  story  of  how  the  Carthaginians  sent 
an  expedition  to  Italy  ;  and  how,  after  it  had  been  tjrouijht  to  a  success- 
ful end,  a  terrible  plague  broke  out  at  home,  so  terrible  that  Carthage 
was  likely  to  lose  her  dominions,  both  Africa  and  Sardinia  revolting 


68 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


On  the  ground  that  the  Carthaginians  had  trespassed 
beyond  their  boundaries,  he  marched  into  their  terri- 
tory with  an  army  of  38,000  infantry  and  3,000 
horse.  Selinus,  Entellus,  and  Eryx,  either  were 
conquered  or  capitulated ;  and  he  then  laid  siege  to 
Lilybaeum,  a  flourishing  port  near  the  promontory  of 
that  name.  At  first  he  pressed  the  siege  with  vigour, 
but  found  that  the  place  was  too  strongly  garrisoned 
to  be  soon  taken.  Then  came  news  that  the  docks 
at  Carthage  had  been  burnt.  Thinking  that  all  the 
enemy's  fleet  must  have  perished,  he  sent  many  of 
his  own  ships  home,  keeping  a  squadron  of  130  at 
Eryx.  The  Carthaginians,  who  seem  not  to  have 
suffered  so  much  as  had  been  thought,  manned  two 
hundred  ships  and  sent  them  to  Sicily.  The  Greek 
admiral  was  taken  by  surprise,  and  lost  more  than 
half  his  squadron.  As  winter  was  now  approaching 
a  truce  was  concluded.  Before  the  time  for  another 
campaign  had  come,  Dionysius  was  dead.^ 

against  her.  "At  this  time,"  says  the  historian  Diodorus,  "there 
fell  on  the  Carthaginians  many  troubles  by  the  ordering  of  the  gods, 
strange  terrors  and  unceasing  panic  fears,  making  men  think  that 
the  enemy  had  entered  into  the  city,  so  that  they  leapt  armed  out  of 
their  houses,  and  fell  upon  one  another,  slaying  some  and  wounding 


some. 


'  He  died,  it  was  said,  from  the  effects  of  a  banquet  which  he  had 
given  to  celebrate  the  success  of  one  of  his  tran;edies  in  a  competition  at 
Athens.  An  oracle  had  told  him  that  he  should  die  when  he  got  the 
better  of  them  that  were  better  than  he.  He  had  understood  this  to 
mean  the  Carthaginians,  and,  says  the  historian,  somewhat  absurdly, 
had  always  been  careful  not  to  push  too  far  his  victories  over  them. 
But  the  real  meaning  of  the  prophecy  was  quite  different.  He  was  a 
bad  poet,  and  yet,  by  the  verdict  of  flattering  judges,  was  judged  to  be 
better  than  poets  who  were  reallv  betlei  than  he.  When  his  tragedy 
was  successful,  the  oracle  was  fulfilled,  and  he  died. 


THE  END   OF   THE    WAR.  69 

The  war  was  not  finished  by  his  death,  but  nothing 
more  of  much  consequence  seems  to  have  happened. 
About  a  year  afterwards  peace  was  concluded,  and  for 
the  next  twenty  years  the  "  story  of  Carthage  "  is 
almost  a  blank. 


^  I , 


V. 


CARTHAGE  AND  TIMOLEON. 


I  SAID  in  my  last  chapter  that  for  twenty  years  and 
more  after  the  death  of  Dionysius  the  story  of  Car- 
thage is  "almost  a  blank."  We  know,  however,  so 
much  about  her  as  to  be  sure  that  she  was  gaining 
strength  in  Sicily.  The  condition  of  the  Greek  cities 
in  that  island  was  going  from  bad  to  worse.  Most  of 
them  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  tyrants,  and  these 
tyrants  were  always  intriguing  or  fighting  against 
each  other.  Carthage  all  the  while  was  steadily 
watching  her  opportunities  and  extending  her  power. 
In  344  she  had  become  so  dangerous  that  some 
Syracusan  citizens,  who  had  been  banished  by  the 
younger  Dionysius,  son  of  the  tyrant  of  that  name  of 
whom  so  much  was  said  in  the  last  chapter,  resolved 
to  call  in  the  aid  of  Corinth.  Corinth  was  the  mother- 
city  of  Syracuse,!  and  the  tie  between  the  two  had 
always  been  close.  The  Corinthians  listened  to  their 
request,  and,  as  it  happened,  had  at  hand  just  the 
man  who  was  wanted.  Timoleon  was  one  of  the  best 
and  noblest  of  their  citizens  ;  but  he  was  the  most 
unhappy.  He  had  had  a  terrible  duty  put  upon  him. 
A  brother  whom  he  had  loved  had  tried  to  make 

«  The  founder  and  first  colonists  of  Syracuse  had  come  from  Corinth. 


TIMOLEON  DECLARES  WAR  AGAINST  CARTHAGE,    yi 

himself  tyrant  in  Corinth,  and  Timoleon  had  ordered 
him  to  be  put  to  death,  or,  as  some  say,  had  killed 
him  with  his  own  hand.  After  this  dreadful  act  done 
to  save  his  country,  he  had  shut  himself  up  in  his 
house.  When  the  Syracusan  envoys  came  with  their 
request,  he  was  glad  to  go,  and  his  countrymen  were 
glad  to  send  him. 

It  was  but  a  small  force  that  Timoleon  could  get 
together  for  his  enterprise — ten  ships  of  war,  and 
seven  hundred  mercenaries.  The  Carthaginians  sent 
a  squadron  to  intercept  him.  This  he  contrived  to 
escape,  and  landed  in  Sicily.  The  tale  of  his  wonder- 
ful achievements  does  not  belong  to  my  story.  It 
must  be  enough  to  say  that  he  gained  possession 
of  Syracuse,  though  one  of  his  opponents  had  actually 
introduced  the  Carthaginians  into  that  city ;  that  he 
gave  it  free  government,  and  that  he  did  the  same 
service  to  other  Sicilian  towns.  To  gain  means  for 
these  enterprises  he  is  said  to  have  plundered  the 
Carthaginian  territory.  However  this  may  be,  we 
may  be  sure  that  Carthage  would  not  look  upon  these 
proceedings  with  favour.  War  was  declared  before 
long,  and  the  Carthaginians  exerted  themselves  to 
the  utmost  to  meet  their  new  enemy.  They  collected 
an  army  of  70,000  (it  may  be  noticed  that  the  num- 
bers become  smaller  and  more  credible  as  we  go  on), 
well  furnished  with  the  artillery  of  the  time,  and 
supplied  with  abundance  of  provisions.  As  usual, 
this  army  consisted  for  the  most  part  of  mercenaries, 
but  it  contained  also  a  numerous  force — one  historian 
puts  it  at  ten  thousand  —  of  native  Carthaginians. 
The  fleet  transported  it  safely  to  Lilybaeum,  and  it 


72 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


at  once  commenced  its  march  eastward.  Timoleon 
had  but  a  small  force  with  which  to  meet  this  great 
host.  In  Syracuse  he  could  not  raise  more  than  three 
thousand  ;  of  mercenary  troops,  after  he  had  sent 
away  a  thousand  laggards  and  cowards,  he  had  about 
as  many  more.  But  he  boldly  marched  out  with  his 
six  thousand,  and  found  the  enemy  encamped  on  the 
river  Crimessus. 

It  was  nearly  midsummer,  and  the  heat  of  the  sun 
had  drawn  up  from  the  low  ground  near  the  river  a 
thick  fog.  The  Greeks  could  see  nothing  of  the 
enemy's  camp,  but  they  could  hear  the  confused  hum 
of  many  voices  rising  up  from  it.  As  the  sun  grew 
stronger,  the  mist  began  to  lift  from  the  valley,  though 
it  still  lingered  on  the  hills  ;  and  as  it  cleared  away 
the  river  could  be  seen,  and  the  great  Carthaginian 
army  in  the  very  act  of  crossing  it,  with  the  four-horse 
chariots  in  front,  and  after  them  a  solid  body  of 
infantry,  ten  thousand  in  number,  splendidly  armed 
and  bearing  white  shields.  These  were  the  native 
Carthaginians,  and  their  march  was  orderly  and  slow. 
After  them  came  the  mixed  crowd  of  hired  troops, 
disorderly  and  unruly,  struggling  who  should  first 
cross  the  river.  Timoleon  saw  his  opportunity,  while 
the  army  of  the  enemy  was  still  divided,  some  being 
actually  in  the  river,  and  some  on  the  further  shore. 
The  native  Carthaginians  were  just  struggling  up  the 
bank  and  forming  themselves  in  line,  when  the  Greek 
cavalry  fell  upon  them.  At  first  charge  after  charge 
was  made  in  vain.  The  chariots  of  the  enemy  were 
driven  furiously  backwards  and  forwards  in  front  of 
the  army,  and  the  Greek  horsemen  had  to  do  their 


BATTLE  OF   THE   CRIMESSUS. 


73 


very  best  to  prevent  their  own  lines  being  broken  by 
them  ;  on  the  lines  of  the  enemy  they  could  make 
no  impression.     Timoleon,  who   had   about  him   a 
small  force  of  Syracusans  and  picked   mercenaries, 
came  up  to  the  help  of  his  cavalry.     They  were  no 
longer,  he  said,  to  attack  the  front  line  of  the  enemy — 
that  with  that  he  would  himself  engage — but  were  to 
fall  upon  the  flanks.    Putting  his  men  into  as  compact 
a  body  as  possible,  something,  we  may  guess,  like  the 
phalanx  with  which  the  Macedonians  won  so  many 
victories,  he  charged  the  enemy.     But  even  he  for 
a  time  could  do  nothing.     The  iron  breastplates,  the 
helmets   of  brass,  the  great   shields  which  covered 
almost  the  whole  of  the  body,  resisted   the  Greek 
spears.     At  this  moment  fortune,  or,  as  the  Greeks 
would  have  said,  Zeus  the  cloud-compeller,  helped 
him.     Suddenly  a  storm,  with  loud  peals  of  thunder 
and  vivid  flashes  of  lightning,  burst  from  the  hills. 
The  mist,  which  had  been  hanging  about  the  heights, 
came  down  again  upon  the  plain,  and  brought  with  it 
a  tempest  of  rain  and  wind  and  hail.     The  Greeks 
only  felt  them  behind  ;  the  Carthaginians  had  them 
dashing  in  their  faces  ;  the  rain  and  hail  and  lightning 
blinded  them  ;  the  thunder  would  not  allow  them  to 
hear  the  words  of  command.     Then  the  ground  grew 
slippery  beneath  their  feet  ;    and  the  heavy  armour 
became  a  hindrance  rather  than  a  protection.     They 
could  hardly  move  from  place  to  place  ;  they  found  it 
difficult  to  stand  ;  when  once  they  had  fallen  it  was 
impossible  to  rise.     Then  came  a  new  trouble.     The 
river,  partly  swollen  by  the  rain,  partly,  it  is  said, 
dammed  back  by  the  multitude  of  troops  that  wcjc 


74 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


;i 


crossing  it,  overflowed  i  banks,  and  the  heavy-armed 
Carthaginians  stumbled  and  rolled  about  in  the  water. 
First  the  front  line  was  cut  to  pieces  ;  then  the  whole 
vanguard  was  broken  ;  finally  the  army  gave  way. 
Many  were  cut  down  in  the  plain,  many  drowned  in 
the  river,  and  yet  more  intercepted  by  the  light  troops 
as  they  were  attempting  to  reach  the  hills.  Ten 
thousand  lay  dead  upon  the  field,  and  of  these  no  less 
than  three  thousand  were  Carthaginian  citizens.  The 
city  had  never  suffered  such  a  loss  before.  It  was 
not  now  Africans  or  Spaniards,  but  her  own  children 
for  whom  she  had  to  mourn. 

Even  after  this  crushing  defeat  the  war  was  not  at 
an  end.  The  Greeks  were,  as  usual,  divided  among 
themselves  ;  and  the  enemies  of  Timoleon  invited 
Carthage  to  continue  the  war,  and  promised  their 
own  help.  Another  battle  was  fought,  and  with  the 
same  result.  Then  Carthage  asked  for  peace.  It  was 
granted  on  the  condition  that  she  should  keep  herself 
to  the  western  side  of  the  Halycus,  and  that  she 
should  not  pretend  to  interfere  with  the  government 
of  the  Sicilian  cities. 


VI. 


CARTHAGE  AND  AGATHOCLES. 

Timoleon  died  in  337  ;  for  twenty  years  and  more 
there  was  peace  in  Sicily ;  then  the  Greeks  fell  out 
among  themselves.  Carthage  was  called  in  to  help 
one  of  the  parties.  Timoleon  had  restored  Syracuse 
to  freedom  ;  but  it  had  fallen  again  into  the  hands  of 
a  tyrant,  Agathocles.  Thousands  of  the  citizens  had 
been  banished  by  the  usurper  ;  and  these,  under  the 
leadership  of  a  certain  Deinocratcs,  made  a  treaty 
with  Carthage.  In  309  a  powerful  expedition  set 
sail  for  Sicily.  There  was  a  contingent  of  native 
Carthaginians  numbering  two  thousand,  among  whom 
were  some  of  the  noblest-born  of  the  citizens,  African 
and  Italian  mercenaries,  and  a  thousand  slingers  from 
the  Balearic  Islands.  Its  start  was  unlucky.  A  great 
storm  sank  sixty  of  the  ships  of  war,  and  more  than 
two  hundred  transports,  and  the  rest  of  the  fleet 
reached  Sicily  in  a  sadly  battered  condition.  It  was 
easy,  however,  to  find  recruits  in  the  island,  and 
Hamilcar,  who  was  in  command,  had  soon  under 
him  an  army  of  40,000  infantry  and  5.000  horse. 
Agathocles  met  him  at  a  place  famous  in  the  history 
of  Sicilian  wars,  the  river  Himera.  The  battle  thdt 
followed  began  well  for  the  Greeks.     Some  troops 


I 


f    f 


'! 


76 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


which    Agathocles    had    put    in    ambush   near    the 
river  fell  upon  a  Carthaginian  detachment  as  it  was 
crossing  the  stream,  laden  with  plunder,  and  drove 
them  in  confusion  to  their  camp.     Their  commander 
thought  it  a  good  opportunity  for  a  general  attack. 
At    first    everything   went   well  ;    the   Greek    army 
assaulted  the  Carthaginian  camp,  and  at  one  time 
seemed  likely  to  take  it.      Then  the  fortune  of  the 
day  changed.      The   Balearic  slingers  were  brought 
into  action,  and   killed  and  wounded  many  of  the 
assailants.     These  still  kept  up  the  attack,  but  at  this 
moment  appeared  a  fresh  squadron  from  Africa,  and 
took  them  in  the  rear.     The  defenders  of  the  camp 
took  fresh  courage  ;  the  attack  was  finally  repulsed, 
and  soon  changed  into  a  rout.     Five  miles  of  level 
ground  lay  between  the  two  camps  ;  the  Carthaginian 
cavalry  could    act    on   this  with  freedom,  and   they 
made  dreadful  havoc  among  the  fugitives.     Another 
cause,  and  this  a  strange  one,  increased  the  Greek 
loss.     The  battle  was  fought  in  the  heat  of  summer 
and  at  midday.     Many  of  the  fugitives  had  made  for 
the  river  rather  than  for  their  camp,  and  they  reached 
it  in  a  state  of  raging  thirst.     The  water  was  salt,  or 
at  least  strongly  brackish,   but  they  drank  greedily 
of   it,   and    with    fatal    results.      Many   unwounded 
corpses  were  found  upon  the  banks.     The  total  loss 
of  the  Greeks  was  seven  thousand,  that  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians not  more  than  fiv  e  hundred.    Agathocles  shut 
himself  up  in  Gela,  hoping  thus  to  divert  Hamilcar's 
attention  from  Syracuse,  where  the  people  would  then 
gain  time  to  gather  in  their  harvests.     The  Cartha- 
ginian general  began  the  siege,  but  seeing  that  he  had 


AGATHOCLES   IN  EXTREMITIES. 


11 


little  chance  of  taking  the  place,  soon  changed  his 
plan.  His  first  step  was  to  win  over  the  other  Greek 
cities  by  kind  treatment  and  liberal  offers.  Many  of 
them  joined  him  ;  their  own  danger  was  imminent, 
and  they  hated  Agathocles. 

Reduced  to  the  last  extremity,  for  nearly  all  Sicily, 
with  the  exception  of  Syracuse,  was  lost  to  him,  this 
extraordinary   man    conceived    one    of   the   boldest 
devices    which   history   records.      He  determined  to 
transfer  the  war  to  Carthage  itself.      That  city,  he 
knew,  was  not  prepared  for  an  attack,  and  its  African 
subjects  were  always  ill-affected,  and  he  believed,  and 
rightly  believed,  that  it  could  be  best  attacked.     This 
scheme  he  kept  a  profound  secret.      The  measures 
that  he  took  for  carrying  it  out  were  most  skilful, 
and,  it  must  be  added,  most  unprincipled.     He  began 
by  choosing  the  force  which  he  was  to  take  with  him 
most  carefully.     The  greater  part  of  it  was  cavalry. 
Horses  he  had  no  means  of  transporting  to  Africa, 
but  he  hoped  to  find  them  there,  and  the  men  were 
ordered  to  furnish  themselves  with  bridles  and  saddles. 
He  had  to  guard  against  a  revolution  in  Syracuse 
during   his   absence;    and    he   was   careful   to    take 
hostage  for  good  behaviour  from  all  the  mo.>t  power- 
ful   families    in    the   city  ;    putting   one  brother,   for 
instance,  in  the  garrison,  and  enlisting  another  in  his 
own  army.     Then  he  wanted  money.     He  gave  notice 
that  any  citizen  who  might  be  unwilling  or  unable  to 
endure   the   hardships  of  a  siege  was  at  liberty   to 
depart.     The  offer  was  accepted  by  numbers  of  the 
rich.     They  had  the  means  of  living  elsewhere,  and 
they  hated  the  rule  of  the  tyrant.     They  were  accord- 


if 

I' 


i 


78 


THE   STORY   OF  CARTHAGE, 


ingly  permitted  to  depart,  and  to  take  their  property 
with  them.  But  Agathocles  sent  some  of  his  mer- 
cenaries after  them.  The  unhappy  men  were  robbed 
and  murdered,  and  the  tyrant  found  himself  amply 
provided  with  means. 

He    then   embarked   his   force,  which   filled  sixty 
ships  of    war.     The  first  necessity  was  to  avoid  the 
blockading  squadron,  which  was  much  stronger  than 
his  own.     Just  at  the  right  time  a  fleet  of  corn-ships 
appeared   off  the  harbour.      The   Carthaginians    left 
their  post  to  pursue  them,  and  Agathocles  took   the 
opportunity  to  get  out  of  the  harbour.     For  a  time 
the  Carthaginian  admiral  expected  an  attack,  thinking 
that  the  Syracusan  fleet  had  come  out  to  fight  for  the 
corn-ships  ;  then  seeing  that  it  was  sailing  in  the  other 
direction,  he  gave  chase.     The  result  was  a  double 
success  to  Agathocles.     The  corn-ships  got  safely  into 
harbour,  and    relieved    the    city,   which  was  already 
beginning  to  suffer  from  scarcity ;  and  the  squadron, 
which   had  got  a  considerable  start,  escaped.     The 
escape,  indeed,  was  a  narrow  one.    The  race  lasted  for 
five  days  and   nights.     On  the  morning  of  the  sixth 
day  the  Carthaginian  fleet  unexpectedly  appeared  close 
at  hand.     Both  sides  strained  every  nerve ;    but  the 
Greeks  won  the  race.     They  reached  the  land  first, 
but  the  foremost  of  the  Carthaginian  ships  were  close 
upon  them.     In  the  skirmish  that  followed  these  were 
too  weak  to  act  with  any  effect,  and  Agathocles  not 
only  landed  in  safety,  but  was  able  to  fortify  a  camp, 
close  to  which  he  beached  his  ships. 

But  he  had  in  his  mind  a  yet  bolder  stroke.     He 
burnt  his  ships.     Forced  thus  to  give  up  all  hope  of 


H 
U 

D 

Q 

< 
< 

u 

p— < 

C4 
< 


78 


THE   STORY   OF   CARTHAGE. 


ingly  permitted  to  depart,  and  to  take  their  property 
with  them.  But  Agathocles  sent  some  of  his  mer- 
cenaries after  them.  The  unhappy  men  were  robbed 
and  murdered,  and  the  tyrant  found  himself  amply 
provided  with  means. 

He    then    embarked    his    force,  which   filled  sixty 
ships  of    war.     The  first  necessitx-  was  to  axoid  the 
blockading  squadron,  which  was  much  stronger  than 
his  own.     Just  at  the  right  time  a  fleet  of  corn-ships 
appeared   off  the  harbour.      The   Carthaginians    left 
their  post  to  pursue  them,  and  Agathocles  took   the 
opp(irtunity  to  get  out  of  the  harbour.     For  a  tnne 
the  Carthaginian  admiral  e.x'pected  an  attack,  thinking 
that  the  Syracusan  fleet  had  come  out  to  fii^ht  for  the 
corn-ships  ;  then  seeing  that  it  was  sailing  in  the  other 
direction,   he  gave   chase.     The  result   was  a  double 
success  to  Agathocles.     The  corn -ships  got  safely  into 
harbour,  and    relieved    the    city,   which  was  already 
beginning  to  suffer  from  scarcity ;  and  the  squadron, 
which   had  got  a  considerable  start,   escaped.     The 
escape,  indeed,  was  a  narrow  one.    The  race  lasted  for 
five  days  and   night.s.     On  the  morning  of  the  sixth 
day  the  Carthaginian  fleet  unexpectedlv  appeared  clo.se 
at  hand.     Both  sides  strained  every  nerve  ;    but  the 
Greeks  won  the  race.     They  reached  the  land  first, 
but  the  foremost  of  the  Carthaginian  ships  were  close 
upon  them.     In  the  skirmish  that  folhjwed  these  were 
too  weak  to  act  with  any  effect,  and  Agathocles  not 
only  landed  in  safety,  but  was  able  to  fortify  a  camp, 
close  to  which  he  beached  his  ships 

But  he  had  in  his  mind  a  yet  bolder  stroke.     He 
burnt  his  ships.     Forced  thus  to  give  up  all  hope  of 


i 


I' 

If 


H 
D 

D 

< 

u 

1—4 

< 


AGATHOCLES  INVADES  AFRICA, 


8i 


escape,  the  army  must  now  conquer  or  perish.     At 
first  they  were  in  despair ;    but  Agathocles  did  not 
give  them  much  time  to  think  about  their  situation. 
He    led    them    to    attack    a   district    in  which  the 
wealthiest  citizens  of  Carthage  had  their  farms  and 
country  houses.     It  was  a  region  of  rich  pastures,  of 
oliveyards   and   vineyards,   and    the    Sicilians   were 
astonished  at  the  plenty  which  they  saw.     Two  towns 
fell  easily  into  their  hands,  and  their  despair  was  soon 
changed  into  confidence.     At  Carthage  there  was  the 
utmost  dismay.     It  was  commonly  believed  that  the 
whole  force  in  Sicily  had  perished,  for  no  one  could 
suppose  that  Agathocles  could  have  ventured  to  leave 
Syracuse  in  danger  and  attack  Africa.     Some  were 
for  treating  for  .peace ;  others  advised  delay  till  the 
truth  could  be  found  out.     When  news  of  what  had 
really  happened  arrived,  they  were,  of  course,  greatly 
encouraged,  and  prepared  to  attack  the  invaders. 

In  the  first  battle  that  took  place,  it  is  interest- 
ing to  see  the  list  of  combatants  on  either  side. 
Agathocles,  besides  his  own  Syracusans,  had  Sam- 
nites,  Etruscans,  and  Celts  (probably  Gauls)  in  his 
army.  The  whole  amounted  to  about  eleven  thou- 
sand, but  many  of  them  were  insufficiently  armed. 
There  was  no  little  discouragement  among  them,^ 
and  the  result  seemed  doubtful.  The  day,  indeed, 
might   have    gone    in   favour   of    Carthage   but    for 

'  A  strange  story  is  told  of  the  device  by  which  Agathocles  endea- 
voured to  give  confidence  to  his  men  He  had  a  number  of  tame  o.vls 
which  he  let  loose  in  the  court.  The  birds  settled  on  the  shields  and 
helmets  of  the  soldiers.  The  owl  was  the  sacred  bi-d  of  Athene 
(Minerva),  and  the  soldiers  looked  upon  this  incident  as  a  proof  of  the 
goddess'  favour. 


82 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


I 


pi 


';i 


the  misfortune  of  the  death  of  one  of  her  generals, 
and  the  treachery  of  another.  The  two  SufTetes 
of  the  year  were  Hanno  and  Bomilcar.  Hanno 
was  in  command  of  the  Sacred  Band  of  native 
Carthaginians.  Eager  to  break  the  opposing  Hne, 
where  Agathocles  himself  was  in  command,  he 
exposed  himself  too  rashly,  and  was  killed.  Bomil- 
car had  designs  of  making  himself  a  tyrant  in 
Carthage,  and  felt  that  the  defeat  of  the  invaders 
would  not  help  him  in  his  object.  He  seems  even 
to  have  had  a  treacherous  understanding  with  the 
enemy.  To  his  own  officers  he  pretended  that  the 
death  of  his  colleague  made  it  necessary  to  retreat. 
The  Carthaginian  mercenaries  soon  took  to  flight; 
the  Sacred  Host  held  its  ground  for  a  long  time,  but 
was  at  last  compelled  to  retreat.  The  camp  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Greeks. 

Agathocles  continued  his  successes,  and  carried 
the  war  almost  up  to  the  walls  of  Carthage.  Mean- 
while things  had  been  going  well  with  him  at  Syracuse. 
Hamilcar  had  made  a  night  attack  upon  the  city,  had 
failed,  and  had  been  taken  prisoner.  His  head  was 
cut  off,  and  sent  to  Agathocles  in  Africa.  Carthage 
suffered  defeat  after  defeat  in  a  series  of  battles,  which 
it  would  be  tedious  to  relate.  At  last  the  people 
found  out  one  cause,  at  least,  of  their  ill-fortune. 
Bomilcar  had  all  along  been  playing  the  part  of 
a  traitor.  He  now  thought  that  the  time  was  come 
for  seizing  the  prize  of  absolute  power  which  he  had 
always  had  in  view.  He  ordered  a  review  of  the 
troops  in  the  city,  When  it  had  been  held,  he  dis- 
missed   all  that  were  not  pledged  to   support   him. 


a: 
r- 


< 


REVOLT  OF  BOMILCAR, 


?5 


Keeping  the  remainder,  five  hundred  native  Carthagi- 
nians and  five  thousand  mercenaries,  he  proclaimed 
himself  king,  and  commenced  a  massacre  of  all  his 
opponents.  If  Agathocles  outside  the  walls  had  known 
of  what  was  going  on,  and  had  arranged  an  attack 
for  the  same  time,  Carthage  was  lost.     The  battle  in 
the  streets  raged  fiercely.     Bomilcar  and  his  adherents 
forced  their  way  into  the  market-place.     But  the  place 
could  not  be  held.     It  was  surrounded  on  all  sides  by 
lofty  houses,  which  were  occupied  by  the  friends  of 
the  government,  and  from  which  showers  of  javelins 
were  discharged   on   the   revolters.      Bomilcar    was 
compelled  to  retreat  into  the  New  City.     Finally  a 
truce  was  agreed  to.     An  amnesty  was  promised,  and 
the  rebels  laid  down  their  arms.     But  Bomilcar  was 
too  dangerous  a  person,  and  had  done  too  much  harm, 
to  be   allowed  to  escape.     The  rulers  of  Carthage, 
never  much  troubled  by  scruples,  moral  or  religious, 
broke   their  oath   and   crucified   him.      The  tide  of 
success  did  not    turn   at    once.      Agathocles    took 
Utica,!  the  largest  of  the  Phoenician  cities  in  Africa 
after  Carthage,  and  a  number  of  other  towns,  til) 
Carthage  was  almost  stripped  of  allies  and  subjects. 

Agathocles  was  now  recalled  by  urgent  affairs  tc 
Syracuse.  He  left  his  son  Archagathus  in  command 
oi  the  African  army.  Archagathus  was  too  ambitious, 
and    undertook    enterprises,   especially   against    the 

'  Another  strange  story  is  told  cf  the  device  which  he  used  in 
approaching  this  city.  He  had  captured  three  hundred  of  the  chief 
Citizens.  These  he  suspended  alive  on  a  tower  which  he  brought  up 
close  to  the  gates,  and  which  he  had  filled  with  archers  and  slingers. 
The  defenders  of  Utica  could  not  deft-nd  themselves  agauist  this  attack 
without  wounding  or  killing  their  own  cuuniiyiucn. 


86 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


\f  andering  tribes  of  the  interior,  for  which  his  strength 
was  not  sufficient.     Carthage,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
now  under  wiser  rule.     The  army  was  divided  into 
three  corps,  each  of  which  carried  on  separate  opera- 
tions against  the  invaders.     Archagathus  suffered  a 
great  defeat  under  the  walls  of  the  city,  and  was  also 
weakened  by  the  revolt  of  many  of  his  allies.     His 
father  now  returned  from  Sicily,  and  for  a  time  re- 
stored the  balance.    But  an  attack  on  the  Carthaginian 
camp  proved  to  be  a  failure.     Then  occurred  a  strange 
succession  of  changes  of  fortune.     The  Carthaginians, 
in  celebrating  their  last  victory  after  their  own  hideous 
fashion  with  human  sacrifice,  set  fire  to  their  camp. 
When  the  confusion  was  at  its  highest,  some  African 
mercenaries,  who  had  taken  service  with  Agathocles, 
deserted  to  the  Carthaginians.     Their  approach  was 
taken  as  an  hostile  attack,  and  a  general  panic  followed. 
When  the  mistake  was   discovered,  some   were  ad- 
mitted into  the  city,  and  there  made  the  very  same 
panic  among  the  Greeks  which  they  had  just  made 
among    the    Carthaginians.      Agathocles    lost    more 
than  four  thousand   men   through  this  mishap.     His 
African  allies  now  left  him,  and  he  began  to  despair 
of  success.     He  had  no  hope  of  being  able  to  get  terms 
from  the  enemy,  and  no  means  of  carrying  away  his 
army.       His  plan  was  to  depart  secretly,  taking  the 
younger  of  his  two  sons  with  him.     But  Archagathus 
the  elder  discovered  the  scheme,  and  revealed  it  to 
the  army.   The  soldiers,  furious  at  the  thought  of  being 
thus  deserted,  mutinied,  seized  Agathocles  and  put  him 
in  chains.     Everything  was  now  in  disorder.    Finally, 
Agathocles  contrived  to  escape  from  confinement,  and 


I 


PYRRHUS. 


89 


to  make  his  way  to  Sicily.  The  army  being  thus 
abandoned,  revenged  itself  by  murdering  his  sons,  and 
then  made  peace  with  Carthage.  They  gave  up  all  the 
towns  which  they  had  captured,  and  received  three 
hundred  talents,  a  free  passage  for  such  as  wished  to 
go,  and  service  in  the  army  of  Carthage  for  such  as 
preferred  to  remain.  The  city  had  been  besieged  for 
four  years.  It  was  now  safe,  and,  indeed,  seems  to 
have  soon  recovered  her  old  strength.  A  few  years 
afterwards  we  find  her  helping  her  old  enemy 
Agathocles — in  return,  no  doubt,  for  substantial 
advantages — to  make  himself  supreme  over  Sicily. 

The  last  Greek  antagonist  with  whom  Carthage 
had  to  deal  might  well  have  been  the  most  formidable 
of  all.  Pyrrhus,  king  of  Epirus,^  was  of  the  kindred  of 
Alexander  the  Great,  through  Alexander's  mother, 
Olympias.  He  had  conceived  a  scheme  of  conquest 
which  should  be  like  that  achieved  by  his  famous 
kinsman.  But  as  Alexander  had  gone  eastward,  so 
he  would  go  westward.  His  famous  conversation  with 
his  philosophical  adviser  will  show  us  what  were  his 
plans,  and  I  will  give  it,  as  Plutarch  tells  it,  in  dialogue 
form  : 

CiNEAS.  The  Romans,  my  lord  Pyrrhus,  are  said  to 
be  great  warriors,  and  to  rule  over  many  nations.  If, 
by  the  favour  of  God,  we  conquer  them,  what  use  shall 
we  make  of  our  victory  ? 

Pyrrhus.  That  is  an  easy  question  to  answer. 
There  will  be  no  city,  Greek  or  barbarian,  that,  if 
Rome  be  once  conquered,  will  be  able  to  withstand 
us.    We  shall  certainly  gain  the  whole  of  Italy,  of 

^  The  modern  Albania. 


I 


90 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


PYRRHUS  LEAVES  SICILY. 


91 


1 


the  greatness,  excellence,  and  wealth  of  which  you,  of 
all  men,  cannot  be  ignorant. 

CiNEAS  (after  a  brief  silence).  After  gaining  Italy, 
what  shall  we  do  next  ? 

Pyrrhus  (not  yet  seeing  his  drift).  Close  to  Italy 
is  Sicily,  stretching  out  her  hands  to  us,  a  wealthy 
island  and  a  populous,  and  easy  to  subdue.  Since 
the  death  of  Agathocles  it  has  been  all  confusion,  for 
lack  of  government  in  the  city  and  the  folly  of  them 
that  lead  the  people. 

CiNEAS.  That  is  like  enough.  When  we  have  con- 
quered Sicily,  shall  we  come  to  an  end  of  our  wars  ? 

Pyrrhus.  Heaven  prosper  our  undertakings  so  far ! 
Well,  then,  who  would  not  go  on  to  Africa  and  Car- 
thage, Carthage  which  will  then  be  in  my  grasp? 
Did  not  Agathocles,  though  he  had  to  run  away,  so 
to  speak,  from  Syracuse,  with  only  a  handful  of  ships, 
come  very  near  to  taking  it  ? 

We  are  not  concerned  just  now  with  the  rest  of  the 
conversation, or  with  the  moral  which  Cineas  drew  from 
it.^  It  was  a  splendid  plan,  and  Pyrrhus  was  one  who 
had  all  the  genius  that  was  wanted  to  carry  it  out. 
Hannibal,  no  mean  judge  in  such  a  matter,  thought 
him  the  greatest  general  2  that  had  ever  lived.  But 
the  beginning  of  his  great  enterprise  was  the  hardest 
part  of  it — too  hard,  indeed,  for  him  to  accomplish. 

«  Briefly  it  was  this  :  "  Master  of  Carthage,"  said  Pyrrhus,  "  I  shall 
come  and  make  myself  lord  of  Greece."  '*  Doubtless,"  said  Cineas; 
"  and  what  then  ?  "  '*  Then,"  answered  the  king,  with  a  laugh,  *'  then 
we  will  sit  down  and  enjoy  ourselves."  "Why  not  sit  down  NOW?* 
was  the  philosopher's  reply. 

*  Another  version  of  the  story  puts  Alexander  first  and  Pyrrhus 
second. 


He  spent  his  strength  in  vain  on  Rome.  He  defeated 
her  armies,  but  he  could  not  conquer  her.  Rome,  wc 
may  say,  saved  Carthage  from  conquest.  These  two 
were  to  fight  for  the  mastery  of  the  West. 

His  own  dealings  with  Carthage  may  be  briefly 
told.  After  two  campaigns  in  Italy,  in  which  he  had 
won  much  glory  but  little  else,  he  passed  over  into 
Sicily  in  the  spring  of  278.  The  Greek  cities  had 
invited  him  to  come ;  they  wanted  him  to  help  them 
against  their  old  enemy  Carthage.  At  first  he  carried 
everything  before  him,  but  Carthage  offered  him  a 
large  sum  of  money  and  a  fleet  which  should  co- 
operate with  him  in  his  enterprises.  He  refused  these 
terms.  Nothing,  he  said,  would  satisfy  him — and  we 
cannot  but  admire  his  fine  feeling  for  the  honour  of 
the  Greek  name — but  that  Carthage  should  quit  the 
island  altogether  and  make  the  sea  the  boundary 
between  Greece  and  herself  After  this  his  good 
fortune  left  him.  The  Greeks  grew  weary  of  ih  ir  ally. 
They  plotted  against  him,  and  he  retaliated  with 
severities  which  made  them  hate  him  still  more. 
Then  he  failed  in  an  attempt  to  storm  the  fortress  of 
Lilybaeum  ;  and  even  his  reputation  as  a  soldier  was 
damaged.  At  last  there  was  nothing  left  for  him  but 
to  go.  "  How  fair  a  wrestling  ring,"  he  said,  as  he 
looked  back  from  his  ship  upon  the  island ;  "  how  fair 
a  wrestling  ring,  my  friends,  are  we  leaving  to  Rome 
and  Carthage ! "  In  the  fourth  part  of  my  storjp'  I 
shall  tell  the  tale  of  this  wrestling  match. 


V 


I 


PART  III. 


THE  INTERNAL  HISTORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


I. — Carthaginian  Discoverers. 
II. — Constitution  and  Religion  of  Carthage. 
Ill, — Revenue  and  Trade  of  Carthage. 


itf 


CARTHAGINIAN  DISCOVERERS. 


The  "  Story  of  Carthage  "  is  mainly  a  story  of  war. 
Of  the  people  themselves  and  of  their  life  we  hear  very 
little  indeed,  and  that  little  either  from  enemies  or 
strangers.  But  there  are  some  exceptions,  and  of 
them  the  most  interesting  is  the  account  of  the  voyage 
of  colonization  and  discovery  made  by  Hanno,  an 
account  which  has  been  preserved  ;  not  indeed  in  his 
own  language—for  of  the  Carthaginian  tongue  we  have 
but  a  few  words  remaining— but  in  a  Greek  translation. 
The  date  of  Hanno  is  not  certain.  He  is  supposed  to 
have  been  either  the  father  or  the  son  of  the  Hamilcar 
who  fell  at  Himera.  There  is  little  to  make  the  one 
supposition  more  probable  than  the  other.  On  the 
whole,  I  am  inclined  to  accept  the  earlier  time.  Car- 
thage was  certainly  more  prosperous,  and  therefore 
more  likely  to  send  out  such  an  expedition  before  the 
disaster  of  Himera  than  after  it.  In  this  case  the 
date  may  be  put  as  520  B.C.  Hanno's  account  of 
his  voyage  is  interesting  enough  to  be  given  in  full. 
I  shall  add  a  few  notes  on  points  that  seem  to  require 

explanation. 
"  It  was  decreed  by  the  Carthaginians  that  Hanno 


96 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


should  sail'  beyond  the  Pillars  of  Hercules^  and 
found  cities  of  the  Liby-Phenicians.3  Accordingly 
he  sailed  with  sixty  ships  of  fifty  oars  each,  and  a 
multitude  of  men  and  women  to  the  number  of  thirty 
thousand,'^  and  provisions  and  other  equipment. 

«  When  we  had  set  sail  and  passed  the  Pillars,  after 
two  days'  voyage,  we  founded  the  first  city  and  named 
it  Thymiaterium.  Below  this  city  lay  a  great  plain. 
Sailing  thence  westward  we  came  to  Soloeis,5  a 
promontory  of  Libya,  thickly  covered  with  trees. 
Here  we  built  a  temple  to  Poseidon  ;  6  and  pro- 
ceeded thence  half-a-day's  journey  eastward,  till  we 
reached  a  lake  lying  not  far  from  the  sea,  and 
filled  with  abundance  of  great  reeds.  Here  were 
feeding  elephants  and  a  great  number  of  other  wild 

animals.  ,  ,     i  i 

"After  we  had  gone  a  day's  sail  beyond  the  lakes  we 
founded  cities  near  to  the  sea,  of  which  the  names 
were  the  Fort  of  Caricon,  Gytta,  Acra,  Melita,  and 
Arambys.      Sailing  thence  we  came  to  Lixus,?  a 

.  The  hfatory  of  the  voyage  is  called  Periplusot  "Circumnavigation." 
The  Greek  narrative  exists  in  a  MS.  in  the  Library  of  Heidelberg,  and 
was  first  published  in  1533. 

»  The  Straits  of  Gibraltar.  ^u,„i„i,„. 

3  A  mixed  population  springing  from  mamages  of  Carth^n  ans 
with  native  Africans,  and  regarded  with  much  jealousy  by  the  authont.es 

"'^T^lr  number  is  probably  exaggerated.    It  n^ed  not,  however  be 
supposed  that  all  the  colonists  were  conveyed  m  the  sixty  sh.ps.    The.e 
were  probably  ships  of  war  which  convoyed  a  number  of  merchantmen 
whkh  discharged  their  cargoes  of  passengers  as  the  various  colomes  were 

founded. 

5  Cape  Cantin.  ,  . 

6  The  Latin  Neptune,  perhaps  the  Phoenician  Dagon. 

f  The  Wadi  Draa. 


ALONG   THE  AFRICAN  COAST, 


97 


great  river  which  flows  from  Libya.  On  its  banks 
the  LixitrTi,  a  wandering  tribe,  were  feeding  their 
flocks.  With  these  we  made  friendship,  and  remained 
among  them  certain  days.  Beyond  these  dwell  the 
Inhospitable  ^Ethiopians,  inhabiting  a  country  that 
abounds  in  wild  beasts  and  is  divided  by  high  moun- 
tains, from  which  mountains  flows,  it  is  said,  the  river 
Lixus.  About  these  mountains  dwell  the  Troglodytar, 
men  of  strange  aspect.^  Of  these  the  Lixitae  said 
that  they  could  rur  swifter  than  horses.  Having  pro- 
cured interpreters  from  these  same  Lixitae,  we  coasted 
for  two  days  along  an  uninhabited  country,  going 
southwards.  Thence  again  we  sailed  a  day's  journey 
eastward.  Here  in  the  recess  of  a  certain  bay  we 
found  a  small  island,  about  five  furlongs  in  circum- 
ference. In  this  we  made  a  settlement,  and  called  its 
name  Cerne.^  We  judged  from  our  voyage  that 
this  place  lay  right  oppo.sit^  to  Carthage,3  for  the 
voyage  from  Carthage  to  the  Pillars  was  equal  to  the 
voyage  from  the  Pillars  to  Cerne.  After  this,  sailing 
up  a  great  river   which  is  called  Chretes,'^  we  came 

^  Possibly  negroes. 

^  Cerne  is  probably  to  be  placed  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  de  Ouro. 
Some  of  the  French  charts  give  the  name  of  Ilcrne,  which  is  said  to 
resemb  e  a  name  used  by  the  natives. 

3  There  is  some  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  this  expression.  Mr. 
Bunbury  suggests  that  it  may  mean  that  the  distance  from  Carthage  to  the 
Straitsof  Gibraltar,  and  from  ihe  Strait- again  to  Cerne  being  equal,  these 
two  would  be  the  ^des  of  an  ico.sceles  triangie,  of  which  the  base  would  be 
the  line  drawn  between  Carthajje  and  Cerne.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
the  ancients  had  nothing  like  the  correct  notions  which  we  have  since  been 
enabled  to  form  of  the  relative  positions  of  the  various  countries  of  the 
world.  From  Cerne  Hanno  made  two  voyages  of  discovery,  which  he 
now  proceeds  to  describe. 

^  The  Senegal,  which  opens  out  into  such  an  expanse  near  its  mouth. 


98 


THE  STORY  OF  CAKTHAGE. 


to  a  lake,  in  which  are  three   islands  greater  than 
Cern6     P  oceeding  thence  a  day's  sail,  we  came  to 
Sunhest  shore  of  the  lake.     Here  it  is  overhung  by 
great  mountains,  in  which  dwell  savage  men  clothed 
with  the  skins  of  beasts.    These  drove  us  away,  pelt  ng 
Is  with  stones,  so  that  we  could  not  land^    Sa.hng 
Sence  we  came  to  another  river,  great  and  broad,  and 
ulTof  crocodiles  and  river-horses.    Thence  returnmg 
ba  k  we  came  again  to  Cerne;  and  from  Cerne  we 
saUed    again   towards    the    south   for    twelve  days. 


VOTIVE  STELE  FROM  CARTHAGE  (HIPPOPOTAMUS). 

coasting  along  the  land.  The  whole  of  this  land  is 
inhabited  by  Ethiopians.  These  would  not  await  our 
approach,  but  fled  from  us  ;  and  their  tongue  cou  d 
not  be  understood  even  by  the  Lixitee  that  were  with 
us  On  the  last  day,  we  came  near  to  certain  large 
mountains  covered  with  trees,  and  the  wood  of  these 
trees  was  sweet-scented  and  of  divers  colours.  Sailing 
by  these  mountains  for  the  space  of  two  days,  we  came 

But  there  is  a  difficulty  about  the  mountains,  which  it  is  not  ^asy  tQ 
identify  with  anything  in  the  lower  course  of  this  nver. 


GORILLAS. 


99 


to  a  great  opening  of  the  sea;  and  on  either  side  of 
this  sea  was  a  great  plain,  from  which  at  night  we  saw 
fire  arising  in  all  directions.     Here  we  watered,  and 
afterwards   sailed    for   five  days,  until  we  came  to  a 
great  bay,  which  the  interpreters  told  us  was  called  the 
Western  Horn.^    In  this  bay  was  a  large  island,  and  in 
this  island  a  lake  of  salt  v/ater,  and  again  in  this  lake 
another  island.     Here  we  landed  ;  and  in  the  daytime 
we  could  find  nothing,  but  saw  wood  ashes  ;  but  in  the 
night  we  saw  many  fires  burning,  and  heard  the  sound 
of  flutes  and  cymbals  and  drums  and   the  noise  of 
confused  shouts.    Great  fear  then  came  upon  us,  and  the 
prophet  bade  us  leave  this  place.     We  sailed  therefore 
quickly  thence,  being  much  terrified ;  and  passing  on 
for  four  days  found  at  night  a  country  full  of  fire.     In 
the  middle  was  a  lofty  fire,  greater  than  all  the  rest,  so 
that  it  seemed  to  touch  the  stars.     When  day  came 
we  found  that  this  was  a  great  mountain  which  they 
call  the   Chariot  of  the  Gods.2      On  the   third   day 
of  our  departure  thence,  having  sailed  by  streams  of 
fire,  we  came  to  a  bay  which  is  called  the  Southern 
Horn.3      At  the  end  of  this  bay  lay  an  island  like 
to  that  which  has  been  before  described.     This  island 
had    a   lake,  and  in  this  lake  another  island,  full  of 
savage  people,  of  whom  the  greater  part  were  women. 
Their  bodies  were  covered  with  hair,  and  our  inter- 
preters called  them  Gorillas.     We  pursued  them,  but 
the  men  we  were  not  able  to  catch  ;  for  being  able  to 
climb  the  precipices  and  defending  themselves  with 

'  The  Gulf  of  Bissagos. 

=  Mt.  Sagres. 

3  Slierboro'  Island  and  Sound,  a  little  distance  south  of  Sierra  Leone. 


lOO 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


Stones,  these  all  escaped.  But  we  caught  three 
women.  But  when  these,  biting  and  tearing  those 
that  led  them,  would  not  follow  us,  we  slew  them, 
and  flaying  off  their  skins,  carried  these  to  Carthage. 
Further  we  did  not  sail,  for  our  food  failed  us." 

This  account  was  set,  we  are  told,  by  Hanno  on  his 
return  to  Carthage  in  the  temple  of  Chronos  or  Saturn 
—the  same,  as  has  been  already  said,  as  the  Moloch 

of  Scripture. 

The  elder  Pliny,  after  mentioning  the  voyage  of 
Hanno,  which  he  strangely  enough  supposes  to  have 
extended  as  far  as  the  borders  of  Arabia,  says,  "At 
the   same    time    Himilco   was   sent   to   discover   the 
northern  coasts  of  Europe."    Unhappily,  we  possess  no 
account  of  Himilco's  voyage  that  can  be  compared  to 
the  "Circumnavigation"  of  Hanno.     All  that  we  know 
of  his  narrative  comes  to  us  from  Avienus,  a  very 
indifferent    Latin  poet,  who  wrote  about    geography 
towards  the  end  of  the  fourth  century  of  the  Christian 
era.     And  what  Avienus  professes  to  quote  from  him 
has    a    very   incredible    look.       It    took    him    four 
months  to  sail  from  Carthage  to  a  country  which  was 
probably    Britain  ;     not,    as   we    might    suppose,   on 
account  of  rough  seas  and  stormy  winds,  but  because 
there  are  no  breezes  to  make  a  ship  move,  or  because 
there  were  such  quantities  of  seaweed  that  it  was  held 
by  them  as  much  as  if  it  were  passing  through  a  wood. 
Perpetual    fogs   covered    everything.      Besides   these 
difficulties  the  sailor  had  to  steel  himself  against  the 
terrible  sight  of  strange  sea-monsters  with  which  these 
waters  abounded.      Avienus  professes  to  have  seen 
the  narrative  of  Himilco.  and  to  quote  from  it  directly. 


A   STRANGE   TALE. 


lOI 


The  ancients  were  not  very  scrupulous  in  such  mat- 
ters, and    it   is  just  possible  that  Avienus  took  his 
information  at  second  hand.     It  has  been  suggested 
that  the  Carthaginians,  jealous  about  their  trade  and 
afraid   that   other  dealers  should   meddle  with  their 
markets,!  instructed  Himilco  to  write  such  an  account 
of  his   voyage  as  would  deter  every  one  else  from 
following  in  his  steps.      It  is  certainly  not  sluggish 
seas  and   winds  not  strong  enough  to  move  a  ship 
which   are    the    obstacles   a   traveller   sailing    north 
would  chiefly  have  to  dread.      However  this  may  be, 
Himilco   the  discoverer   is  little  more   than  a  name 
to  us.  '  I 

'  It  may  possibly  have  betn  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  Carthaginians 
were  ready  to  attack  the  Phoc.eans  at  Alalia  that  these  bold  sailors  had 
visited  Tartessus  (probably  Gades),  had  made  friends  with  its  king,  and 
so  intruded  into  regions  which  the  city  of  merchants  considered  to  be 
its  own. 


\ 


II. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  RELIGION    OF   CARTHAGE. 

We  know  something  of  the  Constitution  of  Carthage, 
for  Aristotle  has  given  a  chapter  to  the  subject  in  his 
book  bearing  the  title  of  "The  Politics."  This  is 
itself  a  curious  fact.  The  Greeks  had  but  little  esteem 
for  any  country  besides  their  own — Egypt,  from  which 
they  got  most  of  their  learning,  perhaps  excepted. 
And  not  only  does  he  write  at  some  length  about  it, 
but  he  praises  it  highly.  He  quotes  and,  on  the  whole, 
agrees  with  a  general  opinion  that  "  in  many  respects 
it  is  superior  to  all  others."  And  he  gives  very  excel- 
lent reasons  for  this  superiority.  It  is  a  sure  proof, 
he  thinks,  "that  a  State  is  well  ordered  when  the 
commons  are  steadily  loyal  to  the  constitution,  when 
no  civil  conflict  worth  speaking  of  has  arisen,  and 
when  no  one  has  succeeded  in  making  himself 
tyrant." 

Aristotle  speaks  of  Carthage  having  "  kings,"  and 
this  name  as  given  to  the  chief  magistrates  of  the 
city  often  occurs  in  history.  But  they  were  not  kings 
in  the  common  sense  of  the  term.  They  did  not 
resemble,  for  instance,  the  kings  of  the  Eastern  world, 
of  Assyria,  of  Persia,  or  of  Egypt.    They  are,  indeed, 


MAGISTRATES  OF  CARTHAGE. 


ioi 


I- 


expressly  compared  to  the  kings  of  Sparta ;  and 
these,  we  know,  had  but  very  limited  power,  and 
were  little  more  than  high  priests  and  permanent 
commanders-in-chief.  One  important  difference  be- 
tween the  two  constitutions  was  that,  in  Sparta,  the 
dignity  was  hereditary  in  two  families,  while  in  Car- 
thage it  was  elective.  "  They  must  belong,"  he  says, 
"  to  one  of  certain  distinguished  families,  but  they 
succeed  to  the  throne  by  election,  not  by  seniority." 
But  it  does  not  appear  that  this  election  was  annual. 
On  the  contrary,  once  chosen  they  were  chosen  for 
life.  These  two  magistrates  were  called  by  the  Romans 
"  Suffetes," '  a  corruption  of  the  word  Shophetim,  or 
"Judges." 

Next  to  the  kings  came  the  generals.  The  two 
offices  might  be  held  together,  but  they  were  often 
separate.  A  king  did  not  command  an  army  or  a 
fleet  unless  he  was  specially  appointed  to  the  post. 
Sometimes  a  general  would  be  made  king  while  he 
was  absent  on  service.  Hanno,  who  commanded  the 
great  exploring  and  colonizing  expedition  before 
described,  is  said  to  have  been  a  king. 

Below  these  high  officers  of  State  came  a  legislative 
body  which,  to  borrow  a  name  made  familiar  both  by 
ancient  and  by  modern  history,  we  may  call  the 
Senate.  In  this  Senate  there  were  two  bodies,  the 
smaller  ^  and  more  powerful  being  chosen  out  of  the 
larger.     Perhaps  we  may  compare  this  Upper  Council 

'  Possibly  '*  Suffetes  "  was  a  reminiscence  of  the  Latin  word  suffedus^ 
which  was  used  when  a  magistrate  was  elected  to  fill  a  vacancy  occuf' 
ring  at  some  casual  time. 

^  It  consisted  of  a  hundred  members. 


I 


104 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


to  the  cabinet  or  ministry  in  the  Constitutions  of 
England  and  the  United  States  of  America.  We  are 
told  that  it  was  called  into  existence  to  meet  the 
danger  which  sooner  or  later  overtook  most  of  the 
Republics  of  the  ancient  world.  "  When  the  House  of 
Mago  became  dangerous  to  a  free  state,  an  hundred 
judges  were  chosen  from  the  senators,  who,  upon  the 
return  of  generals  from  the  war,  should  demand  an 
account  of  things  transacted  by  them,  that  they  being 
thereby  kept  in  awe,  should  so  bear  themselves  in  their 
command  in  the  war,  as  to  have  regard  to  the  laws  at 
home."  The  members  of  the  Council  seem  to  have 
been  chosen  by  what  are  called  Pentarchies,  />.,  bodies 
of  five,  by  the  Greek  writer.  We  do  not  know  what 
these  were,  but  we  may  guess  that  they  were  com- 
mittees that  had  the  charge  of  various  important 
parts  of  government,  as  finances,  trade,  military 
matters,  police,  etc.  Whether  they  were  divisions  of 
the  Council  or  the  Senate  we  cannot  say.  But 
one  thing  is  certain,  viz.,  that  the  Council  was  a  re- 
markably unchanging  body.  It  followed  one  line  of 
policy,  we  may  say  for  centuries,  with  extraordinary 
consistency,  and  this  it  could  hardly  have  done 
except  it  had  kept  up  the  same  character  by  renew- 
ing itself  It  is  clear  that  there  were  no  regular 
changes  of  government,  no  passings  of  power  such 
as  we  see  in  the  United  States  from  Republicans 
to  Democrats,  or  in  England  from  Liberals  to  Con- 
servatives. 

About  the  powers  of  the  larger  assembly  or  Senate 
we  know  nothing  for  certain.  Probably  it  was  legis- 
lative while  the  Council  was  executive.     It  was  the 


ESTATES   OF   THE  REALM  IN  CARTHAGE,      I05 

Congress   or  Parliament,  while  the  Council  was  the 
Ministry  or  Cabinet. 

Finally,  there  was  a  general  assembly  of  the  people. 
About  this,  too,  we  know  very  little.  We  may  guess 
that  its  power  was  limited  to  approving  or  rejecting 
measures  that  were  brought  before  it,  all  such 
measures  being  first  considered  in  the  Senate.  In  the 
same  way  the  people  had  the  right  of  approving  or 
disapproving  of  appointments  to  offices.  Aristotle 
evidently  thought  that  they  were  in  much  the  same 
position  as  the  people  at  Sparta  ;  and  of  the  people 
at  Sparta  we  know  that  they  had  not  much  to  do 
with  the  government  of  the  country. 

These  were  the  actual  "  estates  of  the  realm "  in 
Carthage— the  Kings  or  Suffetes,  the  Senate  with  its 
two  chambers,  so  to  speak,  and  the  Popular  Assembly. 
It  remains  to  ask,  "  Was  there  a  nobility  ?  "  Probably 
there  was,  and  probably  it  was  something  like  that 
which  exists  in  England.  There  were,  indeed,  no 
inherited  titles,  but  still  the  same  families  remained 
powerful  in  the  State.  Probably  they  remained 
powerful  as  long  as  they  remained  rich.  There  was 
no  bar  of  birth  that  prevented  any  one  from  be- 
coming a  member  of  this  nobility.  Ability  and 
wealth,  perhaps  either  of  these  in  a  very  marked 
degree,  would  pass  any  one  into  it. 

Aristotle  says  that  the  offices  of  State  were  unpaid. 
This  docs  not  of  necessity  imply  that  these  were  not 
lucrative.  They  would  bring  patronage  and  oppor- 
tunities of  making  money.  He  also  says  that  the 
hie:hest  offices — and  he  names  those  of  King  and 
General — were  put  up  for  sale.     Perhaps  he  means 


io6 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


that  they  were  obtained  by  bribery,  though  this  is 
not  the  natural  interpretation  of  his  words.  As  he 
says  afterwards  that  one  of  the  abuses  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian Constitution  was  that  several  offices  were  held 
by  one  man,  we  may  suppose  that  though  nominally 
unpaid,  they  could  be,  and  often  were,  made  a  source 
of  profit.  Probably  the  decay  of  Carthage  was  due 
to  the  corruption  and  greed  of  money,  which  are  sure 
to  be  developed  sooner  or  later  in  a  wealthy  State. 
Rome,  when  the  virtue  and  patriotism  of  its  citizens 
decayed,  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  despotic  ruler ; 
Carthage,  following  the  same  course  of  decay,  fell 
under  the  domination  of  a  few  wealthy  citizens. 

One  of  the  points  of  the  resemblance  which  Aristotle 
sees  between  Carthage  and  Sparta  was  the  practice  of 
having  Common  Meals.  But  Sparta  was  a  compara- 
tively small  State.  The  actual  number  of  citizens 
living  at  the  capital,  when  we  have  deducted  those 
who  were  under  or  above  the  military  age,  and  who 
were  therefore  excused  from  the  Common  Meals, 
could  not  have  much  exceeded  a  thousand.  Car- 
thage, on  the  other  hand,  was  one  of  the  most  populous 
cities  of  the  ancient  world.  When  it  was  taken  by  the 
Romans,  long  after  it  had  begun  to  decay,  it  contained 
seven  hundred  thousand  inhabitants.  How  many  of 
these  were  citizens  we  cannot  conjecture  ;  but  the 
number  must  have  been  too  great  to  admit  of  a  system 
of  Common  Meals.  Probably  these  were  limited  to 
the  ruling  class.  Aristotle  speaks  of  them  as  being 
held  by  the  "clubs"  or  "companies."  What  Livy 
says  quite  agrees  with  this.  Hannibal,  then  in  exile, 
sent  an  emissary  to  stir  up  the  war-party  at  Carthage 


.' 


VOTIVE   STEl.E    !  ()    lAV 


io6 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


that  they  were  ohtalned  by  bribery,  though  this  is 
not  the  natural  interpretation  of  his  words.  As  he 
says  afterwards  that  one  of  the  abuses  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian Constitution  was  that  several  offices  were  held 
by  one  man,  we  may  suppose  that  though  nominally 
unpaid,  they  could  be,  and  often  were,  made  a  source 
of  profit.  Probably  the  decay  of  Carthage  was  due 
to  the  corruption  and  greed  of  money,  which  are  sure 
to  be  developed  sooner  or  later  in  a  wealthy  State. 
Rome,  when  the  virtue  and  patriotism  of  its  citizens 
decayed,  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  despotic  ruler ; 
Carthage,  following  the  same  course  of  decay,  fell 
under  the  domination  of  a  few  wealthy  citizens. 

One  of  the  points  of  the  resemblance  which  Aristotle 
sees  between  Carthage  and  Sparta  was  the  practice  of 
having  Common  Meals.  But  Sparta  was  a  compara- 
tively small  State.  The  actual  number  of  citizens 
living  at  the  capital,  when  we  have  deducted  those 
who  were  under  o:  above  the  military  age,  and  who 
were  therefore  excused  from  the  Common  Meals, 
could  not  have  much  exceeded  a  thousand.  Car- 
thage, on  the  other  hand,  was  one  of  the  most  populous 
cities  of  the  ancient  world.  When  it  was  taken  by  the 
Romans,  long  after  it  had  begun  to  decay,  it  contained 
seven  hundred  thousand  inhabitants.  How  many  of 
these  were  citizens  we  cannot  conjecture  ;  but  the 
number  must  have  been  too  great  to  admit  of  a  system 
of  Common  Meals.  Probably  these  were  limited  to 
the  ruling  class.  Aristotle  speaks  of  them  as  being 
held  by  the  "clubs"  or  "companies."  What  IJvy 
says  quite  agrees  with  this.  Hannibal,  then  in  exile, 
sent  an  emissary  to  stir  up  the  war-i)arty  at  Carthage 


VOTIVE   SIKl.K     !(>    I W 


t 


yUSTICE  AND  RELIGION. 


109 


1 


to  action.  His  coming  and  the  message  which  he 
brought,  was,  we  read,  "  debated  first  in  societies  and 
banquets,  and  afterwards  in  the  Senate."  And  we 
find  it  stated  by  another  historian  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians transacted  their  State  affairs  by  night,  and 
in  the  evening  and  at  night-time  held  their  meetings 
and  societies.  Perhaps  we  may  say  that  modern 
poHtics  furnish  an  illustration  in  the  "Caucus,"  a 
meeting  of  influehtial  persons  by  which  the  action  of 
the  party  is  determined. 
^  Justice  seems  to  have  been  administered,  not  by  a 

general  assembly  of  the  people,  as  at  Athens,  but  by 
special  Courts.  We  know  the  name  of  one  of  these, 
"  The  Hundred  and  Four."  ^  Possibly  this  may  have 
been  the  title  of  the  whole  judicial  body,  and  that  this 
was  divided  into  various  Courts  for  the  trial  of  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  cases. 

The  Religion  of  Carthage  was  naturally  in  the  main 
that  of  the  great  city  from  which  it  was  founded.  The 
supreme  Deity  was  Baal  Hammon,  or  Moloch.  Dr. 
Davis — from  whose  excavations  among  the  ruins  of 
Carthage  much  has,  of  course,  been  learnt— tells  us 
that  he  did  not  find  a  single  votive  tablet  in  which  the 
name  of  this  god  did  not  appear.  He  was  worshipped 
with  the  horrible  human  sacrifices  of  which  we  hear 
from  time  to  time  in  Carthaginian  history.^    These 

*  Not  to  be  confounded  with  the  Council  of  the  Hundred. 

*  When  Carthage  was  besieged  by  Agathocles,  a  sacrifice  of  two 
hundred  children  belonging  to  the  first  families  in  the  country  was 
made  to  Moloch  ;  and  three  hundred  men  also  voluntarily  devoted 
themselves  in  the  same  way.  W'e  hear  of  these  sacrifices  as  prevailinp^ 
among  the  Canaanite,  i.e.  IMiaMiician,  tribes  whom  the  Isrncliles  drove 
out  of  Palestine ;  and  special  care  was  taken  to  forbid  this  puriicular 


! 


lio 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


dreadful  practices  caused  the  Greeks  to  identify  him 
with  Chronos  or  Saturn,  who,  in  their  own  mythology, 
was  said  to  have  devoured  his  own  children. 

Next  in  honour  to  Moloch  was  Melcart,  the  tutelary 
deity  of  Carthage,  as  he  was  of  its  mother-city.  Tyre 


A  STELE  TO  TAN  IT. 

To  the   Greeks  he   was   known   as  Hercules.      His 

kind  of  rite.  So  we  read  in  Lev.  xviii.  21,  "Thou  shalt  not  let  thy 
seed  pass  through  the  fire  to  Moloch."  In  spite  of  this  prohibition 
the  practice  gained  ground  among  the  Israelites.  Solomon  built  a 
temple  to  Moloch ;  and  the  reformer  Josiah  "  defiled  the  Valley  of 
llinnom  that  no  man  might  make  his  son  or  his  daughter  pass  through 
the  fire  to  Moloch." 


) 


VOTIVE  STELE  TO  TANIT  FROM   CARTHAGE. 


f 


nn. 


CARTHAGINIAN  DEITIES, 


113 


splendid  temple  at  Tyre  was  one  of  the  most  famous 
in  the  world.  Missions  with  gifts  and  offerings  seem 
to  have  been  regularly  sent  to  it  from  Carthage. 
Neither  there  nor  elsewhere  does  the  god  seem  to 
have  been  represented  in  human  form.  Herodotus, 
who  describes  the  Tyrian  temple  as  an  eye-witness, 
says  nothing  of  any  image,  but  describes,  among  the 
many  rich  offerings  with  which  it  was  adorned,  two 
pillars,  one  of  pure  gold,  the  other  of  emerald,  shining 
with  great  brilliancy  at  night.^ 


VOTIVE  STELES  FROM  CARTHAGE. 

A  sea-god,  whom  the  Greeks  naturally  identified 
with  their  own  Poseidon,  and  the  Romans  with  Nep- 
tune, was  worshipped  at  Carthage.  He  was  the  same 
probably  as  Dagon,  the  fish  -  god,  whom  we  know 
to  have  been  worshipped  in  the  cities  of  the  Philis- 
tines. Ashtaroth,  the  Greek  form  of  whose  name 
was  Astarte,  corresponded  to  Aphrodite  or  Venus. 
Her  Carthaginian  name  was  Tanit.  Of  another 
Carthaginian  deity,  known  to  the  Greeks  as  Triton, 

*  This  was  probably  of  green  glass,  which  had  long  before  been 
manufactured  in  Egypt,  and  was  li^ihted  from  within. 


II 


114 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHA6E. 


I 


we  cannot  recover  the  native  name.  As  the  Greek 
Triton  was  a  god  of  the  sea,  possibly  this  was  only 
another  form  of  Dagon.  We  do  not  hear  of  any 
separate  order  of  priests  ;  but  we  find  kings  and 
generals  offering  sacrifice — sometimes,  as  in  the  case 
of  Hasdrubal  at  Himera,'  while  battle  was  actually 
going  on. 

*  See  p.  27. 


^1 


III. 


THE  REVENUE  AND  TRADE  OF  CARTHAGE.   ' 

The  revenue  of  Carthage  came  from  various  sources 
which  may  be  mentioned  in  order. 

I.  Tribute  from  subject  or  dependent  countries.  The 
Phoenician  towns  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  both  those 
which  were  older  than  Carthage  and  those  which 
had   been   founded  from  it,  paid  tribute  in  money. 


CARTHAGINIAN    COIN. 

Leptis,  for  instance,  in  the  rich  district  of  the  Lesser 
Syrtis,  is  said  to  have  paid  as  much  as  a  talent  per 
diem.'  The  tribes  of  the  interior  paid  their  tribute  in 
kind,  those  who  were  settled  and  employed  in  culti- 
vating the  ground  furnishing  corn,  the  wandering 
tribes  such  articles  as  dates,  wild-beast  skins,  gold, 

'  This  would  amount  to  £%%<)(i%  15s.,  or  nearly  .?45o,ooo. 


I 


tmmm. 


ii6 


THE   STORY   OF   CARTHAGE. 


CARTHAGINIAN  MINES. 


117 


precious  stones,  etc.  The  foreign  possessions  of  the 
empire  also  paid  in  kind.  Part  of  the  stores  which 
they  thus  furnished   was   laid   up   in   the   provinces 


CARTHAGINIAN  COIN   (ELECTRUM). 

themselves  for  the  use  of  the  army,  and  part  was  sent 
to  Carthage.  The  amount  of  these  contributions  is  not 
stated  anywhere;  but  it  seems  to  have  varied  with 


CARTHAGINIAN   COIN   (SILVER). 

the  needs  of  the  government,  and  sometimes  to  have 
amounted  to  as  much  as  a  half  of  the  whole  produce. 
2.  Customs  duties  are  mentioned  in  the  treaties  be- 
tween Carthage  and  Rome  ;  and  the  regulations  about 


them  are  precise.     In  the  treaties  with  the  Etrurians, 
of  which  we  hear  from  Aristotle,  we  learn  that  it  was 
provided  what  articles  might  and  what  might  not  be 
imported.       Hannibal,   when  in    power  at    Carthage 
after  the  end  of  the  Second  Punic  War,  introduced^ 
great  reform  into  the  management   of  the  customs, 
which  we  learn  from  this  passage  to  have  been  levied 
on  goods  imported  both  by  land  and  by  sea  ;  and  is 
said,  by  putting  a  stop  to  dishonest  practices,  to  have 
improved  the  revenue  so  much,  that  it  was  no  longer 
necessary  to  tax  individuals.     That  these  duties  were 
heavy,  we  may  learn  from  the  fact   that  smuggling 
went   on    between  the  Greek  towns  in    the   district 
round  Cyrene  and  the  towns  dependent  on  Carthage. 
3.  Mines.     Carthage  possessed  mines  in  Spain  and 
Corsica.     The  richest  of  these  were  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  New  Carthage.     In  Polybius'  time  (204-122 
B.C.),  when  they  were  worked  by  the  Romans,  they 
produced  about  ;^2,ooo  per  day.     They  are  said   to 
have  been  discovered   by  a  certain   Aletes,  who  was 
supposed  to  have  done  so   much  for  his  country  by 
this  discovery,  that  a  temple  was  dedicated  to  him  at 
New  Carthage.     We  must  not  suppose,  however,  that 
all  the  mines  (Diodorus  says  that  all  the  mines  known 
in  his  time  were  first  worked  by  the  Carthaginians) 
belonged  to  the  State.     Many  of  them  were  worked 
by  individual  citizens  to  their  great  profit.    The  power- 
ful  Barca  family  is  said  to  have  derived  from   their 
mines  much  of  the  wealth  by  which  they  were  enabled 
to   become   so  powerful,   and   Hannibal  is   specially 
mentioned  as  receiving  a  large  income  from  mines. 
Probably  the  State  was  the  owner  of  some,  and  re- 


ii8 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


TRADE, 


119 


! 


^ 


ceived  a  royalty  (or  sum  proportionate  to  the  quan- 
tity of  metal  raised)  from  the  others. 

The  Commerce  of  Carthage  may  be  conveniently 
considered  under  its  two  great  branches— the  trade 
with  Africa,  and  the  trade  with  Europe. 

I.  The  trade  with  Africa.  This  was  carried  on  with 
the  barbarous  tribes  of  the  inland  country  that  could 
be  reached  by  caravans,  and  of  the  sea-coast.  Of 
both  we  hear  something  from  Herodotus,  the  writer 
who  furnishes  us  with  most  of  our  knowledge  about 
these  parts  of  the  ancient  world.  His  story  about 
the  dealings  with  the  tribes  of  the  sea-coast  runs  thus. 
"  There  is  a  certain  country  in  Africa  outside  the 
columns  of  Hercules.  When  the  Carthaginians  come 
hither,  they  unlade  their  goods  and  set  them  in  order 
by  the  side  of  the  sea.  This  done,  they  embark  on 
their  ships  again  and  make  a  smoke.  And  the  people 
of  the  countiy,  seeing  the  smoke,  come  down  to  the 
sea,  and  put  gold  beside  the  goods  and  depart  to  a 
distance.  Then  the  Carthaginians  come  forth  from 
their  ships  and  look  ;  and  if  it  seem  to  them  that  the 
gold  is  of  equal  value  with  the  goods,  they  take  it  and 
depart ;  but  if  it  seem  not  equal,  then  they  return  to 
their  ships  and  sit  still.  Then  the  barbarians  come 
and  add  other  gold  to  that  which  they  put  before, 
until  they  persuade  the  Carthaginians.  And  neither 
do  any  wrong  to  the  other;  for  the  one  touch  not 
the  gold  till  it  be  made  equal  in  value  to  the  goods, 
and  the  others  touch  not  the  goods  before  the  sellers 
have  received  the  gold."  ^     The  Caravan  routes  are 

«  Heeren  quotes  from  Captain  Lynn's  "  Narrative  "  a  curiously  similar 
account.     "In  Soudan,  beyond  the  desert,  in  the  countries  abound- 


described  in  a  very  interesting  passage.  The  starting- 
point  is  Thebes  in  Upper  Egypt,  where  Herodotus 
probably  got  his  information  ;  and  the  route,  in  which 
the  stations— always  places  where  water  can  be  found 
—are  given  with  much  detail,  extend  to  the  Straits  of 
Gibraltar  in  the  west,  and  Fezzan,  and  probably  still 
more  inland  places,  in  the  south. 

The  goods  with  which  the  Carthaginian  merchants 
traded  with  the  African  tribes  were  doubtless  such  as 
those  which  civilized  nations  have  always  used  in  their 
dealings  with  savages.     Cheap  finery,  gaudily  coloured 
cloths,  and  arms  of  inferior  quality,  would  probably  be 
their  staple.     Salt,  too,  would  be  an  important  article. 
Many  of  the  inland  tribes  can  only  get  this  necessary 
of  life  by  importation,  and  the  Carthaginians  would 
doubtless  find  it  worth  their  while  to  bring  it,   not 
necessarily  from  the  sea,  but  from  places  on  the  route 
where,  according  to  Herodotus,  it  could  be  found  in 
large  quantities. 

The  articles  which  they  would  receive  in  exchange 
for  their  goods  are  easily  enumerated.  In  the  first 
place  comes,  as  we  have  seen,  gold.  Carthage  seems 
to  have  had  always  at  hand  an  abundant  supply  of 
the  precious  metal  for  use,  whether  as  money  or  as 
plate.  Next  to  gold  would  come  slaves.  Even  then 
the  negro  race  was  the  victim  of  the  cruel  system 
which  has  not  yet  quite  been  rooted  out  of  the  world, 

ing  in  gold,  there  dwells  an  invisible  nation,  who  are  said  to  trade  only 
by  night.  Those  who  come  to  traffic  for  their  gold,  lay  their  merchan- 
dise ill  heaps  and  retire.  In  the  morning  they  find  a  certain  quantity 
of  gold-dust  placed  against  every  heap,  which  if  they  think  sufficient, 
they  leave  the  goods  ;  if  not,  they  let  both  remain  until  more  of  the 
precious  ore  i§  added." 


120 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


though  no  Christian  nation,  at  least  ostensibly,  prac- 
tises  it.      The   ancients,    indeed,   had    other   slaves 
besides  negroes.     It  was   a   horrible   feature   of  the 
slavery  of  these  times  that,  through  the  practice  of 
selling,  for  private  or  public  gain,  prisoners  of  war  and 
the  inhabitants  of  captured  towns,  men  and  women  of 
every  race   were  reduced  to  bondage,  and  thus  the 
slave  might  be  as  well  born  and  as  well  educated  as 
his  master.^     But  these  slaves  were  sure  to  be  discon- 
tented, and  very  likely,  therefore,  to  be  dangerous,  and 
the  more  gentle  and   docile  negro  soon   came  to  be 
prized.     Fashion,  too,  favoured  the  quaint  appearance 
of  the  race,  so  curiously  contrasted  with  the  fair  com- 
plexion and  chiselled  features  of  the  Greek.     Thus  in 
Menander  (342-291  B.C.),  as  he  is  represented  to  us  by 
Terence,  we  find    a  soldier  saying  to  his  lady-love, 
"  Did  you  ever  find  my  good  will  to  you  halt  ?   When 
you  said  you  wanted  a  handmaid  from  Ethiopia,  did 
not   I   give   up  all   my  business,   and   find   one   for 

you  ? 

Ivory  must  have  been  another  article  of  Cartha- 
ginian trade,  though  we  hear  little  about  it.  The 
Greeks  used  it  extensively  in  art,  making  some  of 
their  most  magnificent  statues  partly  of  it  and  partly 
of  gold  ;2  and  it  seems  to  have  been  employed  in  early 

»  One  Latin  writer  draws  a  distinctit)!!  between  slaves  that  were 
"learned  'and  that  "had  a  smattering  of  learning."  All  the  early 
schoolmasters  at  Rome,  almost  without  exception,  had  been  slaves. 
The  elder  Cato  made  a  profit  of  taking  in  noble  Roman  boys  to  be 
taught  by  an  educated  slave  of  his  own. 

-\he  great  statues  of  Phidias,  viz.,  of  Zeus  at  Olympia,  of  Here  at 
Argos,  and  of  Athene  at  Athens,  were  made  of  these  two  materials, 
and  therefore  called  chryselephantine. 


IVORY  AND  PRECIOUS  STONES.  121 

times  at   Rome  for   the  chairs  of  state  used  by  the 
higher  magistrates.    We  do  not  precisely  know  where 
this  ivory  came  from  first.     Virgil  speaks  of  the  sub- 
stance  as   coming   from  India,  and   the  elder   Pliny 
says  that  the  luxury  of  his  times  had  exhausted  all  the 
sources  of  supply  except  those  of  the  farthest  East 
We  may  be  certain,  however,  that  in  the  flourishing 
days  of  Carthage    her   traders  dealt   largely  in  this 
article,  which  indeed  is  found  of  the  largest  size  and 
finest  quality  in  Africa.     The  elephant  is  still  found 


VOTIVE  STELE  FROM  CARTHAGE. 

over  the  whole  of  that  continent  south  of  the  Sahara 
except  where  it  has  been  driven  away  by  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  man.  The  Carthaginians  had  domesti- 
cated it,  a  thing  which  has  never  since  been  done  by 
any  African  race. 

Precious  stones  seem  to  have  been  another  article 
which  the  savages  gave  in  exchange  for  the  goods  they 
coveted.  The  carbuncle,  in  particular,  came  in  such 
abundance  from  Carthage  into  the  markets  of  Europe 
that  It  was  called  the  "  Carthaginian  Stone."    Perhaps 


122 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


I       1 


) 


we  mav  add  dates  to  the  list  of  articles  obtained  from 
the  interior. 

The  European  trade  dealt,  of  course,  partly  with 
the  things  already  mentioned,  and  partly  with  other 
articles  for  which  the  Carthaginian  merchants  acted 
as  carriers,  so  to  speak,  from  one  part  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean to  another.  Lipara,  and  the  other  volcanic 
islands  near  the  southern  extremity  of  Italy,  pro- 
duced resin  ;  Agrigentum,  and  possibly  other  cities  of 
Sicily,  traded  in  sulphur  brought  down  from  the 
region  of  Etna  ;  wine  was  produced  in  many  of  the 
Mediterranean  countries.  Wax  and  honey  were  the 
staple  goods  of  Corsica.  Corsican  slaves,  too,  were 
highly  valued.  The  iron  of  Elba,  the  fruit  and  the 
cattle  of  the  Balearic  islands,  and,  to  go  further,  the 
tin  and  copper  of  Britain,  and  even  amber  from 
the  Baltic,  were  articles  of  Carthaginian  commerce. 
Trade  was  carried  on  not  only  with  the  dwellers  on 
the  coast,  but  with  inland  tribes.  Thus  goods  were 
transported  across  Spain  to  the  interior  of  Gaul,  the 
jealousy  of  Massilia  (Marseilles)  not  permitting  the 
Carthaginians  to  have  any  trading  stations  on  the 
southern  coast  of  that  country. 

While  we  are  writing  of  trade,  we  must  not  omit  to 
mention  a  curious  statement  about  what  has  been 
called  the  "  leather  money  "  of  Carthage.  The  work 
f.om  which  it  comes  bears  the  name  of  ^Eschines,  a 
disciple  of  Socrates.  It  is  certainly  not  of  his  time, 
but  it  is  probably  ancient.  "The  Carthaginians," 
says  this  author,  whoever  he  may  have  been, "  make 
use  of  the  following  kind  of  money :  in  a  small  piece 
of  leather  a  substance  is  wrapped  of  the  size  of  a 


ART  AND  LITERATURE. 

piece  of  four  drachmae  (about  3s.) ; 
but  what  this  substance  is  no  one 
knows  except  the  maker.  After 
this  it  is  sealed  and  issued  for 
circulation  ;  and  he  who  possesses 
the  most  of  this  is  regarded  as 
having  the  most  money,  and  as 
being  the  wealthiest  man.  But 
if  any  one  among  us  had  ever 
so  much,  he  would  be  no  richer 
than  if  he  possessed  a  quantity 
of  pebbles."  This  unknown  sub- 
stance was  probably  an  alloy  of 
metal,  of  which  the  ingredients 
were  a  State  secret ;  and  the  seal 
was  a  State  mark.  We  have,  in 
fact,  here  a  kind  of  clumsy  bank- 
note. 

Of  Carthaginian  art  and  litera- 
ture there  is  little  to  be  said. 
The  genius  of  the  Phoenicians  did 
not  lead  them  to  distinguish  them- 
selves in  either  way.  As  for  art, 
whatever  grace  is  to  be  found  in 
the  scanty  remains  that  are  left 
to  us  of  Carthaginian  civilization, 
is  clearly  due  to  Greek  influence. 
The  coins,  for  instance,  that  are 
figured  on  pp.  115,  116,  are  evi- 
dently the  work  of  Greek  artists. 
About  Carthaginian  literature  we 
cannot  speak  so  positively.  That 
there  were  libraries   in   the  city 


123 


m 


pi^A 


m 


'\\ 


^   \'-    / 


7.  ///lii 

m 


■ft 


(I 


r 


,1:! 


l\l\ 


•  // 


WRlTING-CAbE. 


124 


THE  STORY  OF   CARTHAGE. 


WEALTH  AND  LUXURY, 


when  it  was  taken  by  the  Romans,  we  know  for 
certain,  as  we  also  know  that  the  conquerors  were 
not  sufficiently  aware  of  their  value  to  keep  them 
for  themselves,  but  allowed  them  to  be  dispersed 
among  the  African  princes.  But  whether  these  libra- 
ries contained  a  native  Carthaginian  literature,  or 
were  furnished  with  the  production  of  Greek  genius, 
we  do  not  know.  Of  one  Carthaginian  work,  in- 
deed, we  know  something.  We  have  its  subject, 
the  name  of  its  author,  and,  it  may  also  be  said,  its 
opening  sentence.     It  was  a   book  on   agriculture, 


125 


VOTIVE  STELE   fRULI,). 

written  by  one  Mago,  and  it  began,  it  is  said,  with 
the  remark  that  he  who  would  make  his  farm 
prosper  should  sell  his  town -house.  So  high  a 
reputation  had  it  obtained,  that  when  Carthage  was 
taken,  the  Roman  Senate  appointed  a  committee  to 
look  after  its  translation  into  Latin.  It  was  after- 
wards  translated  into  Greek.  Roman  writers  made 
much  use  of  it,  and  Cicero  speaks  of  it  as  the  standard 
work  on  its  subject. 

Of  the  domestic  life  of  the  Carthaginians  we  know 
almost  nothing.     Where  there  is  great  wealth  there 


is  sure  to  be  great  luxury.  Of  this  we  get,  indeed, 
a  few  hints  from  the  historians.  We  have  seen] 
for  instance,  how,  when  one  of  the  Carthaginian 
generals  were  pressed  for  arrears  of  pay  by  his  mer- 
cenaries, he  was  able  to  give  them  security  in  the 
rich  gold  and  silver  drinking-cups  which  belonged  to 
the  Carthaginians  on  his  staff.  And  Atheucxus,  a  great 
collector  of  gossip  on  all  such  matters,  tells  us  that 
Dionysius  sold  a  splendid  robe  to  a  Carthaginian 
millionaire  for  a  hundred  and  twenty  talents— the 
almost  incredible  sum  of  nearly  thirty  thousand 
pounds.  And  it  seems  to  have  been  also  true  that  in 
Carthage,  as  elsewhere,  "where  wealth  accumulates 
men  decay."  Political  and  military  talent  she  could 
always  command,  but  she  trusted  more  and  more  to 
her  mercenaries,  to  those  "  silver  spears "  which  are 
sure,  sooner  or  later,  to  break  in  the  day  of  need. 


PART  IV. 


CARTHAGE  AND   ROME. 


For  the  First  and  Second  Punic  Wars  our  chief  authonties 
are  Polybius  and  Livy.  The  first  was  a  Greek,  and  a  great 
friend  of  the  younger  Scipio,  the  conqueror  of  Carthage.  He 
was  present  at  the  capture  of  that  city,  but  unfortunately  the 
part  of  his  work  which  relates  that  event,  and  the  history  of 
the  Third  Punic  War  generally,  is  lost.  For  the  First  Punic 
War,  which  is  the  chief  subject  of  the  introductory  chapters 
of  his  work,  and  for  the  Second,  he  is  our  best  authority,  so 
far  as  he  goes.  Here,  again,  unfortunately,  much  is  lost ; 
indeed,  we  have  no  complete  book  after  the  fifth,  and  this 
takes  us  a  little  farther  than  the  battle  of  Cannae.  Consider- 
able extracts  have,  however,  been  preserved  of  the  lost  books, 
among  them  one  containing  a  description  of  the  battle  of 
Zama.  Polybius  was  an  admirable  historian,  painstaking  and 
just  in  the  highest  degree. 

Livy  (Titus  Livius)  lived  in  the  last  days  of  the  Roman 
Republic  and  the  first  of  the  Empire,  since  he  was  born  B.C. 
59,  the  very  time  of  the  first  Triumvirate,  and  died  in  the 
fourth  year  of  Tiberius.  He  wrote  a  history  of  Rome  in  one 
hundred  and  forty-two  books,  of  which  thirty-five  only  sur- 
vive. Happily  the  ten  books,  twenty-one  to  thirty,  which 
give  a  detailed  account  of  the  Second  Punic  War  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end,  have  been  preserved,  and  epitomes 
of  the  lost  books  exist,  from  which  we  get  some  valuable 
information  about  the  First  and  Third  wars.  Livy  is  a 
great  writer ;  some  excellent  judges  have  even  said  that 
his  style  is  the  very  best  to  be  found  among  prose  writers 
ancient  or  modern.  It  is  certainly  full  of  vigour  and  beauty ; 
but  Livy  is  not  a  great  historian.  He  was  very  careless, 
never  taking  the  pains,  so  far  as  we  can  learn,  to  visit  the 
scenes  of  the  events  which  he  describes,  though  they  must 
often  have  been  within  his  reach,  or  attempting  to  realize 
them  to  himself.  For  the  Third  Punic  War  our  chief  authority 
is  Appian,  a  native  of*  Alexandria,  who  wrote  there,  in  Greek, 
a  Roman  history,  in  which  he  treated  the  affairs  of  every 
country  separately. 


, 


THE  WAR  IN  SICILY  AND  ON  THE  SEA. 

We  have  heard  more  than  once  of  Campanians 
among  the  mercenaries  who  were  accustomed  to  fight 
both  for  Greece  and  for  Carthage  in  the  Sicilian  wars. 
They  seem  to  have  been  particularly  unscrupulous, 
for  they  would  change  sides  when  changing  sides 
seemed  likely  to  give  them  better  pay  or  better 
prospects  of  victory.  And  this  habit  of  theirs  agrees 
with  the  bad  account  we  get  of  them  m  other  ways. 
These  Campanians  let  out  their  swords  for  hire,  not 
so  much  because  they  were  poor  (as  did  the  Arca- 
dians in  ancient  times,  and  the  Swiss  and  Scotch  in 
modern  Europe),  as  because  they  liked  the  life  of  a 
soldier  of  fortune.  They  were  the  youth  of  a  disso- 
lute people,'  and,  not  able  to  find  the  career  they 
liked  at  home,  where  they  would  have  had  to  deal  with 
the  Romans,  they  sought  it  abroad,  and,  as  we  have 
seen,  especially  in  Sicily.  We  shall  not  be  surprised, 
therefore,  to  find  some  of  these  Campanians  behaving 
in  a  most  cruel  and  unscrupulous  way  to  one  of  the 
Greek  cities.     After  the  death  of  Agathocles,  who, 

»  Capua,  the  chief  city  of  Campamn,  hai  a  very  bad  reputation  in 
this  way. 


"^50 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


tyrant  as  he  was,  was  a  man  of  energy,  affairs  in 
Sicily  had  fallen  into  a  state  of  great  confusion. 
Among  other  causes  of  trouble  was  a  corps  of  Cam- 
pan  ian  mercenaries,  who  had  been  in  the  service  of 
the  tyrant,  and  who,  after  his  death,  asserted  their 
independence,  and  set  up  in  the  trade  of  brigands. 
They  seized  the  city  of  Messana,  slew  or  drove  out 
the  citizens,  and  divided  among  themselves  everything 
that  they  possessed.  For  a  time  the  Mamertines,  or 
"  Servants  of  Mars  "  ^  (for  this  was  the  name  that  the 
robbers  had  assumed),  prospered  greatly,  spreading 
their  power  over  the  neighbouring  portion  of  the 
island.  Then  came  a  check.  Syracuse  had  again 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  an  able  ruler,  one  Hiero,  of 
whom  we  shall  often  hear  again.  Hiero  reduced  the 
Mamertines  to  great  straits,  and  they  looked  about  in 
despair  for  some  one  who  could  help  them. 

There  were  two  parties  among  them,  one  favouring 
Carthage,  the  other  Rome.  At  first  the  latter  pre- 
vailed. An  embassy  was  sent,  offering  submission 
and  begging  for  help.  The  request  perplexed  the 
Romans  not  a  little.  It  was  quite  a  new  thing  for 
them  to  look  beyond  the  limits  of  Italy.  There  they 
were  now  supreme ;  but  they  dreaded  undertaking 
conquests  outside  it.  And  to  grant  this  request  would 
of  course  embroil  them  with  Carthage.  On  the  other 
hand,  Carthage  would  become  a  dangerous  enemy  if 
it  were  allowed  to  possess  itself  of  Messana.  It 
would  only  have  to  conquer  Syracuse  to  make  itself 
master  of  Sicily.  The  Senate  debated  the  question 
more   than    once   without  coming  to   any  decision. 

*  **  Mamers  "  is  an  Italian  form  of  "  Mars." 


THE  ROMANS  GAIN  MESSANA. 


131 


Besides  their  fear  of  a  new  enterprise,  they  had,  we 
may  hope,  some  scruple  about  taking  to  themselves 
such  very  discreditable  allies.  From  the  Senate  the 
matter  was  referred  to  the  people,  and  the  people  felt 
neither  the  fear  nor  the  scruple,  but  resolved  that  help 
should  be  sent,  and  that  the  Mamertines  should  be 
received  as  allies. 

Meanwhile  the  other  party  at  Messana  had  been 
busy.  They  applied  for  help  to  Carthage  ;  and  Car- 
thage at  once  sent  it.  A  peace  was  made  with  Hiero, 
who  was  besieging  the  city.  A  fleet  sailed  into  the 
harbour,  and  a  body  of  troops  under  Hanno  occu- 
pied the  citadel.  When  the  Romans,  who  were  under 
the  command  of  Appius  Claudius,  one  of  the  Consuls 
of  the  year,  arrived,  they  found  themselves  anticipated. 
Unfortunately  for  Carthage,  both  the  officers  in  charge 
of  the  fleet  and  Hanno  were  wanting  in  foresight  or 
resolution.  The  former  was  seized  at  a  meeting  of 
the  citizens  to  which  he  had  gone  in  the  hope  of 
keeping  the  peace ;  the  latter  consented  to  give  up 
the  citadel  if  he  were  permitted  to  withdraw  with 
his  garrison.  Then  the  Romans  became  masters 
of  Messana  without  having  to  strike  a  single  blow 
for  it. 

The  Carthaginians  were  not  disposed  to  accept 
this  state  of  things.  Hanno  they  crucified  as  having 
shown  in  his  conduct  neither  courage  nor  good  judg- 
ment. Then,  in  concert  with  Hiero,  they  closely  in- 
vested the  city.  Claudius  attempted  to  make  terms  ; 
he  was  even  willing  to  depart,  if  the  Mamertines 
might  be  allowed  to  remain.  When  these  terms 
were  rejected  he  resolved  to  act.     He  marched  out  of 


132 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


the  city  and  offered  battle.  Hiero  accepted  it,  but 
after  a  long  fight  was  driven  back  into  his  camp.  The 
next  day  he  returned  to  Syracuse.  Appius  followed 
up  his  victory,  attacking  and  routing  the  Carthaginian 
army,  which  immediately  raised  the  siege  of  the  city. 
The  next  year  a  larger  army  was  sent  ;  Hiero,  who 
had  the  sagacity  to  see  with  whom  the  victory  was  most 
likely  to  be,  submitted  to  Rome,  becoming  one  of  its 
most  constant  and  useful  allies  Many  other  cities, 
both  Sicilian  and  Carthaginian,  followed  this  example. 
Carthage,  on  the  other  hand,  increased  her  forces  in 
the  island,  making  Agrigentum  the  base  of  her 
operations  and  the  place  in  which  her  military  stores 
were  kept. 

The  next  year  the  Romans  besieged  Agrigentum, 
and  kept  the  garrison  closely  within  the  walls.  After 
a  blockade  which  lasted  five  months,  Hannibal,  one  of 
the  Suffetes,  who  was  in  command,  found  himself 
sorely  pressed  by  famine,  and  sent  urgent  entreaties  to 
Carthage  for  help.  In  answer  to  these  requests,  a  con- 
siderable body  of  troops,  with  a  number  of  elephants, 
was  sent  to  Sicily.  Han  no,  who  commanded  the 
Carthaginian  army  in  the  field,  was  rendered  superior 
in  force  to  the  Romans  by  this  reinforcement.  He 
cut  off  their  supplies  and  reduced  them  to  great 
straits.  Indeed,  but  for  the  help  of  Hiero  they  could 
not  have  held  out.  Hanno  now  thought  it  time  to 
attack  the  enemy.  He  sent  on  his  African  light- 
horse  in  advance,  with  orders  to  provoke  the  Roman 
cavalry  to  an  engagement,  and  by  retiring  before  them 
to  draw  them  within  reach  of  his  whole  army.  The 
stratagem  succeeded.     The  Romans  sallied  furiously 


CAPTURE   OP  AGRIGENTUM, 


133 


I 


( 


from  their  camp,  drove  the  Africans  before  them,  and 
then,  finding  themselves  in  presence  of  Hanno's  army, 
were  themselves  driven  back. 

For  two  months  the  two  armies  lay  quiet,  with  a 
space  of  about  a  mile  between  them.  Meanwhile  the 
famine  in  the  city  grew  worse,  and  Hannibal,  by  fire 
signals  from  the  city  (for  the  Carthaginians  seem  to 
have  had  some  system  of  telegraphing),  and  by  mes- 
sengers, made  his  colleague  aware  that  he  could 
hold  out  no  longer.  The  Romans  were  scarcely  less 
in  need,  so  that  both  parties  were  eager  to  fight.  The 
battle  that  followed  was  long  and  obstinate.  At  last 
the  Carthaginian  mercenaries,  who  composed  the  front 
line,  gave  way,  fell  back  upon  the  elephants  behind 
them,  and  threw  the  whole  army  into  disorder.  Only 
a  small  part  of  the  troops  escaped.  But  Hannibal 
with  the  garrison  of  Agrigentum  was  more  fortunate. 
Seeing  that  the  Romans,  rejoicing  in  their  victory, 
were  guarding  their  lines  very  carelessly,  he  made  his 
way  through  undiscovered  The  next  day  the  Romans 
marched  mto  Agrigentum,  where  they  found  abun- 
dance of  spoil  and  many  prisoners  of  war. 

After  this  success  the  Romans  began  to  think  that 
then  it  was  within  their  power  to  make  themselves 
masters  of  the  island.  But  the  great  obstacle  was 
that  Carthage  was  still  mistress  of  the  sea,  and  that 
even  their  own  coasts  were  not  safe  from  the  ravages 
of  her  fleet.  If  their  hope  was  to  be  fulfilled  they 
must  have  a  fleet  of  their  own.  Ships  of  course  they 
had,  for  the  treaties  •  with  Carlha^e,  made  hundreds 
of  years  before,  had  set  limits  beyond  which  they 

'  See  pp.  14-16. 


\ 


134 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


should  not  go ;  possibly  they  had  ships  of  war ;  but 
they  had  nothing  which  they  could  match  against  the 
great  five-banked  vessels  of  the  enemy.  Fortunately 
one  of  these  came  into  their  possession,  stranded  by  a 
storm  or  in  an  attack  made  upon  their  transports. 
This  they  used  as  a  model  for  their  shipbuilders.  In 
the  course  of  a  few  weeks,  a  hundred  five-banked  and 
twenty  three  banked  vessels  were  built — of  green  wood, 
it  is  said,  and  not  likely  to  last,  but  still  sufficient  for 
their  purpose. 

The  first  attempt  of  the  new  force  was  not  fortu- 
nate. A  squadron  of  seventeen  ships  was  taken  at 
Lipara,  with  one  of  the  consuls,  who  was  in  command. 
But  the  Carthaginians  soon  found  that  the  Romans 
were  quite  as  formidable  by  sea  as  by  land.  Their 
admiral,  Hannibal,  who  was  reconnoitring  with  fifty 
ships,  fell  in  unexpectedly  with  a  superior  force  of  the 
Romans,  lost  the  greater  part  of  his  fleet,  and  barely 
escaped  himself  Still,  the  greater  experience  of  their 
seamen  would  have  given  them  the  advantage  but  for 
the  device  by  which  their  enemies  contrived  to  make 
a  sea-fight  very  much  like  a  fight  on  dry  land.  Every 
Roman  ship  was  filled  with  a  boarding  apparatus.  It 
was  like  a  gangway,  eighteen  feet  long  and  four  feet 
broad,  and  was  attached  to  a  pillar  of  wood  set  up  by 
the  bowsprit,  from  which  it  was  dropped  when  the 
two  ships  came  in  contact.  The  further  end  was 
furnished  with  a  sharpened  bar  of  iron,  which  was 
driven  by  the  force  of  the  fall  into  the  enemy's  deck 
and  held  it  fast.  If  the  ships  were  laid  broadside  to 
broadside,  the  boarders  jumped  from  all  parts  of  their 
own  ship  on  to  that  of  the  enemy  ;   if  prow  only 


DUILIAN  COLUMN. 


134 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


should  not  go  ;  possibly  they  had  ships  of  war  ;  but 
they  had  nothing  which  they  could  match  against  the 
great  five-banked  vessels  of  the  enemy.  Fortunately 
one  of  these  came  into  their  possession,  stranded  by  a 
storm  or  in  an  attack  made  upon  their  transports. 
This  they  used  as  a  model  for  their  shipbuilders.  In 
the  course  of  a  few  weeks,  a  hundred  five-banked  and 
twenty  three  banked  vessels  were  built — of  green  wood, 
it  is  said,  and  not  likely  to  last,  but  still  sufficient  for 
their  purpose. 

The  first  attempt  of  the  new  force  was  not  fortu- 
nate. A  squadron  of  seventeen  ships  was  taken  at 
Lipara,  with  one  of  the  consuls,  who  was  in  command. 
But  the  Carthaginians  soon  found  that  the  Romans 
were  quite  as  formidable  by  sea  as  by  land.  Their 
admiral,  Hannibal,  who  was  reconnoitring  with  fifty 
ships,  fell  in  unexpectedly  with  a  superior  force  of  the 
Romans,  lost  the  greater  part  of  his  fleet,  and  barely 
escaped  himself  Still,  the  greater  experience  of  their 
seamen  would  have  given  them  the  iidvantage  but  for 
the  device  by  which  their  enemies  contrived  to  make 
a  sea-fight  very  much  like  a  fight  on  dry  land.  Every 
Roman  ship  was  filled  with  a  boarding  apparatus.  It 
was  like  a  gangway,  eighteen  feet  long  and  four  feet 
broad,  and  was  attached  to  a  pillar  of  wood  set  up  by 
the  bowsprit,  from  which  it  was  dropped  when  the 
two  ships  came  in  contact.  The  further  end  was 
furnished  with  a  sharpened  bar  of  iron,  which  was 
driven  by  the  force  of  the  fall  into  the  enemy's  deck 
and  held  it  fast.  If  the  ships  were  laid  broadside  to 
broadside,  the  boarders  jumped  from  all  parts  of  their 
own  ship  on  to  that  of  the  enemy  ;    if  prow   only 


..!i;<j 


■i   ¥ 


•v  .  .\ 


Hj^R   ^^^» 


^^icatfaPfti^ 


>#-*•' 


DUILIAN   COLUMN. 


BATTLE  OF  MYLM, 


137 


touched  prow,  they  went  two  and  two  along  the 
gangway. 

The  new  apparatus  was  soon  brought  into  use. 
Hannibal  (the  same  commander  who  had  escaped 
from  Agrigentum)  encountered  the  Roman  Consul 
Duilius,  and  despising  his  enemy,  bore  down  upon  him 
without  taking  the  trouble  to  form  his  fleet  in  order. 
The  front  ships,  as  soon  as  they  came  near  the 
Romans,  were  grappled  by  the  new  machines,  and 
the  boarding  parties  poured  in  from  the  Roman  ves- 
sels. The  Carthaginians  were  taken  by  surprise  and 
overpowered,  and  lost  all  the  thirty  ships  that  com- 
posed the  van.  The  rest  of  the  fleet  fared  little  better. 
Whenever  they  tried  to  approach,  the  grappling-irons 
hune  over  them.  In  the  end  they  fled  with  the  loss  of 
fifty  more  ships  ;  Hannibal  escaping  in  an  open  boat. 
This  battle  of  Mylae  was  one  of  the  turning  points 
of  the  long  struggle  between  the  two  powers.  Car- 
thage had  ruled  the  sea  for  centuries,  and  now  it  was 
beaten  by  a  foe  who  had  first  taken  to  it  only  a  few 
months  before.^ 

It  is  needless  to  give  all  the  details  of  the  long 
struggle  that  followed.  Hannibal  met  with  his  end 
in  the  year  of  his  defeat  at  Myla^.  He  had  sailed  to 
Sardinia,  and  was  there  surprised  by  the  Roman  fleet, 
losing  many  of  his  ships.  As  usual  he  escaped,  but 
this  time  in  vain.  He  was  seized  by  the  survivors  and 
crucified. 


, 


'  Duilius  received  high  honours  at  Rome,  a  triumph,  a  column  adorned 
with  the  beaks  of  the  captured  vessels,  and  the  singular  privilege  of 
being  accompanied  by  a  torch- bearer  and  a  flute-player  when  he  was 
coming  home  from  dinner  at  night. 


138 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


BATTLE  OF  ECNOMUS. 


139 


The  next  two  years  the  war  dragged  on  in  Sicily 
without  any  decisive  event,  though  the  advantage  was 
for  the  most  part  with  Rome.  But  in  256  a  great 
battle  was  fought.  The  Roman  Government,  weary 
of  these  tedious  campaigns,  resolved  to  carry  the  war 
into  Africa,  and  attack  their  enemy  at  home.  With 
this  end  in  view  they  collected  a  fleet  of  as  many  as 
three  hundred  and  thirty  decked  ships.  On  these  they 
embarked  their  best  troops.  Each  vessel  had  a  crew 
of  three  hundred  seamen,  and  carried  a  complement 
of  one  hundred  and  twenty  soldiers.  The  Cartha- 
ginian force  was  still  larger,  numbering  three  hundred 
and  fifty  ships,  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men.  The  two  fleets  met  at  Ecnomus,  a  promontory 
of  the  southern  coast  of  Sicily. 

The  Roman  fleet  was  formed  in  the  shape  of  a 
triangle,  with  the  apex  or  point  towards  the  enemy. 
At  this  point  were  the  two  huge  ships,  each  rowed  by 
six  banks  of  oars,  in  which  sailed  the  two  Roman 
Consuls— Atilius  Regulus,  of  whom  we  shall  hear 
again,  and  Manlius.  Each  side  of  this  triangle  was 
made  up  of  a  squadron  ;  a  third  squadron,  which  held 
the  transports  containing  the  cavalry  in  tow,  formed 
the  base;  and  there  was  yet  a  fourth,  a  reserve, 
ranged  in  one  long  line  so  as  to  cover  both  flanks  of 
the  squadrons  before  them. 

The  Carthaginians  adopted  very  different  tactics. 
They  arranged  their  ships  in  what  may  be  called  open 
order,  extending  their  line  from  the  shore  far  out  to 
sea  with  the  view  of  surrounding  the  enemy.  The 
shore  squadron,  or  left  wmg.  was  under  the  command 
of  Hamilcar ;   the  rest  of  the  fleet  was  led  by  the 


Han  no  whose  army  had  been  defeated  before  Agri- 
gentum.  The  Roman  fleet  began  the  attack.  Seeing 
that  the  enemy  had  but  a  weak  line  of  single  ships, 
they  bore  down  upon  the  centre.  Hamilcar  had 
foreseen  this,  and  had  given  orders  to  his  officers  to 
retreat  as  soon  as  the  attack  should  be  made.  This 
was  done,  and  with  the  expected  result.  The  Romans 
eagerly  pursued  the  flying  enemy ;  their  order  of 
battle  was  broken,  the  two  squadrons  in  advance 
being  separated  from  the  third  (that  which  had  the 
transports  in  tow)  and  from  the  reserve.  Then  the 
retreating  Carthaginians  turned  upon  their  pursuers. 
An  obstinate  fight  followed ;  the  Carthaginians  had 
the  advantage  in  seamanship  and  in  the  speed  of 
their  ships.  But  do  what  they  might,  they  hardly 
dared  to  come  to  close  quarters.  The  Roman  ships 
were  fitted  with  the  dreaded  grappling  and  boarding 
machines.  If  these  were  once  brought  into  use  the 
battle  had  to  be  fought  by  the  soldiers,  and  there 
v/as  no  chance  of  standing  against  the  soldiers  of 
Rome. 

While  this  struggle  was  going  on,  another  com- 
menced in  the  rear  of  the  Roman  fleet.  Hanno  bore 
down  with  his  ships  upon  the  reserve  squadron  and 
threw  it  into  confusion.  And  then  began  a  third, 
the  left  or  in-shore  wing  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet 
attacking  the  squadron  which  had  the  transports 
attached  to  it.  But  the  Roman  superiority  was 
maintained  everywhere.  At  close  quarters  the  Car- 
thaginians could  not  hold  their  own,  and  though 
here  and  there  they  might  sink  a  ship  by  a  sudden 
skilful   charge,   to  close  quarters    they   were   bound 


140 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


sooner  or  later  to  come.  Hamilcar  was  the  first  to 
retreat  ;  then  Hanno,  who  had  been  pressing  hard  on 
the  transport  squadron  and  the  reserve,  was  attacked 
in  his  turn  and  forced  to  fly.  Thus  the  Romans  won 
the  second  great  naval  victory.  Twenty- six  of  their 
ships  had  been  sunk,  but  none  were  taken.  The  Car- 
thagmians  lost  about  a  hundred,  as  many  as  sixty- 
four  having  been  captured  with  all  their  crews.  Those 
that  escaped  were  scattered  in  all  directions,  and 
there  was  now  nothing  to  prevent  the  Romans  from 
invading  Africa. 


II. 


THE  INVASION  OF  AFRICA. 

Hanno  hastened  home  with  the  news  of  the  disaster 
of  Ecnomus  (though  home,  as  we  have  seen,  was  not 
the  place  to  which  a  defeated  Carthaginian  general 
would  naturally  desire  to  go),  and  bade  his  country- 
men prepare  for  defence.  But  Carthage  was.  now  as 
ever,  almost  helpless  when  attacked  in  her  own  do- 
minions. Her  subjects  were  always  disaffected  and 
ready  to  rebel  ;  and  even  her  own  colonies  were  not 
permitted  to  protect  themselves  with  walls.  No 
resistance  could  be  offered  to  the  invaders,  who  found 
the  country  much  the  same  as  Agathocles  had  found 
it  fifty  years  before,  a  singularly  rich  and  perfectly 
defenceless  region  They  collected  a  rich  booty,  part 
of  which  consisted  of  as  many  as  twenty  thousand 
slaves.  It  is  possible  that  if,  instead  of  busying  them- 
selves with  plunder,  they  had  advanced  on  Carthage 
at  once,  they  might  have  finished  the  war  at  a  single 
blow. 

If  this  had  ever  been  possible,  it  certainly  ceased  to 
be  so  when  an  order  came  from  the  Senate  at  Rome 
that  one  of  the  consuls  was  to  remain  in  Africa  with 
such  forces  as  might  be  necessary  to  finish  the  war, 


i 


142 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


while  the  other  was  to  return  home  with  the  rest  of 
the  expedition.  Regulus  was  left  accordingly  with 
fifteen  thousand  infantry  and  six  hundred  horse  and  a 
squadron  of  forty  ships  ;  the  rest  of  the  force,  with  the 
vast  booty  that  had  been  collected,  Manlius  put  on 
shipboard  and  carried  back  to  Italy. 


RESERVOiKS   OF   CARTHAGE. 


The  Carthaginians,  on  the  other  hand,  were  doing 
their  best  to  strengthen  their  force.  They  appointed 
two  new  generals,  and  sent  for  a  third  from  Sicily,  who 
at  once  came  back,  bringing  with  him  between  five  and 
six  thousand  men  It  seems  strange  that  the  Romans, 
who  must  now  have  been  masters  of  the  sea,  made 


DEFEAT  OF  HAMILCAR, 


143 


no  attempt  to  interrupt  him.  On  his  arrival  the 
Carthaginians  resolved  to  take  the  offensive.  The 
wealthy  citizens  could  not  bear  to  see  their  estates 
plundered  and  their  country  houses  burnt  to  the 
ground,  and  resolved  to  risk  a  battle.  What  might 
have  been  the  result  if  they  had  had  skilful  generals 
is  doubtful  ;  but,  unfortunately,  skilful  generals  could 
not  be  found.  Hamilcar  and  his  colleagues  marched 
out  of  the  city  and  took  up  their  position  upon  a  hill. 
As  their  strength  was  in  cavalry  and  elephants  they 


CROSS   SECTION   OF  CISTERN    WALL.       FROM   DAUX. 

ought,  of  course,  to  have  remained  on  level  ground, 
where  both  these  could  have  been  brought  into  use. 
The  Roman  general,  whose  military  ability  was  great, 
saw  his  advantage.  Half  the  enemy's  force  was 
useless  in  the  position  which  he  was  occupying,  and 
in  that  position  he  resolved  to  attack  him.  He 
ordered  a  simultaneous  advance  against  both  sides 
of  the  hill  on  which  the  Carthaginian  camp  was 
pitched.  The  cavalry  and  the  elephants  were,  as  he 
had  foreseen,  quite  useless ;  and  though  some  of  the 


142 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


DEFEAT  OF  HAMILCAR, 


143 


while  the  other  was  to  return  home  with  the  rest  of 
the  expedition.  Regulus  was  left  accordingly  with 
fifteen  thousand  infantry  and  six  hundred  horse  and  a 
squadron  of  forty  ships  ;  the  rest  of  the  force,  with  the 
vast  booty  that  had  been  collected,  Manlius  put  on 
shipboard  and  carried  back  to  Italy. 


RfcSERVOiKS   OF   CARTHAGE. 


The  Carthaginians,  on  the  other  hand,  were  doing 
their  best  to  strengthen  their  force.  They  appointed 
two  new  generals,  and  sent  for  a  third  from  Sicily,  who 
at  once  came  back,  bringing  with  him  between  five  and 
six  thousand  men  It  seems  strange  that  the  Romans, 
who  must  now  have  been  masters  of  the  sea,  made 


no  attempt  to  interrupt  him.  On  his  arrival  the 
Carthaginians  resolved  to  take  the  offensive.  The 
wealthy  citizens  could  not  bear  to  see  their  estates 
plundered  and  their  country  houses  burnt  to  the 
ground,  and  resolved  to  risk  a  battle.  What  might 
have  been  the  result  if  they  had  had  skilful  generals 
is  doubtful  ;  but,  unfortunately,  skilful  generals  could 
not  be  found.  Hamilcar  and  his  colleagues  marched 
out  of  the  city  and  took  up  their  position  upon  a  hill. 
As  their  strength  was  in  cavalry  and  elephants  they 


CROSS   SECTION    OF  ClblLKN    WALL.       IKOM    DAUX, 

ought,  of  course,  to  have  remained  on  level  ground, 
where  both  these  could  have  been  brought  into  use. 
The  Roman  general,  whose  military  ability  was  great, 
saw  his  advantage.  Half  the  enemy's  force  was 
useless  in  the  position  which  he  was  occupying,  and 
in  that  position  he  resolved  to  attack  him.  He 
ordered  a  simultaneous  advance  against  both  sides 
of  the  hill  on  which  the  Carthaginian  camp  was 
pitched.  The  cavalry  and  the  elephants  were,  as  he 
had  foreseen,  quite  useless  ;  and  though  some  of  the 


144 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


XANTIPPUS. 


H5 


mercenaries  stood  firm  against  the  first  charge,  these 
too  gave  way  when  they  were  taken  in  the  rear.  The 
Romans  won  a  decided  victory,  though  they  were 
too  weak  in  cavalry  to  inflict  much  loss  upon  the 
enemy  in  his  retreat.  The  next  day  they  advanced 
and  took  up  a  position  at  Tunes,  a  town  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  was  not  more  than  five  miles  from 
Carthage. 

The  Carthaginians  were  in  despair.  Both  their 
fleet  and  their  army  had  suffered  terrible  defeats,  and 
their  subjects  and  allies  were  in  rebellion— the  Afri- 
cans ravaging  the  territory  of  their  late  masters  even 
more  mercilessly  than  did  the  Romans.  In  fact  they 
had  nothing  left  to  them  but  the  city  itself;  and  this, 
crowded  with  the  multitude  of  fugitives  that  had  fled 
into  it  from  all  the  country  round  about,  was  threat- 
ened with  famine.  Affairs  were  in  this  condition 
when  envoys  arrived  from  Regulus,  who  was  afraid 
that  his  year  of  office  might  expire  before  the  war 
was  finished,  offering  to  treat  for  peace.  Envoys 
were  at  once  sent  from  Carthage  ;  but  they  could  do 
nothing.  The  Roman  general,  probably  aware  that 
the  Senate  at  home  would  not  sanction  any  great 
concessions,  demanded  terms  which  it  was  impossible  to 
grant.  The  Carthaginian  government  felt  that  they 
could  not  be  more  entirely  humiliated  by  absolute 
conquest,  and  they  broke  oft  the  negotiation,  resolving 
to  resist  to  the  last. 

Then  came  one  of  those  singular  turns  of  fortune 
of  which  history  is  so  full.  The  pride  of  the  Roman 
general  was  "  the  pride  that  goeth  before  a  fall."  The 
Carthaginians  had  not  hesitated  to  use  their  almost 


mi  I 


boundless  wealth  in  hiring  mercenaries  from  abroad, 
and  now  there  came  to  Africa  a  body  of  these  troops 
in  command  of  one  of  those  soldiers  of  fortune  who 
have  had  the  luck  to  have  great  opportunities  and  to 
make  good  use  of  them.  Xantippus  came  from  the 
best  school  of  soldiers  in  the  world — Sparta.  It  was 
a  Spartan  who  had  turned  the  tide  when  Athens 
seemed  likely  to  conquer  Syracuse ;  and  another 
Spartan  was  to  do  the  same  service  for  Carthage 
against  Rome.  Xantippus  heard  the  story  of  the 
late  battle ;  he  saw  the  strength  of  the  Carthaginian 
forces,  the  numbers  of  their  cavalry  and  of  their 
elephants,  and  he  came  to  the  conclusion — a  conclu- 
sion which  he  did  not  hesitate  to  announce  to  his 
friends — that  their  disasters  had  been  due,  not  to  the 
inferiority  of  their  army,  but  to  the  unskil fulness  of 
the  generals.  The  Senate  sent  for  him.  Introduced 
into  the  council-chamber,  he  set  forth  the  causes  of 
the  late  defeat,  and  the  strategy  which  ought  to  be 
pursued  in  the  future,  with  such  clearness  as  to 
convince  his  hearers.  The  generals  were  displaced, 
and  the  "  care  of  the  army  was  committed  "  to  the 
Spartan. 

Every  one  hoped  much  from  the  change,  and 
Xantippus  soon  began  to  show  himself  equal  to  his 
task.  Even  in  drilling  the  troops — and  this  he  began 
to  do  at  once — his  skill  was  so  manifestly  superior  to 
that  of  his  colleagues,  that  the  soldiers  began  to  feel 
the  utmost  confidence  in  him.  They  loudly  asked 
that  they  might  be  led  against  the  enemy,  and  that 
the  general  who  was  to  lead  them  should  be  Xantippus. 
The  other  generals  offered  to  give  up  their  commands 


146 


THE   STORY  OF   CARTHAGE. 


DEFEAT  OF  REGULUS. 


to  their  comrade  ;  and  the  army,  which  numbered 
twelve  thousand  foot  and  four  thousand  horse,  and 
which  was  accompanied  by  the  enormous  number  of  a 
hundred  elephants,^  was  led  out  against  the  enemy. 
Xantippus  arranged  the  elephants  in  a  single  line  in 
front.  Behind  these  he  placed  what  Polybius  calls 
"  the  Carthaginian  phalanx."  Probably  the  desperate 
condition  of  the  country  had  brought  a  force  of  native 
Carthaginians  into  the  field.  On  the  right  wing  were 
posted  the  heavy-armed  mercenaries.  With  them 
were  ranged  also  some  of  the  light-armed  troops  and 
of  the  cavalry.  The  left  wing  was  made  up  entirely 
of  the  two  latter  kinds  of  troops. 

Regulus,  on  the  other  hand,  when  he  saw  that  the 
Carthaginians  were  bent  on  fighting,  arranged  his 
line  of  battle  with  the  special  view  of  holding  his 
ground  against  the  elephants,  which  his  men  greatly 
feared.  The  light-armed  troops  were,  as  usual,  posted 
in  front  ;  but  behind  them  stood  the  legions  in  un- 
usually deep  and  close  order.  The  cavalry  were 
posted  as  usual  on  the  wings.  These  tactics  were 
well  contrived  to  resist  the  elephants,  but  laid  the 
army,  with  its  narrow  front,  open  to  the  flank  attacks 
of  the  powerful  Carthaginian  cavalry. 

Xantippus  began  the  battle  by  a  forward  movement 
of  his  elephants  against  the  Roman  centre.  His 
cavalry  charged  at  the  same  time  on  cither  wing.  The 
Roman  horse,  five  hundred  only  against  four  thousand — ■ 

'  It  is  not  easy  to  imagine  how  a  city  which  was  threatened  with 
famine  could  support  a  hundred  elephants,  each  of  which  must  have 
required  a  daily  ration  of  at  least  half  a  hundredweight  of  food,  some 
of  it  at  least  available  for  hnman  consumption. 


H7 


if  these  numbers  are  right — was  speedily  overpowered. 
The  Roman  left  wing  at  first  fared  better.    Charging 
fiercely,  with  not  the  less  zeal  because  they  were  not 
called  to  encounter  the  dreaded  elephants,  they  fell  on 
the  heavy-armed  mercenaries,  routed  them,  and  pur- 
sued them  as  far  as  their  camp.    The  centre,  too,  held 
its  own  for  a  time.     The  front  ranks,  indeed,  were 
trampled  down  in  heaps  by  the  elephants,  but  the 
main   body,   with   its   deep,   close   files,  stood    firm. 
But  they  had  to  face  about  to  resist  attacks  in  front, 
on  the  sides,.and  in  the  rear.     One  part,  after  driving 
back  the  elephants,  was  met  by  the  phalanx  of  native 
Carthaginians,  which  was  fresh  and   unbroken,  and 
indeed  had  not  been  in  action  at  all ;  another  had  to 
resist  the  furious  charges  of  the  cavalry ;  nor   were 
there  any  reserves  to  be  brought  up.  The  greater  part 
of  the  army  fell  where  they  stood :  some  crushed  by 
the  elephants,   others  struck  down   by   the  javelins 
showered  on  them  by  the  nimble  African  horsemen, 
some  slain  in  more  equal  conflict  with  the  Carthaginian 
heavy-armed.     The  few  that  sought  safety  in  flight 
died  but  with  less  honour.     The  way  to  the  fortified 
post  which  they  held  upon  the  sea-coast  (it  was  called 
Aspis  or  Clypea  from  its  resemblance  to   a  shield) 
was  over  a  flat  and  open  country  ;  the  cavalry  and  the 
elephants  pursued  the  fugitives,  and  few  reached  the 
fort.     A  solid  body  of  two  thousand  men,  however, 
which  had  broken  through  the  mercenaries,  was  able 
to   make  good   its   retreat  to  Aspis.     Five  hundred 
prisoners  were  taken,  among  them  the  Consul  Regulus. 
All  the  rest  of  the  army,  scarcely  less  than  twelve- 
thousand  in  number,  perished  on  the  field  or  in  the 


148 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


flight.  The  great  historian,^  from  whom  I  have  taken 
this  account,  concludes  his  narrative  of  the  campaign 
with  reflections  on  the  changes  of  fortune  which  bring 
men  down  in  the  course  of  a  day  from  the  heights 
of  prosperity  to  the  depths  of  misery,  and  on  the 
marvellous  results  which  the  genius  of  a  single  man 
can  eflect ;  but  he  says  nothing  either  here  or  after- 
wards of  the  romantic  story  of  the  fate  of  the 
prisoner  Regulus.  We  are  not  certain  to  what  year  it 
belonsrs — we  are  not  even  sure  that  it  is  true  at  all ; 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  too  famous,  too  noble  in  its 
meaning  and  moral,  to  be  omitted.  I  may  therefore 
tell  it  now  where  it  will  fitly  close  the  career  of  one  of 
the  great  soliers  of  Rome,  the  simple,  frugal  men  who 
were  called  from  the  plough  to  command  the  armies 
of  the  republic.2 

I  do  not  know  that  the  story  can  be  better  told 
than  in  Horace's  noble  ode,  perhaps  the  very  noblest 
that  he  ever  wrote.  Regulus,  we  may  say,  by  way  of 
j>rcface,  after  being  kept  in  prison  at  Carthage  for 
several  years,  was  sent  to  Rome  to  negotiate  a  peace, 
under  the  promise  to  return  if  he  failed.  Among  the 
terms  which  he  was  to  ofler  was  that  of  a  ransoming 

*  Polybius. 

»  The  story  was  told  in  later  times  that  Re^ilus  was  sowing  his  fields 
when  the  messenger  came  with  the  tidings  of  his  election  to  the  consul- 
ship ;  and  the  agnomen  (a  sort  of  second  surname)  of  Serrnnus  was 
said  to  have  been  given  to  the  family  from  this  circumstance.  Among 
the  future  heroes  of  his  race  whom  /Eneas  sees  is  in  his  Elysian  fields  is 
"Serranus  o'er  his  furrow  bowed."  It  is  cruel  to  have  to  say  that  the 
first  Regulus  that  bore  the  name  of  Serranus  was  the  son  of  the  hero  ; 
and  still  worse  to  be  told  that  the  proper  spelling  of  the  word  is 
"  Saranus,"  and  that  it  probably  comes  from  Saranum,  an  insignificant 
town  of  Umbria. 


HORACE   ON  REGULUS, 


149 


or  exchanging  of  prisoners.  When  brought  into  the 
Senate,  which  at  first  he  refused  to  enter  as  being 
now  a  mere  Carthaginian  slave,  he  strongly  advised 
his  countrymen.  At  the  same  time  he  gave  his  voice 
against  peace  generally. 

With  warning  voice  of  stern  rebuke 

Thus  Regulus  the  Senate  shook  : 

He  saw  proplietic,  in  far  days  to  come, 

The  heart-corrupt,  and  future  doom  of  Rome. 

"  These  eyes,"  he  cried,  "  these  eyes  have  seen 

Unblooded  swords  from  warriors  tern, 

And  Roman  standards  nailed  in  scorn 

On  Punic  shrines  obscene  ; 

Have  seen  the  hands  of  free-born  men 

Wrenched  back ;  th'  unliarred,  unguarded  gate, 

And  fields  our  war  laid  desolate 

By  Romans  tilled  again. 

"  What  !  will  the  gold-enfranchised  slave 
Return  more  loyal  and  more  brave? 

Ye  heap  but  loss  on  crime  ! 
The  wool  that  Cretan  dyes  distain 
Can  ne'er  its  virgin  hue  regain  ; 
And  valour  fallen  and  disgraced 
Revives  not  in  a  coward  breast 

Its  energy  sublime. 

*'  The  stag  released  from  hunter's  toils 
From  the  dread  sight  of  man  recoils. 
Is  he  more  brave  than  when  of  old 
He  ranged  his  forest  free  ?     Behold 
In  him  your  soldier  !     He  has  knelt 
To  faithless  foes  ;  he,  too,  has  felt 
The  knotted  cord  :  and  crouched  beneath 
Fear,  not  of  shame,  but  death. 

*'  He  sued  for  peace  tho'  vowed  to  war ; 
Will  such  men,  girt  in  arms  once  more 
Dash  headlong  on  the  Punic  shore? 
No  !  they  will  buy  their  craven  lives 
With  Punic  scorn  and  Punic  gyves. 


T50 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


O  mighty  Carthage,  rearing  high 
Thy  fame  upon  our  infamy, 
A  city  eye,  an  empire  built 
On  Roman  ruins,  Roman  guilt  ?  '* 


From  the  chaste  kiss,  and  wild  embrace 
Of  wife  and  babes,  he  turned  his  face, 
A  man  self-doomed  to  die, 
Then  bent  his  manly  brow,  in  scorn, 
Resolved,  relentless,  sad  but  stern. 

To  earth,  all  silently  ; 
Till  counsel  never  heard  before 
Had  nerved  each  wavering  Senator  ; — 
Till  flushed  each  cheek  with  patriot  shame, 
And  surging  rose  the  loud  acclaim  ; — 
Then,  from  his  weeping  friends,  in  haste, 
To  exile  and  to  death  he  passed. 


He  knew  the  tortures  that  Barbaric  hate 

Had  stored  for  him.     Exulting  in  his  fate, 

With  kindly  hand  he  waved  away 

The  crowds  that  strove  his  course  to  stay. 

He  passed  from  all,  as  when  in  days  of  yore. 

His  judgment  given,  thro'  client  throngs  he  pressed 

In  glad  Venafrian  fields  to  seek  his  rest, 

Or  Greek  Tarentum  on  th'  Ionian  shore.' 


What  is  the  truth  about  the  "  tortures  of  barbaric 
hate"  we  cannot  say.  The  Romans  had  a  horrible 
story  of  how  the  hero  on  his  return  was  cruelly  put  to 
death.  But  then  they  were  never  scrupulous  about 
the  truth  when  they  were  writing  of  their  enemies  ; 
and  about  Carthage  and  its  doings  they  were,  we  have 
reason  to  believe,  particularly  apt  to  exaggerate  and 
even  to  invent.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Carthaginians 
showed   no  mercy  to  their  own  generals  when  these 


'  I  have  availed  myself  of  a  translation  by  Sir  Stephen  De  Vere. 
(Bell  and  Sons,  1885.) 


REVENGE  FOR  REGULUS. 


151 


were  unsuccessful ;  and  it  is  very  probable  that  they 
showed  as  little  to  an  enemy,  especially  when  he  had 
done  them  such  damage  and  had  treated  them  as 
haughtily  as  had  Regulus. 

But  there  is  at  least  equal  authority  for  a  story  not 
less  horrible  which  is  told  against  the  Romans  them- 
selves, or  rather  against  a  Roman  woman.  The 
Senate  handed  over  two  noble  Carthaginians  to  the 
wife  of  Regulus  as  hostages  for  the  safety  of  her  hus- 
band. When  she  heard  of  his  death  she  ordered  her 
servants  to  fasten  the  two  prisoners  in  a  cask,  and  to 
keep  them  without  bread  and  water.  After  five  days 
one  of  them  died.  The  savage  creature  kept  the  living 
shut  up  with  the  dead,  giving  him  now  a  little  bread  and 
water  that  his  torments  might  be  prolonged.  But  the 
servants  themselves  rebelled  against  these  horrible 
doings,  and  informed  the  Tribunes  of  the  people  of 
what  was  going  on.  By  them  the  poor  wretch  was 
rescued  ;  and  the  people  would  not  allow  him  to  be 
ill-treated  any  more. 


ROMAN  LOSSES  AT  SEA, 


153 


III. 


IN     SICILY     AGAIN. 

The  Romans  still  retained  their  superiority  at  sea. 
It  is,  indeed,  a  very  strange  thing  that  the  Cartha- 
ginians, though  they  had  been  sailors,  and  adven- 
turous sailors  too,  for  centuries,  should  have  been 
beaten  almost  at  once  on  their  own  element  by  a 
people  that  had  had  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  it^ 
But  so  it  was.  News  of  the  disaster  that  had  hap- 
pened to  the  army  of  Regulus  was  brought  to  Rome, 
and  a  fleet  was  sent  to  carry  off  the  garrison  of 
Clypea,  which,  it  was  said,  still  held  out  against  the 
enemy.  It  met  and  defeated  the  fleet  of  Carthage, 
taking,  we  are  told,  as  many  as  one  hundred  and 
fourteen  vessels  out  of  a  total  of  two  hundred,  and 
carried  the  troops.  But  though  the  Romans  seem  to 
have  fought  as  well  by  sea  as  by  land,  still  they  were 
not  sailors.     We  shall  hear  several  times  in  the  course 

'  The  fleet  of  Kome  must  have  been,  to  a  great  extent,  manned  by 
the  Italian  allies.  Indeed,  down  to  just  a  late  period  the  seamen  em- 
ployed in  it  were  called  soai  navales,  "naval  allies."  Polybius,  to 
show  the  ignorance  of  ihe  Romans  in  these  matters,  has  a  curious  story 
of  how  the  crews  of  iht-  ships  first  built  during  the  war  were  taught  to 
row  by  practising  on  dry  land.  The  practising,  one  imagines,  would 
not  go  very  far  in  teaching  them. 


of  the  next  (q\n  years  of  terrible  losses  by  shipwreck, 
losses  which  we  know  to  have  been  increased,  if  not 
caused,  by  the  obstinacy  and  ignorance  of  the  officers 
in  command.     So  it  seems  to  have  been  in  the  case 
of  the  relieving  fleet.     The  pilots  warned  the  consuls 
that   the   south   coast   of  Sicily   was  dangerous,  but 
warned  in  vain.     The  result  was  a  calamity  of  which 
Polybius,  a  sober  and  sensible  writer,  says  that  "  his- 
tory can  scarcely  afford  another  example  of  so  great 
and  general   a  disaster."     Out  of  four  hundred  and 
sixty-four  vessels  little  more  than  a  sixth  part  escaped. 
The    Carthaginians  were  proportionately  encouraged, 
and,  fitting  up  a  new  fleet  and  levying  another  army, 
resolved  to  have  another  struggle  for  Sicily.     In  the 
first  campaign,   indeed,   they  lost  Panormus,  but  in 
those   that    followed    they   had   a   clear    advantage. 
Again  the  weather  helped  them.     The  Romans  lost 
another  fleet,  and  for  a  time  gave  up  all  hope  of  being 
masters  of  the  sea,  contenting  themselves  with  keep- 
ing only  so  many  vessels  afloat  as  were  wanted  to 
carry  supplies  to  their  army.     In  the  field,  too,  Car- 
thage more  than  held  her  own.     The  havoc  which  the 
elephants  had  wrought  in  the  army  of  Regulus  had 
not  been   forgotten,  and  the  Roman  armies  did  not 
venture  to  offer  battle  in  any  place  where  the  ground 
w^as  suitable  for  the  action  of  these  formidable  crea- 
tures.    It  was  not  till  thcry'  found  out  that  it  was  easy 
to  make  them  as  dangerous  to  their  friends  as  they 
could  be  to  their  foes  that  they  dared  to  face  them. 
One  of  the  Carthaginian  generals  was  rash  enough  to 
use  the  animals   in  attacking  a  town.     The  archers 
showered   arrows   upon    them    from    the    walls    till, 


154 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


driven  to  madness  by  their  wounds,  they  turned 
round  and  broke  down  their  own  ranks.  Many 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans  on  this  occasion. 
A  still  greater  gain  was  that  they  were  no  longer 
feared. 

And  now  began  one  of  the  most  obstinate  sieges 
recorded  in  history.  Lilybaeum  was  a  strongly  fortified 
town  near  the  Cape  of  the  same  name.  Its  wall  was 
unusually  high,  and  its  ditch  unusually  deep,  while 
the  harbour  could  be  approached  only  by  a  channel 
through  shallow  lakes  which  stretched  between  it 
and  the  sea.  The  Romans  began  by  attacking  a  fort 
on  the  south-western  wall,  and  battered  down  six  of 
the  towers  upon  the  wall.  Himilco,  who  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  garrison,  was  unceasing  in  his  efforts,  re- 
pairing the  breaches,  digging  countermines,  and  watch- 
ing continually  for  a  chance  of  setting  fire  to  the 
Roman  works.  And  he  averted  a  worse  danger  in 
the  threatened  treachery  of  the  mercenaries.  The 
leaders  of  these  troops  were  actually  in  treaty  with 
the  Romans,  when  Himilco  heard  of  what  was  going 
on,  and  contrived  to  break  it  off.  A  few  days  after- 
wards came  help  from  Carthage.  No  news  of  the 
garrison  at  Lilybaeum  had  reached  the  city,  and  it  was 
feared  that  they  were  in  distress.  A  fleet  of  fifty  ships 
was  hastily  fitted  out  and  despatched  to  Sicily,  with  a 
relieving  force  of  ten  thousand  men  on  board.  The 
admiral  in  command  waited  for  a  favourable  wind,  and 
then,  with  all  his  ships  ready  for  action,  sailed  straight 
into  the  harbour,  the  Romans  being  so  surprised  by 
their  boldness  that  they  did  not  attempt  to  oppose. 
Himilco,  encouraged  by  this   reinforcement,  resolved 


!(:•■•••.>•••-- 


STELE   AT    I.II.VH.ErM. 


«»■>»—.:»      ■ 


154 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


driven  to  madness  by  their  wounds,  they  turned 
round  and  broke  down  their  own  ranks.  Many 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans  on  this  occasion. 
A  still  greater  gain  was  that  they  were  no  longer 
feared. 

And  now  began  one  of  the  most  obstinate  sieges 
recorded  in  history.  LilybLUum  was  a  strongly  fortified 
town  near  the  Cape  of  the  same  name.  Its  wall  was 
unusually  high,  and  its  ditch  unusually  deep,  while 
the  harbour  could  be  approached  only  by  a  channel 
through  shallow  lakes  which  stretched  between  it 
anil  the  sea.  The  Romans  began  by  attacking  a  fort 
on  the  south-western  wall,  and  battered  down  six  of 
the  towers  upon  the  wall.  Ilimilco,  who  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  garrison,  was  unceasing  in  his  efforts,  re- 
pairing the  breaches,  digging  countermines,  and  watch- 
ing continually  for  a  chance  of  setting  fire  to  the 
Roman  works.  And  he  averted  a  worse  danger  in 
the  threatened  treacherv  of  the  mercenaries.  The 
leaders  of  these  troops  were  actually  in  treaty  with 
the  Romans,  when  Ilimilco  heard  of  what  was  going 
on,  and  contrived  to  break  it  off.  A  few  days  after- 
wards came  help  from  Carthage.  No  news  of  the 
garrison  at  Lilyb.x-um  had  reached  the  city,  and  it  was 
feared  that  thc\'  were  in  distress.  A  fleet  of  fifty  ships 
was  hastily  fitted  (Mit  and  despatched  to  Sicily,  with  a 
relieving  force  of  ten  thousand  men  on  board.  The 
admiral  in  command  waited  for  a  favourable  wind,  and 
then,  with  all  his  ships  read}'  for  action,  sailed  straight 
into  the  harbour,  the  Romans  being  so  surprised  by 
their  boldness  that  they  did  not  attempt  to  oppose. 
Ilimilco,  enc(juragel   b\'  this    reinforcement,  resolved 


ic-« 


o.zi —  —  ■ 

s'ir.l.K    Al     1. 1  I. \i:. 1.1   M. 


ROMAN  DISASTERS. 


157 


to  attack  the  besiegers.  Sallying  forth  with  nearly 
his  whole  force,  he  fell  on  the  Roman  works  ;  but  he 
just  missed  his  object :  his  troops  were  on  the  point 
of  setting  fire  to  the  engines  and  towers  when  he 
found  that  they  were  suffering  heavier  loss  than  he 
could  afford,  and  withdrew  them.  But  a  few  weeks 
afterwards  he  succeeded.  The  works  had  been  injured 
by  a  violent  gale,  and  some  of  the  mercenaries  saw 
in  the  confusion  thus  caused  an  opportunity  for 
destroying  them.  Himilco  approved  their  scheme. 
These  bands  sallied  from  the  gate  and  set  fire  to  three 
different  places.  The  Romans  were  taken  by  sur- 
prise ;  and  the  wind  blew  such  volumes  of  smoke  into 
their  faces  that  they  could  see  and  do  nothing.  In 
the  end  everything  was  destroyed,  the  towers  being 
burnt  to  the  ground,  and  the  metal  heads  of  the  rams 
melted.  After  this  loss  they  gave  up  all  hopes  of 
taking  the  place  by  storm,  and  resolved  to  trust  to  a 
blockade. 

Meanwhile  the  Carthaginian  fleet  lay  at  Drepanum  ; 
and  this  the  new  consuls  who  came  into  ofifice  in  the 
year  249  resolved  to  attack.  Publius  Claudius,  who  was 
in  command,  managed  to  reach  Drepanum  unobserved. 
Adherbal,  the  Carthaginian  admiral,  was  taken  by 
surprise,  but  did  not  lose  courage.  He  manned  his 
ships  at  once,  and  sailing  out  of  the  harbour  by  the 
opposite  side  to  that  by  which  the  Romans  were 
entering,  formed  his  line  on  the  open  sea  outside. 
Claudius  had  to  recall  his  ships  ;  such  as  had  entered 
the  harbour  came  into  collision  in  backing  out  with 
those  that  followed  them,  and  there  was  great  con- 
fusion.    Still  the  captains  ranged  them  as  well  as  they 


i> 


158 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


could  alonf^  the  shore,  with  their  prows  turned  towards 
the  enemy.     But  they  had  lost  the  choice  of  ground  ; 
the  Carthaginians  had  the  open   sea  and  plenty  of 
room  to  manoeuvre.     They  could  retreat  when  they 
were  hard  pressed,  and  turn  again  when  the  oppor- 
tunity occurred.     When  the  Roman  vessels  ventured 
to  advance  they  were  attacked  in  front,  on  the  side, 
and  in  rear.     But   a  Roman  ship  that  was  in  diffi- 
culties  had  nothing  behind  it  but  the  shore.     If  it 
retired,  it   either   grounded    in  the  shallows   or  was 
actually   stranded.      Nor  was   this    disadvantage   of 
place  counterbalanced  by  any  superiority  in  the  build 
of  the   ships  or   in  seamanship.      The    ships    were 
clums}/,  the  seamen  unskilful.     In  the  end  Claudius 
suffered  a  crushing  defeat.     He  made  his  own  escape 
with  thirty  ships  ;  but  all  the  rest,  nearly  a  hundred  in 
number,  were  captured.     The  crews,  too,  were  taken 
prisoners,  excepting  a  few  who  beached  their  ships 
and  jumped  ashore. 

Junius,  the  other  consul,  was  even  more  un- 
fortunate. He  had  a  hundred  and  twenty  ships  of 
war,  with  which  he  had  to  convey  a  fleet  of  eight 
hundred  transports.  The  Carthaginian  admiral 
forced  him  to  cast  anchor  on  a  lee-shore  (near 
Camarina),  where  there  was  no  harbour  within  reach. 
When  it  came  on  to  blow  the  blockading  squadron  put 
out  to  sea,  and  doubling  Cape  Pachynus  escaped  the 
worst  of  the  storm.  The  Roman  fleet  had  not  time, 
or  perhaps  was  not  wise  enough,  to  follow  them. 
Anyhow,  it  was  completely  destroyed.  "  Scarcely  a 
plank  remained  entire,"  says  the  historian.  As  a  few 
days   before  most   of  the   ships  in  the    harbour  of 


THE  ROMANS  GAIN  ERYX. 


159 


Lilyba^um  had  been  burnt,  Rome  was  now  without  a 
fleet 

Still,  the  siege  of  Lilybceum  was  pushed  on.  The 
blockading  army  had  now  most  of  Sicily  to  draw 
upon  for  stores,  and  was  well  supplied,  while  the  town 
could   be   provisioned    from    the   sea.     Though    the 


COIN  :   THE   TKMri.K   AM)    RAMPARTS   OF   ERYX. 

Romans  gained  possession  by  surprise  of  the  strong 
post  of  Eryx,  the  second  highest  mountain  in  Sicily, 
the  war  for  some  time  dragged  on  without  much 
advantage  to  either  side. 

And  now  appeared  upon  the  scene  one  of  the  few 
great  men  that  Carthage  produced.     Hamilcar,   sur- 


i 


4 


i6o 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


named  Barca,i  was  a  very  young  man  when  he  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Carthaginian  fleet 
and  army.     But  he  had  already  made  himself  a  name, 
and  he  soon  showed  that  he  was  fit  for  his  post.     He 
established  himself  in  a  strong  place  in  the  north-west 
of  the  island,  between  Panormus  and  Drepanum.     It 
was  a  lofty  rock  called  Hercta  (now  Pellegrind),  and 
seems  to  have  united  every  kind  of  advantage.     It  was 
so  difficult  of  approach  from  the  land  that  it  could  be 
defended   by  a  very  small  force.     There  was  some 
productive  land  in  the  neighbourhood.     The  climate 
was   cool  and   healthy ;   and  there  was  a   deep  and 
spacious  harbour.     In  this  place,  though  the  Roman 
forces   held    all    the   neighbourhood,   he   maintained 
himself  for  three  years.     His   fleet— for   Rome  had 
given  up  for  the  present  the  attempt  to  command  the 
sea — ravaged  the  southern  coasts  of  Italy,  and  helped 
to  furnish  him  with  supplies.     On  land  he  kept  his 
enemies  engaged  by  perpetual  surprises  and  strata- 
gems.    He  won,  indeed,  no  great  victory  over  them, 
but  he  kept  them  from  doing  anything  else,  and  the 
siege  of  Lilybaeum  made  no  progress.     So  anxious 
were  the  Romans  to  drive  him  out  of  this  stronghold, 
that  they  at  one  time  assembled  as  many  as  forty 
thousand  men  to  carry  on  their  attacks   upon   him. 
All,  however,  was  in  vain,  and  it  was  of  his  own  free 
will  that  at  the  end  of  three  years  he  took  up  another 
position.     This  was  Eryx,  the  capture  of  which  by  the 
Romans  has  been  mentioned  above.     He  put  his  army 
on   board  the  fleet,  and   suddenly  carried  it  to   the 
place  which  he  had   fixed  upon,    and   though   the 

*  See  page  1 1. 


HASDRUBAL'S  SUCCESSES. 


l6l 


I 


enemy  still  held  the  fort  upon  the  top  of  the  hills, 
got  possession  of  the  town.  Here  he  maintained 
himself  for  two  years,  getting  little  help,  it  would 
seem,  from  home,  for  one  of  his  chief  difficulties  was 
with  his  mercenaries,  who  were  clamouring  for  the 


I'lKENlClAN    WALL   AT    ERYX. 


pay  which  he  could  not  give  them,  and  whom  he  was 
obliged  to  put  off  with  promises.  Still  the  Romans 
could  make  no  impression  on  him,  and  of  course  made 
no  advance  in  the  siege  of  the  Carthaginian  fortresses. 


I 


t  |ti 


i6o 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


named  Barca,i  was  a  very  younf^  man  when  he  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Carthac^inian  fleet 
and  army.     But  he  had  ah'eady  made  himself  aname, 
and  he  soon  showed  that  he  was  fit  for  his  post.     He 
estabh"shed  himself  in  a  stron^i^  place  in  the  north-west 
of  the  island,  between  Panormus  and  Drejianum.     It 
was  a  lofty  rock  called   Hercta  (now  Pcllcgrind),  and 
seems  to  have  united  every  kind  of  advantage.     It  was 
so  difficult  of  approach  from  the  land  that  it  could  be 
defended    by  a   very  small  force.     There  was  some 
productive  land  in  the  neighbourhood.     The  climate 
was   cool  and    healthy  ;    and  there  was  a   deep  and 
spacious  harbour.     In  this  jilace,  though  the  Roman 
forces   held    all    the    neighbourhood,    he    maintained 
himself  for   three  years.     Mis    fleet— for    Rome  had 
given  up  for  the  present  the  attempt  to  command  the 
.sea — ravaged  the  southern  coasts  of  Italy,  and  helped 
to  furnish  him  with  supplies.     On  land  he  kept  his 
enemies  engaged  by  perpetual  surprises  and  strata- 
gems.    He  won,  indeed,  no  great  victory  over  them, 
but  he  kept  them  from  doing  anything  else,  and  the 
siege  of  Lilyb.xum  made   no   progress.     So  anxious 
were  the  Romans  to  drive  him  out  of  this  stronghold, 
that  they  at  one  time  as.sembled  as  many  as   forty 
thousand  men  to  carry  on  their  attacks    upon    him. 
All,  however,  was  in  vain,  and  it  was  of  his  own  free 
will  that  at  the  end  of  three  years  he  took  uj)  another 
position.     This  was  ICry.x,  the  capture  of  which  by  the 
Romans  has  been  mentioned  above.     He  put  his  army 
on    board   the  fleet,  and    suddenly  carried  it  to   the 
place   which   he   had    fixed   upon,    ami    though   the 

*  See  page  il. 


HASDRUBAL^S   SUCCESSES. 


l6l 


,1 


enemy  still  held  the  fort  upon  the  top  of  the  hills, 
got  possession  of  the  town.  Here  he  maintained 
himself  for  two  years,  getting  little  help,  it  would 
seem,  from  home,  for  one  of  his  chief  difficulties  was 
with  his  mercenaries,  who  were  clamouring  for  the 


riKJiNlClA.N    WALL   AT    ERVX. 


pay  which  he  could  not  give  them,  and  whom  he  was 
obliged  to  put  off  with  promises.  Still  the  Romans 
could  make  no  impression  on  him,  and  of  course  made 
no  advance  in  the  sie^je  of  the  Cartha'^inian  fortresses. 


l62 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


If  Hamilcar  could  have  been  everywhere  the  war 
might  have  had  a  different  result,  or,  in  any  case, 
might  have  been  prolonged  still  more  than  it  was. 
But  he  could  not  be  sure  that  his  lieutenants  would 
be  as  able  as  himself.     In  241  Rome  made  a  great 


POSTERN    IN    THE   WALL  OF   ERYX. 


/y*Atf 


effort  to  recover  her  supremacy  at  sea.  The  public 
treasury  was  exhausted,  as  it  might  well  be  after 
neary  five  and  twenty  years  of  war,  but  private  citizens 
came  forward  to  supply  what  was  wanting.  Some 
of  the  richest  undertook  to  build    each   a   ship  ;  or 


BATTLE   OF  MGATES  ISLAND. 


163 


two  or  three  of  smaller  means  would  join  together. 
Thus  a  fleet  of  two  hundred  five-banked  vessels  were 
got  together,  and  these  of  the  very  best  construction. 
With  this  Lutatius  Catulus,  the  consul,  sailed  to  Sicily. 
The  Carthaginians  seem  to  have  been  unprepared,  not 
expecting  indeed  that  the  enemy,  who  had  aban- 
doned the  sea  for  several  years,  should  now  seek  to 
recover  the  command  of  it.  Catulus  was  therefore 
able  to  possess  himself  unopposed  of  the  harbours  of 
Lilybaium  and  Drepanum.  He  pressed  the  siege  of 
the  latter  place  with  much  vigour,  and  meanwhile 
kept  his  crews  busy  with  training  and  exercise,  till  he 
made  them  expert  and  ready. 

The  Carthaginians,  on  the  other  hand,  prepared  to 
act,  The  plan  of  Hanno,  who  was  in  command  of 
the  fleet,  was  this.  To  take  stores  for  the  supply 
of  Hamilcar's  army  at  Eryx,  and,  after  landing 
these,  to  take  on  board  some  of  the  best  troops  and 
Hamilcar  himself,  who  alone  was  equal  to  an  army  ; 
and  thus  engage  the  Romans.  It  was  the  object  of 
the  Romans,  on  the  other  hand,  to  force  an  action 
before  this  could  be  done.  Catulus  accordingly  put 
some  of  his  best  troops  on  board  his  ships  and  sailed 
to  iEgusa,  an  island  opposite  Lilybseum.  Hanno  was 
at  Hiera,  another  island,  a  little  further  out  to  sea, 
The  whole  front  was  known  by  the  name  of  the 
iEgates  (a  word  that  has  probably  something  to  do 
with  the  Greek  word  for  a  goat).  Catulus  intended 
to  give  battle  at  once.  Then,  when  the  day  for  action 
came,  he  began  to  doubt.  The  wind  was  stormy, 
and  was  blowing  from  the  west,  and  so  would  help  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  and  hinder  his  own.     On 


)) 


l62 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


If  Hamilcar  could  have  been  everywhere  the  war 
might  have  had  a  different  result,  or,  in  any  case, 
might  have  been  prolonged  still  more  than  it  was. 
But  he  could  not  be  sure  that  his  lieutenants  would 
be  as  able  as  himself     In  241  Rome  made  a  great 


I'OSn.K.N    IN     rilK    WAM.   OF    KKYX. 


^t/it^ 


effort  to  recover  licr  supremacy  at  sea.  The  public 
treasury  was  exhausted,  as  it  might  well  be  after 
neary  five  and  twenty  years  of  war,  but  private  citizens 
came  forward  to  supply  what  was  wanting.  Some 
of  the  richest  undertook   to  build    each    a   ship  ;  or 


BATTLE   OF  JEGATES  ISLAND. 


I()J 


two  or  three  of  smaller  means  would  join  together. 
Thus  a  licet  of  two  hundred  five-banked  vessels  were 
got  together,  and  these  of  the  very  best  construction. 
With  this  Lutatius  Catulus,  the  consul,  sailed  to  Sicily. 
The  Carthaginians  seem  to  have  been  unprepared,  not 
expecting  indeed  that  the  enemy,  who  had  aban- 
doned the  sea  for  several  years,  should  now  seek  to 
recover  the  command  of  it.  Catulus  was  therefore 
able  to  possess  himself  unoi)posed  of  the  harbours  of 
Lilybxnun  and  Drcpanum.  He  pressed  the  siege  of 
the  latter  place  with  mucli  vigour,  and  meanwhile 
kept  his  crews  busy  with  training  and  exercise,  till  he 
made  them  expert  and  ready. 

The  Carthaginians,  on  the  other  hand,  prepared  to 
act.  The  plan  of  Ilanno,  who  was  in  command  of 
the  fleet,  was  this.  To  take  stores  for  the  supply 
of  Ilamilcar's  army  at  Kryx,  and,  after  landing 
these,  to  take  on  board  some  of  the  best  troops  and 
Hamilcar  himself,  who  alone  was  equal  to  an  army  ; 
and  thus  engage  the  Romans.  It  was  the  object  of 
the  Romans,  on  the  other  hand,  to  force  an  action 
before  this  could  be  done.  Catulus  accordingly  put 
some  of  his  best  troops  on  board  his  ships  and  sailed 
to  yEgusa,  an  island  opposite  Lilyba^um.  Ilanno  was 
at  Hiera,  another  island,  a  little  further  out  to  sea, 
The  whole  front  was  known  by  the  name  of  the 
yEgates  (a  word  that  has  probably  something  to  do 
with  the  Greek  word  for  a  goat).  Catulus  intended 
to  give  battle  at  once.  Then,  when  the  day  for  action 
came,  he  began  to  doubt.  The  wind  was  stormy, 
and  was  blowing  from  the  west,  and  so  would  help  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  and  hinder  his  own.     On 


164 


THE   STORY   OF  CARTHAGE. 


the  other  hand,  there  was  much  to  be  lost  by  delay. 
At  present  the  Carthaginian  ships  were  burdened 
with  the  stores  which  they  were  carrying.  If  he  did 
not  engage  them  at  once  they  would  rid  themselves 
of  these,  would  take  on  board  some  first-rate  troops 
from  the  army  at  Eryx,  and,  above  all,  would 
have  the  presence  of  the  dreaded  Hamilcar  himself. 
These  thoughts  made  him  resolve  on  battle.  The 
Carthaginians  were  already  on  their  way  eastward 
when  he  put  out  to  sea.  His  crews,  become  strong 
and  dexterous  by  practice,  got  their  ships  between  the 
enemy  and  the  point  for  which  he  was  making,  and, 
ranged  in  a  single  line,  prepared  to  receive  them. 
The  conflict  was  short  and  decisive.  Hanno's  ships 
were  encumbered  with  stores  ;  his  crews  were  un- 
skilled, for  the  fleet  had  been  neglected,  and  the 
troops  on  board  were  nothing  better  than  raw  levies. 
In  all  these  points  the  Romans  were  superior  ;  they 
had  nothing  on  board  but  what  was  wanted  for  the 
battle  ;  their  rowers  were  well  trained,  and  their 
fighting  men  of  the  best  quality.  At  the  very  first 
meeting  they  showed  their  superiority.  Fifty  of  the 
Carthaginian  ships  were  sunk  and  seventy  more  taken 
with  all  their  crews  ;  the  rest  were  saved  by  a  sudden 
change  of  the  wind  to  the  east  which  took  them  back 
to  their  anchorage  at  Hiera. 

The  battle  of  the  yEgates  Islands  brought  the  war 
to  an  end.  Carthage  could  no  longer  provision  her 
army  in  Sicily,  and  felt  that  it  was  usele  s  to  prolong 
the  struggle.  Accordingly,  Hamilcar  was  empowered 
to  make  peace.  The  Romans  were  ready  enough  to 
meet  him,  for  they  too  were  exhausted  by  the  long 


CONCLUSION  OF   WAR, 


165 


struggles,  and  after  some  negotiations  a  treaty  was 
made.  The  chief  condition  was  that  Carthage  was 
to  give  up  all  her  positions  in  Sicily,  and  engage  to 
leave  the  island  alone  for  the  future.  She  had  had  a 
hold  on  the  island  for  at  least  four  centuries,  and 
for  nearly  two  had  cherished  hopes  of  winning  it. 
Sometimes  she  had  been  very  near  their  accomplish- 
ment. Now  they  had  to  be  finally  given  up.  This  was 
undoubtedly  a  great  blow.  We  may  call  it  the  first 
great  step  downward.  A  war  indemnity  of  nearly 
i;8oo,ooo  was  imposed.  But  Hamilcar  was  resolved 
to  save  his  honour.  The  Romans  demanded  that 
the  troops  at  Eryx  should  surrender.  This  demand 
he  resolutely  refused,  and  it  was  given  up.  They 
marched  out  with  all  the  honours  of  war  and  were 
carried  back  to  Carthage  ;  and  so,  after  a  duration  of 
four  and  twenty  years,  the  First  Punic  War  came  to 
an  end. 


IV. 


CARTHAGE  AND   HER   MERCENARIES. 


We  have  seen  more  than  once  that  Carthage 
had  much  trouble  with  her  mercenary  troops.  This 
trouble  now  came  upon  her  again,  and  in  a  worse 
form  than  ever.  The  fact  was  that  five  and  twenty 
years  of  war  had  exhausted  even  her  vast  wealth,  and 
she  could  not  meet  her  engagements  with  the  soldiers 
whom  she  had  hired.  These,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
more  powerful  than  they  had  ever  been  before.  They 
were  not  troops  hired  for  a  campaign,  and  discharged 
after  a  few  months'  service,  but  a  standing  army 
trained  by  a  long  war  to  know  each  other  and  to  act 
together  ;  and  many  of  them  had  been  taught  the 
art  of  war  by  a  great  soldier,  Hamilcar  Barca. 

As  soon  as  peace  was  concluded,  Gesco,  Governor 
of  Lil)bceum,  had  begun  sending  the  mercenaries 
to  Carthage  in  small  detachments.  He  hoped  that 
as  they  came  they  would  be  paid  off  and  dismissed 
to  their  homes.  Had  this  been  done,  all  would  have 
been  w^ell.  But  the  government  either  would  not  or 
could  not  find  the  money.  Shipload  after  shipload 
of  the  men  arrived  till  the  city  was  full  of  them. 
After  a  while,  so  troublesome  and  disorderly  were 
they,  they  were  collected  in  a  camp  outside  the  walls, 


REVOLT  OF   THE   MERCENARIES. 


167 


and  left  there  with  nothing  to  do  but  talk  over  their 
grievances  and  plot  mischief. 

When  at  last  the  money,  or  part  of  the  money,  was 
forthcoming,  it  was  too  late.  The  troops  had  found 
leaders,  and  the  interest  of  these  leaders  was  not 
peace  but  war.  One  of  them  was  a  certain  Spendius, 
a  runaway  slave  from  Campania,  who  dreaded,  of 
course,  that  when  everything  was  settled  he  might  be 
sent  back  to  his  master,  that  is  to  torture  and  death. 
He  is  said  to  have  been  a  man  of  enormous  strength, 
and  brave  even  to  rashness.  The  other  was  a  free- 
born  African,  of  the  name  of  Matho.  He  had  been 
a  ringleader  in  all  the  disturbances  that  had  taken 
place  since  the  return  of  the  mercenaries,  and  he 
dreaded  the  vengeance  of  his  employers.  Matho  found 
his  fellow  Africans  ready  to  listen  to  him  ;  and  there 
was  probably  much  truth  in  what  he  said.  "  The 
Carthaginians,"  he  told  his  comrades,  "are  going  to 
send  to  their  homes  the  troops  belonging  to  other 
nations  ;  when  you  are  left  alone  they  will  make  you 
feel  their  anger."  A  pretext  for  open  revolt  was 
soon  found.  Gesco,  who  had  been  sent  to  settle  with 
the  troops,  handed  over  the  arrears  of  pay,  but  put  off 
the  question  of  allowances  for  corn,  horses,  etc.,  to 
another  time.  At  this  proposal  there  were  loud  cries 
of  discontent,  and  in  a  few  minutes  a  noisy  crowd  of 
troops  was  assembled.  Spendius  and  Matho  harangued 
the  assembly,  and  were  received  with  shouts  of  ap- 
plause. Any  one  else  that  attempted  to  speak  was 
killed.  "  Kill,"  says  the  historian,  was  the.  only  word 
that  every  one  in  this  motley  crowd,  gathered  from 
ftlmost  every  country  of  Western  Europe,  could  under- 


l68  THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 

Stand.  The  two  speakers  were  chosen  generals 
Gesco  and  his  staff  were  seized,  fettered,  and  thrown 
into  prison.  There  was  now  open  war  between  Car- 
thage and  her  mercenaries. 

The  African  towns  at  once  joined  the  rebels.    They 
were  ahvays  discontented  with  their  masters,  and  this 
discontent  had  now  reached  its  height.    The  neces- 
sities   of  Carthage  during  the  war  just  ended  had 
compelled  her  to  increase  the  taxes  of  her  depen- 
dencies,  and  to  exact  these  taxes  to  the  uttermost 
farthing.    The  rent  in  kind  paid  by  the  cultivators 
of  the   soil  had   been  raised   to  a  half  of  the  pro- 
duce, and  the  tribute  paid  by  the  towns  had  been 
doubled  ;  and  any  default  in  payment  had  been  cruelly 
punished.     So  fierce  was  the  wrath  raised   by  this 
oppression  that  the  very  women  brought  their  orna- 
ments—and  her  ornaments   were  no  small  part  ot 
an  African  woman's   wealth-and  threw  them   into 
the  common  stock.     From  these  and  other  sources, 
Spendius  and  Matho  received  so  much  money  that 
they  settled  all   the  claims  of  the  troops,  and   had 
still  abundance  of  means  for  carrying  on  the  war. 

Two  towns  only,  Hippo  and  Utica,  remained  loyal. 
-  These  were  at  once  besieged.  The  mercenaries  had 
three  armies  in  the  field.  One  was  before  Hippo, 
another  before  Utica  ;  the  third  held  an  entrenched 
camp  at  Tunes.  Carthage  was  thus  cut  off  from  al 
communication  by  land  with  Africa:  but  she  still 
retained  command  of  the  sea. 

The    Carthaginian   commander-in-chief,    Hanno,' 

'  This  Hanno  seems  somehow  to  have  got  the  title  of  "  The  Great," 
but  to  have  done  very  little  to  deserve  it. 


V     3»    fc    si    ^     t 


u 


PLAN  OF  HARBOUR  AT  UTICA. 


iaui 


SIEGE  OF   UTICA, 


171 


marched  against  the  rebel  force  that  was  besieging 
Utica.  He  had  as  many  as  a  hundred  elephants 
with  him.  These  broke  through  the  entrenchments 
of  the  rebel  camp,  and  the  mercenaries  fled  in  con- 
fusion. Hanno,  accustomed  to  have  to  do  with  half 
savage  enemies,  who,  once  defeated,  could  not  easily 
be  rallied,  thought  that  the  victory  was  won,  and, 
while  he  was  amusing  himself  in  Utica,  allowed  his 
troops  to  be  as  idle  and  as  careless  as  they  pleased. 
But  the  enemy  were  soldiers  trained  by  Hamilcar 
Barca,  and  accustomed  to  retreat  and  rally,  if  need 
was,  more  than  once  in  the  same  day.  They  rallied 
now,  and  seeing  that  the  Carthaginian  camp  was  left 
unguarded,  attacked  it,  and  got  possession  of  a 
quantity  of  stores,  and,  among  them,  of  some  artillery 
which  Hanno  had  sent  for  out  of  the  city. 

The  conduct  of  the  war  was  now  committed  to 
Hamilcar.  The  strength  of  his  force  was  a  corps 
of  ten  thousand  native  Carthaginians.  Besides  these 
he  had  a  body  of  mercenaries,  a  number  of  deserters 
from  the  enemy,  and  seventy  elephants.  His  first 
operation  was  to  relieve  Utica.  The  chief  difficulty 
was  to  break  the  blockade  which  the  rebel  general 
Matho  had  established  round  Carthage.  The  hills 
at  the  land  end  of  the  isthmus  on  which  the  city 
stood  were  held  in  force  by  the  rebels ;  as  was  the 
only  bridge  over  the  river  Macar.  But  Hamilcar  had 
noticed  that  a  certain  wind  brought  up  such  quanti- 
ties of  sand  to  the  bar  of  the  Macar  as  to  make  it 
easily  fordable.  Taking  advantage  of  this,  he  marched 
his  army  across  the  river  by  night,  and,  to  the  sur- 
prise of  both  friends  and  encmjcs,  appeared  in  the 


1^2  THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 

morning  on  the  other  side,  and  hastened  to  attack  the 
rear  of  the  rebel  force  that  was  guarding  the  bridge. 
A  strong  detachment  from   the   besiegers   of   Qtica 
advanced  to  support  their  comrades.      Hamilcar  was 
marching  with  his  elephants  in  front,  his  light-armed 
troops  behind  them,  and  his  heavy-armed  in  the  rear. 
On  coming  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  he  changed  this 
disposition.     Spendius  mistook  the  movement  for  a 
flight,  and  ordered  a  charge.     The  rebels  found  the 
helvy  troops  quietly  waiting  to  receive  them,  while 
the  cavalry  and  the  elephants  fell  upon  their  flanks. 
They  were  soon   broken.      Six  thousand  were  slain 
upon  the  field   of  battle,  and   two  thousand   taken 
prisoners.     Hamilcar  had  broken  the  blockade ;  but 
Hippo  and  Utica  were  still  besieged,  and  the  rebels 
were  still  in  force  at  Tunes. 

His  success,  however,  had  a  good   effect   on   the 
African  tribes.     One  of  the  chief  Numidian  princes 
came   into   his  camp  with  a  force  of  two  thousand 
men,  and  Hamilcar  felt  himself  strong  enough  again 
to  offer  battle.     The  fight  that  ensued  was  long  and 
obstinate.     At  last  the  Carthaginians  prevailed,  chiefly 
by  the  help  of  the  elephants.     Ten  thousand  rebels 
were  killed,  and  four  thousand  taken  prisoners.     To 
these   latter    Hamilcar,   with   a   wise   mercy,  offered 
liberal  terms.      They  might  take  service  with   Car- 
thage, or  they  might  go  home.      But  if  they  were 
found  in  arms  again,  they  must   expect   no  further 

mercy. 

The  rebel  generals  were  dismayed  when  they  heard 
of  this  politic  act.  Their  only  plan  was  to  commit 
their  followers  to  deeds  which  could  not  be  pardoned. 


MAP  OF   PENINSULA  OF  CARTHAGE. 


172  THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 

mornin-  on  the  other  side,  and  hastened  to  attack  the 
rear  of  \he  rebel  force  that  was  guarding  the  bridge. 
A  stron^^  detachment  from   the    besiegers   of   Utica 
advanced  to  support  their  comrades.      Hamilcar  was 
marchin-  with  his  elephants  in  front,  his  hght-armed 
troops  behind  them,  and  his  heavy-armed  in  the  rear. 
On  coming  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  he  changed  this 
disposition.     Spendius  mistook  the  movement  for  a 
flight,  and  ordered  a  charge.     The  rebels  found  the 
hc^ivy  troops  quietly  waiting  to  receive  them,  while 
the  cavalry  and  the  elephants  fell  upon  their  flanks. 
They  were  soon   broken.      Six   thousand  were  slain 
upon  the  field   of  battle,  and    two   thousand    taken 
prisoners.     Hamilcar  had  broken  the  blockade;  but 
Hippo  and  Utica  were  still  besieged,  and  the  rebels 
were  still  in  force  at  Tunes. 

His  success,  however,  had   a  good   effect   on   the 
African  tribes.     One  of  the  chief  Numidian  princes 
came   into   his  camp  with  a  force  of  two  thousand 
men,  and  Hamilcar  felt  himself  strong  enough  again 
to  offer  battle.     The  fight  that  ensued  was  long  and 
obstinate.     At  last  the  Carthaginians  prevailed,  chiefly 
by  the  help  of  the  elephants.     Ten  thousand  rebels 
were  killed,  and  four  thousand  taken  prisoners.     To 
these    latter    Hamilcar,   with   a   wi-e   mercy,  ofl^ered 
liberal  terms.      They  might  take  service  with   Car- 
thage, or  they  might  go  home.      But  if  they  were 
found  in  arms  again,  they  must   expect   no  further 

mercy. 

The  rebel  generals  were  dismayed  when  they  heard 
of  this  politic  act.  Their  only  plan  was  to  commit 
their  followers  to  deeds  which  could  not  be  pardoned. 


r  < 

if ' 


MAP  OF   PENINSULA   OF   CARTHAGE. 


MASSACRE  OF  PRISONERS, 


175 


Accordingly  they  called  an  assembly  of  the  soldiers. 
Into  this  was  brought  a  courier  who  professed  to 
come  with  a  despatch  from  the  rebels  in  Sardinia. 
This  despatch  contained  a  warning  of  a  plot  that  was 
being  hatched  in  the  camp  for  setting  Gesco  and  the 
other  prisoners  free.  Then  Spendius  stood  up  to 
speak.  "Do  not  trust  Hamilcar,"  he  said.  "His 
mercy  is  a  mere  pretence.  When  he  has  got  you  all 
in  his  power,  he  will  punish  you  all.  And  meanwhile 
take  care  that  Gesco,  who  is  a  most  dangerous  man, 
does  not  escape  you."  When  he  had  finished  speaking, 
a  second  courier  arrived,  this  time  professing  to  come 
from  the  camp  at  Tunes,  and  bearing  a  despatch  to 
much  the  same  effect  as  the  first.  On  this  Antaritus, 
a  Gaul,  who  had  shared  the  command  with  Spendius 
and  Matho,  rose  to  address  the  assembly.  He  had 
the  advantage  of  being  able  to  speak  in  Carthaginian, 
a  language  of  which  most  of  his  hearers,  from  long 
service  with  the  State,  knew  something.  He  told  his 
hearers  that  it  was  madness  to  think  of  concluding 
peace  with  Carthage.  Any  one  who  advised  such  a 
thing  was  a  traitor,  and  they  had  better  make  it  im- 
possible by  putting  the  prisoners  to  death. 

This  horrible  advice  was  followed.  Gesco  and  his 
fellow- prisoners,  seven  hundred  in  number,  were 
cruelly  murdered,  and  from  that  time  till  the  end  of 
the  war  no  mercy  was  showed  on  either  side. 

For  a  time  everything  went  ill  with  the  Carthaginians. 
Hanno  had  been  joined  with  Hamilcar  in  the  com- 
mand ;  but  the  two  could  not  agree,  and  the  army 
suffered  greatly  in  consequence.  Sardinia  was  lost  to 
Carthage,  and  now  Utica  and  Hippo  revolted,  after 


i  j 

it 


176 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


massacring  their  Carthaginian  garrisons.  At  this  crisis 
the  foreign  alHes  of  the  State  stood  faithfully  by  it. 
Hiero  of  Syracuse  gave  them  help.  It  was  not  to 
his  interest  that  Carthage  should  be  destroyed.  Rome 
left  without  a  rival  would  be  too  powerful,  and  Syra- 
cuse would  soon  be  swallowed  up.  And  Rome, 
without  the  same  reason,  behaved  equally  well.  She 
would  not  take  possession  either  of  Sardinia  or  of 
Utica,  though  both  were  offered  to  her  by  the  rebels. 
And  she  allowed  traders  to  send  supplies  into  Carth- 
age, while  she  forbad  them  to  have  any  dealings  with 

the  rebels. 

And  now  the  tide  turned  against  the  mercenaries. 
They  were  besieging  Carthage,  but  they  were  also 
besieged  themselves.  Naravasus,  a  Numidian  prince, 
with  his  cavalry  cut  off  all  supplies  from  the  country, 
and  they  were  reduced  to  the  most  frightful  ex- 
tremities. Spendius  and  his  colleagues  endeavoured 
to  make  terms.  Hamilcar  agreed  to  let  the  rebels  go 
free,  with  ten  exceptions  such  as  he  should  choose. 
When  the  treaty  was  concluded,  he  said,  "  I  choose 
among  the  ten  those  that  are  now  present."  Spendius 
and  Antaritus  were  two  of  them. 

The  siege  of  Carthage  was  now  raised,  and  Hamilcar 
advanced  against  the  camp  at  Tunes.  He  posted 
himself  on  one  side,  while  his  lieutenant,  Hannibal, 
took  up  his  position  on  the  other.  Spendius  and  his 
fellow  -  prisoners  were  crucified  before  the  walls. 
Unfortunately  Hannibal  was  an  incompetent  general. 
Matho,  who  was  in  command  of  the  rebels,  made 
a  sally,  stormed  the  camp,  and  took  Hannibal  him- 
self prisoner.     In  retaliation  for  the  death  of  Spendius 


END   OF   WAR    WITH  MERCENARIES, 


177 


he  was  fastened  alive  to  the  same  cross  on  which  the 
body  of  the  rebel  leader  was  still  hanging. 

Carthiige  now  made  a  last  effort  to  bring  the  war 
to  an  end.  Every  citizen  that  was  of  an  age  to  bear 
arms  was  forced  to  serve.  Hamilcar  and  Hanno 
agreed  to  forget  their  differences  and  to  act  together. 
And  now  everything  went  well.  Matho  was  com- 
pelled to  risk  a  battle,  and  was  defeated  and  taken 
prisoner.  AH  the  African  towns,  except  Utica  and 
Hippo,  at  once  submitted,  and  these,  finding  them- 
selves alone,  dio  not  long  hold  out. 

"  Such,"  says  polybius,  "  was  the  conclusion  of  the 
war  between  Carthaginians  and  their  mercenaries, 
after  a  continuance  of  three  years  and  about  four 
months  ;  a  war  by  far  the  most  impious  and  bloody 
of  any  that  we  find  in  history." 

Carthage  came  out  of  the  struggle  much  weakened. 
Besides  men  and  money  she  lost  her  province  of 
Sardinia.  The  Romans  seem  to  have  repented  of 
their  moderation,  and  did  not  refuse  the  island  when 
it  was  offered  them  bv  the  rebel  mercenaries  a  second 
time,  and  when  Carthage  prepared  to  retake  the 
island  by  force,  Rome  declared  war.  The  unfortunate 
State  had  to  give  way,  and  to  pay  besides  an  indemnity 
of  twelve  hundred  -talents. 


V- 


CARTHAGE  AND  SPAIN. 

When  the  war  of   the  mercenaries  was  at  last 
over,  Hamilcar  Barca  was  left  the  greatest  man  in 
Carthage.     It  was  he  who  had  saved  the  State  at  its 
greatest  need  ;  and  it  was  to  him  the  people  looked  for 
guidance.     For  the  next  forty  years,  or  thereabouts, 
he  and  his  family,  or  the  party  that  was  led  by  them, 
called  by  their  opponents  the  "  Barcine  Faction,"  had 
the   government    in   their    hands.      Hamilcar's   one 
object  was  to  recover  what  Carthage  had  lost ;  but  it 
was  an  object  which  it  was  difficult  to  attain.     To 
reconquer  Sicily  and  the  other  islands  of  the  Western 
Mediterranean  was  hopeless.     For  four  hundred  years 
and  more  Carthage  had  spent  her  strength  in  these 
regions,  and  had  never  quite  got  them  into  her  grasp. 
Now  they  had  passed  for  ever  into  hands  which  were 
stronger  than   hers.     Not   only   must   no  action  be 
taken  directly  against  Rome,  but   nothing  must  be 
done  to  rouse  her  jealousy.     Another  war  with  Rome 
would  be  fatal,  at  least  till  Carthage  had  got  back 
her  strength,  and  war  had  already  been  threatened. 
Hamilcar  had  to  look  elsewhere,  and  he  looked  to 
Spain.     Carthage  had  already  had  dealings  with  this 
country.     She  had  trading  ports  along  its  coasts,  and 


HAMILCAR  IN  SPAIN. 


179 


she  had  got  some  of  her  best  troops  from  its  tribes. 
Hamilcar  now  conceived  the  idea  of  building  up  here 
an  empire  which  should  be  a  compensation  for  that 
which  his  country  had  lost  elsewhere.  This  idea  he 
kept  secret  till  he  had  begun  to  carry  it  into  action. 
He  set  out  with  the  army,  of  which  he  seems  to  have 
been  permanent  commander-in-chief,  on  an  expedition 
to  complete  the  conquest  of  the  African  tribes  dwel- 
ling westward  of  Carthage.  Little  or  nothing  was 
heard  of  him  till  the  news  came  that  he  had  crossed 
over  into  Spain,  and  was  waging  war  on  the  native 
tribes.  For  nine  years  he  worked  on,  making  a  new 
empire  for  his  country.  We  know  little  or  nothing 
about  his  campaigns,  except  that  they  were  successful. 
Not  only  did  he  make  war  support  itself,  but  he  sent 
home  large  sums  of  money  with  which  to  keep  up  the 
influence  of  his  party,  and  he  had  still  enough  to  spare 
for  bribing  native  chiefs.  At  the  end  of  the  nine 
years  he  fell  in  battle.  But  he  left  an  able  successor 
behind  him  in  Hasdrubal,  his  son-in-law,  who  had 
been  his  colleague  in  his  campaigns.  Hasdrubal 
carried  out  his  plans,  and  completed  the  work  which 
he  had  begun.  Here,  too,  we  know  nothing  of  de- 
tails. That  he  was  a  good  soldier  we  are  sure,  for 
when  the  restless  tribes  of  the  African  coast  had 
risen  in  arms  after  Hamilcar  had  crossed  over  into 
Spain,  he  had  been  sent  back  by  his  chief,  and  had 
soon  reduced  them  to  submission.  But  he  seems  to 
have  been  still  greater  as  a  manager  and  ruler  of  men. 
By  pleasing  manners,  by  politic  dealing  with  the 
native  tribes,  and  by  friendship  formed  with  their 
petty  chiefs — he  is  said  to  have  married  a  Spanish 


ibKj 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


princess— he  furthered  the  cause  of  his  country  more 
than  by  force  of  arms.  The  foundation  of  New 
Carthage  was  his  work.  It  had  the  best  harbour  on 
the  coast  ;  it  was  near  the  rich  silver  mines  discovered 
by  Alctes,  and  it  soon  became  the  capital  of  the 
new  province.  So  powerful,  indeed,  was  Hasdrubal 
that  he  was  suspected  of  a  plan  for  making  himself 
absolute  master  of  Carthage  ;  while  the  treaty  with 
the  Romans  by  which  the  boundaries  of  the  two 
empires  were  fixed  at  the  river  Ebro  is  spoken  of  as 
having  been  made  with  Hasdrubal. 

The  jealousy  of  the  Romans  had  indeed  by  this 
time  been  roused.  They  saw  with  some  alarm  the 
wonderful  progress  that  the  Carthaginian  general  was 
making  with  the  Spanish  tribes,  and  they  looked 
about  for  friends  for  themselves.  Saguntum,  a  town 
partly  Greek  in  origin  (its  name  seems  to  have  been 
connected  with  that  of  Zacynthos,  one  of  the  islands 
off  the  western  coast  of  Greece),  applied  to  them  for 
protection,  and  they  readily  promised  it.  A  treaty 
was  concluded  by  which  the  river  Iberus  (now  the 
Ebro)  was  to  be  the  eastern  boundary  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian province,  but  it  was  stipulated  that  Saguntum, 
which  lay  about  fifty  miles  within  these  limits,  should 
be  independent.  Hasdrubal  met  his  death  by  assas- 
sination. He  had  executed  a  Spanish  chief  for  some 
offence  against  his  government,  and  one  of  the  man's 
slaves  in  revenge  struck  him  down.  He  had  held  the 
chief  command  in  Spain  for  a  little  more  than  eight 

years. 

And  now  the  greatest  man  that  Carthage  ever  pro- 
duced  comes  to  the  front.     Some  seventeen  years 


HANNIBAL. 


i8i 


^F 


before,  when  Hamilcar  was  about  to  cross  over  into 
Spain,  his  son  Hannibal,  then  a  boy  of  nine,  begged 
to  be  allowed  to  go  with  him.  The  father  consented, 
but  first  he  brought  the  boy  up  to  the  altar  on  which, 
in  preparation  for  the  expedition  he  was  about  to 
make,  he  was  offering  sacrifice,  and  bade  him  lay  his 
hand  upon  the  victim,  and  swear  eternal  hatred  to 
Rome.     We  shall  see  how  the  lad  kept  his  oath. 

He  was  present  at  the  battle  in  which  his  father 
met  his  death  ;  and  though  then  but  eighteen  years 
of  age,  was  put  by  his  brother-in-law,  Hamilcar's  suc- 
cessor, in  high  military  command.  "There  was  no 
one,"  says  Livy,  "  whom  Hasdrubal  preferred  to  put 
in  command,  whenever  courage  and  persistency  were 
specially  needed,  no  officer  under  whom  the  soldiers 
were  more  confident  and  more  daring."  And  indeed 
he  was  the  very  model  of  a  soldier.  He  was  bold, 
but  never  rash,  cool  in  the  presence  of  danger,  and 
infinitely  fertile  in  resource.  To  fatigue  he  seemed 
insensible.  He  could  bear  heat  and  cold  equally  well. 
Of  food  and  drink  he  cared  only  to  take  so  much  as 
satisfied  the  needs  of  nature.  To  sleep  he  gave  such 
time  as  business  spared  him ;  and  he  could  take  it 
anywhere  and  anyhow.  Many  a  time  could  he  be 
seen  lying  on  the  ground,  wrapped  in  his  military 
cloak,  among  the  sentries  and  pickets.  About  his 
dress  he  was  careless  ;  it  was  nothing  better  than  that 
of  his  humblest  comrades.  But  his  arms  and  his 
horses  were  the  best  that  could  be  found.  He  was 
an  admirable  rider,  a  skilful  man  at  arms,  and  as 
brave  as  he  was  skilful.  With  such  a  man  in  the 
camp,  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  successor  of 


r  I 


182 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


Hasdrubal :  the  army  at  once  elected  him  to  the  com- 
mand. His  strong  resemblance  to  his  father,  whom 
many  of  the  soldiers  still  remembered,  was  not  the 
least  of  his  many  claims.  And  the  government  at 
home  could  do  nothing  but  confirm  the  election. 

Hannibal's  first  operations  were  against  some 
Spanish  tribes  in  the  interior,  occupying  the  country 
on  both  banks  of  the  Upper  Tagus  (the  western  por- 
tion of  what  is  now  New  Castile).  A  great  victory 
over  a  native  army,  which  is  said  to  have  numbered 
as  many  as  a  hundred  thousand  men,  brought  to  an 
end  these  campaigns,  which  occupied  the  autumn  of 
221  and  the  greater  part  of  the  following  year. 

In  the  spring  of  219  Hannibal  laid  siege  to  Sagun- 
tum.  His  first  operations  were  successful.  His  quick 
eye  had  spied  the  weak  place  in  the  town's  fortifica- 
tions, and  he  at  once  made  it  the  object  of  his  attack  ; 
but  the  Saguntines  were  prepared  to  receive  him. 
Indeed  they  more  than  held  their  own,  and  Hannibal 
himself  was  dangerously  wounded  by  a  javelin  thrown 
from  the  wall.  But  he  had  the  advantage  of  vast 
numbers — his  army  amounting,  it  is  said,  to  as  many  as 
150,000 — while  the  garrison  had  not  men  enough  to 
guard  the  whole  circuit  of  their  walls.  The  battering- 
rams  were  used  with  effect,  and  a  breach  was  made. 
Then  came  an  attempt  to  storm,  furiously  made,  and 
furiously  resisted.  The  townspeople  are  said  to  have 
made  great  havoc  among  the  besiegers  by  a  curious 
missile,  which  is  described  as  having  had  a  heavy  iron 
point  and  a  shaft  which  was  wrapped  in  tow  and  set 
alight  In  the  end  the  storming  party  was  beaten 
back.. 


SIEGE   OF  SAGUNTUM. 


183 


Meanwhile  an  embassy  arrived  from  Rome.  Han- 
nibal  refused  to  receive  it.  He  pretended  that  it 
would  not  be  safe  for  the  envoys  to  enter  his  camp. 
He  could  not,  he  said,  undertake  to  protect  them  from 
his  barbarian  allies.  The  ambassadors  proceeded,  as 
their  instructions  directed,  to  Carthage.  Hanno,  the 
leader  of  the  peace  party,  pleaded  earnestly  with  the 
Senate  to  yield  to  the  demands  of  Rome.  He  ad- 
vised that  the  army  should  be  withdrawn  from  before 
Saguntum,  that  compensation  should  be  made  to  that 
town,  and  even  that  Hannibal  should  be  surrendered 
as  having  broken  the  treaty.  But  he  scarcely  found 
a  seconder,  and  the  ambassadors  were  sent  away  with 
a  refusal. 

The  siege  meanwhile  was  being  pressed  on  with 
vigour.  The  garrison  hastily  built  a  new  wall  at  the 
spot  where  the  breach  had  been  made,  but  this  was 
easily  thrown  down  ;  and  a  party  of  the  besiegers  now 
established  itself  actually  within  the  city.  The  defence 
was  still  continued,  but  it  was  manifestly  hopeless. 
Hannibal  was  willing  to  give  terms.  The  Saguntines 
might  withdraw  with  their  wives  and  children,  each 
person  to  have  two  garments,  but  leaving  all  their 
property  behind.  While  this  offer  was  being  dis- 
cussed in  an  irregular  assembly,  for  a  number  of 
people  had  crowded  into  the  Senate-house,  some  of 
the  chief  citizens  gradually  withdrew.  They  lit  a 
great  fire,  and  collecting\^ll  the  public  treasure  and 
all  the  private  property  on  which  they  could  lay  their 
hands,  flung  it  into  the  flames,  and  then,  with 
desperate  resolution,  leaped  into  them  themselves. 
While  this  was  going  on,  the  Carthaginians  forced 


184 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


their  way  into  the  town.  Every  grown-up  male  was 
slain.  The  booty  was  enormous.  Enough  was  left, 
besides  all  that  the  soldiers  took,  to  bring  a  great  sum 
into  the  public  treasury. 

There  could  be  now  no  doubt  that  war  would 
follow.  The  Romans,  indeed,  made  all  preparations 
for  it.  Still,  anxious,  it  would  seem,  to  do  all  things 
in  order,  they  sent  another  embassy  to  Carthage.  ■ 
The  envoys  were  instructed  to  put  to  the  Carthaginian 
Senate  the  simple  question,  "  Was  it  by  the  order  of 
the  government  that  Hannibal  attacked  Saguntum  ?" 
The  Carthaginian  Senate  refused  to  give  a  direct 
answer.  The  speaker  who  represented  their  opinion 
pleaded  that  the  regular  treaty  between  Carthage  and 
Rome  made  no  mention  of  Saguntum,  and  that  they 
could  not  recognize  a  private  agreement  made  with 
Hasdrubal.  "  Upon  this,"  says  Livy,  "  the  Roman 
gathered  his  robe  into  a  fold  and  said,  *Here  we  bring 
you  peace  and  war :  take  which  you  please.'  In- 
stantly there  arose  a  fierce  shout,  *  Give  us  which  you 
please  ! '  The  Roman,  in  reply,  shook  out  the  fold, 
and  spoke  again,  *  I  give  you  war.'  The  answer  from 
all  was,  *  We  accept  it ;  and  in  the  spirit  with  which 
we  accept  it,  will  we  wage  it.' " 

Thus  began  the  Second  Punic  War. 


VI. 


FROM  THE  EBRO  TO  ITALY. 

After  tne  capture  of  Saguntum,  Hannibal  went  into 
winter  quarters  at  New  Carthage.  He  gave  a  furlough 
to  any  of  his  Spanish  troops  that  wished  to  visit  their 
homes.  "  Come  back,"  he  said,  "  in  early  spring,  and 
I  will  be  your  leader  in  a  war  from  which  both  the 
glory  and  the  gain  will  be  immense."  The  winter  he 
spent  in  maturing  his  great  plan,  which  was  nothing 
less  than  to  invade  Italy.  Carthage,  he  knew,  had 
been  brought  to  the  brink  of  destruction  by  being 
attacked  at  home  ;  and  this  because  her  subjects  had 
been  raised  against  her.  Rome,  too,  had  subjects  who 
were  doubtless  ill-content  with  her  rule.  Within  the 
last  hundred  years  she  had  added  the  greater  part  of 
Italy  to  her  Empire.  It  was  in  Italy  that  he  hoped 
to  find  his  best  allies.  We  shall  see  how  far  his  hopes 
were  fulfilled,  how  far  they  were  disappointed. 

In  the  spring  he  made  a  disposal  of  his  forces. 
Some  fifteen  thousand,  chiefly  Spaniards,  he  sent  into 
Africa.  With  his  brother  Hasdrubal  he  left  an  army 
of  between  twelve  and  thirteen  thousand  infantry,  two 
thousand  five  hundred  cavalry,  five  hundred  slingers. 
and  twenty-one  elephants,  besides  a  fleet  of  fifty-seven 
ships,  chiefly  of  the  largest  size.     His  policy  in  making 


tS6 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


these  arrangements  was  to  garrison  Africa  with  Spanish, 
and  Spain  with  African  troops.  The  force  with  which 
he  himself  crossed  the  Ebro  consisted  of  ninety  thou- 
sand infantry  and  twelve  thousand  cavalry. 

To  cross  the  Ebro,  which  was  still  nominally  the 
boundary  between  Rome  and  Carthage,  was  formally 
to  commence  hostilities.  On  the  night  before  he 
made  the  passage,  Hannibal,  who  had  lately  returned 
from  a  solemn  visit  to  the  temple  of  Melcarth  at 
Gades,  had  a  dream.  He  saw  a  youth  of  godlike 
shape,  who  said,  "Jupiter  has  sent  me  to  lead  your 
army  into  Italy.  Follow  me,  but  look  not  behind." 
Hannibal  followed  trembling,  but  could  not,  after  a 
while,  keep  his  eyes  from  looking  behind.  He  saw  a 
serpent  of  marvellous  size  moving  onwards,  and  de- 
stroying the  forest  as  it  went.  When  he  asked  what 
this  might  mean,  his  guide  answered,  "  This  is  the  de- 
vastation of  Italy.  Go  on  and  ask  no  more,  but  leave 
the  designs  of  fate  in  darkness," 

Hannibal's  numbers,  indeed,  were  much  diminished 
before  he  reached  the  foot  of  the  Alps,  which  was  to 
be  the  first  stage  in  his  journey.  He  had  to  conquer 
the  country  between  the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees,  and 
leave  a  large  force  to  hold  it ;  and  he  felt  it  wise  to 
dismiss  to  their  homes  a  number  of  men  who  were 
unwilling  or  afraid  to  go  on  with  him.  It  was  with 
fifty  thousand  foot  and  nine  thousand  horse  that  he 
crossed  the  Pyrenees.  From  the  Pyrenees  he  marched 
with  little  opposition  to  the  Rhone.  His  route  seems 
to  have  led  him  to  Nemausus  (now  Nismes),  while  the 
point  at  which  he  touched  the  river  was  probably 
Roquemaure.      Polybius  describes   it  as   being  four 


i^A^SAOt,   Ut    I'Ht.   RHONt.. 


187 


days'  march  from  the  mouth.  He  found  the  further 
bank  occupied  by  a  strong  force  of  the  neighbouring 
Gauls.  His  guides  informed  him  that  some  twenty- 
five  miles  higher  up  the  river  there  was  an  island,  and 
that  when  the  stream  was  divided  it  was  shallow  and 
comparatively  easy  to  cross.  Accordingly  he  sent 
Hanno,  son  of  Bomilcar,  with  a  party  of  his  army  to 
cross  at  this  place,  and  to  take  the  enemy  in  the  rear. 
Hanno  found  no  one  to  oppose  him.  His  Spanish 
troops,  men  accustomed  to  the  water,  put  their  clothes 
and  arms  on  bladders,  and  swam  to  the  further  bank, 
pushing  these  before  them  ;  the  Africans,  who  had  not 
had  the  same  experience,  crossed  upon  rafts.  Han- 
nibal meanwhile  was  making  his  own  preparations  for 
the  passage.  He  had  collected  from  friendly  tribes 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  liver  a  number  of  small  boats. 
These  he  used  for  his  infantry.  Larger  vessels  and 
rafts  constructed  by  his  own  men  were  reserved  for 
the  cavalry,  and  were  put  higher  up  the  stream,  to 
break  the  force  of  the  current  against  the  lighter  craft. 
When  all  was  ready  he  gave  the  signal  to  start.  The 
enemy,  though  startled  by  his  boldness  in  thus  crossing 
in  face  of  their  opposition,  would  doubtless  have  stood 
firm,  and,  perhaps,  successfully  resisted  him,  but  for  the 
force  which  had  already  made  the  passage  higher  up 
the  river.  At  the  critical  moment  they  saw  behind 
them  the  smoke  of  the  fires  which,  by  a  concerted  plan 
Hanno  and  his  infantry  had  lighted.  They  found 
themselves  taken  in  the  rear,  a  danger  which  no  un- 
disciplined troops  can  brave.  Hannibal,  familiar  with 
this  fact,  pushed  boldly  on.  He  was  himself  in  one  of 
the  foremost  boats,  and,  leaping  to  shore,  led  his  men 


iSS 


THE  STORY  OF  CARThAGk\ 


to  the  charge.  The  Gauls  broke  and  fled  almost  with- 
out striking  a  blow.  He  had  still  to  get  his  elephants 
across.  A  large  raft  was  covered  with  earth  and 
moored  firmly  to  the  bank,  and  to  this  again  a  smaller 
raft,  similarly  disguised,  was  attached.  The  elephants, 
led  by  two  females,  were  taken  first  upon  the  larger, 
then  upon  the  smaller  raft,  and,  fancying  themselves 
still  upon  dry  ground,  made  no  objection.  Then  the 
smaller  raft  was  detached,  and  propelled  across  the 
stream.  The  great  beasts  were  frightened  when  they 
found  themselves  afloat,  but  their  very  terror  kept 
them  quiet ;  and  two  that  plunged  into  the  water, 
though  their  unfortunate  drivers  were  drowned,  got 
safely  to  the  opposite  shore. 

Hannibal  marched  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhone 
till  he  reached  the  Isere.  Here  he  made  a  valuable 
ally  in  a  chief  of  the  Allobroges,  whom  he  supported 
against  a  younger  brother  that  was  claiming  the 
throne.  This  prince  supplied  his  army  with  stores  of 
all  kinds,  among  which  shoes  are  especially  mentioned, 
and  escorted  him  as  far  as  the  foot  of  the  Alps. 

But,  it  will  be  asked,  were  the  Romans  doing 
nothing  to  defend  themselves  against  this  invasion  ? 
They  had  other  work  on  their  hands,  for  they  were  at 
war  with  the  Gauls  in  what  is  now  Northern  Italy, 
but  was  then  called  Cisalpine  or  Hither  Gaul.  The 
first  armies  they  could  raise  were  sent  against  them  ; 
but  Publius  Cornelius  Scipio  (a  name  of  which  we 
shall  hear  much  hereafter)  was  despatched  with  a 
force  to  the  mouths  of  the  Rhone.  Had  he  moved 
up  the  river  at  once  he  might  have  hindered  Hanni- 
bal's  passage,  but   he   sat   still.     A   proof  that   the 


ROUTE  OVER   THE  ALPS, 


189 


Carthaginians  were  near  was  soon  given  him.  Han- 
nibal had  sent  a  squadron  of  African  horse  to  recon- 
noitre, and  this  fell  in  with  some  cavalry  which  Scipio 
had  sent  out  for  the  same  purpose.  A  sharp  skirmish 
followed.  It  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  the  two 
enemies  crossed  swords,  and  the  Romans  won  the  day. 
When  his  cavalry  had  returned,  Scipio  marched  up 
the  river  ;  but  he  found  Hannibal  gone,  and  did  not 
think  it  well  to  follow^  him.  Returning  to  the  sea,  he 
sent  the  greater  part  of  his  army  under  his  brother 
Cnaeus  into  Spain,  and  sailed  back  with  the  rest  to 
Italy.  This  policy  of  strengthening  the  Roman  force 
in  Spain,  in  face  of  what  seemed  a  greater  danger 
nearer  home,  was  masterly,  and  was  to  bear  good 
fruit  in  after  time. 

Hannibal's  route  across  the  Alps  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  much  controversy,  into  which  I  do  not  intend 
to  enter.  The  view  which  seems  to  me  the  most  pro- 
bable is  that  he  marched  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhone 
as  far  as  Vienne  ;  then,  leaving  the  river,  struck  across 
the  level  country  of  Upper  Dauphiny,  and  met  the 
river  again  at  St.  Genix.  Thence  he  marched  up  the 
valley  of  the  Upper  Isere,  and  crossed  by  the  pass  of 
the  Little  St.  Bernard,  descending  into  the  Valley  of 
Aosta. 

The  dangers  and  difficulties  of  the  passage  are 
described  in  vivid  language  by  the  historians,  and 
indeed  they  must  have  been  terrible.  To  take  an 
army,  with  all  its  stores  and  baggage,  the  horses,  and 
the  elephants,  across  the  Alps,  was  indeed  a  wonder- 
ful task  ;  still  more  wonderful  when  we  consider  how 
late  it  was  in  the  year  when  the  attempt  was  made 


IQO  THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 

It  was  almost  the  end  of  October  before  the  summit 
of  the  pass  was  reached,  and  the  seasons,  there  is 
little  reason  tc  doubt,  were  colder  then  than  they  are 

now. 

If  Hannibal  had  only  had  natural  obstacles  to  con^ 
tend  with  he  would  have  had  plenty  to  do;  but  he 
found   the   mountain   tribes   fiercely  hostile.     They 
resented  the  intrusion  of  this  formidable  force  mto 
their  country,  and  they  saw  an  excellent  opportunity 
for  plundering.     Their  attacks  began  as  soon  as  he 
commenced  the  ascent,  and  were  continued  till  he 
had  nearly  reached  the  highest  point.    The  first  stage 
of  the  march  was  at   the  pass  which  leads  to  the 
Lake  of  Bourget.     Every  mile  of  this  had  to  be  won 
by  hard  fighting.     The  road  was  steep  and  narrow, 
and  the  barbarians  attacked  the  army  from  points  of 
vantage.     It  was  only  Hannibal's  foresight  in  occupy- 
ing a ''still  higher  position,  which  the  enemy  had  left 
du'^ring  the  night,  that  prevented  a  most  serious  loss. 
When  the  plain  at  the  upper  end  of  the  pass  was 
reached,   the   disciplined  army  had  nothing  to  fear. 
The   mountaineers'   fortified  town  was  stormed,  and 
much  of  the  property  that  had  been  lost  was  regained. 
The  next  three  days'  march  was  made  without  oppo- 
sition ;  and  then  the  mountain  tribes,  seeing  that  force 
had  failed,  tried  what  treachery  could  do.  Their  chiefs 
came  into  the  camp,  offered  hostages,  sent  in  supplies, 
and   promised  to  guide  the  army  by  the  best  and 
shortest  route.     Hannibal  did  not  wholly  trust  them, 
and  took  precautions  against  a  sudden  attack.     But 
he  allowed  the  guides  to  lead  him  into  a  dangerous 
defile,  where  the  loneer  road  would  have  been  safer. 


IQO 


TUB  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


It  was  almost  the  end  of  October  before  the  summit 
of  the  pass  was  reached,  and  the  seasons,  there  is 
little  reason  tc  doubt,  were  colder  then  than  they  are 

now. 

If  Hannibal  had  only  had  natural  obstacles  to  con- 
tend with  he  would  have  had  plenty  to  do;  but  he 
found   the    mountain   tribes   fiercely   hostile.      They 
resented  the  intrusion   of  this  formidable  force  mto 
their  country,  and  they  saw  an  excellent  opportunity 
for  plundering      Their  attacks  began  as  soon  as  he 
commenced  the  ascent,  and  were  continued  till  he 
had  nearly  reached  the  highest  point.     The  first  stage 
of  the  march  was  at    the  pass  which  leads  to   the 
Lake  of  Bourget.     Every  mile  of  this  had  to  be  won 
by  hard  fighting.     The  road  was  steep  and  narrow, 
and  the  barbarians  attacked  the  army  from  points  of 
vantage.     It  was  only  Hannibal's  foresight  in  occupy- 
ing a  "still  higher  position,  which  the  enemy  had  left 
dining  the  night,  that  prevented  a  most  serious  loss. 
When  the  plain  at  the  upi)er  end  of  the  pass  was 
reached,   the   disciplined   army  had  nothing  to  fear. 
The    mountaineers'   fortified  town  was  stormed,  and 
much  of  the  property  that  had  been  lost  was  regained. 
The  next  three  days'  march  was  made  without  oppo- 
sition; and  then  the  mountain  tribes,  seeing  that  force 
had  failed,  tried  what  treachery  could  do.  Their  chiefs 
came  into  the  camp,  offered  hostages,  sent  in  supplies, 
and    promised   to  guide  the  army  by   the  best  and 
shortest  route.     Hannibal  did  not  wholly  trust  them, 
and  took  precautions  against  a  sudden  attack.     But 
he  allowed  the  guides  to  lead  him  into  a  dangerous 
defile,  where  the  longer  road  would  have  been  safer. 


ROCKS  SPLIT    WITH   VINEGAR. 


193 


ll 


ii 


At  the  most  critical  point  of  the  march  the  enemy 
attacked,  rolling  down  great  rocks  or  sending  showers 
of  stones  from  the  cliffs.  The  loss  was  great,  but  the 
army  struggled  through.  The  elephants,  difficult 
as  they  must*  have  been  to  drive  up  those  narrow 
and  slippery  roads,  were  of  great  service.  The  moun- 
taineers were*  terrified  at  the  sight  of  them,  and 
wherever  they  were  visible  did  not  venture  to 
approach. 

The   story  of  how    Hannibal   split   with  fire  and 
vinegar  the  rocks  which  his  men  could  neither  remove 
or  climb  over  is  so  famous  that  it  cannot  be  omitted, 
though   it   is   not  easy  to  imagine  how  the  vinegar 
came  to  be  there.     Had  his  foresight,  wonderful  as  it 
was,  extended  so  far  as  to  provide  this  most  unlikely 
kind  of  store  ?     But  without  further  criticism  I  shall 
quote  Livy's  own  words.     "  Having  to  cut  into  the 
stone,  they  heaped  up  a  huge  pile  of  wood  from  great 
trees  in  the  neighbourhood,  which  they  had  felled  and 
lopped.     As   soon  as  there  was  strength  enough  in 
the  wind   to  create  a  blaze   they  lighted    the   pile, 
and    melted  the  rocks,  as  they  heated,  by  pouring 
vinegar  upon   them.     The   burning  stone  was  then 
cleft  open  with  iron  implements." 

Livy  represents  this  incident  as  occurring  in  the 
course  of  the  descent.  By  that  time  the  work,  of 
course,  was  really  done.  The  army  took  nine  days, 
we  are  told,  to  make  its  way  to  the  top.  That  once 
reached,  they  were  permitted  to  rest  tw^o  days. 
When  they  resumed  their  march  a  fall  of  snow  almost 
reduced  them  to  despair.  But  Hannibal  told  them 
to  keep  up  their  courage.     He  would  show  them  the 


\ 


I 


>l 


194 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


end  of  their  toils.  And  indeed,  a  little  further  on, 
they  came  to  a  point  from  which  they  could  look 
down  on  the  rich  plains  of  Italy.  "  You  are  climb- 
in<T,"  he  cried  to  his  men,  "  not  the  walls  of  Italy  only, 
but  of  Rome  itself  What  remains  will  be  a  smooth 
descent ;  after  one  or,  at  the  most,  two  battles,  we 
shall  have  the  capital  of  Italy  in  our  hands." 

Six  days  sufficed  for   the   descent.     It  was   more 
than  four  months  since  Hannibal  had  started   from 
New  Carthage.     His    losses   on   the  way  had   been 
terrible.     He  brought  down  with  him  into  the  plains 
of  Italy   not    more   than    twenty   thousand  infantry 
(three-fifths   of  them   Africans   and    the    remainder 
Spaniards)  and  six  thousand  cavalry  ;    and  he   had 
left  thirty-three  thousand,  most  of  them  victims  of 
disease  and  cold,  upon  his  road.     This  was  the  force, 
if  we  arc  to    reckon   only  his    regular   troops,    with 
which   he  was  to   undertake  the  conquest  of  Italy. 
The  numbers  rest  on  the  authority  of  a  Roman  who 
was  a  prisoner  in  the  Carthaginian  camp,  and  who 
heard  them  from  the  lips  of  the  great  general  himself. 


VII. 


THE  FIRST  CAMPAIGN  IN   ITALY. 

Hannibal  gave  a  few  days*  rest  to  his  troops. 
They  greatly  needed  it,  for  their  toils  and  sufferings 
had  given  them,  we  are  told,  a  look  that  was  "  scarcely 
human."  Then  he  struck  his  first  blow.  If  he  was 
to  succeed  he  must  have  the  people  of  the  Italian 
peninsula  on  his  side  against  Rome.  In  one  way 
or  another  they  must  be  made  to  join  him.  Accord- 
ingly, when  the  Taurini,  a  tribe  of  Gauls,  refused 
his  proposals  of  alliance— they  were  at  feud  with 
another  tribe  which  was  friendly  to  him— he  attacked 
and  stormed  their  stronghold.^  After  this  almost  all 
the  tribes  of  Hither  Gaul  joined  him.  They  furnished 
him  with  supplies  and  with  a  number  of  excellent 
recruits. 

Meanwhile  Publius  Scipio  had  landed  his  army  at 
Pisa,  had  marched  over  the  Apennines,  and,  crossing 
the  Po  at  Placentia,  was  advancing  against  the  in- 
vaders. Hannibal  scarcely  expected  to  meet  him  so 
soon  ;  Scipio  had  never  believed  that  the  Carthaginian 
army  would  be  able  to  make  the  passage  of  the  Alps. 
Both  made  ready  for  battle.   Among  the  preparations 

'  Probably  the  town  afterwards  called  Augusta  Taurinoruni  and  n  :w 
known  as  Turin. 


196 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


d{  Hannibal  was  a  spectacle  which  he  exhibited  to 
his  army.  Some  of  the  mountaineers  who  had  been 
taken  prisoners  in  crossing  the  Alps  were  matched  to 
fight  against  each  other.  The  conquerors  were  to 
have  a  set  of  arms  and  their  liberty  ;  the  conquered 
would,  at  all  events,  be  released  from  their  chains  by 
death.  All  the  prisoners  eagerly  accepted  the  offei 
when  it  was  made  to  them,  and  fought  with  the 
greatest  courage,  whilst  those  who  had  not  been 
chosen  looked  envyingly  on.  Hannibal  meant  the 
exhibition  as  a  parable  to  his  own  men.  **  This,"  he 
said,  "  is  exactly  your  situation.  You  have  this  same 
choice — a  rich  reward  and  liberty  on  the  one  side,  and 
death  on  the  other.  See  how  gladly  these  barbarians 
accept  it.    Do  you  be  as  cheerful  and  as  brave  as  they 


are. 

Scipio  crossed  the  Ticinus  by  a  bridge  which  he 
had  built  for  the  purpose.  Both  armies  were  now  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Po,  the  Carthaginians  moving 
eastward  and  having  the  river  on  their  right,  the 
Romans  coming  westward  to  meet  them.  At  the  end 
of  the  second  day's  march  both  encamped,  and  on 
the  morning  of  thf?  third  the  cavalry  of  both  advanced, 
Hannibal  and  Scipio  commanding  in  person.  The 
Romans  had  their  light-armed  troops  and  their  Gallic 
horsemen  in  front,  and  the  rest  of  their  cavalry  in  the 
second  line  Hannibal  had  skilfully  arranged  his  heavy 
cavalry  in  a  .solid  body  in  the  centre ;  while  the  light  and 
active  African  troopers,  men  who  rode  their  horses  with- 
out a  bit,  were  on  either  wing.  The  Roman  light-armed, 
after  a  single  discharge  of  their  javelins,  retired  hastily 
through  the  spaces  of  the  squadrons  behind  them. 


SClPlO  RETIRES   TO   THE   TREBtA, 


199 


Between  the  heavy  cavalry  on  both  sides  there  was 
an  obstinate  struggle,  the  Romans  having  somewhat 
the  advantage.  But  the  clouds  of  Africans  had  out- 
flanked the  Roman  line,  and  had  fallen  first  on  their 
light-armed  troops  and  then  on  the  rear  of  the  heavy 
cavalry.  A  general  rout  followed.  Not  the  least 
serious  disaster  of  the  day,  as  we  shall  see,  was  that 
Scipio  himself  received  a  disabling  wound.  Indeed, 
it  was  only  the  bravery  of  his  son,  a  youth  of 
seventeen,  of  whom  we  shall  hear  again,  that  saved 
his  life.  A  body  of  horsemen  formed  round  the 
consul,  and  escorted  him  off  the  field. 

Hannibal  waited  awhile  to  see  whether  his  antago- 
nists meant  to  risk  a  general  engagement.  As  they 
made  no  sign,  he  advanced,  and  finding  that  they  had 
left  their  camp,  crossed  first  the  Ticinus,  and  after- 
wards the  Po,  where  he  captured  six  hundred  men 
who  had  been  left  behind  by  the  Romans.  Scipio 
was  now  encamped  under  the  walls  of  Placentia. 
Hannibal,  after  vainly  offering  him  battle,  took  up  a 
position  about  six  miles  off.  The  first  result  of  his 
late  victory  was  the  crowding  into  his  camp  of  the 
Gallic  chiefs  from  the  south  side  of  the  Po.  Before 
long  he  had  a  stronger  proof  of  the  charrge  of  feeling 
in  this  people.  A  Gallic  contingent  that  was  acting 
with  the  Roman  army  left  the  camp  at  night,  carry- 
ing with  them  the  heads  of  a  number  of  their  comrades 
whom  they  had  massacred,  and  took  service  with  him. 
Scipio  was  so  alarmed  by  this  general  movement 
among  the  Gauls  that  he  left  his  camp,  and  moved 
southward  to  the  Trebia,  where  he  could  find  a  strong 
position  and  friendly  neighbours.     Hannibal   imme- 


200 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


diately  sent  his  African  horse  in  pursuit  ;  and  these, 
if  they  had  not  stopped  to  plunder  and  burn  the 
deserted  camp,  might  have  greatly  damaged  the 
retreating  ar;ny.  As  it  was,  all  but  a  few  stragglers 
had  crossed  the  Trebia  before  the  Africans  came  up. 
Scipio  took  up  a  strong  position  on  the  hills,  and 
resolved  to  wait  till  his  colleague  Sempronius,  who 
was  on  his  way  northward,  should  join  him.  Hannibal, 
who  had  followed  with  his  whole  force,  pitched  his 
camp  about  five  miles  to  the  north.  He  had  received 
meanwhile  a  most. welcome  gain  in  the  surrender  of 
Clastidium,  a  fortress  near  Placcntia,  where  the  Romans 
had  accumulated  great  stores  of  corn  The  place  was 
given  up  to  him  by  the  commandant,  a  native  of 
Brundusium,  who  received,  it  is  said,  four  hundred 
gold  pieces  as  the  price  of  his  treachery. 

It  was  not  long  before  Sempronius  and  his  army 
arrived.  The  numbers  of  the  Romans  were  of  course 
greatly  increased  by  this  reinforcement  ;  but  the  result 
was  really  disastrous.  Scipio  was  a  skilful  general  ; 
Sempronius  was  nothing  but  a  brave  man,  whom  the 
accident  of  being  consul  for  the  year  had  put  in  com- 
mand of  the  army.  And,  unfortunately,  Scipio  was 
disabled  by  the  'wound  which  he  had  received  at 
Ticinus.  His  colleague  could  not  believe  but  that  the 
Romans  must  win  a  pitched  battle,  if  the  enemy  should 
be  rash  enough  to  fight  one  ;  and  he  was  anxious  to 
get  the  credit  of  the  victory  for  himself  If  he  was 
to  do  this  he  must  force  a  battle  at  once.  Winter  was 
coming  on,  and  before  the  beginning  of  another  cam- 
paign he  would  be  out  of  office. 

If  he  had  any  doubt  about  success,  it  was  dispersed 


SEMPRONIUS  EAGER   TO  FIGHT. 


201 


by  the  result  of  a  skirmish  which  took^lace  between 
the  Roman  and  Carthaginian  cavalry.  Hannibal  had 
sent  some  horsemen,  Africans  and  Gauls,  to  plunder 
the  lands  of  a  tribe  which  had  made  terms  with  Rome. 
As  these  were  returning,  laden  with  booty,  some 
Roman  squadrons  fell  upon  them,  and  drove  them  to 
their  camp  with  considerable  loss. 

Sempronius  was  now  determined  to  fight,  and 
Scipio  could  not  hinder  him.  As  Hannibal  was  at 
least  equally  anxious  for  a  battle,  which  was  as  much 
to  his  interest  as  it  was  against  the  interest  of  his 
antagonists,  the  conflict  was  not  long  delayed.  Sem- 
pronius  had  forty  thousand  men  under  his  command, 
and  Hannibal's  army,  reinforced  as  it  had  been  by  the 
Gauls,  was  probably  equal. 

Hannibal's  first  care  was  to  place  an  ambuscade  of 
two  thousand  men,  picked  with  the  greatest  care,  in 
some  brushwood  near  the  river.     His  brother  Mago 
had    chosen   a   hundred    foot-soldiers   and    as   many 
troopers  ;  and  each  of  these  again  had  chosen  nine 
comrades.     They  were  to  play,  we  shall  see,  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  battle.     Early  the  next  morning 
he  sent   his    African    cavalry  across   the   river,  with 
orders  to  skirmish  up  to  the  Roman  camp,  and  pro- 
voke an  engagement.     Sempronius  eagerly  took  the 
bait.     He  sent  out  of  his  camp,  first  his  cavalry,  then 
his  light-armed,  and   finally  his  legions,  and  he  sent 
them  before  they  had  been  able  to  take  any  food.     It 
was  now  far  on  in  the  winter ;  the  snow  was  falling 
fast,  and   the  Trebia,  swollen   by  rain,  was  running 
high  between  its  banks.      The  water  was  up  to  the 
men's  breasts,   as  they  struggled,  cold  and   hungry, 


I  :l 


M 


202 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


across  it.  The  Carthaginians,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  had  their  usual  meal,  and  had  warmed  them- 
selves before  fires.  With  ample  time  on  his  hands 
and  perfectly  at  his  ease,  Hannibal  drew  up  his  army. 
Twenty  thousand  infantry,  Africans,  Spaniards,  and 
Gauls,  formed  the  centre  ;  the  cavalry,  numbering  ten 
thousand,  were  on  the  wings,  with  the  elephants  in 
front  of  them.  The  light-armed  troops  had  been  sent 
on  in  advance  to  support  the  African  horse.  The 
Roman  line  of  battle  was  similarly  arranged. 

And  now  again,  as  before  at  thq  Ticinus,  the  weak- 
ness of  the  Romans  in  cavalry  was  fatal.  This  arm 
was  inferior  both  in  numbers  and  in*  quality.  The 
Carthaginian  horse  charged  on  both  wings,  and 
routed  their  opponents  almost  without  a  struggle. 
The  flanks  of  the  great  body  of  infantry  which  formed 
the  Roman  centre  were  thus  uncovered,  and  were 
exposed  to  fierce  attacks  both  from  the  cavalry  and 
from  the  light- armed  troops  of  the  enemy.  Still 
they  held  their  own  for  a  long  time  with  all  the  courage 
and  tenacity  of  Romans.  But  everything  was  against 
them,  and  when  Mago's  ambuscade  leapt  out  from 
the  watercourse,  in  which  it  had  been  hiding,  and  fell 
furiously  upon  their  rear,  the  day  was  lost.  If  any- 
thing was  still  wanting  to  complete  their  rout,  it  was 
found  in  the  elephants,  strange  and  terrible  creatures 
which  few  of  the  Romans  or  their  allies  had  ever  seen 
before.  The  rear  of  the  armv  suffered  worst.  Indeed 
it  was  almost  destroyed.  The  front  ranks  cut  their 
way  through  the  Gallic  and  African  infantry  that  was 
opposed  to  them,  and  made  their  way  to  Placentia. 
These  numbered  about  ten  thousan  1     Some  stragglers 


mhu 

'   .!■   I' 


03 
Ui 

H 


i 


I 


THE   CARTHAGINIANS    VICTORIOUS.  205 

from  the  rest  of  the  army  afterwards  joined  them. 
Others  made  their  way  back  into  the  -amp,  for  the 
conquerors  did  not  pursue  beyond  the  river.  But  it 
is  probable  that  the  Romans  lost  nearly  half  their 
force  in  killed,  prisoners,  and  missing. 

The  Carthaginians  did  not  win  their  victory  without 
some  loss.  But  the  slain  were  chiefly  from  among 
the  Gauls,  whom  Hannibal  could  most  easily  spare 
His  best  infantry,  the  Spaniards  and  Africans,  suffered 
little,  except  indeed  from  the  cold— which  the  latter 
of  course,  felt  very  much.  The  cold,  too,  was  fatal  to 
all  the  elephants  but  one. 

With  the  battle  of  the  Trebia  the  first  campaign  of 
the  Second  Punic  War  came  to  an  end. 


VIII. 


TRASUMENNUS. 


Hannibal  spent  the  winter  among  the  Ligurian 
Gauls.  They  had  welcomed  him  among  them  as  the 
successful  enemy  of  Rome,  but  grew  weary,  we  are 
told,  of  his  presence,  when  they  found  that  they  had 
to  support  his  army.  He  was  even  in  danger  of 
being  assassinated,  and  had  to  protect  himself  by 
frequently  changing  his  dress  and  even  his  wig.  The 
winter  was  scarcely  over  when  he  took  the  field, 
making  his  way  through  the  marshes  of  the  Arno 
into  the  heart  of  Etruria.  This  way  was  the  shortest 
that  he  could  have  taken,  and  by  following  it  he 
avoided  the  Roman  armies  that  were  watching  for  him. 
But  it  cost  him  and  his  army  dear.  The  floods  were 
out  everywhere,  and  not  a  spot  of  dry  ground  could 
be  found  on  which  his  men  could  rest  themselves. 
All  that  they  could  do  was  to  pile  up  the  baggage  in 
the  water  and  to  rest  upon  that,  or  even  upon  the 
heaps  of  dead  horses.  Weary,  without  food,  and 
without  sleep,  for  this  was  their  worst  trouble,  num- 
bers perished  on  the  march.  Hannibal  himself,  who 
rode  upon  the  one  elephant  that  was  left,  to  keep 
himself  as  far  as  possible  above  the  water,  was 
attacked  with  ophthalmia,  and  lost  the  sight  of  one  of 


«' 


LAKE   TRASUMENNUS. 


207 


his  eyes.     When  he  reached  the  higher  ground  he 
gave  his  troops  a  short  rest,  and  then  marched  boldly 
towards  Rome,  wasting  the  country,  which  was  one 
of  the  richest  parts  of  Italy,  most  cruelly  as  he  went. 
One   of  the    Roman    Consuls,    Flaminius,    was    at 
Arretium  with  about  thirty  thousand  men  ;  the  other 
was  at  Ariminum  on  the  east  coast  with  as  many 
more.     Hannibal  ventured  to  leave  them  in  his  rear, 
and  now  there  was  no  army  between  him  and  Rome. 
Flaminius,  who  had  found  it  hard  to  sit  still  and  see 
the  country  of  his  alh'es  wasted  with  fire  and  sword 
before  his   eyes,  could  not  allow  Rome  itself  to  be 
attacked  without  striking  a  blow  for  it.     He  broke 
up  his  camp,  and  followed  the  Carthaginians.     This 
was  exactly  what  Hannibal    expected   and   wished. 
And  he  laid  an  ambush  for  his  pursuer.     The  road 
from  Cortona  to  Perusia,  along  which  he  was  march-' 
ing,  passed  close  to  the  northern  shore  of  the  Lake 
Trasumennus.     Near  the   north-west   corner  of  the 
lake  the  hills  on   either  side  of  this  lake  approach 
close  to  each  other;  at  the  north-east  corner  again 
there  is  a  still  narrower  passage  formed  by  the  hills 
on  the  north,  and  the  lake  itself  on  the  south.     Be- 
tween these  two  is  a  level  plain,  somewhat  like  a  bow 
in  shape,  if  we  suppose  the  edge  of  the  water  to  be 
the  string,  and  the  retreating  hills  the  bow  itself.     In 
front  of  the  hills  which  commanded  the  eastern  end 
of  the  pass  Hannibal  posted  his  African  and  Spanish 
troops  ;  and  here  he  himself  remained.     At  the  end 
of  the  pass  itself,  behind  some  rising  ground  which 
conveniently  concealed  them,  he  stationed  his  Gallic 
cavalry.     The   rest   of  his   army   he  placed   on  the 


208 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


further  slopes  of  the  hills  which  enclosed  the  plain 
upon  the  north. 

Flaminius  reached  the  western  end  of  the  lake  at 
sunset,  and  pitched  his  camp  there  for  the  night. 
The  next  morning,  while  the  light  was  still  dim,  and 
without,  it  seems,  attempting  to  reconnoitre  his  route, 
he  continued  his  march.  When  his  whole  army  had 
passed  through  the  defile  into  the  plain  beyond, 
Hannibal  gave  the  signal  which  had  been  arranged, 
and  the  Numidian  cavalry  with  the  Gallic  infantry 
descended  from  the  hills,  and  occupied  the  western 
outlet.  The  Roman  army  was  hemmed  in.  They 
were  surrounded,  too,  with  mist,  which  rose  from  the 
lake  and  lay  thick  upon  the  level  ground,  while  the 
sunshine  was  bright  upon  the  slopes  down  which  the 
enemy  was  moving  to  the  attack.  Before  they  could 
form  their  ranks  in  order  of  battle,  almost  before  they 
could  draw  their  swords,  the  enemy  was  upon  them. 

Flaminius  did  his  best,  but  it  was  very  little  that 
he  could  do.  There  was  no  scope  for  a  general's 
skill,  even  if  he  had  possessed  it.  It  was  a  soldiers' 
battle,  where  every  man  had  to  fight  for  himself ;  but 
the  soldiers  of  Rome,  newly  recruited  ploughmen 
and  vinedressers,  were  scarcely  a  match  for  the 
veterans  of  Carthage,  and  were  now  taken  at  a 
terrible  disadvantage.  Still,  for  a  time,  they  held 
their  ground.  For  three  hours  the  battle  raged,  so 
fiercely  that  none  of  the  combatants  felt  the  shock 
of  an  earthquake  which  that  day  laid  more  than  one 
Italian  city  in  ruins.  Then  the  Consul  fell.  Con- 
spicuous in  his  splendid  arms,  he  had  kept  up  the 
Roman   battle,  till   one  of   Hannibal's   troopers,   an 


SLAUGHTER  OF  THE  ROMANS. 


209 


Insubrian  Gaul,   recognizing  his  face  (for  Flaminius 
had   conquered   the    Insubrians  eight   years  before), 
fiercely  charged  him.     "  See  !  "  cried  the  man  to  hiJ 
comrades,  "this   is  he  who  slaughtered  our  legions 
and  laid  waste  our  fields.     I  will  offer  him  a  sacrifice 
to   the   shades   of  my   countrymen."     The   Consul's 
armour-bearer  threw  himself    in   the   way,  but  was 
struck  down  ;  and  Ducarius  (for  that  was  the  trooper's 
name)  ran  the  Consul  through  with  his  lance.     Then 
the    Romans   ceased   to  resist,  even  as  the  English 
ceased   at  Senlac   when    Harold   was  slain.      Some 
sought  to  escape  by  the  hills,  others  waded  out  into 
the  lake,  which  is  shallow  to  some  distance  from  the 
shore.     Men  weighted  with  heavy  armour  could  not 
hope    to    escape    by    swimming  ;    yet    some    were 
desperate    enough   to    try    it.       These   were    either 
drowned  in  the  deeper  water,  or  struggling  back  to 
the   shallows   were    slaughtered    in    crowds    by   the 
cavalry,  which  had  now  ridden  into  the  water.    About 
six  thousand  of  the  vanguard  cut  their  way  through 
the  enemy  at  the  eastern  end  of  the  pass,  and  halted 
on  the  high  ground  beyond  to  watch  the  result  of  the 
battle.     When   the   mist  lifted,   as   the   sun    gained 
strength,   from  hill   and   plain,  they  saw   that    their 
comrades  were  hopelessly  defeated,  and,  taking  up 
their   standards,   hurried   away.       But   without  pro- 
visions, and    not   knowing  which  way  to  turn,  they 
surrendered  themselves  next  day  to  Hannibal.  About 
ten  thousand  contrived  to  escape  from   the  field  of 
battle.     These  made  the  best  of  their  way  to  Rome. 
Nearly  fifteen  thousand   fell   on  the  field  or  in  the 
flight.     The   Carthaginians   lost   two   thousand    and 


210 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


five  hundred,  a  proof  that  for  a  time  at  least  the 
Romans  had  not  sold  their  lives  for  nothing.  The 
body  of  the  Consul  was  never  found,  though  Hannibal, 
anxious  to  give  so  brave  a  foe  an  honourable  burial, 
ordered  a  careful  search  to  be  made  for  it. 

A  few  days  afterwards  Hannibal  had  another  suc- 
cess.    Maharbal  surprised  a  body  of  cavalry  which 
Servilius  was  sending  to   help  his   colleague,  killed 
half,   and   took  the  other  half  prisoners.     He   then 
marched   south,  but  not,  as  one   might   expect,   on 
Rome,  though  it  had  no  army  to  protect  it.     He  was 
afraid  of  undertaking  the  siege  of  such  a  city  ;  indeed, 
when  he  attempted  to  take  Spoletium,  a  colony,  or 
military  settlement,  in  Umbria,  he  was  beaten  back 
with  great  loss.     He  marched  on  in  a  south-easterly 
direction,  wasting  the  country  as  he  went,  and  gather- 
ing an  immense  booty,  till  he  came  to  the  eastern 
sea  near  a  town  called  Hadria.     There  he  took  a  few 
days  rest  and  refreshed  his  army,  for  both  men  and 
horses  were  terribly  exhausted  with  toil  and  privation. 
We  are  told  that  the  horses,  which  were  covered  in 
ulcers,  were  bathed  in  old  wine,  and  that  this  treat- 
ment  cured   them.     From   this   place,   too,  he   sent 
despatches  to  Carthage  with  an  account  of  what  he 
had  done.     They  were  the  first  that  he  had  written 
since  he  crossed  the  Ebro.     Soldiers  say  that  the  most 
dangerous  thing  that  a  general  can  do  is  to  cut  him- 
self off  from  his  base,  to  launch  himself  into  the  air, 
as  it  is  sometimes  called — that  is,  to  leave  nothing  be- 
hind him  on  which  he  can  fall  back.     Hannibal  had 
done  this  so  boldly  that  he  had  never  been  able  even 
to  send  a  messenger  back  with  a  letter.     Now  he  was 


Hannibal's  policy. 


211 


at  the  sea,  and  letters  could  be  sent  to  and  fro  without 
hindrance.  He  is  also  said  at  this  time  to  have  armed 
some  of  his  African  infantry  with  arms  of  the  Roman 
fashion.  From  Hadria  he  moved  still  southward, 
ravaging  the  eastern  part  of  Italy  as  far  down  as 
Apulia,  but  always  showing  that  it  was  with  Rome 
and  not  with  the  Italian  subjects  of  Rome  that  he 
was  waging  war.  Any  Roman  citizen,  or  child  of  a 
Roman  citizen  that  was  of  age  to  carry  arms,  he 
ordered  to  be  slain.^  The  Italians  that  fell  into  his 
hands  he  not  only  spared,  but  treated  with  the  utmost 
kindness. 

'  So  goes  the  Roman  story,  but  the  frequent  mention  of  Roman 
prisoners  sdema  to  prove  that  it  was  false. 


f 


IX. 


FABIUS  AND  HIS  TACTICS. 

At  Rome,  after  the  first  feeling  of  grief  and  terror 
had  passed  away,  everything  was  being  done  to  carry 
on  the  war  with  vigour.  No  one  spoke  of  surrender, 
or  even  of  peace.  The  chief  command  of  all  the 
armies  of  the  State  was  given  to  a  veteran  soldier, 
Quintus  Fabius  Maximus  by  name,  who  had  won  the 
honour  of  a  triumph  nearly  twenty  years  before. 
Fabius'  first  act  was  to  consult  the  books  of  the  Sibyl.i 
They  were  found  to  prescribe  various  acts  of  worship 
of  the  Gods,  as  the  offering  of  prayers  and  sacrifices, 
the  building  of  temples,  and  the  celebrating  public 
games.  These  were  either  done  at  once  or  promised 
for  some  future  time.  The  Dictator  (for  this  was  his 
title)  then  ordered  the  levying  of  two  new  legions, 
and  of  a  force  which  was  to  defend  the  city  and  man 
the  fleet.  He  also  directed  that  everything  in  the 
line  of  Hannibal's  march  should  be  destroyed.  The 
Carthaginians  were  to  find  nothing  but  a  desert 
wherever  they  came.     He  then  marched  north.     At 

'  Books  of  prophecy,  said  to  have  been  written  by  one  of  the  Sibyls, 
sold  to  Tarquinius  Priscus,  fifth  king  of  Rome,  and  afterwards  preserved 
m  the  temple  of  Jupiter  of  the  Capitol,  to  be  consulted  in  any  great  need 
of  the  State.     See  "The  Story  of  Rome,"  p.  59. 


HANNIBAL  A  MASTER   OF  STRATAGEM.        213 

Ocriculum  in  Umbria  he  met  Servilius,  who  was  on 
his  way  to  Rome,  and  took  over  his  legions  from  him. 
Servilius  he  sent  to  command  the  fleet,  which  was 
being  got  ready  at  Ostia  for  the  defence  of  the  Italian 
seas.  He  himself,  with  an  army  numbering  about 
fifty  thousand  men,  followed  in  pursuit  of  the 
enemy.  Hannibal  found  that  he  gained  no  friends  in 
Apulia,  and  marched  westward  into  Samnium,  which, 
less  than  a  hundred  years  before,  had  been  the  fiercest 
enemy  of  Rome.  But  here  again  he  met  with  no 
success  in  making  strife  between  Rome  and  its  allies. 
He  moved  on  into  what  was,  perhaps,  the  very  richest 
part  of  Italy,  the  great  Falernian  plain,  where  wines 
were  grown  that  were  to  become  famous  over  all  the 
world.  Fabius  still  followed  him,  watching  every 
movement,  cutting  off  stragglers,  and  harassing  him 
in  every  way  that  he  could  devise,  but  always  refusing 
a  battle.  When  he  saw  his  enemy  below  him  in  the 
l^^alernian  plain  — for  Fabius  kept  his  own  army  on  the 
hills — he  believed  tli.it  he  had  him  in  a  trap.  To  the 
north,  the  passes  into  Latium  and  the  way  to  Rome 
were  barred ;  the  sea  was  in  front  of  him  ;  and  to  the 
south  the  deep  stream  of  the  Volturnus.  On  the  east 
the  hills,  with  their  passes  held  by  Roman  troops, 
seemed  to  shut  off  his  escape.  Then  Hannibal  showed 
what  a  master  of  stratagem  he  was.  He  not  only 
escaped,  but  carried  off  the  booty  which  he  had 
collected.  His  plan  was  this.  About  tw«o  thousand 
oxen  were  chosen  out  of  the  vast  herds  which  had 
been  collected  out  of  the  plundered  districts.  To 
their  horns  were  fastened  bundles  of  dry  twigs.  Then 
one  day,  as  the  dusk  of  evening  came  on,  he  silently 


214 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


FABIUS  AND  MINUCIUS. 


215 


struck  his  camp,  and  moved  eastward  towards  the 
hills,  the  oxen  being  driven  a  little  in  front  of  the 
vanguard.  When  the  army  reached  the  foot  of  the 
hills  it  was  dark  ;  and  then  Hannibal  ordered  the 
bundles  to  be  lighted.  The  drivers  of  the  oxen 
started  them  up  the  slope  of  the  hills  ;  the  animals, 
maddened  by  fear  and  pain — for  the  light  flashed  all 
about  them,  and  the  heat  reached  the  flesh  at  the 
roots  of  their  horns — rushed  wildly  on.  The  four 
thousand  Romans  who  had  been  posted  to  guard  the 
principal  pass  were  dismayed  at  the  sight.  What  it 
meant  they  could  not  understand  ;  but  that  it  meant 
danger  they  were  sure.  Probably  they  fancied  that 
they  were  being  surrounded — for  this  is  always  the 
first  fear  of  all  but  the  very  best  and  bravest  troops. 
Anyhow  they  left  their  post,  and  made  for  the  heights. 
Fabius,  in  his  camp,  saw  the  strange  sight,  and  was 
equally  puzzled  ;  nor  did  he  venture  out  till  it  was 
light.^  Meanwhile  Hannibal  had  quietly  marched 
his  army  through  the  pass,  taking  all  his  plunder  with 
him,  and  pitched  his  camp  next  day  at  Allifae,  on  the 
other  side  of  the  hills.  Fabius  followed  him.  He 
marched  northwards  through  Samnium,  as  far  as  the 
country  of  the  Peligni,  ravaging  as  he  went.  Fabius 
still  moved  along,  keeping  his  army  between  him 
and  Rome. 

'  "This  story  of  Livy,"  says  Niebuhr,  '*  represents  the  Romans  in  a 
foolish  light.  The  truth  is  told  by  Polybius.  Nothing  was  more  com- 
mon among  the  ancients  than  the  march  by  night  with  lanterns  ;  and 
when  the  Roman  outposts  saw  the  lights  between  themselves  and  the 
unoccupied  district,  they  thought  that  the  Carthaginians  wefe  forcing 
their  way,  and  quickly  advanced  towards  the  supposed  danger  to  shut 
the  road  against  the  enemy  "  (I^ecture  Ixxiv.). 


The  effect  of  Hannibal's  escape  was  twofold.  Not 
only  did  he  get  out  of  a  difficult  position,  carrying 
the  greater  part  of  his  plunder  with  him,  but  he 
made  it  very  hard  for  Fabius  to  carry  out  his  policy 
of  delay.  This  policy  of  course  had  many  enemies. 
The  allies,  who  saw  their  country  ravaged  without 
being  able  to  strike  a  blow  for  it,  were  furious ;  and 
the  wealthy  Romans,  whose  estates  were  suffering  in 
the  same  way,  were  loud  in  their  complaints.  And 
Hannibal's  cunning  plan  of  leaving  Fabius'  estates 
untouched,  while  all  the  neighbourhood  was  plun- 
dered, increased  their  anger.  This  change  of  feeling 
soon  became  evident.  Fabius  had  to  go  to  Rome  on 
business  for  a  time,  and  left  his  army  in  the  charge  of 
Minucius,  Master  of  the  Horse  (this  was  the  title  of 
the  Dictator's  second-in-commandj,  with  strict  orders 
not  to  fight.  Minucius  did  fight,  and  won  something 
like  a  little  victory.  When  news  of  his  success  came 
to  Rome,  the  opponents  of  Fabius  persuaded  the 
people  to  divide  the  army,  and  give  the  command  of 
one  half  to  the  Dictator,  and  of  the  other  to  the 
Master  of  the  Horse. 

There  were  now  two  Roman  armies  encamped 
about  a  mile  apart.  Hannibal,  who  knew  what 
had  happened,  immediately  took  advantage  of  the 
situation.  Minucius,  if  he  wished  to  satisfy  his  friends 
was  bound  to  fight,  and  Hannibal  soon  gave  him 
what  looked  like  a  favourable  opportunity.  He  occu- 
pied some  rising  ground  between  his  own  camp  and 
that  of  the  Romans  with  what  looked  like  a  small 
force.  The  Romans  hastened  to  dislodge  it.  But 
there  were  five  thousand  men  in  ambush,  who,  when 


2l6 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


the  fighting  had  been  going  on  for  some  time,  fell 
upon  the  Roman  rear.  This  gave  way,  and  another 
great  disaster  would  have  been  the  result,  had  not 
Fabius,  who  was  on  the  watch,  led  out  his  troops,  and 
changed  the  fortunes  of  the  day.  After  all  no  great 
harm  was  done ;  and  there  was  this  good  result,  that 
Minucius  confessed  his  error,  and  gave  up  his  com- 
mand. The  rest  of  the  year  passed  without  any 
further  disasters,  except  that  the  Consul  Servilius, 
landing  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  and  ravaging  the 
country,  was  attacked  by  the  Carthaginians,  and  lost 
a  thousand  men. 

Hannibal  spent  the  winter  at  Geronium,  in  the 
north  of  Apulia.  It  was  a  mountainous  country  ;  and 
it  was  close  to  the  sea.  (This  part  of  Apulia,  indeed, 
is  like  an  elbow  projecting  out  into  the  Adriatic.) 
He  had  ample  supplies,  and  he  was  in  communication 
with  Carthage.  Probably  new  troops  were  sent  to 
him.  Anyhow,  when  the  next  year  came  (216)  he 
was  stronger  than  ever.  It  was  late  in  the  spring 
when  he  took  the  field.  His  first  movement  was  to 
march  round  the  Roman  army,  which  had  been 
watching  him  during  the  winter,  and  to  seize  a  great 
magazine  of  stores  which  the  enemy  had  collected. 
It  was  still  his  policy  to  provoke  them  to  fight  a 
battle,  and  this  successful  movement  helped  him. 
The  Romans  had  gathered  a  great  force,  but  found  it 
difficult  to  feed  it.  They  were  afraid,  too,  lest  they 
should  lose  their  allies,  if  they  allowed  Hannibal  to 
march  up  and  down  through  Italy  and  plunder  as  he 
pleased.  And  the  party  of  fighting  had  had  a  great 
success  at  the  elections.     C.  Tcrcntius  Varro,  a  man 


VARRO  AND  PAULLUS  IN  COMMAND.         2jy 

of  the  people,  after  loudly  proclaiming  that  the  nobles 
were  prolonging   the    war   for   their  own    purposes, 
had  been  chosen  Consul  by  an   immense   majority 
It  was  resolved  to  fight,  but  not  to  do  so  till  the 
newly-levied  legions  should  have  joined  the  armi^  of 
the  year  before.     This  was  done  about  the  beginning 
of  June  ;  and  the  whole  army,  now  numbering  about 
ninety  thousand  men,  marched  in  pursuit  of  Hannibal 
who  was  gathering  in  the  early  harvests  on  the  sea- 
board of  Apulia.     The  two  consuls  (Varro's  colleague 
was  a  noble,  ^milius  Paullus  by  name)  had  command 
on  alternate  days,    ^milius,  an  experienced  soldier 
was  doubtful  of  the  result  of  a  battle,  and  anxious  to' 
put  It  off.     Varro,  on  the  other  hand,  was  confident 
and  eager,  and  on  his  first  day  of  command  brought 
matters  to  a  crisis  by  taking  up  a  position  between 
rlannibal  and  the  sea. 


i 


X. 


CANNiE. 


The  great  battle  was  still  delayed  for  a  few  days. 
But   when    Hannibal's   cavalry  cut   off  the   Roman 
watering -parties  from  the  river,   and  left  the  army 
without  water  at  the  very  height  of  an  Italian  summer, 
the  impatience  of  the  soldiers  could  not  be  restrained. 
On  the  morning  of  the  ist  of  August,^  Varro,  who 
that  day  was  in  command,  hoisted  on  his  tent  the  red 
flag  as  a  signal  of  battle.     He  then  ordered  the  army 
to  cross  the  river  Aufidus,  and  to  draw  up  their  lines 
on  the  right  bank.     Hannibal  at  once  took  up  the 
challenge,  and  fording  the  stream  at  two  places,  drew 
up  his  army  opposite  to  the  enemy.     His  army  was 
but  half  as  large  ;  if  he  should  be  defeated  his  doom 
was   certain  ;    but   he   was    confident   and   cheerful. 
Plutarch  tells  us  a  story— one  of  the  very  few  which 
show  us  something  of  the  man   rather   than  of  the 
general— of  his  behaviour  on  the  morning  of  the  battle. 
He  seems  to  have  been  one  of  the  soldiers  whose 
spirits  rise  in  danger,  and  who  become  cheerful,  and 
even  gay,  when  others  are  most  serious.     "  One  of  his 
chief  officers,  Cisco   by  name,  said  to  him:  *I  am 

*  The  Roman  reckoning  was  six  or  seven  weeks  in  advance  of  the 
real  year,  and  the  time  was  really  about  midsummer. 


HANNIBAL'S  ARMY. 


219 


astonished  at  the  numbers  of  the  enemy.'  Hannibal 
smiled  and  said  :  '  Yes,  Gisco  ;  but  there  is  something 
more  wonderful  still.'  *  What  is  that  ? '  said  he.  *  That 
though  there  are  so  many  of  them,  not  one  of  them  is 
called  Gisco.'  The  answer  was  so  unexpected  that 
everybody  laughed."  And  he  goes  on  to  tell  us  that 
the  Carthaginians  were  mightily  encouraged  to  see 
this  confident  temper  in  their  chief. 

The  Aufidus,  bending  first  to  the  south,  and  then 
again,  after  flowing  nearly  eastward  for  a  short  dis- 
tance, to  the  north,  makes  a  loop.  This  loop  was 
occupied  by  Hannibal's  army.  The  left  wing  con- 
sisted of  eight  thousand  heavy  cavalry,  Spaniards  and 
Gauls.  Hasdrubal  (who  must  not  be  confounded 
with  Hannibal's  brother  of  the  same  name)  was  in 
command.  They  had  the  river  on  their  left  flank  and 
on  their  right.  Behind  them  was  one  half  of  the 
African  infantry.  "  One  might  have  thought  them  a 
Roman  army,"  says  Livy,  "for  Hannibal  had  armed 
them  with  the  spoils  of  Trcbia  and  Trasumennus." 
Next  in  the  line,  but  somewhat  in  advance  so  as  to 
be  about  on  a  level  with  the  heavy  cavalry,  were 
posted  the  Spanish  and  Gallic  infantry,  with  their 
companies  alternately  arranged,  and  under  the  imme- 
diate command  of  Hannibal  himself  and  his  brother 
Mago.  These  troops  were  still  armed  in  their  native 
fashion.  The  Spaniards  wore  white  linen  tunics, 
dazzlingly  bright,  and  edged  with  purple.  Their  chief 
weapon  was  the  sword  which  they  used,  of  a  short 
and  handy  size,  and  with  which  they  were  accustnmcd 
to  thrust  rather  than  strike.  Nevertheless  it  was 
fitted  for  a  blow,  for  it  had,  of  course,  an  edge.     The 


:i 


220 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


Gauls  were  naked  from  the  hips  upwards.  They  used 
very  long  swords,  without  a  point.  Both  had  oblong 
shields,  and  both  seemed  to  the  Romans  and  Italians, 
whose  stature  seldom  exceeded  the  average  height  of 
men,  to  be  almost  giants  in  size.  Still  further  to  the 
right,  but  thrown  back  somewhat  so  as  to  be  on  a 
level  with  their  countrymen  on  the  left  wing,  stood 
the  other  half  of  the  African  infantry.  And  then  on 
the  extreme  right  wing  of  the  whole  army,  were  the 
African  light  horsemen  under  the  command  of  Mago. 
These,  to  use  the  military  phrase,  "  rested  upon 
nothing  ; "  that  is,  they  had  nothing  to  support  their 
right  flank.  There  were  but  two  thousand  of  them, 
for  they  had  had  some  of  the  hardest  of  the  fighting 
since  the  army  had  entered  Italy  ;  but  they  were  con- 
fident of  victory.  The  whole  army  numbered  fifty 
thousand,  but  ten  thousand  had  been  detached  to 
guard  the  camp.  The  right  wing  of  the  enemy  con- 
sisted of  the  Roman  horse,  who  thus  fronted  the 
heavy  cavalry  of  Carthage  ;  next  to  these  came  the 
infantry  of  the  legions,  more  than  seventy  thousand 
strong,  yet  drawn  up  in  so  dense  an  array — in  column, 
in  fact,  rather  than  in  line — that  they  did  not  overlap 
the  far  smaller  force  of  their  adversaries.  On  the  left 
wing  were  posted  the  cavalry  of  the  allies.  It  was 
here  that  Varro  commanded.  Paullus  was  on  the 
right  of  the  army.  The  whole  force  numbered  about 
eighty  thousand,  allowing  for  the  detachment  which 
had  been  told  off  to  guard  the  camp.  Their  faces 
were  turned  to  the  south.  This  was  a  great  disad- 
vantage to  them,  not  so  much  on  account  of  the  glare 
pf  the  sun,  for  it  was  yet  early  in  the  day,  but  because 


THE  STRUGGLE. 


221 


the  hot  wind,  which  the  country  people  called  Vul- 
turnus,  rolled  such  clouds  of  dust  in  their  faces  that 
they  could  scarcely  see  what  lay  before  them. 

The  battle  began  as  usual  with  the  skirmishers. 
Here  the  Carthaginians  had  the  advantage.  The 
slingers  from  the  Balearic  islands  ^  were  more  expert 
and  effective  than  any  of  the  Roman  light-armed 
troops.  The  showers  of  stones  which  they  sent 
among  the  legions  did  much  damage,  wounding 
severely,  among  others,  the  Consul  Paullus.  Then 
the  heavy-armed  cavalry  of  Carthage  charged  the 
Roman  horse  that  was  ranged  over  against  them. 
The  Romans  were  some  of  the  bravest  and  best  born 
of  their  nation  ;  but  they  were  inferior  in  numbers,  in 
the  weight  of  men  and  horses,  and  in  their  equip- 
ment. They  wore  no  cuirasses  ;  their  shields  were 
weak ;  their  spears  were  easily  broken.  Probably 
they  had  no  special  skill  in 'cavalry  tactics ;  had  they 
possessed  it,  there  was  no  opportunity  of  showing  it, 
for  there  was  no  room  to  manoeuvre.  It  was  a  fierce 
hand-to-hand  fight  ;  many  of  the  Spaniards  and 
Gauls  leapt  to  the  ground,  and  dragged  their  opponents 
from  their  horses. 

In  the  centre  of  the  field  where  the  Roman  legions 
met  the  Gallic  and  Spanish  infantry,  Hannibal  seemed 
for  a  time  to  be  less  successful.  He  had  advanced 
these  troops  considerably  beyond  the  rest  of  his  line. 
When  charged  by  the  heavy  columns  of  the  enemy 
they  were  forced  to  fall  back.     The  Romans  pressed 

'  Majorca,  Minorca,  and  Ivica.  The  reader  must  not  be  tempted  by 
the  plausible  derivation  from  the  Greek  ftaXXoj  (ballo),  to  throw  or 
strike.    The  name  seems  to  have  been  derived  from  some  form  of  Baal. 


Cii 


222 


THE  STORY  OP  CARTHAGE. 


on  in  a  dense  and  unmanageable  mass.     And  in  what 
seemed  the  moment  of  victory  they  found  themselves 
assailed  on  both  flanks  and  in  the  rear.     On  either 
side  the  two  bodies  of  African    infantry,   who   had 
hitherto  taken  no  part  in  the  battle,  fell  upon  them. 
Almost  at  the  same  time  came  Hasdrubal  with  his 
heavy  horsemen.     After  routing  the  Roman  cavalry 
of  the  right  wing,  he  had  charged  that  of  the  allies 
upon  the  left.     These  had  been  already  thrown  into 
confusion    by  the  stealthy  attack   of  five   hundred 
Africans,  who  had  pretended  to  surrender,  but  came 
up  in  the  critical  moment  and  hamstrung  their  horses. 
Hasdrubal   completed   their  rout,    and    leaving    the 
Africans  to  pursue  the  fugitives,  charged  the  rear  of 
the  Roman  infantry.     These  were  now  surrounded 
on  all  sides,  for   the   Gauls   and  Spaniards  in  their 
front  had  rallied,  and  checked  their  advance.     Upon 
this  helpless  mass  the  Carthaginians  used  their  swords 
till  they  were  fairly  weary  of  slaying.     How  many 
men  lay  dead  upon  the  field  when  darkness  came  on 
it  is  impossible  to  say.     Polybius  gives  the  number 
at   seventy  thousand,  and    he   is   probably  a  better 
authority  than  Livy,  who  reduces  it  to  fifty  thousand. 
Among  them  were  one  of  the  consuls,  the  ex-consul 
Servilius,   twenty-one  military  tribunes  (officers  of  a 
rank  about  equal  to  that  of  a  colonel),  and  eighty 
members  of  the  Senate.      Varro  had  fled  from  the 
field  with  seventy  horsemen.      Hannibal's  loss  was 
something  under  six  thousand. 

The  question  was,  "What  was  he  to  do.?"  He 
had  destroyed  the  enemy's  army,  for  even  the  force 
left  to  guard  the  camps  had  surrendered,  and  there 


WILL  HE  MARCH  ON  ROME  ? 


223 


was  no  other  army  in  the  field.  Most  of  his  officers, 
while  they  crowded  round  to  congratulate  him, 
advised  him  to  give  himself  and  his  army  some  rest. 
Maharbal,  who  was  in  chief  command  of  the  cavalry, 
thought  otherwise.  "  Do  you  know,"  he  said,  "  what 
you  have  done  by  this  day's  victory  ?  I  will  tell  you. 
Four  days  hence  you  shall  be  supping  in  the  Capitol 
of  Rome.  Let  me  go  on  in  front  with  my  cavalry. 
They  must  know  that  I  have  come  before  they  know 
that  I  am  coming."  Hannibal  was  not  so  sanguine. 
He  praised  Maharbal's  zeal,  but  must  take  time  to 
consider  so  grave  a  matter.  Then  Maharbal  broke 
out :  *'  I  see  that  the  gods  do  not  give  all  their  gifts  to 
one  man.  Hannibal,  you  have  the  secret  of  victory, 
but  not  the  secret  of  using  it." 

It  will  never  be  decided  whether  Hannibal,  with 
his  cautious  policy,  or  the  bold  Maharbal  was  in  the 
right.  But  one  is  disposed  to  believe  that  so  skilful 
a  general,  one,  too,  who  was  not  wanting  in  boldness 
(for  what  could  be  bolder  than  this  whole  march  into 
Italy  ?),  knew  what  could  and  what  could  not  be  done 
better  than  anybody  else.  He  could  not  hope  to 
succeed  unless  the  allies  of  Rome  deserted  her,  and 
he  had  to  wait  and  see  whether  this  would  happen. 
Till  he  was  sure  of  it  he  could  not,  we  may  well 
believe,  afford  to  risk  an  advance.  One  defeat  would 
have  been  fatal  to  him.  It  would  have  been  almost 
as  fatal  to  sit  down  in  vain  before  the  walls  of  Rome. 
But,  however  this  may  be,  it  is  certain  that  the  op- 
portunity, if  it  was  an  opportunity,  never  came  back 
to  him.  He  did  indeed  come  near  to  Rome,  as  I 
shall  have  to  tell  hereafter,  but  this  was  a  feint  rather 


224 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


^ 


than  a  serious  attack.  That  midsummer  day  in  the 
year  216  saw  the  highest  point  which  the  fortunes  of 
Carthage  ever  reached.  Then  only,  if  even  then,  she 
might  have  been  the  mistress  of  the  world. 


XI. 


AFTER   CANN^. 


The  victory  of  Cannae  had  great  results,  though  it 
did  not  make  Hannibal  feel  strong  enough  to  strike 
a  blow  at  Rome.     First  and   foremost  among  these 
results  was  the  alliance  of  Capua,  the  second  city  in 
Italy.   The  Capuans,  indeed,  were  not  all  of  one  mind 
in   the   matter.      It   was   the   people   that   favoured 
Carthage ;  the  nobles  were  for  the  most  part  inclined 
to  Rome.     It  was  a  noble,  however,  and  one  who  was 
married  to   a   lady   of  the  great    Roman    house   of 
Claudms,  that  took  the  lead  in  this  movement.     The 
people  rose    against    the   Senate,  stripped    it   of  its 
power,  massacred  a  number  of  Roman  citizens  who 
were  sojourning  in   the   town,   and    sent   envoys   to 
invite    Hannibal    to   their   city.      He  was  of  course 
delighted    to   come  ;    Capua,   which    had  more  than 
thirty  thousand  soldiers  of  her  own,  was  almost  as 
great  a  gain  as  the  victory  at  Cannae.     He  was  near 
to    being  assassinated,  indeed,  on    the  night  of  his 
entering  the  city,  for  the  son  of  his  entertainer  had 
resolved  to  stab  him  at  the  dinner-table.     The  next 
day  he  was  present  at  a  meeting  of  the  Senate.     He 
v/as  full  of  promises ;  he  undertook  that  Capua  should 
thereafter   be   the  capital   of  Italy.     Meanwhile  he 


226 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


demanded  that  a  leading  citizen  who  had  been 
specially  active  on  the  Roman  side  should  be  given 
up  to  him.  The  man  was  arrested,  and  was  sent  by 
Hannibal  to  Carthage. 

The  greater  part  of  Central  and  Southern  Italy 
followed  the  example  of  Capua.  All  the  Samnites, 
with  the  exception  of  a  single  tribe,  revolted  from 
Rome  ;  so  did  Lucania  and  Bruttii,  and  so  did  many 
of  the  Greek  cities  in  the  south,  the  chief  among  them 
being  Crotona.  These  cities  had  passed  the  height 
of  their  prosperity,  but  they  were  still  populous  and 
powerful  towns. 

It  was  only  the  extraordinary  tenacity  and  courage 
of  Rome  that  enabled  her  to  hold  out.  The  Senate 
never  lost  its  courage,  and,  after  the  first  panic  was 
over,  the  people  were  ready  to  stand  by  their  rulers  to 
the  last.  When  Varro,  whose  rashness  and  folly  had 
almost  ruined  his  country,  returned  to  Rome,  the 
Senate  went  out  to  meet  him,  and  publicly  thanked 
him  that  he  "had  not  despaired  of  the  commonwealth." 
As  he  was  of  the  opposite  party  in  politics,  this  was  a 
way  of  saying  that  all  Romans,  whatever  their  way 
of  thinking,  must  join  together  to  made  the  best  of 
everything.  Nothing  that  could  be  done  to  raise  an 
army  was  neglected.  Bands  of  brigands  were  induced 
to  enlist  by  promises  of  pardon  for  past  offences ; 
even  slaves  were  recruited.  As  many  as  eight  thou- 
sand soldiers  were  gained  in  this  way.  But  when  a 
proposal  came  from  Hannibal  that  the  prisoners  of 
Cannae  should  be  ransomed,  the  horsemen  at  £17, 
the  infantry  at  ;^io  each,  the  offer  was  refused.  By 
great  exertions  an  army  was  raised,  and  put  under 


MAGO  AT  CARTHAGE. 


227 


the  command  of  Marcellus,  who  was  probably  the 
best  soldier  that  Rome  possessed  at  the  time. 

Hannibal  had  sent  his  brother  Mago  to  Carthage 
from  the  battle-field  of  Cannae.     Introduced  into  the 
Senate,  he  gave  a  glowing  account  of  what  had  been 
done,  of  the  four  victories  which  had  been  gained,  of 
the  two  hundred  thousand  men  that  had  been  slain, 
the  fifty  thousand  that  had  been  taken  prisoners.     As 
a  practical  proof  of  the  truth  of  his  story,  he  poured 
out  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate-house  a  peck  of  gold 
rings  which   had  been  taken,  he  said,  from  Roman 
soldiers  that  had  been  slain  in  battle.     It  was  only 
the   horsemen,  indeed   only  the  upper  class  of  the 
horsemen,   he   explained,   that   were   accustomed   to 
wear  them.    But  the  practical  conclusion  of  his  speech 
was  a  demand  for  help.     "  The  nearer  the  prospect," 
he  said,  "  of  finishing  the  war,  the  more  you  are  bound 
to  support  your  general.     He   is   fighting  far  away 
from  home.     Pay  is  wanted  for  troops  ;    provisions 
are  hard  to  obtain.     And  though  he  has  won  great 
victories,  he  has  not  won   them  without  some  loss. 
He  asks,  therefore,  for  help  in  men,  money,  and  stores." 
The  war-party  was  delighted.     One  of  them  turned 
to  Hanno,  leader  of  the  opposite  faction,  and  asked 
him,  "  Does  Hanno  still  repent  of  having  made  war 
on  Rome.?"  "Yes,"  replied   Hanno,  *' I  still  repent, 
and  shall  do  so  till  I  see  peace  made  again.     Your 
invincible  general  makes  as  great  demands  upon  you 
as  if  he  had  been  beaten.     And  as  for  his  prospects 
for  the  future,  has  any  Latin  city  joined  him  ?     Has 
a  single  man  of  the  thirty-five  tribes  of  Rome  deserted 
to  him .? ' 


228 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


To  these  questions  Mago  could  only  answer  "  No  !  '* 
Hanno  asked  again,  *'  Has  Rome  said  a  word  about 
peace?"  Mago  could  only  answer  that  it  had  not 
Then  said  Hanno,  '*  We  are  as  far  off  from  the  end  of 
the  war  as  we  were  when  Hannibal  crossed  into  Italy. 
I  vote  that  no  help  should  be  sent  to  prolong  a  war 
which  can  have  no  good  end." 

This  protest,  of  course,  was  useless.  The  Senate 
resolved  to  send  four  thousand  African  troops,  forty 
elephants,  and  a  sum  of  money.  And  Mago  was  to 
go  into  Spain  and  raise  20,000  troops  to  fill  up  the 
gaps  in  the  armies  there  and  in  Italy.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  little  was  done  ;  at  this  crisis  the  Carthaginian 
government  showed  but  little  energy,  and  Hannibal 
was  left,  for  the  most  part,  to  help  himself. 

The  winter  of  216-5  he  and  his  army  spent  in 
Capua.  Ever  since  he  had  started  from  New  Carthage, 
more  than  two  years  before,  his  men  had  lived  in 
tents,  satisfied  with  the  hard  discipline  and  scanty  fare 
of  the  camp.  Doubtless,  they  had  lost  something  of 
their  vigour  by  the  time  that  they  took  the  field 
again  ;  but  there  were  other  and  weightier  reasons 
why  Hannibal's  great  plans  should  end  in  failure  than 
that  his  army  was  spoilt  by  the  luxury  of  a  winter  in 
Capua. 

In  the  next  year  little  was  done.  Hannibal  gained 
some  small  successes,  and  met  with  some  small  losses. 
His  chief  venture  had  been  the  siege  of  Nola,  which, 
after  Capua,  was  the  chief  city  of  Campania.  In  this  he 
failed,  owing  chiefly  to  the  skill  and  energy  of  Mar- 
cellus.  To  have  let  a  year  pass  without  making  a 
decided  advance  was  in  fact  to  fall  back.     Still  his 


Hannibal's  prospects. 


229 


M' 


9 


{} 


I 


prospects  in  some  directions  had  improved.  At 
Syracuse  the  wise  old  King  Hiero,  who  had  continued 
to  be  loyal  to  Rome,  without  making  an  enemy  of 
Carthage,  was  dead.  Hieronymus,  his  grandson  and 
successor,  was  a  foolish  youth,  who  thought  he  could 
do  better  for  himself  by  joining  what  seemed  to  be 
the  winning  side.  He  offered  his  help  to  Carthage, 
asking  as  the  price  the  supremacy  over  the  whole  of 
Sicily.  Philip,  King  of  Macedon,  again,  seemed  ready 
to  join  an  alliance  against  Rome.  Little  advantage, 
however,  was  gained  in  this  way.  Of  what  happened 
to  Hieronymus  I  shall  soon  have  to  speak.  Philip's 
action  was  delayed,  first  by  the  accident  of  his  envoys 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Romans  as  they  were  on 
their  way  back  from  Hannibal's  camp,  and  afterwards 
by  causes  which  we  have  no  means  of  explaining. 
Anyhow,  at  the  time  when  his  help  would  have  been 
most  valuable  to  Hannibal  and  most  damaging  to 
Rome,  he  did  nothing. 

On  the  other  hand,  Carthage  suffered  a  great  loss  in 
the  complete  conquest  by  their  enemies  of  the  island 
of  Sardinia,  which  had  again  fallen  into  their  hands. 
*  On  the  whole,  at  the  end  of  215  Hannibal,  though  he 
had  received  no  serious  check  in  the  field,  was  in  a 
much  worse  position  than  he  had  been  in  at  the 
beginning. 

The  next  year  also  (214)  had  much  the  same  result. 
Hannibal  made  an  attempt  to  seize  Tarcntum,  but 
failed.  There  were  in  this  town,  as  elsewhere,  a 
Carthaginian  and  a  Roman  party.  The  latter  got  to 
know  what  their  opponents  were  planning,  and  took 
such  precautions,  that  when  Hannibal  appeared  before 


230 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


the  walls  of  the  city  he  found  it  prepared  for  defence  ; 
and  after  vainly  lingering  in  the  neighbourhood  for  a 
few  days,  was  obliged  to  depart.  In  another  part  of 
Southern  Italy  he  suffered  a  serious  loss.  Hanno,  one 
of  his  lieutenants,  had  raised  a  force  of  twenty  thousand 
Lucanians.  This  was  defeated  at  Beneventum  by  the 
Roman  general  Gracchus,  who  was  in  command  of  an 
army  of  slaves.  Hanno's  Lucanian  infantry  either 
perished  on  the  field  of  battle,  or  dispersed  to  their 
own  homes  ;  but  he  escaped  himself  with  about  a 
thousand  African  cavalry. 

The  next  great  event  of  the  war — its  exact  date 
is  uncertain— was  a  great  gain  to  Hannibal.  The 
friends  of  Carthage  in  Tarentum,  though  overpowered 
for  the  moment,  had  never  given  up  their  plans  ;  and 
now  they  found  an  opportunity  for  carrying  them  out. 
The  city  had  sent  hostages  to  Rome.  These  had 
attempted  to  escape,  had  been  captured,  and  executed. 
This  act  of  cruelty  roused  their  fellow-citizens  to  fury  ; 
communications  were  at  once  opened  with  Hannibal, 
and  the  ringleaders  of  the  plot  were  not,  as  might  have 
been  supposed,  popular  leaders,  but  nobles — relatives, 
it  is  probable,  of  the  unfortunate  hostages.  Hannibal 
marched  towards  the  town  with  a  picked  force  of  ten 
thousand  men,  and  halted  a  few  miles  off,  while  his 
friends  within  the  city  completed  their  preparations. 
One  party  was  told  off  to  deal  with  the  governor. 
a  Roman  of  the  house  of  Livius.  He  had  been 
giving  a  banquet  to  some  of  the  citizens ;  the  con- 
spirators paid  him  a  visit  after  it  was  over,  laughed 
and  joked  with  him,  and  finally  left  him  in  such  a 
state  that  they  had  nothing  to  fear  from  his  watchful- 


TARENTUM  GAINED, 


231 


ness.  Another  party  had  arranged  to  admit  Hannibal 
himself  by  a  gate  which  opened  out  of  the  quarter  of 
the  tombs,  which  in  Tarentum — we  might  almost  say 
alone  among  Greek  cities — were  within  the  walls.  A 
fire  signal  was  given  by  Hannibal  and  answered  by 
the  conspirators.  The  latter  fell  upon  the  guards  of 
the  gate,  and  Hannibal  was  at  hand  outside  to 
support  them.  A  third  party  was  busy  at  another  of 
the  gates.  They  had  been  accustomed  for  several  days 
to  go  out  on  what  seemed  to  be  hunting  parties,  to 
return  late  at  night,  to  talk  over  their  sport  with  the 
guard,  and  to  give  them  some  of  the  game.  On  this 
occasion  they  brought  back  with  them  a  particularly 
fine  wild  boar.  While  the  animal  was  actually  in  the 
passage  of  the  gate,  and  the  sentry  was  busy  admiring 
it,  thirty  African  soldiers,  who  had  been  stealthily 
approaching,  rushed  up,  cut  the  man  down,  and, 
securing  the  gate,  let  in  a  large  body  of  their  com- 
rades. The  city  of  Tarentum  was  taken,  but  the 
citadel  was  hastily  secured  by  the  Roman  garrison. 
The  Tarentines  were  not  harmed.  It  was  sufficient  if 
any  citizen  wrote  over  his  door,  "  This  is  a  Tarentine's 
house."  But  all  the  dwellings  in  which  Romans  had 
been  quartered  were  given  up  to  plunder. 


XII. 


THE  TURN  OF  THE  TIDE. 

From  Trebia  to  Cannae  the  tide  of  success  rose 
with  Hannibal.  For  three  years  or  thereabouts  after 
Cannas  it  may  be  said  to  have  remained  at  its  height. 
His  gains  and  losses  about  balanced  each  other. 
This,  of  course,  really  meant  that  his  chances  of 
victory  were  growing  less,  for  his  was  an  enterprise  to 
which  delay,  even  without  defeat,  was  fatal. 

In  212  the  tide  manifestly  turned.  The  Romans 
felt  themselves  strong  enough  to  besiege  Capua. 
The  city  was  already  in  distress  for  want  of  food  ;  for 
with  the  Roman  armies  so  near  the  rich  Campanian 
plains  could  not  be  cultivated.  And  Hannibal's  first 
attempt  to  provision  it  failed.  A  second  succeeded ;  but 
shortly  after  the  place  was  regularly  invested.  Three 
Roman  armies  sat  down  before  it,  and  then  drew  a 
complete  line  round  it  with  a  strong  rampart  and 
ditch,  and  with  forts  at  intervals.  The  townspeople 
were  not  strong  enough  to  make  sallies  with  effect, 
and  all  that  they  could  do  was  to  send  messenger 
after  messenger  to  Hannibal,  begging  earnestly  for 
help,  if  he  did  not  wish  to  see  them  perish.  Early  in 
the  year  2ii— that  is,  after  the  siege  had  lasted  some 
months— he  made  a  determined  effort  to  relieve  the 


ATTEMPTED  RELIEF  OF  CAPUA. 


233 


city.  He  marched  rapidly  with  a  picked  force  from 
Tarentum,  where  the  citadel  was  still  holding  out 
against  him,  and  took  up  a  position  on  Mount  Tifata, 
a  hill  which  overlooked  the  city.  He  had  contrived 
to  warn  the  Capuans  of  his  coming,  arranging  that 
thev  should  make  a  sortie  from  their  walls  while  he 
was  attacking  one  of  the  camps  of  the  besiegers.  The 
sortie  was  easily  repulsed  ;  Hannibal's  attack  seemed 
at  one  time  likely  to  succeed,  but  ended  in  failure. 
His  elephants — he  had  thirty-three  of  these  animals 
with  him — forced  their  way  into  the  Roman  camp, 
and  made  great  havoc  with  the  tents,  while  they 
caused  a  stampede  among  the  horses.  In  the  midst 
of  the  confusion  voices  were  heard  bidding  the 
Romans  make  the  best  of  their  way  to  the  hills.  The 
camp,  they  said,  was  lost,  and  each  man  must  save 
himself  The  speakers  used  the  Latin  tongue,  and 
spoke  in  the  name  of  the  consuls  ;  but  they  were 
really  Hannibal's  men.  This  was  one  of  the  tricks 
with  which  this  great  general  was  always  so  ready. 
Ingenious  as  it  was,  it  does  not  seem  to  have  had 
much  effect. 

Then  he  tried  his  last  resource.  He  would  march 
on  Rome  itself  With  forces  so  large  engaged  in  this 
siege,  the  city  could  have  but  few  to  defend  it.  It 
was  possible  that  by  a  sudden  movement  he  might 
get  within  the  walls  ;  in  any  case  it  was  likely  that  a 
part  of  the  investing  force  would  be  withdrawn  for 
the  protection  of  the  capital.  The  Capuans  were 
informed  of  what  he  was  intending  to  do,  and  en- 
couraged to  hold  out.  He  made  his  way  through  the 
rich  wine-producing  region  of  Northern  Campania, 


\ 


234 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


ravaging  the  country  as  he  went.  At  Fregellae  he 
found  the  bridge  ov^er  the  Liris  broken  down,  and 
lost  some  time  in  consequence.  Crossing  into  Latium, 
he  passed  through  the  town  of  Anagnia  to  Mount 
Algidus.  After  a  vain  attempt  to  seize  Tusculum,  he 
continued  his  march  northwards,  and  pitched  his 
camp  at  a  distance  of  eight  miles  from  Rome. 
Fulvius,  the  proconsul,  had  made  his  way  meanwhile 
from  Capua  with  a  force  of  fifteen  thousand  men. 
Marching  through  a  friendly  country,  and  finding  all 
that  he  wanted  supplied  by  the  towns  through  which 
he  passed,  he  had  been  able  to  outstrip  the  Cartha- 
ginian army.  Nevertheless  the  terror  in  the  city  was 
great.  The  women  crowded  to  the  temples,  and,  with 
their  long  hair  unbound,  threw  themselves  before  the 
images  of  the  gods  and  implored  their  protection. 
The  next  day  Hannibal  advanced  still  nearer  to  the 
walls.  He  pitched  his  camp  on  the  bank  of  the  Anio, 
at  the  third  milestone  from  Rome  ;  and  then,  taking 
with  him  a  force  of  two  thousand  cavalry,  rode  up 
and  reconnoitred  the  southern  wall  of  the  city.  On 
the  morrow  he  crossed  the  Anio  with  his  whole  army, 
and  offered  battle.  But  no  engagement  was  fought. 
Livy  tells  us  a  story  of  how,  that  day  and  the  next,  so 
fierce  a  storm  of  rain  came  on  that  neither  army 
could  keep  the  field,  the  weather  clearing  immediately 
when  they  returned  to  camp  ;  and  how  Hannibal 
exclaimed,  "  Once  I  wanted  the  will  to  take  this  city, 
and  now  I  want  the  fortune."  We  are  told  that  he 
was  greatly  discouraged  by  two  proofs  of  the  indif- 
ference with  which  the  Romans  regarded  his  presence. 
Soldiers,  he  heard,  were  being   actually  sent   away 


CAPUA   LOST   TO  HANNIBAL. 


235 


from  the  city  to  reinforce  the  armies  in  Spain  ;  and 
the  very  land  on  which  he  had  pitched  his  camp  had 
easily  found  a  purchaser.  By  way  of  retort  to  this 
last  affront — for  so  he  is  said  to  have  regarded  it — he 
ordered  the  bankers'  shops  round  the  Roman  market- 
place to  be  put  up  to  auction.  But  he  found  that  his 
move  had  failed,  and  marched  back  to  Campania,  and 
from  thence  to  the  extreme  south  of  Italy. 

Capua,  thus  left  to  itself,  could  do  nothing  but  sur- 
render. Of  its  punishment  b}^  Rome  it  is  needless  to 
speak  in  detail.  The  nobles  were  executed  ;  the  rest 
of  the  population  sold  into  slavery.  In  a  play  that 
was  acted  at  Rome  some  twenty  years  afterwards  we 
find  a  brutal  jest  on  their  cruel  fate.  "  There,"  says 
one  of  the  characters,  speaking  of  some  unhealthy 
spot,  "  even  a  Syrian — and  the  Syrians  are  the  toughest 
of  slaves— cannot  live  six  months."  "  Nay,"  says  the 
other,  "  the  Campanians  have  learnt  by  this  time  to 
bear  more  than  the  Syrians." 

The  next  year  (210J  passed  with  little  incident,  as 
far  as  Italy  was  concerned  (I  shall  speak  of  Sicily  and 
Spain  hereafter).  The  Romans  had  never  been  able 
to  vanquish  Hannibal  in  the  open  field  ;  they  scarcely 
even  ventured  to  meet  him.  He  had  shown  that  he 
could  march  from  one  end  of  Italy  to  the  other  with- 
out hindrance,  and  that  he  could  send  his  plundering 
parties  up  to  the  very  walls  of  Rome  ;  but  he  had  not 
been  able  to  save  the  great  city  which  had  come  over  to 
him  ;  and  there  was  small  temptation  to  any  other  to 
join  him.  Not  only  was  Capua  a  great  actual  losi:  to 
him,  but  the  fact  that  it  had  fallen  in  spite  of  all  his 
efforts  to  relieve  it  was  a  terrible  blow  to  his  reputa- 


236 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


tion.  For  all  his  skill  as  a  general — and  that  showed 
itself  more  and  more  as  the  war  went  on — he  was 
clearly  wanting  in  power. 

In  Sicily,  the  course  of  events  went  against  the 
cause  of  Carthage.  Hicronymus,  the  foolish  youth 
who  had  succeeded  the  wise  old  Hiero  at  Syracuse, 
had  been  murdered  after  a  reign  of  thirteen  months 
by  an  assassin  who  professed  to  be  acting  in  the 
interests  of  Rome.  A  series  of  dreadful  acts  of 
cruelty  followed.  Here  also,  as  elsewhere,  the  popular 
party  favoured  Carthage,  while  the  aristocrats  were 
inclined  to  Rome,  and  there  was  a  fierce  struggle 
between  them.  In  the  end  the  former  triumphed, 
and  Syracuse  became  the  ally  of  Carthage.  As  such 
it  was  besieged  by  the  forces  of  Rome,  Appius 
Claudius  commanding  the  army  and  Marcellus  the 
fleet.  The  narrative  of  the  siege  does  not  fall  within 
the  scope  of  this  book.  The  story  of  how  the  defence 
was  prolonged  by  the  engineering  skill  of  Archimedes 
is  full  of  interest,  but  it  may  be  found  elsewhere. 
The  efforts  which  Carthage  made  to  save  her  new 
ally  were  fruitless.  A  large  army,  indeed,  was  col- 
lected under  Himilco,  and  this  was  reinforced  from 
various  Sicilian  cities,  which  had  been  enraged  by  the 
savage  cruelty  which  the  Romans  had  shown  in  their 
treatment  of  such  places  as  fell  into  their  hands.  But 
the  Roman  lines  could  not  be  broken  ;  and  when 
Himilco  encamped  outside  them,  intending,  it  is 
probable,  to  blockade  them  as  they  were  blockading 
the  city,  a  pestilence  broke  out  among  his  troops.  So 
fearful  were  its  ravages  that  the  army  w^as  literally 
destroyed.       The  fleet  under   Bomilcar  did  no  more. 


CARTHAGE   LOSES   SICILY. 


237 


It  did  not  even  make  an  attempt  at  relieving  the 
city.  Though  it  numbered  as  many  as  a  hundred 
and  thirty  vessels  of  war,  it  declined  an  engagement 
with  the  Romans,  and  instead  of  attempting  to  enter 
the  harbour  of  Syracuse,  sailed  away  to  Tarentum. 
In  212  Syracuse  was  taken  by  Marcellus. 

Hannibal,  however,  was  not  willing  to  give  up  the 
island  as  lost.     He  sent  one  Mutines,  a  Liby- Phoeni- 
cian, or  half-caste  Carthaginian,  to  take  command  of 
the  'forces  ;  and  Mutines,  fixing  his  headquarters  at 
Agrigentum,  carried  on  for  many  months  a  guerilla 
warfare.     Unfortunately  his  appointment  had  caused 
great   annoyance    to    the    pure-blood    Carthaginian 
officers  in  the  island,  especially  to  Hanno,  who  was  the 
commander-in-chief.     H^nno  at  last  suspended  him, 
and  handed  over  the  command  to  his  own  son.      The 
loyalty  of  Mutines  did  not  stand  firm  under  such  pro- 
vocation,  and  the  Numidians  who  comprised  his  force 
were  furious  at  his  disgrace.     Communications  were 
at  once  opened  with   Laevinus,   the  Roman  general. 
A  force  was  sent  to  Agrigentum  ;  the  Numidians  cut 
down  the  guards  of  one  of  the  city  gates,  threw  it 
open,  and  admitted  the  Roman  soldiers.     Hanno,  who 
had  come  to  the  place  probably  to  make  arrangements 
for  the  change  of  commanders,  saw  that  something 
had  taken  place,  and,  supposing  that  it  was  nothing 
more  than  some  riotous  proceedings  of  the  Numidians, 
went  down  to  restore  order.     He  discovered  the  truth 
just  in  time  to  save  himself  by  flight.     La^vinus  exe- 
cuted the  principal  citizens  of  Agrigentum,  and  sold 
the  rest  of  the  population  as  slaves.     Of  the  sixty- 
six  Sicilian  towns  that  had  taken  the  side  of  Carthage, 


238 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


six  were  taken  by  force  of  arms  and  twenty  were  be- 
trayed ;  the  remainder  capitulated.  Before  the  end 
of  2IO  Sicily  was  finally  lost. 

In  Spain  affairs  had  not  reached  the  same  point,  but 
they  were  tending  the  same  way.  Hannibal  had  left, 
we  have  seen,  his  brother  Hasdrubal  in  command,  and 
the  war  was  carried  on  for  several  years  with  varying 
success  between  him  and  the  two  brothers,  Cna^us  and 
Publius  Scipio.  Cnaeus  Scipio  had  been  left  in  Spain 
in  temporary  command  when  Publius  left  the  country 
to  face  Hannibal  in  Italy,  and  he  gained  some  con- 
siderable successes,  if  Livy's  account  is  to  be  trusted. 
We  cannot  help  noticing,  however,  that  the  Roman 
generals  are  again  and  again  credited  with  great 
victories  which  mostly  are  found  to  lead  to  nothing. 
Unfortunately  we  have  no  other  accounts  to  fall  back 
upon,  and  we  can  only  tell  the  story  as  it  is  told  to 
us,  and  believe  whatever  seems  credible. 

In  218  Cnaeus  Scipio  fought  a  battle  with  Hanno, 
who  had  been  left  in  command  of  the  country  between 
the  Ebro  and  the  Pyrenees,^  vanquished  and  took 
him  prisoner,  and  almost  annihilated  his  army.  The 
soldiers  found  a  great  prize  in  his  camp,  for  Hannibal 
had  left  with  him  the  heavy  baggage  which  he  could 
not  carry  across  the  Alps.  Hasdrubal  moved  to  help 
his  colleague,  but  finding  himself  too  late,  re-crossed 
the  Ebro.  The  next  year,  after  wintering  at  Tarraco, 
Cnaeus  defeated  the  Carthaginian  fleet  off  the  mouth 
of  the  Ebro.  Shortly  afterwards  he  was  joined  by 
his  brother  Publius  ;  and  the  two  generals  continued 
to  act  together  for  several  years.  Their  first  step  was 
to  march  to  Saguntum.     The  hostages  given  to  the 


ROMAN  SUCCESSES  IN  SPAIN, 


239 


Carthaginian  government  by  the  Spanish  tribes  were 
kept  in  the  citadel  of  this  town  ;  the  Scipios  contrived 
to  get  possession  of  them  by  the  treachery  of  the  officer 
who  had  the  charge  of  them.     They  sent  them  back  to 
their  friends,  and  of  course  gained  great  popularity 
throughout  Spain  by  the  act.     In  the  following  year 
(216)  they  are  said  to  have  defeated   Hasdrubal  on 
the  banks  of    the  Ebro  so  completely  that  he  fled 
from  the  field  of  battle  with  but  a  few  followers.     In 
215  they  relieved  Illiturgis,  which  Hasdrubal  and  two 
other  Carthaginian   generals   were   besieging.      The 
Romans,   we  read,   had   but    sixteen   thousand  men 
under  arms,  the  Carthaginians  sixty  thousand;  but 
the  result  of  the  battle  was  a  complete  victory.     The 
Romans  killed  more  than  their  own  number,  captured 
three  thousand  men,  nearly  a  thousand  horses  (Livy  is 
careful  not  to  overstate  the  number),  sixty  standards, 
and   seven   elephants.      Moving  on  to    Intibilis  the 
Scipios  fought  another  battle,  killed  thirteen  thousand 
of  the  enemy,  captured  two  thousand,  two  and  forty 
standards,  and  nine  elephants.     The  result  of  these 
brilliant  victories  was  that  nearly  all  Spain  came  over 
to  the  Roman  side.     So  we  read,  but  find  that  for  all 
this  it  was  necessary  to  win  two  more  great  victories 
in  the  following  year  (214). 

We  may  be  sure,  however,  that  during  these  years 
and  the  two  following  years  (^2 13,  212)  the  balance  of 
success  inclined  to  the  Roman  side.  And  this  supe- 
riority became  more  evident  when  Hasdrubal  Barca 
had  to  be  recalled  to  Africa,  where  the  Numidian 
king  Syphax  had  declared  war  against  Carthage. 
The  Scipios  had  sent  envoys  to  him,  promising  him 


240 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


immediate  help  and  future  reward  if  he  would  perse- 
vere in  his  hostility.  One  of  the  envoys  remained 
behind  to  assist  in  drilling  his  new  levies.  The  Car- 
thaginians found  an  ally  in  King  Gala,  Syphax's 
neighbour  and  rival.  King  Gala  had  a  son,  Masinissa, 
a  youth  of  but  seventeen  years,  but  of  extraordinary 
capacity.  Young  as  he  was,  he  was  put  in  command 
of  his  father's  army  and  of  the  Carthaginian  troops 
which  served  with  it,  and  defeated  Syphax  so  com- 
pletely that  the  war  was  ended  by  a  single  battle. 
We  shall  hear  of  Masinissa  again. 

Hasdrudal  was  now  able  to  return  to  Spain.  He 
took  with  him  large  reinforcements,  two  lieutenants, 
another  Hasdrubal,  the  son  of  Gisco,  and  Mago,  the 
youngest  brother  of  Hannibal,  and  Masinissa.  After 
this  the  fortune  of  war  changed.  The  Scipios  had 
made  a  great  effort  to  complete  the  conquest  of  Spain, 
raising  a  native  force  of  twenty  thousand  to  act 
together  with  their  own  troops.  In  view  of  the  fact  that 
three  Carthaginian  armies  were  now  in  the  field,  they 
determined  to  divide  their  own  forces.  Publius  with 
two-thirds  of  the  army  was  to  act  against  Mago  and 
Hasdrubal  Gisco,  Cnaeus  against  Hasdrubal  Barca. 
Publius,  hearing  that  his  opponents  were  likely  to 
have  their  strength  largely  increased  by  native  allies, 
resolved  to  attack  them  at  once.  He  was  himself 
attacked  on  his  march  by  the  African  light  horsemen 
under  Masinissa,  and  when  he  faced  about  to  receive 
their  charge,  found  the  Carthaginians  assailing  his 
rear.  He  was  himself  killed  early  in  the  day,  and 
after  his  death  his  troops  soon  took  to  flight.  Few, 
however,  could  escape  when  the  pursuers  were  the 


DEATH  OF  THE   SCIPIOS. 


241 


light  African  horsemen,  and  an  infantry  that  was 
almost  as  fleet  of  foot.  The  camp,  however,  with  its 
garrison  was  still  safe. 

Cnaeus  did  not  long  survive  his  brother.  His  native 
allies  had  been  bribed  to  leave  him  ;  and  he  now 
found  himself  in  the  presence  of  the  united  forces  of 
the  three  Carthaginian  generals.  He  drew  his  forces 
together  on  some  rising  ground  that  was  near.  The 
place  was  incapable  of  being  defended.  The  ascent  was 
was  easy.  There  was  no  timber  for  a  rampart ;  no  earth 
with  which  the  soldiers  could  make  an  entrenchment. 
All  that  could  be  done  was  to  make  a  poor  defence  out 
of  the  pack-saddles  of  the  horses  and  mules  and  the 
baggage.  This  was  almost  immediately  broken  down. 
Many  of  the  soldiers  made  their  escape  to  the  camp 
of  the  other  army  ;  but  the  general  perished.  He  had 
survived  his  brother  only  twenty-nine  days.  Lucius 
Marcius,  the  officer  left  in  command  of  the  camp, 
contrived  to  keep  together  what  was  left  of  the  Roman 
forces,  and  even  to  inflict  some  losses  on  the  enemy. 
His  command  was  taken  over  by  Claudius  Nero,  who 
was  sent  from  Rome  for  that  purpose,  but  who  seems 
to  have  effected  but  little  good.  Livy  tells  a  strange 
story  of  how  Hasdrubal  was  surrounded  ;  how  he 
promised  to  evacuate  Spain ;  how  he  amused  the 
Roman  general  by  conferences  about  the  terms  of 
agreement,  and  in  the  meanwhile  contrived  to  get 
his  army  out  of  their  dangerous  situation,  so  that 
Nero,  when  the  negotiations  were  broken  off,  found 
nothing  but  an  empty  camp.  The  death  of  the  two 
Scipios  seems  to  have  happened  in  the  year  211. 

The  next  year  the  son  of  Publius,  whom  we  have 


242 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


seen  saving  his  father's  life  at  the  battle  of  the  Ticinus, 
came  into  Spain  as  commander-in-chief.  It  was  an 
office  which  no  one  had  desired  to  hold,  for  when  the 
election  was  held  at  Rome  not  a  single  candidate 
presented  himself.  At  last  the  young  Scipio  came 
forward.  He  was  not  twenty- four  years  old,  and 
therefore  below  the  legal  age  for  even  the  lowest 
office;  but  the  people  received  him  with  applause. 
His  high  reputation,  the  beauty  of  his  person,  and 
his  charm  of  manner,  spoke  for  him.  When  he  pro- 
mised that  he  would  conquer  not  only  Spain,  but 
Carthage  itself,  what  would  have  seemed  in  any  other 
man  but  a  foolish  boast  was  received  with  delight, 
and  he  was  unanimously  chosen. 

He  began  his  campaign  by  a  great  achievement — 
the  capture  of  New  Carthage,  the  capital  of  the  Car- 
thaginian province.  A  night  march  brought  him  up  to 
the  walls  of  the  city  before  any  one  knew  that  he  had 
even  arrived  in  Spain.  With  the  keen  eye  of  a  great 
general  he  spied  the  weak  spot  in  the  defences,  a 
place  where  the  sea  came  up  to  the  wall.  Taking 
advantage  of  an  unusually  low  tide — for  he  seems  to 
have  had  the  curious  good  fortune  which  goes  to  make 
a  great  general — he  led  his  men  through  the  water, 
which  was  barely  up  to  their  knees,  and  found  his  way 
into  the  city.  Mago,  who  was  in  command,  retreated 
into  the  citadel ;  but,  finding  it  impossible  to  hold 
out,  surrendered  himself  and  his  garrison  in  the  course 
of  a  few  hours.  Within  four  days  after  coming  into 
this  province,  Scipio  had  thus  justified  his  appointment 
by  capturing  the  Carthaginian  capital.  It  will  be 
convenient  if  we  take  this   opportunity  of  finishing 


CAPTURE   OF  NEW  CARTHAGE. 


243 


the  story  of  the  Carthaginian  rule  in  Spain,  though  h 
will  carry  us  beyond  the  time  up  to  which  we  have 
followed  the  course  of  events  e'se where. 

During  the  remainder  of  the  year  which  he  had 
begun  by  the  capture  of  New  Carthage  Scipio  re- 
mained quiet,  but  was  busy  in  preparing  for  future 
action.  He  made  friends  of  the  Spanish  chiefs.  This 
was  a  business  which  he  could  do  better  than  any 
other  man,  for  no  one  could  withstand  the  singular 
charm  of  his  manner.  When  he  took  the  field  in  the 
following  year  (209)  the  natives  joined  him  in  large 
numbers.  In  the  course  of  this  campaign  he  fought 
a  great  battle  with  Hasdrubal  Barca.  He  is  said  to 
have  defeated  him,  but  as  he  did  not  hinder  him  from 
carrying  out  his  great  plan  (of  which  I  shall  have  to 
speak  hereafter)  of  marching  into  Italy  to  the  help  ot 
Hannibal,  the  defeat  was  evidently  not  serious.  The 
next  year  passed  with  few  incidents,  but  in  207  a 
decisive  defeat  of  the  Carthaginian  armies  at  Silpia 
made  Scipio  master  of  nearly  the  whole  of  Spain, 
Only  Gades  was  left  to  Carthage  Scipio  had  not 
forgotten  his  promise  that  he  would  conquer  not 
only  Spain  but  Carthage  also.  One  part  of  it  was 
now  nearly  fulfilled,  and  he  now  saw  a  chance  of 
fulfilling  the  other.  He  crossed  over  with  only  a 
couple  of  war-ships  to  Africa,  and  presented  himself 
at  the  court  of  King  Syphax.  His  object  was  to 
persuade  the  king  to  desert  Carthage,  and  enter  into 
alliance  with  Rome.  Curiously  enough  Hasdrubal 
Cisco  had  come  on  a  similar  errand.  The  two 
opponents  spent  several  days  together,  and  conversed, 
we  are  told,  in   a  most   kindly  fashion.     The   king 


> 


244 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


seems  to  have  made  promises  to  both.  He  was 
greatly  charmed  with  Scipio,  and  even  promised  to 
make  the  alliance  which  he  desired.  But  he  was  still 
more  charmed  with  Sophonisba,  the  lovely  daughter 
of  Hasdrubal.  She  became  his  wife,  and  under  her 
influence  he  remained  faithful  to  Carthage. 

Things  had  not  gone  well  in  Spain  during  Scipio's 
absence.  Mago,  who  was  still  at  Gades,  induced 
some  of  the  Spanish  tribes  to  revolt  against  Rome. 
These  had  to  be  again  subdued.  When  this  was 
done,  Scipio  himself  fell  ill.  During  his  illness  a  part 
of  the  Roman  army  broke  out  into  open  mutiny. 
Their  pay  was  in  arrear,  and  Scipio's  strict  discipline 
forbad  them  to  make  it  up  by  plundering  the  natives 
of  the  country.  But  when  the  general  was  sufficiently 
recovered  to  be  able  to  deal  with  them  in  person,  he 
contrived  to  bring  them  back  to  their  duty.  The 
Carthaginian  cause  in  Spain  was  now  lost.  Mago, 
the  brother  of  Hannibal,  transported  what  forces 
remained  to  him  into  Liguria,  and  Gades  surrendered 
to  the  Romans.     This  was  in  the  year  205. 


XHI. 


THE  LAST  CHANCE  OF  VICTORY. 


In  Italy  Hannibal  still  remained  unvanquishcd  in 
the  field,  though  his  hopes  were  gradually  growing 
less.  Early  in  the  year  210  he  won  at  Herdonia 
in  Western  Apulia  a  victory  which  may  almost  be 
reckoned  with  those  that  had  made  his  early  cam- 
paigns so  famous.  Cnaeus  Fulvius,  who  had  been 
Consul  the  year  before,  had  made  a  sudden  march  on 
the  town.  It  was  one  of  those  that  had  revolted 
after  the  defeat  at  Cannas,  and  he  understood  it  to 
be  badly  guarded.  He  was  the  bolder  because  he  be- 
lieved Hannibal  to  be  in  the  extreme  south  of  Italy. 
But  Hannibal  had  heard  everything  from  his  spies, 
and  was  there  to  meet  him.  Fuivius,  as  might  be 
expected,  was  out-gencrallcd.  His  army  was  unskil- 
fully posted,  and  could  not  resist  the  attacks  which 
were  directed  against  it  from  several  points  at  once. 
The  end  was  a  complete  rout.  Even  the  Roman 
c  imp  was  taken.  Fulvius  himself  fell  in  the  battle, 
and  the  Roman  loss  was  estimated  by  some  at  eleven, 
by  others  at  seven  thousand.  It  was  evidently  a 
great  disaster.  Nothing  like  an  army  was  left  ;  only 
some  scattered  fugitives  made  their  way  to  Marcellus 
in  Samnium.     It  was  from  Marcellus,  not  from  any 


246 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


officer  who  had  been  present  at  Herdonia,  that  the 
Senate  received  a  despatch  describing  what  had 
happened. 

During  the  rest  of  the  campaign  but  little  hap- 
pened, though  Marcelkis  is  said  to  have  fought  a 
drawn  battle  with  Hannibal,  which  was  claimed  as 
a  victory  when  the  next  day  he  found  that  the 
enemy  had  decamped.  The  following  year  (209)  was 
one  of  disaster  to  Hannibal,  for  he  lost  the  second  of 
the  great  gains  which  he  had  secured  in  Italy,  the  city 
of  Tarentum.  It  was  betrayed  to  the  Romans  by  the 
commander  of  the  Bruttian  garrison  which  Hannibal 
had  placed  in  it.  The  veteran  soldier  Fabius,  now  in 
his  eightieth  year  and  consul  for  the  fifth  time,  had 
the  great  delight  of  finishing  his  many  campaigns  by 
this  piece  of  good  fortune.  A  happy  jest  which  the 
old  man  is  said  to  have  uttered  on  the  occasion  has 
been  recorded.  Livius,  when  his  carelessness  had 
lost  the  city,  had  taken  refuge  in  the  citadel.  The 
citadel  had  never  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
Romans,  and  this  fact  of  course  made  the  recovery  of 
the  town  somewhat  more  easy.  Livius  was  disposed 
to  get  some  credit  for  himself  out  of  this  circum- 
stance. "You  may  thank  me,"  he  said,  "  Quintus 
Fabius,  for  having  been  able  to  recover  Tarentum." 
"Quite  so,"  replied  Fabius,  "for  if  you  had  not  lost  it, 
I  never  should  have  recovered  it."  Hannibal  had  heard 
of  the  advance  of  the  Romans,  and  had  hastened  by 
forced  marches  to  save  the  city.  He  was  too  late. 
He  pitched  his  camp  close  by,  and  after  a  few  days 
returned  to  his  headquarters  at  Metapontum.  He 
made  an  attempt  to  entrap   Fabius,  who  might,  he 


THE  DEATH  OF  MARCELLUS. 


Ml 


thought,  be  tempted,  after  his  success  at  Tarentum, 
into  making  a  similar  attempt  on  Metapontum.  A 
forged  letter,  purporting  to  come  from  some  of  the 
principal  citizens,  was  conveyed  to  him,  offering  to 
betray  the  place  into  his  hands.  The  old  Roman  is 
said  to  have  been  deceived,  but  to  have  been  deterred 
from  making  the  attempt  by  some  unfavourable  signs 
in  the  sacrifices.  Notwithstanding  this  loss,  Hannibal 
seems  to  have  held  his  own  during  the  rest  of  the 
campaign.  Livy  tells  us,  indeed,  that  Marccllus  fought 
three  battles  with  him,  and  that  after  being  beaten  in 
the  first,  he  drew  the  second,  and  won  the  third. 
But  as  it  was  made  a  complaint  against  him  after- 
wards that  he  had  kept  his  troops  for  the  greater  part 
of  the  year  within  the  walls  of  Venusia,  and  had 
allowed  the  enemy  to  plunder  the  country  at  his 
pleasure,  we  may  well  doubt  whether  any  victory 
was  won.  Rome  was  now  showing  great  signs  of 
exhaustion,  for  twelve  out  of  the  thirty  Latin 
cities  refused  to  furnish  any  further  supplies  ;  and 
the    Etrurians   were    beginning    to   waver    in    their 

fidelity. 

The  next  year  (208)  is  chiefly  marked  by  the  death 
of  Marcellus.  Chosen  consul  for  the  sixth  time,  he 
marched  with  his  colleague  Crispinus  to  act  against 
Hannibal.  He  was  never  content,  we  are  told,  except 
when  he  was  engaged  with  the  great  Carthaginian 
leader  himself.  The  two  consuls  had  ridden  out  of 
the  camp  with  an  escort  of  two  hundred  cavalry,  some 
of  them  Etrurians,  who  had  been  compelled  to  serve 
to  ensure  the  fidelity  of  their  cities.  Some  African 
horsemen  under  cover  of  a  wood  which  was  between 


248 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


the  two  camps,  crept  unobserved  to  the  rear  of  the 
Roman  party,  and  then  charged  them  from  behind. 
The  Etrurians  fled  ;  the  rest  of  the  escort,  who  were 
Latins,  were  overpowered.  Marcellus  was  killed  on 
the  spot ;  Crispinus  was  wounded  so  seriously  that  he 
died  not  long  afterwards.  Hannibal  gave  honourable 
burial  to  the  body  of  his  brave  opponent. 

And  now  came  one  of  the  critical  years  of  the 
war.  Hasdrubal,  of  whose  departure  from  Spain  I 
have  spoken  before,  was  now  in  Italy.  He  had  found 
little  difficulty  in  crossing  the  Alps  ;  the  native  tribes 
had  learnt  that  no  harm  was  intended  to  them, 
and  probably  received  some  consideration  for  their 
neutrality.  And  some  of  the  engineering  works 
which  Hannibal  had  constructed  were  doubtless  still 
in  existence.  Anyhow,  Hasdrubal  made  his  appear- 
ance in  Italy  before  the  Romans,  and  even,  it  would 
seem,  before  his  brother  expected  him.  Rome  made 
a  great  effort  to  meet  this  new  danger.  She  had  lost 
some  of  her  best  generals.  Marcellus  \\  as  dead,  and 
Fabius  was  too  old  for  active  service.  Livius,  an  old 
soldier  who  had  distinguished  himself  twelve  years 
before,  but  had  since  been  living  in  retirement,  and 
Claudius  Nero  were  chosen  consuls,  and  fifteen 
legions  were  raised  to  form  their  armies.  Livius 
was  sent  to  act  against  Hasdrul  al ;  Nero  watched 
the  army  of  Hannibal. 

And  now  we  come  to  one  of  the  boldest  and  most 
skilful  achievements  in  the  history  of  Roman  war. 
A  despatch  from  Hasdrubal  to  his  brother,  announc- 
ing his  intention  of  joining  him,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
some  Roman  scouts  and  was  brought  to  Nero.     It 


NERO  S   GREAT  MARCH. 


249 


was  written  in  the  Carthaginian  language,  but  there 
were,  of  course,  prisoners  in  the  camp  who  could  read 
it  to  the  consul.  He  conceived  at  once  a  bold  design. 
He  would  take  his  best  troops,  join  his  colleague 
by  forced  marches,  and  crush  Hasdrubal  before  he 
could  effect  the  junction  with  his  brother.  The  force 
which  he  selected  numbered  seven  thousand  men. 
Even  they  were  not  at  first  let  into  the  secret. 
They  were  to  surprise  a  garrison  at  Lucania,  he  told 
them.  It  was  only  when  they  were  well  on  their 
way  that  he  discovered  his  real  design.  He  reached 
the  camp  of  Livius  in  safety,  and  it  was  agreed  be- 
tween the  two  consuls  that  battle  should  be  given 
at  once. 

But  the  keen  eyes  of  Hasdrubal  had  discovered 
what  had  happened.  The  Romans  seemed  more 
numerous  than  before  ;  his  scouts  noticed  that  of  the 
watering-parties  which  went  down  to  the  river  some 
were  more  sunburnt  than  the  rest.  Finally  it  was 
observed  that  the  clarion  was  sounded  twice  in  the 
camp,  showing  that  both  consuls  were  present.  He 
resohcd  to  avoid,  if  he  could,  an  engagement,  and 
left  his  camp  during  the  night.  But  when  he 
attempted  to  march  southward  his  difficulties  began. 
His  native  guide  escaped,  and  he  could  not  find  the 
ford  over  the  river  Metaurus,  which  lay  in  his  route. 
He  thus  lost  the  start  which  he  had  gained  by  his 
stealthy  departure,  and  the  Romans  came  up  with 
him.  He  had  begun  to  fortify  a  camp,  but  seeing 
the  enemy  advance  prepared  to  give  battle.  He  put 
his  elephants  in  front.  The  Gauls,  recent  levies  whom 
he  could  not  trust,  he  posted  on   his  left,  protecting 


250 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


them  as  much  as  he  could  by  the  elephants.  His 
own  place  was  on  the  right  wing.  Here  he  had  his 
Spanish  infantry,  veteran  soldiers  whom  he  had  often 
led  to  victory.  The  left  wing  of  the  Romans  which 
was  opposed  to  him  was  led  by  the  Consul  Livius. 
Here  the  struggle  was  long  and  obstinate.  The 
elephants  at  first  did  good  service  to  their  side. 
Afterwards,  maddened  by  the  wounds  which  they 
received,  they  trampled  down  friend  and  foe  alike. 
After  a  while,  Nero,  repeating  the  same  tactics  which 
h:id  made  him  leave  his  own  weakened  army  facing 
Hannibal  to  help  his  colleague,  withdrew  some  of  the 
troops  from  the  Roman  right  wing,  and  charged 
the  flank  of  the  enemy.  The  Spaniards  could  not 
resist  this  new  attack.  The  Gauls,  who  had  broken 
into  the  stores  of  wine  and  had  drunk  to  excess,  were 
cut  down  where  they  stood,  or  lay  helpless  on  the 
ground.  The  rout  was  complete.  Hasdrubal  would 
not  survive  so  terrible  a  defeat.  He  set  spurs  to  his 
horse,  charged  the  Roman  line,  and  fell  fighting  with 
the  courage  that  became  the  son  of  Hamilcar  and 
brother  of  Hannibal.  The  loss  of  the  Carthaginians 
is  said  to  have  been  56,000.  This  is  a  manifest  exag- 
geration, for  Hasdrubal  could  not  have  had  so  many 
in  his  army.  Whatever  were  the  numbers,  it  was  a 
decisive  victory.  There  could  now  be  no  doubt  that 
Rome,  not  Carthage,  was  to  be  the  conqueror  of  the 
Second  Punic  War.  I  may  conclude  this  chapter  by 
quoting  part  of  the  splendid  ode  in  which  Horace, 
singing  the  praises  of  another  Nero,^  dwells  on  the 
achievement  of  his  great  ancestor. 

'  Tiberius  Claudius  Nero,  afterwards  the  Emperor  Tiberius. 


ODE  FROM  HORACE. 


251 


What  thou,  Rome,  dost  the  Neros  owe, 

Let  dark  Metaurus  river  say, 
And  Hasdrubal,  thy  vanquished  foe, 
And  that  auspicious  day 
Which  through  the  scattered  gloom  broke  forth  with  smiling  ray. 

When  joy  again  to  Latium  came, 

Nor  longer  through  her  towns  at  ease 
The  fatal  Lyl)ian  swept,  like  flame 
Among  the  forest  trees. 
Or  Eurus'  headlong  gust  across  Sicilian  seas. 

Thenceforth,  for  with  success  they  toiled, 
Rome's  youth  in  vigour  waxed  amain, 
And  temples,  ravaged  and  despoiled 
By  Punic  hordes  profane. 
Upraised  within  their  shrines  beheld  their  gods  again. 

Till  spoke  forth  Hannibal  at  length  : 

"  Like  stags,  of  ravening  wolves  the  prey, 
Why  rush  to  grapple  with  their  strength, 
From  whom  to  steal  away 
Our  loftiest  triumph  is,  they  leave  for  us  to-day  ? 

•*  That  race,  inflexible  as  brave, 

From  Ilium  quenched  in  flames  who  bore, 

Across  the  wild  Etruscan  wave, 
Their  babes,  their  grandsires  hoar, 
And  all  their  sacred  things  to  the  Ansonian  shore ; 

"  Like  oak,  by  sturdy  axes  lopped 

Of  all  its  boughs,  which  once  the  brakes 

Of  shaggy  Algidus  o'ertopped. 
Its  loss  its  glory  makes, 
And  from  the  very  steel  fresh  strength  and  spirit  takes. 


(( 


Not  Hydra,  cleft  through  all  its  trunk, 
With  fresher  vigour  waxed  to  spread, 
Till  even  Alcides'  si)irit  shrunk  ; 
Nor  yet  hath  Colchis  dread, 
Or  Echionean  Thebes  more  fatal  monster  bred. 


252  THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 

"  In  ocean  plunge  it,  and  more  bright 

It  rises ;  scatter  it,  and  lo  ! 
Its  unscathed  victors  it  will  smite 

With  direful  overthrow. 
And  Rome's  proud  dames  shall  tell  of  many  a  routed  foe; 

"  No  messenger  in  boastful  pride 

Shall  I  to  Carthage  send  again ; 
Our  every  hope  it  died,  it  died, 

When  Hasdrubal  was  slain. 
And  with  his  fall  our  name's  all-conquering  star  did  wane."* 

Nero  returned  in  haste  to  his  army,  and  ordered 
the  head  of  Hasdrubal  to  be  thrown  in  front  of  the 
Carthaginian  outposts.  It  was  carried  to  Hannibal, 
and  recognized  by  him.  "  I  see,"  he  said,  "  the  doom 
of  Carthage."  The  next  day  he  retreated  into  the 
extreme  south  of  Italy. 

'  I  have  borrowed  the  version  of  Sir  Theodore  Martin. 


XIV. 


THE  LAST  STRUGGLE. 


For  more  than  three  years  after  the  fatal  day  of 
Metaurus,  Hannibal  maintained  himself  in  Italy.  It 
was  only  the  extreme  south  of  the  peninsula,  the 
mountainous  country  of  Bruttii,  that  he  held  ;  and 
even  here,  though  the  Roman  generals  were  con- 
tent to  leave  him  alone,  knowing  well  how  formidable 
he  still  was  in  the  field,  he  was  obliged  to  draw  his 
defences  within  still  narrowing  limits.  His  head- 
quarters were  at  Crotona.  Near  this  place  he  built 
an  altar  to  Juno,  and  placed  on  it  a  tablet  with  an 
inscription  in  Carthaginian  and  Greek,  giving  a  sum- 
mary of  his  campaigns  in  Italy,  with  the  number  of 
battles  won,  towns  taken,  and  enemies  slain.  Livy 
bestows  hearty  praise  on  his  conduct  at  this  time.  "  I 
know  not,"  he  says,  *'  whether  the  man  was  more  ad- 
mirable in  prosperity  or  in  adversity.  For  thirteen 
years,  far  away  from  home,  he  waged  war,  and  waged 
it  not  with  an  army  of  his  own  countrymen,  but  with 
a  miscellaneous  crowd  gathered  from  all  nations — 
men  who  had  neither  laws,  nor  customs,  nor  language 
in  common,  with  different  dress,  different  arms,  dif- 
ferent worship,  I  may  say,  different  gods.  And  yet 
he  kept  them  together  by  so  close  a  tie  that  the\' 


i 


254 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


i 


never  quarrelled  among  themselves  or  mutinied 
against  him,  and  this  though  he  was  often  without 
money  for  their  pay.  Even  after  Hasdrubal's  death, 
when  he  had  nothing  but  a  corner  of  Italy  left  to  him, 
his  camp  was  as  quiet  as  ever." 

Hannibal  was  of  course  unwilling  finally  to  give  up 
the  great  scheme  of  his  life.  He  hoped  against  hope 
that  something  might  yet  happen  which  would  give 
him  a  chance  of  carrying  it  out.  Rome  had  other 
enemies  besides  Carthage  who  might  yet  be  united 
against  her.  There  was  Antiochus  in  Syria,  and 
Philip  in  Macedonia.  He  lived  to  see  them  both 
engaged  in  war  with  Rome,  and  both  conquered.  If 
he  could  only  have  given  them  something  of  his  own 
foresight,  and  united  them  against  the  common  enemy, 
he  might  even  yet  have  succeeded  in  his  great  scheme. 
But  want  of  wisdom,  or  want  of  energy,  or  want  of 
courage,  made  them  hold  back,  and  the  opportunity 
was  lost. 

One  effort,  indeed,  was  made  to  help  him.  His 
youngest  brother  Mago,  seeing  that  nothing  could  be 
done  in  Spain,  landed  with  all  the  forces  that  he  could 
raise,  and  with  what  were  sent  him  from  home,  in 
Liguria.  On  his  way  he  possessed  himself  of  the 
island  now  called  Minorca,  where  Port  Mahon  (Mago's 
Harbour)  still  preserves  the  memory  of  his  visit.  He 
had  some  success  in  rallying  the  Gauls  to  his  stan- 
dard, but  he  accomplished  nothing  of  importance.  So 
far  as  his  object  was  to  make  a  diversion  in  favour  of 
Hannibal,  he  failed. 

In  204  Scipio  crossed  over  from  Sicily  to  Africa. 
His  first  movements  were  not  very  successful.     He 


SCIPIO  AND   SYPHAX. 


257 


began  the  siege  of  Utica,  but  was  compelled  to  raise 
it,  and  to  retire  to  a  strong  position  on  the  sea-coast, 
where  he  was  protected  by  the  united  strength  of  his 
fleet  and  his  army.  Here  he  wintered,  and  earlv  the 
following  year  began  again  active  operations.  He 
had  two  armies  opposed  to  him — that  of  Carthage, 
commanded  by  Hasdrubal,  the  son  of  Gisco,  and  that 
of  King  Syphax.  In  his  own  camp  was  Masinissa, 
who,  though  he  had  lost  his  kingdom,  and  indeed  had 
barely  escaped  with  his  life,  was  without  doubt  a  very 
a  very  valuable  counsellor  and  ally. 

King  Syphax  had  conceived  the  hope  that  he  might 
be  able  to  act  as  mediator  between  Rome  and  Car- 
thage. He  now  proposed  a  peace,  in  which  the  chief 
condition  was  that  Hannibal  should  evacuate  Italy 
and  Scipio  Africa.  Scipio  answered  that  these  were 
terms  which  could  not  be  accepted,  but  gave  him  to 
understand  that  he  was  ready  to  listen  to  other  pro- 
posals. Envoys  went  backwards  and  forwards  be- 
tween the  two  camps.  On  the  part  of  the  king  there 
was,  it  would  seem,  a  genuine  belief  that  peace  might 
be  made ;  Scipio's  envoys  were  really  nothing  else 
than  so  many  spies.  He  was  waiting  for  the  oppor- 
tunity of  carrying  out  a  scheme  which  had  possibly 
been  invented  by  himself,  or,  as  is  more  probable, 
suggested  by  Masinissa.  This  scheme  was  to  set  fire 
to  the  camps  of  the  two  hostile  armies.  These  camps 
consisted  of  huts  which  would  readily  burn,  and  the 
chief  thing  wanted  was  to  put  the  enemy  completely 
oft'  his  guard.  Scipio  can  scarcely  be  acquitted  of 
sci!xething  like  treachery  in  this  affair.  There  was 
virtually  a  truce  between  him  and  Syphax.      While 


258 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


negotiations     for   peace    were    going   on,   the    king 
naturally  supposed  himself  to  be  safe  from  attack. 

When  all  his  preparations  were  complete,  Scipio 
divided  his  army  into  two.  With  half  he  was  himself 
to  attack  the  Carthaginian  camp  ;  the  other  half  he 
put  under  the  command  of  his  friend  Laelius,  who 
was  assisted  by  Masinissa.  The  two  armies  marched 
out  of  the  camp  at  night,  and  Lrelius  and  Masinissa 
advanced  to  the  camp  of  Syphax.  While  the  former 
of  these  two  remained  in  reserve,  the  latter  under- 
took the  work  of  setting  the  camp  on  fire.  The 
.scheme  succeeded  perfectly.  "  The  camp  seemed 
framed,"  says  Polybius,  who  doubtless  heard  the 
story  from  Laelius  himself,  "  for  the  very  purpose  of 
being  set  on  fire."  The  flames  spread  rapidly ;  and 
no  one  had  any  suspicion  but  that  the  fire  had  hap- 
pened by  accident.  Some  perished  in  their  tents  ; 
many  were  trampled  to  death  in  the  confusion  ;  and 
nearly  all  who  contrived  to  escape  out  of  the  camp 
were  cut  down  by  the  Romans. 

At  first  the  Carthaginians  in  the  neighbouring  camp 
thought,  as  their  allies  had  thought,  that  the  fire  was 
accidental.  Some  of  them  ran  to  help  ;  others  stood 
gazing  at  the  sight.  None  had  any  notion  that  the 
enemy  was  at  hand  ;  they  were  therefore  actually 
unarmed  when  the  Romans  fell  upon  them.  In  a 
few  minutes  the  second  camp  was  in  the  same  con- 
dition as  the  first.  Hasdrubal,  with  a  small  body  of 
cavalry,  escaped  ;  Syphax  also  contrived  to  save  him- 
self, but  the  two  armies  were  virtually  destroyed. 

Syphax  had  thought  of  reconciling  himself  to  Rome ; 
but  his  wife  Sophonisba  prevailed  upon  him  to  give 


HANNIBAL  RECALLED, 


259 


them  up.  He  raised  another  army,  which  was  .soon 
joined  by  Hasdrubal,  who  had  also  contrived  to  get 
together  a  new  force,  among  them  being  four  thou- 
sand mercenaries  from  Spain.  A  battle  followed,  in 
which  Scipio  was  again  victorious. 

There  was  now  only  one  course  left  to  Carthage, 
and  that  was  to  recall  Hannibal  and  Mago.  Mago, 
who  had  been  defeated  by  the  Roman  forces  just 
before  this  summons  reached  him,  set  sail  with  what 
was  left  of  his  army,  but  died  of  his  wounds  before 
he  reached  home.  Hannibal  received  the  com- 
mand to  return  with  indignation  and  grief.  Livy 
gives — we  know  not  on  what  authority — the  very 
words  in  which,  "  gnashing  his  teeth  and  groaning, 
and  scarcely  able  to  restrain  his  tears,"  he  answered 
the  envoys  of  the  Carthaginian  Senate.  "  They  call  me 
back  at  last  in  plain  words  ;  but  they  have  long  since 
implicitly  called  me  by  refusing  me  reinforcements 
and  money.  Hannibal  has  been  conquered,  not  by 
the  Roman  people,  which  he  has  defeated  and  routed 
a  hundred  times,  but  by  the  jealousy  of  the  Senate 
of  Carthage.  It  will  not  be  Scipio  that  will  exult 
in  the  disgrace  of  my  return  so  much  as  Hanno,  who, 
having  no  other  means  of  overthrowing  the  power  of 
my  family,  has  done  it  by  the  ruin  of  his  own  country." 
Hanno,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  the  leader  of  the 
peace-party.  Wrathful,  however,  as  he  was,  he  made 
no  delay  in  obeying  the  summons.  He  had  his  ships, 
indeed,  ready  prepared  for  this  service.  "  Seldom," 
says  Livy,  "has  an  exile  left  his  country  with  a 
sadder  heart  than  was  Hannibal's  when  he  departed 
from  the  land  of  his  enemies.     Again  and  again  he 


26o 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


looked  back  on  the  shores  which  he  was  leaving, 
and  cursed  himself  that  he  had  not  led  his  soldiers 
dripping  with  the  blood  of  Cannae  to  Rome  itself. 
*  Scipio,'  he  said,  *  has  ventured  to  attack  Carthage  ; 
but  I  wasted  my  time  at  Casilinum  and  Cumae  and 
Nola." 

When  the  news  of  his  departure  reached  Rome,  a 
public  thanksgiving  was  ordered.  The  veteran  sol- 
dier Fabius  had  bestowed  upon  him  the  unexampled 
honour  of  a  wreath  of  oak  leaves,  given,  not  as  was 
commonly  the  case,  for  having  saved  the  life  of  a 
citizen,  but  for  having  saved  his  country.  A  few 
months  afterwards  he  died,  in  extreme  old  age, 
having  been  spared  to  see  the  dearest  wish  of  his 
heart,  Italy  freed  from  the  invader. 

Hannibal's  movements  after  his  landing  in  Africa — 
from  which  he  had  been  absent  more  than  thirty 
years — are  not  easily  followed.  Indeed  the  whole 
history  of  this  time  is  somewhat  obscure.  We  hear 
of  a  truce  between  Carthage  and  Rome,  which  the 
former  treacherously  violated  ;  of  favourable  terms  of 
peace  offered  by  Scipio,  and  of  a  fruitless  interview 
between  the  two  rival  generals  ;  but  it  is  difficult  to 
make  out  of  our  authorities  a  clear  and  consistent 
account.  I  shall  pass  on  at  once  to  the  great  battle 
which  brought  the  Second  Punic  War  to  an  end.  Of 
this  we  have  full  details.  It  was  fought  at  Zama,  on 
October  19th  according  to  some  authors,  according 
to  others  in  the  spring.^     Scipio  arranged  his  army 

'  Possibly  the  discrepancy  may  be  partly  accounted  for  by  the  de- 
rangement of  the  Roman  calendar  of  this  time.  The  months  and  the 
seasons  were  not  by  any  means  m  rccirdance. 


ZAMA. 


261 


according  to  the  usual  Roman  fashion,  but  did  not  fill 
up  the  intervals  between  the  cohorts  or  companies,^ 
and  he  put  more  space  than  usual  between  the  lines. 
His  object  was  to  lessen  the  danger  from  the  ele- 
phants. Laellus  with  the  Roman  cavalry  was  posted 
on  the  left,  Masinissa  with  the  African  horse  on  the 
right.  The  light-armed  troops  were  placed  in  front, 
with  orders  to  retire,  if  they  found  themselves  hard 
pressed  by  the  elephants,  through  the  intervals  be- 
tween the  lines. 

Hannibal  posted  his  elephants,  of  which  he  had 
eighty,  in  front.  Behind  these  was  a  mixed  multitude 
of  mercenaries  ;  behind  these,  again,  the  native  Car- 
thaginian troopsj  who  now,  in  the  extremity  of  danger, 
appear  again  in  the  field ;  and  in  the  third  line  the 
veterans  whom  he  had  brought  with  him  from  Italy. 
On  the  left  wing  he  posted  his  African,  on  the  right 
his  Carthaginian  cavalry. 

The  battle  was  begun  by  the  elephants.  These 
creatures  did  at  least  as  much  harm  to  friends  as 
to  foes.2  They  are  said,  indeed,  to  have  caused  so 
much  confusion  among  the  Carthaginian  cavalry  that 
Lxlius  was  easily  able  to  rout  this  part  of  the  hostile 

army. 

In  the  centre  of  the  two  armies  the  day  at  first 
went  in  favour  of  Hannibal.  His  mercenaries,  tried 
and  skilful  soldiers,  were  more  than  a  match  for  the 
unpractised  Romans.      If  they  had   been   properly 

'  The  intervals  of  the  first  line-were  usually  filled  up  in  the  second, 
and  those  of  the  second  in  the  third. 

=^  The  trained  animals  had  long  since  been  used  up.  We  hear,  not 
long  before  this  time,  of  one  Hauno  being  sent  to  hunt  for  fresh  ones. 


262 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


supported  by  the  second   line  they  might  have  won 
the  day.     But  the  citizen-soldiers  made  no  attempt  to 
advance.     It  was  only  when  they  were  attacked  by 
the  advancing  Romans,  and  even,  Polybius  adds,  by 
the  mercenaries,  now  infuriated  at  being  thus  deserted, 
that  they  began  to  defend  themselves.     This  they  did 
with  the  greatest    fury,   striking   indiscriminately  at 
friend  and  foe.      Hannibal's   own   force,   which  had 
closed  its  lines  against  the  fugitives  from  the  routed 
divisions,  had  still  to  be  dealt  with.     Here  the  battle 
was  long  and  obstinate.     The  combatants  fell  where 
they   fought.      But    Laelius   and    Masinissa  (for   the 
Numidian  prince  had  also  been  successful  in  his  part 
of  the  field)  returned  from  their  pursuit  of  the  Car- 
thaginian cavalry,  and  fell  upon  the  rear  of  Hannibal's 
troops,  and  broke  their  lines.     A  general  rout  ensued. 
Hannibal  made  his  way  with  a  small  body  of  cavalry 
to  Adrumetum.     Of  the  rest  few  escaped.     Twenty 
thousand  were  killed  on  the  field  of  battle ;  as  many 
more  were   taken   prisoners.     The  Roman  loss  was 
fifteen  hundred.     "  Such,"  says    Polybius,   "  was  the 
battle  between  Hannibal  and  Scipio;  the  battle  which 
gave  to  the  Romans  the  sovereignty  of  the  world." 

Hannibal  collected  about  six  thousand  men,  the 
remains  of  his  army,  and  with  this  force  made  his 
way  back  to  Carthage.  The  government  had  opened 
negotiations  for  peace,  and  their  envoys  had  just 
returned,  bringing  back  Scipio's  terms.     They  were 

briefly  these  : 

I.  Carthage  was  to  retain  its  African  possessions; 
was  to  be  independent ;  was  not  to  be  compelled  to 
receive  a  Roman  garrison. 


TERMS   OF  PEACE. 


263 


2.  All  prisoners  and  deserters  were  to  be  surren- 
dered. 

3.  All  ships  of  war,  except  fen^  were  to  be  given  up, 
and  all  elephants. 

4.  Carthage  should  not  make  war  on  any  state 
outside  Africa ;  nor  on  any  within  it,  without  leave 
first  obtained  from  the  Romans. 

5.  King  Masinissa  should  have  restored  to  him  all 
that  he  or  his  ancestors  had  possessed. 

6.  The  Roman  army  was  to  be  provisioned  and 
paid  till  peace  was  formally  concluded. 

7.  An  indemnity  of  ten  thousand  talents,  and  an 
annual  tribute  of  two  hundred,  to  be  paid. 

8.  One  hundred  hostages,  to  be  chosen  by  the 
Roman    commander-in-chief,  to   be  handed  over  as 

security. 

When  these  terms  were  recited  in  the  Carthaginian 
Senate,  a  senator  rose  to  speak.  Hannibal  laid  hold 
of  him,  and  dragged  him  down.  The  assembly 
received  this  act  with  angry  shouts.  "  Pardon  me," 
said  Hannibal,  "  if  my  ignorance  has  led  me  to  offend 
against  any  of  your  forms.  I  left  my  country  at  nine 
years  of  age,  and  returned  to  it  at  forty-five.  The 
real  cause  of  my  offence  was  my  care  for  our  common 
country.  It  is  astonishing  to  me  that  any  Cartha- 
ginian who  knows  the  truth  should  not  be  ready  to 
worship  his  good  fortune,  when  he  finds  Rome  ready 
to  deal  with  us  so  mercifully.  Do  not  debate  these 
conditions  ;  consent  to  them  unanimously,  and  pray 
to  all  the  gods  that  they  may  be  ratified  by  the 
Roman  Senate." 

Ratified  they  were,  though  not,  it  would  seem,  till  the 


264 


THE  SrORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


following  year.  We  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  old  days 
before  men  had  learnt  the  use  of  iron,  when  we  read 
how  the  heralds  went  to  Carthage  carrying  with  them 
the  knives  of  flint  with  which  the  animals  offered  in 
sacrifice  were  to  be  slain.  The  Carthaginians  surren- 
dered all  their  ships  of  war,  their  elephants,  the 
deserters  who  had  come  o\  ci  to  them,  and  as  many 
as  four  thousand  prisoners.  The  ships  of  one  kind 
and  another  numbered  five  hundred.  Scipio  ordered 
them  to  be  towed  out  to  sea  and  burnt.  "  The  sight 
of  the  flames  was  as  terrrible,"  says  Livy,  "  to  the 
vanquished  people  as  would  have  been  that  of  their 
city  on  fire." 

When  the  indemnity  came  to  be  paid  it  was  diffi- 
cult to  find  the  money ;  and  there  were  loud  murmurs 
in  the  Senate  at  the  sacrifices  which  it  would  be 
necessary  to  make.  One  of  the  members  complained 
to  the  House  that  Hannibal  had  been  seen  to  laugh  ; 
and  this  though  he  was  really  the  cause  of  all  their 
troubles.  Then  the  great  man  spoke  out.  "  If  you 
could  see  my  heart  as  easily  as  you  can  my  face,  you 
would  know  that  my  laughter  comes  not  from  a 
joyful  heart,  but  from  one  almost  maddened  by 
trouble.  And  yet  my  laughter  is  not  so  unreasonable 
as  your  tears.  You  ought  to  have  wept  when  our 
arms  w^ere  taken  from  us  and  our  ships  were  burnt. 
But  no ;  you  were  silent  when  you  saw  your  country 
stripped  ;  but  now  you  lament,  as  if  this  were  the 
death-day  of  Carthage,  because  }'ou  have  to  furnish 
part  of  the  tribute  out  of  your  private  means.  I  fear 
me  much  that  you  will  soon  find  that  this  is  the  least 
of  the  trouble  you  will  have  to  bear." 


XV. 


HANNIBAL  IN   EXILE. 

It  was  true  that,  as  the  discontented  senator  had 
said,  Hannibal  had  been  the  cause  of  the  troubles  of 
Carthage  ;  still  he  was  too  great  a  man  to  be  any- 
where but  in  the  first  place  ;  and  for  some  years  he 
practically  governed  the  State.  He  seems  to  have 
done  this  new  work  well.  The  Court  of  Judges  at 
Carthage  had  usurped  a  power  which  did  not  belong 
to  them.  Every  man's  property,  character,  and  life 
were  at  their  disposal  ;  and  they  were  unscrupulous 
in  dealing  with  it.  Hannibal  set  himself  to  bring 
about  a  change  ;  he  carried  the  people  with  him  ; 
the  office  of  judge  became  annual,  and  it  was  filled 
up  by  election.  It  is  a  change  that  does  not  alto- 
gether commend  itself  to  us  ;  but  it  was  probably 
required  by  the  peculiar  condition  of  the  country. 

Another  reform  concerned  the  public  revenue. 
Hannibal  made  a  searching  inquiry  into  what  came 
in,  and  what  was  spent,  and  he  found  that  a  very 
large  proportion  of  the  whole  was  embezzled.  He 
stated  these  discoveries  in  a  public  assembly.  The 
expenses  of  the  country  might  be  met,  the  tribute  to 
Rome  paid,  and  taxation  nevertheless  lightened,  if 
only  the  revenue  were  honestly  collected  and  honestly 


266 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


HANNIBAL    WITH  ANTIOCHUS. 


267 


spent.  It  was  only  too  natural  that  these  proceedings 
should  make  many  enemies.  And  besides  those  who 
were  furious  at  the  loss  of  their  unjust  gains,  there 
were  doubtless  some  who  were  honestly  afraid  of 
what  Hannibal  was  aiming  at.  If  he  was  making 
Carthage  richer  and  more  powerful,  it  was  that  he 
might  plunge  her  again  into  a  war  with  Rome.  So, 
from  one  cause  or  the  other,  a  strong  party  was 
raised  against  him.  His  enemies  had,  it  is  said,  the 
meanness  to  accuse  him  to  the  Roman  Government. 
He  was  planning,  they  said,  a  new  war  in  concert 
with  Antiochus,  king  of  Syria.  The  Romans  were  on 
the  point  of  war  with  this  prince,  and  were  ready  to 
suspect  their  old  enemy.  An  embassy  was  sent  to 
Carthage,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  Scipio,  to 
demand  that  he  should  be  given  up.  Ostensibly  the 
object  of  their  invasion  was  to  settle  a  dispute  between 
Carthage  and  Masinissa. 

Hannibal  knew  the  truth,  and  resolved  to  fly.  To 
put  his  enemies  off  their  guard,  he  showed  no  kind  of 
alarm,  but  walked  about  in  public  as  usual.  But  he 
took  horse  at  night,  reached  the  coast,  and  embarked 
in  a  ship  which,  in  anticipation  of  such  a  need,  he 
had  kept  in  readiness,  and  sailed  to  Cercina  (Kerkena). 
It  was  necessary  to  conceal  the  fact  of  his  flight,  and 
he  gave  out  that  he  was  going  as  ambassador  to  Tyre. 
But  the  harbour  of  the  island  happened  to  be  full  of 
merchant-ships,  and  the  risk  of  discovery  was  great. 
He  resolved  accordingly  to  escape.  The  captains  were 
invited  to  a  great  entertainment,  and  were  asked  to 
lend  their  sails  and  yards  for  the  construction  of  a 
tent.    The  revel  was  long  and  late.     Before  it  was 


over  Hannibal  was  gone,  and  the  dismantled  ships 
could  not  be  made  ready  for  several  hours.  From 
Cercina  he  sailed  to  Tyre,  where  he  was  received 
with  great  honours,  and  from  Tyre  again  to  the 
port  of  Antioch.  Antiochus  had  left  that  place 
and  was  at  Ephesus,  and  thither  Hannibal  followed 
him. 

Antiochus  of  Syria,  fourth  in  descent  from  Seleucus, 
one  of  the  Macedonian  generals  who  had  shared  be- 
tween them  the  empire  of  Alexander,  has  somehow 
acquired  the  title  of  the  "  Great."  He  had  little  that 
was  great  about  him  except,  perhaps,  his  ambition. 
His  treatment  of  Hannibal,  whether  it  was  the  result 
of  weakness  or  of  jealousy,  was  foolish  in  the  extreme. 
He  did  not  take  his  advice,  and  he  would  not  employ 
him.  His  advice  had  been  to  act  at  once.  Rome  at 
this  time  (195  RC.)  had  to  deal  with  many  enemies. 
The  Gauls  especially  were  giving  her  much  trouble. 
If  Antiochus  could  have  made  up  his  mind  to  attack 
her  immediately,  the  result  might  have  been  different 
to  what  it  was.  As  it  was  he  lingered  and  delayed, 
and  when  at  last,  two  years  afterwards,  he  made  up 
his  mind  to  act,  the  opportunity  was  lost.  In  192  he 
crossed  over  into  Greece,  and  was  defeated  with  heavy 
loss  the  following  year  at  Thermopylae.  Hannibal 
was  not  employed  in  this  campaign.  But  he  was  sent 
to  equip  and  to  command  a  fleet.  There  was  nothing 
strange  in  this  variety  of  employment  ;  for  then— and 
indeed  the  same  has  been  the  case  till  quite  recent 
times — the  same  men  would  command  fleets  and 
armies  indiflerently.  He  was  attacked  by  a  greatly 
superior  fleet  belonging  to  the  island  of  Rhodes,  then 


k 


268 


THE   STORY   OF  CARTHAGE. 


CANNIBAL   IN  BITHYNIA. 


269 


a  great  naval  power,  and,  though  successful  where  he 
commanded  in  person,  was  defeated. 

In  the  same  year  (190)  was  fought  the  great  battle 
of  Magnesia.  Whether  Hannibal  was  present  at  it 
we  do  not  know  ;  but  an  anecdote  is  told  of  him 
which  belongs  to  this  time.  Antiochus  had  collected 
a  great  army — some  sixty  or  seventy  thousand  in 
number — to  do  battle  with  the  Romans.  It  had  been 
gathered  from  the  cities  of  Greece  and  from  Western 
Asia,  and  their  dress  and  armour  was  as  splendid  as 
it  was  various.  The  king  looked  with  pride  on  the 
ranks  glittering  with  gold  and  silver.  "  Will  not  this 
be  enough  for  the  Romans  ?  "  he  asked  of  Hannibal 
who  was  standing  by  his  side.  "  Yes,"  said  he,  with 
a  grim  jest,  "  yes,  enough  even  for  them,  though  they 
are  the  greediest  nation  on  the  earth !  "  But  it  was 
of  the  spoils,  not  of  the  fighting  strength  of  the  army, 
that  he  was  speaking. 

The  battle  of  Magnesia  ended,  as  Hannibal  had 
expected,  in  the  utter  defeat  of  the  Syrian  army. 
Antiochus  was  advised  to  sue  for  peace.  Two  years 
afterwards  (188)  it  was  granted  to  him,  one  of  the 
conditions  being  that  he  should  give  to  Rome  such  of 
her  enemies  as  he  had  received  at  his  court.  He  ac- 
cepted the  condition,  but  gave  his  guest  an  opportunity 
of  escaping. 

Various  stories  are  told  of  Hannibal's  movements 
after  his  flight  from  the  court  of  Antiochus.  Accord- 
ing to  one  account  he  sought  refuge  for  a  time  in 
Crete.  A  story  is  told  of  him  here  which  very  likely 
is  not  true,  but  which  shows  the  common  belief  in  his 
ingenuity  and  readiness  of  resource.     He  suspected 


the  Cretans  of  coveting  the  large  treasure  which  he 
carried  about  with  him.  To  deceive  them  he  filled  a 
number  of  wine-jars  with  lead,  which  had  over  it  a 
thin  covering  of  gold  and  silver.  These  he  deposited 
with  much  ceremony  in  the  presence  of  the  chief  men 
of  the  island  in  the  temple  of  Diana.  His  real  treasure 
meanwhile  was  hidden  in  some  hollow  brazen  figures 
which  were  allowed  to  lie,  apparently  uncared  for,  in  the 
porch  of  his  house.  From  Crete  he  is  said  to  have 
visited  Armenia,  and  to  have  founded  in  that  country 
the  city  of  Artaxata.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  he 
spent  the  last  years  of  his  life  with  Prusias,  king  of 
Bithynia.  Prusias  was  at  war  with  Eumenes  of 
Pergamus,  a  firm  friend  of  Rome,  and  Hannibal 
willingly  gave  him  his  help.  We  need  not  believe 
the  story  which  he  tells  us  how  he  vanquished  enemies 
in  a  sea-fight  by  filling  a  number  of  jars  with  venomous 
snakes  and  throwing  them  on  board  the  hostile  ships. 
For  some  years  he  was  left  unmolested  in  this 
refuge.  But  in  183  the  Romans  sent  an  embassy  to 
Prusias  to  demand  that  he  should  be  given  up.  The 
demand  was  one  which  the  king  did  not  feel  able  to 
resist,  and  he  sent  soldiers  at  once  to  seize  him. 
Hannibal  had  always  expected  some  such  result. 
He  knew  that  Rome  could  never  forgive  him  for  what 
he  had  done,  and  he  did  not  trust  his  host.  Indeed 
he  must  have  known  that  a  king  of  Bithynia  could 
not  refuse  a  request  of  the  Romans  if  it  was  seriously 
made.  The  story  of  his  end,  ornamented  as  such 
stories  commonly  are,  tells  us  how  he  made  seven 
ways  of  getting  out  of  his  house,  and  that  finding 
them  all  beset  with  soldiers,  he  called  for  the  poison, 


n 


I 


270 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


which  was  kept  always  ready  for  such  an  emergency, 
and  drank  it  off.  Some  writers  say  that  he  carried 
the  poison  with  him  in  a  ring — the  ring  which 
Juvenal,  when  he  uses  the  example  of  Hannibal  to 
show  the  vanity  of  a  soldier's  ambition,  describes  as 
"the  avenger  of  the  day  of  Cannae."  Livy  gives  us 
what  profess  to  be  his  last  words.  "  Let  me  free  the 
Roman  people  from  their  long  anxiety,  since  they 
think  it  tedious  to  wait  for  an  old  man's  death. 
Flaminius  [this  was  the  Roman  ambassador]  will  gain 
no  great  or  famous  victory  over  a  helpless  victim  of 
treachery.  As  to  the  way  in  which  the  Roman 
character  has  changed,  this  day  is  proof  enough.  The 
grandfathers  of  these  men  sent  to  King  Pyrrhus,  when 
he  had  an  army  fighting  against  them  in  Italy,  warn- 
ing him  to  beware  of  poison  ;  but  they  have  sent 
an  ambassador  to  suggest  to  Prusias  the  crime  of 
murdering  a  guest."  He  was  in  his  sixty-fourth  or 
sixty-fifth  year  when  he  died. 

Of  Hannibal's  character,  as  of  the  history  of  his 
country,  we  have  to  judge  from  the  narratives  of 
enemies.  His  military  skill  is  beyond  all  doubt.  In 
that,  it  is  probable,  he  has  never  been  surpassed.  His 
courage  also  was  undoubted,  though  he  is  expressly 
praised  for  the  discretion  with  which  he  avoided  any 
needless  exposure  of  his  life.  The  testimony  to  the 
temperance  of  his  habits  is  equally  clear.  The  chief 
charges  brought  against  him  are  treachery,  cruelty, 
and  avarice.  From  personal  avarice  he  was  certainly 
free,  but  a  general  who  has  to  make  war  support  itself, 
who  has  to  feed,  clothe,  and  pay  a  great  army  in  a 
foreign  country,  with  but   rare   and  scanty  supplies 


CHARACTER   OF  HANNIBAL. 


271 


from  home,  cannot  be  scrupulous.     About  the  charge 
of  cruelty  it  is  not  easy  to  speak.     What  has  been 
said  about  Hannibal's  alleged  avarice  applies  in  a  way 
to  this  other  accusation.      A  general  situated  as  was 
Hannibal  could  not  but  be  stern  and  even  merciless 
in  his  dealings  with  enemies.     As  to  treachery,  we 
know  that  "Punic  faith"  passed  among  the  Romans 
into  a  proverb  for  dishonesty  ;  and  "  faithless"  is  the 
epithet,  as  we  have  seen,  which  Horace  applies  to  the 
great  general.     But  we  find  no  special  grounds  for 
the  charge,  while  we  may  certainly  doubt  whether  the 
Roman  generals  showed  such  conspicuous  good  faith 
as  to  be  in   a   good   position   for   censuring  others. 
There  was  no  more  honourable  Roman  than  Scipio, 
but  Scipio's  treacherous  attack  on  Syphax  during  the 
progress  of  the  negotiations  is  at  least  as  bad  as  any- 
thing that  is  charged  against  Hannibal. 


'  ii 


A 


XVI. 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  END. 

The  death  of  Hannibal  did  not  remove  the  sus- 
picion of  Rome  that  Carthage  might  be  plotting  some 
mischief     The  conditions  imposed  upon  her  by  the 
Peace   of  Hannibal    (as   the   treaty  made   after   the 
battle  of  Zama  was  called)  had  not  permanently  dis- 
abled her.     She  had  lost  her  dominions  but  not  her 
trade  ;  her  war-ships  had  been  destroyed,  but  not  the 
ships  of  hor  commerce  ;  and  she  had  always  in  her 
treasury   the   gold   with   which   to   hire  new  armies. 
Only  twenty  years  had  passed  since  the  conclusion  of 
the  peace,  when   she  offered  to  pay  up  at  once  the 
balance  of  the   indemnity  which  was  to  have  been 
spread  over  fifty  years.     The  Romans  preferred  keep- 
ing this  hold  over  their  ancient  enemies  to  receiving 
the  money,  but  they  were  alarmed  at  this  proof  of 
how  completely  the  wealth  of  Carthage  was  restored. 
Some  ten  years  later,  when  war  with  Macedonia  was 
threatening,  news  came  to  Rome  that  the  envoys  of 
the  Macedonian  king  had  been  received  at  Carthage. 
Doubtless  the  envoys  had  been  sent ;  and  it  is  prob- 
able that  they  found  some  powerful  persons  ready  to 
listen   to  them — for  there  was  still   a  war-party   in 
Carthage— but  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the 


CATO'S  HOSTILITY   TO   CARTHAGE. 


273 


government  had  had  any  dealings  with  the  enemies 
of  Rome.   There  was  one  Roman  statesmen  by  whom 
these  suspicions  were  very  strongly   felt.     This  was 
Marcus    Porcius   Cato,   commonly   called   the   Elder 
Cato,  to  distinguish  him  from  his  great-grandson,  Cato 
of  Utica,  the   republican  who  killed  "himself  sooner 
than  live  under  the  despotism  of  Caesar.     Cato  had 
served  throughout  the  campaigns  of  the  Second  Punic 
War,  and  had  not  forgotten  his  experiences  of  that 
time.     He  had  been  sent  to  inquire  into  the  causes  of 
a  war  that  had   broken   out  between  Carthage  and 
King  Masinissa,  and  he  had  been  much  struck  by  the 
proofs  of  wealth  and  power  that  he  saw  during  his 
visit,  the  crowded  population  of  the  city  and  territory, 
the  well-appointed  fleet,  and  the  well-filled  armouries. 
Returning  to  Rome,  he  related  in  the  Senate  what  he 
had  seen.     "  This  people,"  he  said,  "  is  stronger  than 
ever.  They  are  practising  war  in  Africa  by  way  of  pre- 
lude to  war  against  you."    As  he  spoke,  he  threw  down 
from  a  fold  in  his  robe  a  bunch  of  ripe  figs.     "  The 
country  that  bears  these,"  he  cried,  as  the  senators 
admired  the  beautiful  fruit,  "  is  but  three  days'  jour- 
ney  from  here."     One  is  not  certain  whether  he  meant 
that  it  was  so  near  as  to  be  dangerous,  or  that  it  could 
be  easily  reached.     Anyhow,  from  that  time  he  never 
ceased  to   take  every   opportunity  that  occurred   of 
expressing  his  opinion  in  the  Senate.     Whatever  the 
matter  might  be  that  was  being  voted  upon,  he  added 
the  words,  "  And  I  also  think  that  Carthage  ought  to 
be  blotted  out."     With  equal  pertinacity  one  of  the 
Scipios  (surnamed  Nasica,  or  "  Scipio  of  the  Pointed 
Nose),  a  near  kinsman  of  the  conqueror  of  Zama, 


274 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


added  to  every  vote,  "  And  I  also  think  that  Cart\-age 
ought  to  be  left." 

Carthage  had  a  dangerous  enemy  at  home  in  King 
Masinissa.  He  had  begun  life,  as  we  have  seen,  by 
serving  with  Hasdrubal  Barca  in  Spain,  had  then 
changed  sides,  and  fought  on  the  side  of  the  Romans 
at  the  battle  of  Zama.  He  had  been  handsomely 
rewarded  for  these  services.  His  father's  dominions 
had  been  restored  to  him,  and  to  these  had  been 
added  the  greater  part  of  the  kingdom  of  Syphax. 
For  more  than  fifty  years  he  was  continually  engaged 
in  enlarging  his  borders  at  the  expense  of  Carthage, 
and  he  always  felt  that  he  could  rely  on  the  help,  or 
at  least  the  countenance,  of  the  Romans.  Carthage 
was  forbidden  to  make  war  on  her  neighbours  in 
Africa  without  the  leave  of  Rome,  and  all  that  she 
could  do  in  return  for  Masinissa's  aggressions  was  to 
send  to  appeal  to  that  power  to  protect  her  against 
the  wrongs  that  she  was  compelled  to  suffer.  More 
than  once  the  Romans  sent  commissioners  to  inquire 
into  her  complaints.  Once,  indeed,  possibly  oftener, 
these  commissioners  decided  against  Masinissa,  but 
they  generally  left  the  matter  unsettled.  Anyhow,  the 
king  went  on  with  his  encroachments,  and  generally 
contrived  to  keep  what  he  had  laid  his  hands  upon. 

In  151  this  quarrel  broke  out  into  open  war.  Masi- 
nissa had  a  party  of  his  own  in  Carthage.  The  demo- 
cratic or  war  party  expelled  forty  of  its  principal 
members,  imposing  at  the  same  time  an  oath  upon  the 
people  that  they  would  never  allow  them  to  return. 
The  exiles  fled  to  the  king  and  urged  him  to  make 
war.     He  was  willing  enough,  for  he  had  his  eye  on  a 


AFRICANUS   THE   YOUNGER, 


275 


town  which  he  particularly  coveted  ;  but  he  first  sent 
one  of  his  sons  on  an  embassy  to  Carthage  to  demand 
redress.     The  prince   was  not   admitted   within   the 
works,   and   was   even   attacked  on   his  way   home. 
Masinissa  then   laid   siege  to   the   town.     The  Car- 
thaginians sent  Hasdrubal,  their  commander-in-chief, 
against  him.     They  were  joined  by  two  of  the  king's 
chief  officers,   who  deserted,  bringing  with  them  as 
many  as  six  thousand  horse.     In  some  slight  engage- 
ments that  followed  Hasdrubal  was  victorious  ;    and 
the  king  made  a  feint  of  retreat,  and  drew  Hasdrubal 
after  him  into  a  region  where  supplies  could  not  easily 
be  obtained.     A  battle  soon  followed.     The  old  king 
— he  was  eighty-eight  years   of  age — commanded  in 
person,  riding  after  the  fashion  of  his  country,  without 
saddle  or  stirrup.     No  very  decided  result  followed, 
but  the  king,  on  the  whole,  had  the  advantage.  There 
was  present  that  day,  as  spectator  of  the  conflict,  a 
young  Roman  who  had  much  to  do  with  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  story  of  Carthage.     To  give  him  the  full 
title  which   he   bears    in   history,    this    was    Publius 
Cornelius    Scipio  ^milianus   Africanus   Minor.     He 
was  a  son  of  a  distinguished  Roman  general,  ^Emilius 
Paullus,   the  conqueror  of  Pydna,i  and  grandson   of 
the  ^milius  Paullus  who  fell  at  Cannae.      He   was 
adopted  by  the  elder  son  of  the  Scipio  Africanus,  the 
conqueror   of  Zama,   whose   weak   health  prevented 
him  from  taking  any  part  in  public  affairs.^     He  had 

^  Pydna  was  the  great  battle  (fought  in  169)  by  which  the  Macedonian 
kingdom  was  brought  to  an  end.     See  "  The  Story  of  Rome,    p.  163. 

-  The  young  reader  may  observe  that  he  took  the  names  01  the 
family  into  which  he  was  adopted,  adding  to  them  that  of  his  own  ^.«5, 
altered  from  ^milius  into  /Emilianus,  according  to  the  practice  m  case 
of  adoption. 


2^6 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


been  serving  with  a  Roman  army  in  Spain,  and  had 
come  to  Masinissa  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing 
elephants.  He  had  privilege  of  seeing  the  battle 
from  a  hill  that  overlooked  the  plain,  and  afterwards 
said  (we  probably  get  the  story  from  his  friend  Poly- 
bius)  that,  though  he  had  been  present  at  many 
battles,  he  had  never  been  so  much  pleased.  "  I  saw," 
said  he,  "  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand  men  meet  in 
combat.  It  was  a  sight  such  as  two  only  have  seen 
before  me,  Zeus  from  the  top  of  Ida,  and  Poseidon 
from  Samothrace,  in  the  Trojan  war." 

Scipio  undertook  to  arbitrate  between  the  two 
parties.  The  Carthaginians  offered  to  give  up  the 
country  round  Emporia,  or  the  Markets  (now  Gabes 
and  Terba),  and  to  pay  two  hundred  talents  down 
and  eight  hundred  more  in  instalments  ;  but  when  the 
king  demanded  also  the  surrender  of  the  fugitives, 
the  negotiations  were  broken  off.  Hasdrubal  ought 
now  to  have  taken  up  a  position  which  it  would  have 
been  possible  for  him  to  hold,  but  he  neglected  to  do 
so.  He  expected  another  offer  from  Masinissa,  and 
he  also  had  hopes  that  the  Romans  would  interfere 
in  his  favour.  His  delay  was  fatal  to  him.  Famine, 
and  the  fever  that  always  follows  on  famine,  wasted 
his  army.  In  the  end  he  was  obliged  to  accept  the 
most  humiliating  terms.  The  exiles  of  Masinissa's 
party  were  to  be  taken  back  into  the  city  ;  the  fugitives 
were  to  be  surrendered ;  an  indemnity  of  five  thou- 
sand talents  was  to  be  paid,  and  he  and  his  soldiers 
were  to  pass  through  the  hostile  camp,  unarmed  and 
with  but  a  single  garment  apiece.  The  helpless 
fugitives  were  attacked  by  one  of  the  king's  sons  at 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CARTHAGE. 


277 


the  head  of  a  force  of  cavalry,  and  cruelly  slaughtered. 
Only  a  very  few,  among  whom  was  Hasdrubal  him- 
self, returned  to  Carthage. 

But  worse  remained  behind.  The  Carthaginian 
government  condemned  to  death  Hasdrubal  and 
those  who  had  been  most  active  in  promoting  the 
war.  But  when  the  ambassadors  whom  they  sent 
to  Rome  pleaded  this  proceeding  as  a  ground  for 
acquittal,  they  were  asked,  "  Why  did  you  not  con- 
demn them  before,  not  after  the  defeat  ? "  To  this 
there  was  no  answer  ;  and  the  Roman  Senate  voted 
that  the  Carthaginian  explanation  was  not  sufficient. 
"  Tell  us,"  said  the  unhappy  men,  "  what  we  must 
do  ?  "  "  You  must  satisfy  the  Roman  People,"  was 
the  ambiguous  answer.  When  this  was  reported  at 
Carthage,  a  second  embassy  was  sent,  imploring  to  be 
definitely  told  what  they  must  do.  These  were  dis- 
missed with  the  answer,  "The  Carthaginians  know 
this  already."  Rome  had  accepted  the  pitiless  counsel 
of  Cato,  and  Carthage  was  to  be  blotted  out.  If  there 
was  any  doubt,  it  was  dismissed  when  envoys  came 
from  Utica  offering  the  submission  of  that  city.  The 
consuls  of  the  year,  Manilius  and  Censorinus,  were 
at  once  dispatched  with  a  fleet  and  an  army.  Their 
secret  instructions  were  that  they  were  not  to  be 
satisfied  till  Carthage  was  destroyed.  The  forces 
which  they  commanded  amounted  to  nearly  a  hundred 
thousand  men.  The  expedition  was  popular  ;  for  the 
prospects  of  booty  were  great,  and  volunteers  of  all 
ranks  thronged  to  take  part  in  it.  The  news  that  the 
fleet  had  sailed  was  the  first  intimation  that  Carthage 
received  that  war  had  been  declared. 


2ys 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


The  Carthaginian  government  still  hoped  that  an 
absolute  submission  might  save  them.  They  sent 
another  embassy  to  Rome  with  full  powers  to  grant 
any  terms  that  might  be  asked.  The  answer  that 
they  received  was  this :  "  If  the  Carthaginians  will  give 
three  hundred  hostages  from  their  noblest  families, 
and  fulfil  all  other  conditions  within  thirty  days,  they 
shall  retain  their  independence  and  the  possession  of 
their  territory."  But  secret  instructions  were  also  sent 
to  the  consuls  that  they  were  to  abide,  whatever 
might  happen,  by  their  first  instructions. 

The  hostages  were  sent,  after  a  miserable  scene  of 
parting  from  their  friends.  But  few  believed  that 
submission  would  be  of  any  avail.  And  indeed  it 
was  soon  seen  to  be  useless.  The  consuls  demanded 
that  the  arms  in  the  city  should  be  given  up.  The  de- 
mand was  accepted.  Two  hundred  thousand  weapons, 
more  darts  and  javelins  than  could  be  counted,  and  two 
thousand  catapults  were  given  up.  Then  the  consuls 
spoke  again.  "  You  must  leave  Carthage  ;  we  have 
resolved  to  destroy  this  city.  You  may  remove  your 
furniture  and  property  to  some  other  place,  but  it 
must  be  not  less  than  ten  miles  from  the  sea."  And 
they  added  some  reasons,  which  must  have  sounded 
like  the  cruellest  mockery,  why  they  should  be  con- 
tent with  this  decision.  "  You  will  be  better  away 
from  the  sea,"  they  said  in  effect  ;  "  it  will  only  re- 
mind you  of  the  greatness  which  you  have  lost.  It 
is  a  dangerous  element,  which  before  this  has  raised 
to  great  prosperity  and  brought  to  utter  ruin  other 
countries  besides  yours.  Agriculture  is  a  far  safer 
and  more  profitable  employment.     And,"  he  added, 


WAR  DECLARED, 


279 


"  we  are  keeping  our  promise  that  Carthage  should  be 
independent.  It  is  the  men,  not  the  walls  and  build- 
ings of  the  city,  that  constitute  the  real  Carthage."  ^ 

The  return  of  the  envoys  had  been  expected  at 
Carthage  with  the  utmost  impatience.  As  they 
entered  the  gate  of  the  city  they  were  almost 
trampled  to  death  by  the  crowd.  At  last  they  made 
their  way  into  the  Senate-house.  Then  they  told 
their  story,  the  people  waiting  in  a  dense  throng  out- 
side the  doors  of  the  chamber.  When  it  was  told, 
a  loud  cry  of  dismay  and  rage  went  up  from  the  as- 
sembly ;  and  the  people,  hearing  it,  rushed  in.  A  fearful 
scene  of  violence  followed.  Those  who  had  advised  the 
surrender  of  the  hostages  and  of  the  arms  were  fiercely 
attacked.  Some  of  them  were  even  torn  to  pieces. 
The  envoys  themselves  were  not  spared,  though  their 
only  offence  had  been  to  bring  bad  news.  Any  un- 
lucky Italians,  whom  business  had  happened  to  detain 
in  the  city,  fell  victims  to  the  popular  fury.  A  few 
more  wisely  busied  themselves  with  making  such  pre- 
parations for  defence  as  were  possible,  for  of  course 
there  was  but  one  alternative  now  possible.  Indeed 
the  Senate  declared  war  that  same  day. 

'  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  these  abominable  sophistries  were  ever 
really  uttered.  But  we  have  good  reason  for  supposing  that  Appian, 
from  whom  we  get  the  report  of  the  Consuls'  speech,  copied  it  from 
Polybius,  an  excellent  authority.  The  historians  of  antiquity,  however, 
had  a  passion  for  putting  speeches  into  the  mouths  of  their  characters, 
and  were  not  always  particular  about  their  authenticity. 


XVII. 

THE  SIEGE  AND   FALL  OF  CARTHAGE. 

The  Carthaginian  government  did  their  best  to 
defend  their  city.  One  Hasdrubal,  the  same  that  had 
been  condemned  to  death  in  the  vain  hope  of  pro- 
pitiating the  Romans,  was  appointed  to  command  the 
forces  outside  the  city  ;  another  had  the  control  of 
those  within  the  walls.  The  manufacture  of  arms 
was  carried  on  night  and  day,  by  men  and  women 
alike,  even  the  temples  and  sacred  enclosures  being 
turned  into  workshops.  A  hundred  shields,  three 
hundred  swords,  a  thousand  javelins  to  be  thrown  by 
the  catapults,  were  made  daily.  The  women  are  said 
to  have  cut  off  their  hair  for  the  cords  of  the  catapults, 
for  which  the  horsehair  that  was  commonly  used  was 
wanting. 

The  wall  of  Carthage  had  a  circumference  of  about 
eighteen  miles.  It  was  about  forty-six  feet  high,  and 
thirty-four  feet  thick.  The  height  is  that  of  what  is 
called  the  curtain  of  the  wall,  i.e.  the  portions  between 
the  towers.  The  towers  were  of  four  stories,  and  much 
higher.  Where  the  sea  came  up  to  the  fortifications — 
and  as  the  city  was  built  upon  a  peninsula,  this  was 
the  case  with  the  greater  part  of  the  circuit — a  single 
wall  was  deemed  sufficient ;  but  on  the  land  side,  i.e. 


THE   WALLS  OF  CARTHAGE, 


to  the  north  and 
south,  the  wall  was 
triple.  Appian  tells 
that  the  three  walls 
were  of  equal  height 
and  breadth.  This 
is  incredible,  because 
such  an  arrangement 
would  have  been  use- 
less. The  first  wall 
once  taken  would 
have  given  the  be- 
siegers such  an  ad- 
vantage that  the 
second  would  have 
soon  become  unten- 
able. No  trace  of 
any  such  kind  of 
fortification  can  be 
discovered  either  at 
Carthage  or  in  any 
ancient  town.  The 
real  meaning  of  the 
author  —  possibly 
Polybius  —  from 
whom  Appian  quo- 
ted, seems  to  have 
been  this.  There 
were  three  ditches. 
Behind  the  inner  of 
the  three,  the  wall 
proper  was  built. 


281 


o. 

•I 


Si- 


C/J 

D 

< 

H 

O 

•4 
.-J 
< 

oi 
H 


(4 


«A 


282 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


Then  came  the  advance  wall,  much  lower  than  the 
wall  proper,  and  in  front  of  this  the  second  ditch  ; 
possibly  there  was  an  outer  defence  of  palisades, 
itself  protected  by  a  third  ditch.  The  traces  of 
exactly  such  a  system  of  fortification  are  to  be 
found  at  Thapsus.  Within  the  casemates  of  the 
main  wall  there  was  room  for  three  hundred  ele- 
phants, four  thousand  cavalry,  and  twenty  thousand 
infantry. 

The  harbours  were  so  arranged  that  ships  had  to 
pass  through  the  one  to  reach  the  other.  The  outer 
harbour  was  meant  for  merchant  ships,  and  its  entrance 
from  the  sea  was  closed  with  iron  chains.  In  the 
inner  harbour  were  kept  the  ships  of  war.  There  was 
an  island  in  it,  and  on  this  island,  as  well  as  round 
the  sides  of  the  harbour,  were  slips  in  which  two 
hundred  and  twenty  vessels  could  be  placed.  The 
island  also  contained  the  admiral's  house.  This  was 
so  high  that  he  could  get  a  view  of  all  that  was  going 
on  outside.  Between  the  two  harbours  there  was  a 
wall  so  high  that  it  was  not  possible  to  look  from  the 
outer  into  the  inner.  There  was  a  separate  entrance 
from  the  town  to  the  outer  harbour.  The  inner  or 
military  harbour  was  evidently  guarded  with  the 
greatest  care. 

Manilius  directed  his  attack  on  the  landward  side 
of  the  wall  ;  Censorinus  attempted  a  part  which, 
being  partly  protected  by  a  lagoon,  was  less  strongly 
fortified  than  the  rest.  The  outer  fortifications  were 
carried,  but  no  further  progress  was  made.  Indeed 
the  besiegers  had  some  serious  losses,  as  Hasdrubal, 
with  his  lieutenants,  among  whom  a  certain   Himilctv 


■Ui* 


f-:*  ,*  *'  ! 


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Itlu 


;:  I  '  I 


W>W;>'4f/y!^^^^MM 


■■y^< 


,-,!,   >. 


!'•' 


^VMhii!  -J, 


i:;iii\5i|if 


1 1;  Hi' 


Ml 
11   A 


^         -        .  ....  -  .«.»..i»_r  t  1  '^'V'V  <'  *     ■ 


Mi 

WW  -'^'^ 

mwB. 


? 


^ 


t/3 

a. 
< 

H 

H 
< 


< 

as 
O 

X 


THE  ROMANS  LOSE   THEIR   ALLY  MASINISSA.     285 

surnamed  Phamaeas,  was  conspicuously  active,  con- 
tinually attacked  any  detached  parties. 

Things  seemed  more  hopeful  when  Censorinus, 
having  filled  up  part  of  the  lagoon,  brought  two 
battering-rams  to  bear  on  the  wall,  one  of  them 
worked  by  six  thousand  soldiers,  the  other  by  as 
many  sailors.  The  force  of  these  brought  down  part 
of  it  ;  and  the  Carthaginians  built  up  again  this  por- 
tion in  the  night.  The  new  work  was  not  very  strong. 
Then  the  besieged  made  a  furious  sally,  set  some  of 
the  works  on  fire,  and  made  the  whole,  for  a  time  at 
least,  unserviceable.  The  next  day  the  Romans  at- 
tempted an  assault  by  a  part  of  the  breach  which  had 
not  been  repaired,  but  were  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 

Censorinus  now  found  that  his  crews  suffered  from 
the  climate,  for  it  was  the  height  of  summer.  Ac- 
cordingly he  transferred  his  ships  from  the  lagoon 
to  the  open  sea.  The  Carthaginians  took  every  op- 
portunity, when  the  wind  favoured,  of  sending  fire 
ships  among  the  Roman  fleet,  and  thus  did  it  a  great 

deal  of  damage. 

The  Roman  commanders  continued  to  conduct 
their  operations,  with  little  skill  and  as  little  success. 
And  just  at  the  time  when  they  most  needed  his  help 
they  had  the  misfortune  to  lose  their  ally  Masinissa. 
There  had  been  a  coolness  between  the  old  man  and 
his  Roman  friends,  he  conceiving  that  he  had  been 
rudely  put  aside,  and  that  the  task  of  dealing  with 
Carthage  had  been  unfairly  taken  out  of  his  hands. 
And  now  when  the  consuls  sent  to  ask  his  help— he 
had  promised  to  give  it  w/ien  they  asked  for  it,  and 
this  they  had  been  too  proud  to  do— they  found  him 


286 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


dying.  He  had  completed  his  ninetieth  year,  retaining 
to  the  last  his  vigour  of  mind  and  body.  The  other 
inveterate  enemy  of  Carthage,  the  old  Cato,  had  died 
a  few  months  before.  Scipio,  who  had  been  dis- 
tinguishing himself  during  the  siege,  was  entrusted 
with  the  task  of  dividing  the  old  king's  dominion  and 
wealth  between  his  three  sons.  One  of  these,  Gulussa 
by  name,  became  at  once  an  active  ally,  and  was 
found  especially  helpful  in  repelling  the  attacks  of 
Phamaeas  with  his  light  cavalry.  It  was  not  indeed 
long  before  Phamaeas  himself  was  induced  by  Scipio 
to  desert  his  friends. 

A  change  of  commanders,  Manilius  and  Censo- 
rinus  giving  place  to  Piso  and  Mancinus,  did  not 
bring  a  change  for  the  better  in  the  conduct  of  the 
siege.  This,  in  fact,  was  almost  given  up,  the  new 
consuls  busying  themselves  with  assaults  on  the 
neighbouring  towns.  Calpurnius  was  particularly  un- 
fortunate at  Hippo  (now  Bizerta),  where  all  his  siege 
works  were  destroyed  by  a  sally  of  the  townspeople. 

The  spirits  of  the  Carthaginians  rose  in  proportion 
to  the  discouragement  of  the  Romans.  Some  of 
Gulussa's  cavalry  had  deserted  to  them  ;  and  the  two 
other  sons  of  Masinissa,  though  nominally  friendly  to 
Rome,  stood  aloof  and  waited  for  what  might  happen. 
Envoys  were  sent  to  them  and  to  the  independent 
Moors,  representing  that  if  Carthage  fell  they  would 
be  the  next  to  be  conquered.  Communications  were 
also  opened  with  the  Macedonian  pretender  who  was 
then  at  war  with  Rome.  Unfortunately  the  Hasdrubal 
who  commanded  outside  the  walls  coveted  the  position 
of  his  namesake  in  the   city.     He  accused   him   of 


286 


THE   STORY   OF   CARTHAGE, 


dyinf^.  He  had  completed  his  ninetieth  year,  retaining 
to  the  last  his  vigour  of  mind  and  body.  The  other 
inveterate  enemy  of  Carthage,  the  old  Cato,  had  died 
a  few  months  before.  Scipio,  who  had  been  dis- 
tinguishing himself  during  the  siege,  was  entrusted 
with  the  task  of  dividing  the  old  king's  dominion  and 
wealth  between  his  three  sons.  One  of  these,  Gulussa 
by  name,  became  at  once  an  active  ally,  and  was 
found  especially  helpful  in  repelling  the  attacks  of 
Phamasas  with  his  light  cavalry.  It  was  not  indeed 
long  before  Phama-'as  himself  was  induced  by  Scipio 
to  desert  his  friends. 

A  change  of  commanders,  Manilius  and  Censo- 
rinus  giving  place  to  Piso  and  Mancinus,  did  not 
brinix  a  chancre  for  the  better  in  the  conduct  of  the 
siege.  This,  in  fact,  was  almost  given  up,  the  new 
consuls  busying  themselves  with  assaults  on  the 
neighbouring  towns.  Calpurnius  was  particularly  un- 
fortunate at  Hippo  (now  Bizerta),  where  all  his  siege 
works  were  destroyed  by  a  sally  of  the  townspeople. 

The  spirits  of  the  Carthaginians  rose  in  proportion 
to  the  discoura<Tcment  of  the  Romans.  Some  of 
Gulussa's  cavalry  had  deserted  to  them  ;  and  the  two 
other  sons  of  Masinissa,  though  nominally  friendly  to 
Rome,  stood  aloof  and  waited  for  what  might  happen. 
Envoys  were  sent  to  them  and  to  the  independent 
Moors,  representing  that  if  Carthage  fell  they  would 
be  the  next  to  be  conquered.  Communications  were 
also  opened  with  the  Macedonian  pretender  who  was 
then  at  war  with  Rome.  Unfortunately  the  Hasdrubal 
who  commanded  outside  the  walls  coveted  the  position 
of  his   namesake   in  the   citv.     He  accused    hiin   of 


o 


w 
o 
< 


o 


o 

a. 


SCIPIO  IN  COMMAND. 


289 


treachery — it  was  his  misfortune  to  be  closely  related 
to  Gulussa;  the  unhappy  man,  surprised  by  the 
charge,  faltered  in  his  defence,  and  was  murdered  in 
the  Senate-house,  his  senators  striking  him  down 
with  the  fragments  of  the  benches. 

At  Rome  every  one  had  expected  a  speedy  end 
to  the  siege,  and  there  was  great  vexation  and  even 
alarm  at  these  long  delays.  All  eyes  were  fixed  on 
the  one  man  who  had  showed  real  capacity  for 
command,  and  fixed  the  more  earnestly  on  account  of 
the  fortunate  name  that  he  bore.  It  had  been  a 
Scipio  who  had  brought  the  war  of  Hannibal  to  an 
end ;  it  was  to  be  a  Scipio  who  should  complete  his 
work  and  destroy  Carthage  itself.  The  young  soldier 
went  to  Rome  to  stand  for  the  office  of  ^dile — not, 
we  may  guess,  without  some  notion  of  what  was  going 
to  happen.  The  people  elected  him  to  the  consulship. 
The  consul,  who  was  presiding,  protested.  Scipio 
was  thirty  seven  years  old,  and  was  therefore  under 
the  legal  age.  The  people  insisted  ;  they  were  the 
masters  of  the  elections  and  could  choose  whom  they 
would.  The  tribunes  threatened  to  suspend  the  pre 
siding  consul,  unless  he  gave  away.  He  yielded  ;  as 
did  Scipio's  colleague  when  it  came  to  choosing  the 
province  which  each  consul  should  have.  This  was 
commonly  determined  by  lot,  but  the  people  was 
resolved  that  Scipio  should  have  Africa,  and  it  was 
so  arranged. 

The  new  commander's  first  exploit  was  to  rescue 
Mancinus  from  a  dangerous  position  into  which  he  had 
got  himself.  Anxious  to  do  something  before  he  was 
superseded,  he  led  a  storming  party  against  a  weak 


290 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


point  in  the  wall,  and  actually  made  his  way  into  the 
town.  But  he  was  not  strong  enough  to  advance, 
and  could  barely  maintain  his  hold  of  what  he  had 
gained.  His  colleague  Piso,  though  summoned  to 
help  him,  made  no  movement ;  but  Scipio,  who,  on 
reaching  Utica,  had  received  a  despatch  describing 
the  situation,  hastened  to  the  spot,  and  carried  off 
Mancinus  and  his  party  in  safety.  The  two  consuls 
shortly  afterwards  returned  to  Rome,  and  Scipio  set 


THE  HARBOURS  OF  CARTHAGE  (ACCORDING  TO  BEUL£). 

himself  to  restore  the  discipline  and  order  which  the 
lax  rule  of  his  predecessors  had  suffered  to  decay. 
He  purged  the  Roman  camp  of  a  crowd  of  idlers  and 
plunderers  which  had  collected  there,  and  left  nothing 
but  what  was  manageable  and  serviceable.  His  first 
operation  was  to  storm  a  quarter  of  the  city  which 
went  by  the  name  of  the  Megara,  and  was,  it  would 
§eem  the  abode  of  the  wealthier  class.     The  assault 


\\    >^^^ '  £       '■       --~~ 


HARBOURS   OF   CARTHAGE    (ACCORDING  TO  DAUX). 


ATTACK  ON   THE  MEGARA, 


293 


was  made  by  two  parties,  one  of  them  led  by  Scipio 
in  person.  Neither  could  make  its  way  over  the  wall ; 
but  a  tower,  belonging  to  some  private  dwelling, 
which  had  been  unwisely  allowed  to  stand  though  it 
commanded  the  fortification,  was  occupied,  and  some 


ARRANGEMENTS  OF  THE  BERTHS  (ACCORDING  TO  BEULfe). 

of  the  besiegers  made  their  way  from  it  on  to  the  wall, 
and  from  the  wall  into  the  Megara.  They  then 
opened  one  of  the  gates,  and  Scipio  with  a  force  of 
four  thousand  men  entered.  He  did  not,  however,  feel 
it  safe  to  remain,  for  the  place  was  full  of  gardens,  and 
its  hedges  and  watercourses  made  it  difficult  ground 


PLAN  OF  WALL  AT  BYRSA. 

for  the  action  of  troops  ;  but  the  operation  had  its 
results,  the  most  important  of  which  was  that  the 
army  outside  the  walls,  fancying  that  the  city  was 
taken,  abandoned  its  camp,  and  retreated  into  the 
Byrsa  or  Upper  City. 


294 


THE   STORY   OF   CARTHAGE, 


Hasdrubal,  enraged  at  this  movement,  retaliated 
by  a  barbarous  massacre  of  all  the  prisoners  in  his 
hands.  He  brought  the  poor  wretches  to  the  edge 
of  the  wall,  subjected  them  to  the  cruellest  tortures, 
and  threw  them  down  still  alive  from  the  height. 
After  such  an  act  the  besieged  would  feel  that  they 
had  no  hope  of  mercy. 

The  siege  now  became  almost  a  blockade.  Scipio 
burnt  the  camp  which  the  outside  army  had  deserted 
in  their  panic,  and  was  now  master  of  the  neck  of  the 
peninsula  on  which  the  city  stood.  No  more  food 
could  be  introduced  overland,  and  the  supplies  which 
came  by  sea  were  small  and  precarious.  The  next 
step  was  to  block  up  the  harbour.  Scipio  constructed 
a  great  wall  across  the  mouth.  So  huge  was  the 
work  that  the  besieged  at  first  believed  it  impossible, 
but  when  they  saw  it  advance  rapidly,  the  whole  army 
labouring  at  it  night  and  day,  they  began  to  be 
alarmed.  Their  own  energy  was  not  less  than  that  of 
the  besiegers.  They  dug  a  new  channel  from  the 
harbour  to  the  open  sea,  and,  while  this  worl:  wa.s 
being  carried  on,  they  built  also  fifty  ships  of  war. 
The  besiegers  knew  nothing  of  what  was  being  done, 
though  they  heard  a  continual  sound  of  hammering. 
Their  astonishment  was  very  great  when  a  fleet,  of 
whose  existence  they  had  not  an  idea — for  all  the 
ships  had  been  given  up  and  destroyed — issued  forth 
from  a  harbour  mouth  which  had  never  been  seen 
before.  The  Carthaginians,  in  great  glee,  manoeuvred 
in  front  of  the  Roman  fleet.  If  they  had  attacked  it 
promptly,  they  might  have  done  it  irreparable  damage, 
for  the  ships  had   been  left  almost  entirely  without 


kNGAGEMENTS  BETWEEN  THE  FLEETS,       295 

protection.  As  it  was,  they  contented  themselves 
with  a  demonstration,  and  then  returned  to  the  har- 
bour. It  was  an  opportunity  which  never  returned.  It 
was  fated,  says  the  historian,  that  Carthage  should  be 
taken.  Two  days  afterwards  the  two  fleets  fought  ; 
but  by  this  time  the  Romans  were  prepared,  and 
the  battle  was  drawn.  The  next  day  it  was  re- 
newed, and  then  the  Carthaginians  were  decidedly 
worsted. 

A  determined  effort  was  now  made  on  the  harbour 
side  of  the  city.  The  rams  were  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  walls,  and  brought  down  a  considerable  part  of  it. 
But  the  Carthaginians  made  a  furious  sally.  They 
plunged  naked  into  the  lagoon,  carrying  unlighted 
torches.  Some  waded  through  the  shallows  ;  others 
swam.  Reaching  the  land,  they  lighted  their  torches 
and  rushed  fiercely  on  the  siege  works.  Many  were 
killed,  for  they  had  neither  shields  nor  armour ;  but 
nothing  could  resist  their  charge.  The  Romans  gave 
way  in  confusion,  and  the  siege  works  were  burnt. 
Even  Scipio,  though  he  ordered  the  flying  soldiers  to 
be  cut  down,  could  not  check  the  panic.  The  day 
ended  in  a  great  success  for  the  besieged. 

When  the  winter  with  its  cooler  weather  drew  on, 
Scipio  turned  his  attention  to  the  region  from  whirV 
Carthage  drew  what  supplies  it  could  still  obtain. 
His  lieutenant  Lselius,  in  concert  with  King  Gulussa, 
attacked  and  defeated  with  enormous  loss  (though  it 
is  difficult  to  credit  the  figures  of  seventy  thousand 
slain  and  ten  thousand  prisoners)  an  army  of  native 
allies.  The  food  supply  of  the  besieged  city  was 
now  almost  cut  off,  but  Hasdrubal  had  still  enough 


I" 


29b 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


to  support  his  garrison.  The  rest  of  the  population 
were  left  to  starve. 

With  the  beginning  of  146  Scipio  prepared  for  an 
attack  on  the  Upper  City  and  the  Harbour  of  the 
War-ships,  or  Cothon,  as  it  was  called.  The  Harbour 
was  taken  first,  the  resistance  of  the  besieged  being 
feeble  and  desultory.  From  the  Harbour  Scipio  made 
his  way  into  the  neighbouring  market-place.  Even 
he  could  not  check  his  troops  in  the  plunder  of  the 
rich  temple  of  Apollo.  They  are  said  to  have  stripped 
from  the  statue  and  shrine  as  much  as  a  thousand 
talents  of  gold. 

The  next  thing  to  be  done  was  the  attack  on  the 
Upper  City.  Three  streets  led  up  to  it  from  the 
market-place,  each  of  six-storied  houses,  from  which 
the  garrison  and  many  of  the  citizen  population  kept 
up  an  incessant  fight  with  the  besiegers.  House  after 
house  was  stormed,  the  defenders  being  gradually 
forced  back  by  superior  strength  and  discipline. 
Another  conflict  was  going  on  meanwhile  in  the 
streets,  the  Romans  struggling  up  each  of  the  three 
roads  till  they  gained  the  Upper  City.  When  that 
was  accomplished,  Scipio  ordered  the  streets  to  be  set 
on  fire.  The  scene  of  destruction  which  followed  was 
terrible.  A  number  of  non-combatants,  old  men, 
women,  and  children,  had  hidden  themselves  in  the 
houses  that  were  now  blazing.  Some  threw  themselves 
on  to  the  spears  and  swords  of  the  soldiers ;  some  were 
burnt  in  their  hiding  places  ;  some  flung  themselves 
from  the  windows  into  the  streets.  Many  were  buried 
or  half-buried  under  the  ruins,  for  the  pioneers  were 
busy   clearing  a  way  for  the   troops,  and  did  their 


FIGHTING  IN  THE  CITY. 


297 


work  careless  of  the   living  creatures  that  came  in 
their  way. 

For  six  days  and  nights  these  horrors  continued, 
described,  it  must  be  remembered,  by  an  eye-witness, 
the  historian  Polybius  ;  for  it  is  from  him,  there  is 
little  doubt,  that  Appian  has  borrowed  his  vivid 
description  of  the  scene.  The  troops  worked  and 
fought  in  relief  parties.  Scipio  alone  remained 
unceasingly  at  his  post.  He  never  slept,  and  he 
snatched  a  morsel  of  food  as  the  chance  came  to 
him.  On  the  seventh  day  a  train  of  suppliants  came 
from  the  temple  of  ^sculapius,  which  stood  con- 
spicuous at  the  summit  of  the  citadels.  They  begged 
that  the  lives  of  such  as  still  survived  might  be 
spared.  Scipio  granted  the  request,  but  excepted 
the  deserters,  and  fifty  thousand  men  and  women 
availed  themselves  of  his  grace.  The  deserters  shut 
themselves  up  in  the  temple—there  were  nine  hundred 
of  them,  all  Romans— and  with  them  Hasdrubal  and 
his  wife  and  their  two  sons.  The  place  was  im- 
pregnable, but  their  position  was  hopeless,  for  there 
was  no  fighting  against  hunger. 

Hasdrubal  contrived  to  escape  from  his  companions, 
and  threw  himself,  humbly  begging  for  life,  at  the 
feet  of  Scipio.  The  boon  was  granted,  and  the 
Roman  general  showed  his  prisoner  to  the  deserters, 
who  were  crowded  on  the  temple-roof  They  bitterly 
reproached  the  coward  who  had  deserted  them,  and 
then  set  fire  to  the  temple.  When  the  flames  were 
burning  fiercely,  the  wife  of  Hasdrubal  came  forward. 
She  had  dressed  herself  with  all  the  splendour  that 
she  could  command,  and  had  her  two  children  by  her 


298 


THE  STORY  OF  CARTHAGE. 


side.  Turning  first  to  Scipio,  she  said,  **  On  thee,  man 
of  Rome,  I  call  no  vengeance  from  heaven.  Thou 
dost  but  use  the  rights  of  war.  But  as  for  this 
Hasdrubal,  this  traitor  to  his  country  and  his  gods, 
to  his  wife  and  to  his  children,  I  pray  that  heaven, 
and  thou  as  the  instrument  of  heaven,  may  punish 
him."  Then  she  turned  to  her  husband.  "Villain, 
traitor,  and  coward,"  she  cried,  "  I  and  my  children 
will  find  a  tomb  in  the  flames,  but  thou,  the  mighty 
general  of  Carthage,  wilt  adorn  a  Roman  triumph ! " 
She  then  slew  her  children,  threw  their  bodies  into 
the  flames,  and  followed  them  herself. 

Thus,  after  seven  centuries  of  greatness,  Carthage 
fell.  The  conqueror,  as  he  looked  on  the  awful 
spectacle,  burst  into  tears,  and  murmured  to  himself, 
as  he  thought  of  the  fate  which  had  overtaken  empire 
after  empire,  and  which  would  one  day  overtake  his 
own  country,  the  lines  of  Homer,  in  which  Hector 
foretells  the  doom  of  Troy. 

The  soldiers  were  permitted  to  plunder  the  city, 
but  all  the  gold  and  silver  and  all  the  treasuries  of 
the  temples  were  reserved.  Military  decorations  were 
liberally  distributed,  but  none  of  the  troops  who  had 
assisted  in  the  spoliation  of  the  temple  of  Apollo  were 
thus  distinguished.  The  Sicilian  cities  were  informed 
that  they  might  regain  possession  of  the  works  of 
art  which  the  Carthaginians  had  carried  off  during 
a  century  and  a  half  of  warfare.  Agrigentum  regained 
her  famous  Bull  of  Phalaris  ;  Segesta  her  statue  of 
Diana.  The  name  of  Scipio  Africanus  was  long 
honoured  by  the  Sicilians  for  this  act  of  honesty. 
Before  a  hundred  years  had  passed  they  were  to  lose 


D 

O 
U 

z 

< 
u 

oi 
< 


298 


THE   STORY  OF  CARTHAGE, 


side.  Turning  first  to  Scipio,  she  said,  "  On  thee,  man 
of  Rome,  I  call  no  vengeance  from  heaven.  Thou 
dost  but  use  the  rights  of  war.  But  as  for  this 
Hasdrubal,  this  traitor  to  his  country  and  his  gods, 
to  his  wife  and  to  his  children,  I  pray  that  heaven, 
and  thou  as  the  instrument  of  heaven,  may  punish 
him."  Then  she  turned  to  her  husband.  "Villain, 
traitor,  and  coward,"  she  cried,  "  I  and  my  children 
will  find  a  tomb  in  the  flames,  but  thou,  the  mighty 
general  of  Carthage,  wilt  adorn  a  Roman  triumph!" 
She  then  slew  her  children,  threw  their  bodies  into 
the  flames,  and  followed  them  herself. 

Thus,  after  seven  centuries  of  greatness,  Carthage 
fell.  The  conqueror,  as  he  looked  on  the  awful 
spectacle,  burst  into  tears,  and  murmured  to  himself, 
as  he  thought  of  the  fate  which  had  overtaken  empire 
after  empire,  and  which  would  one  day  overtake  his 
own  country,  the  lines  of  Homer,  in  which  Hector 
foretells  the  doom  of  Troy. 

The  soldiers  were  permitted  to  plunder  the  city, 
but  all  the  gold  and  silver  and  all  the  treasuries  of 
the  temples  were  reserved.  Military  decorations  were 
liberally  distributed,  but  none  of  the  troops  who  had 
assisted  in  the  spoliation  of  the  temple  of  Apollo  were 
thus  distinguished.  The  Sicilian  cities  were  informed 
that  they  might  regain  possession  of  the  works  of 
art  which  the  Carthaginians  had  carried  off  during 
a  century  and  a  half  of  warfare.  Agrigentum  regained 
her  famous  Bull  of  Phalaris  ;  Segesta  her  statue  of 
Diana.  The  name  of  Scipio  Africanus  was  long 
honoured  by  the  Sicilians  for  this  act  of  honesty. 
Before  a  hundred  years  had  passed  they  were  to  lose 


o 

in 

o 

u 

7. 
< 

U 

< 


'!i 


SUCCESSORS  OF  CARTHAGE. 


301 


their  treasures  again,  not  by  the  fortune  of  war,  but 
by  the  shameless  robberies  of  a  Roman  governor.' 

The  city  was  razed  to  the  ground,  and  a  curse 
was  pronounced  on  any  one  who  should  rebuild  it. 
Notwithstanding  this,  some  twenty  years  later  the 
younger  Gracchus  carried  a  proposal  for  founding  a 
colony  of  six  thousand  citizens  on  the  site.  It  was 
never  carried  into  execution.  Neither  was  the  simi- 
lar plan  which  some  eighty  years  afterwards  was 
conceived  by  Julius  Caesar.  Augustus,  however, 
founded  a  Roman  Carthage,  which  soon  became  a 
prosperous  city.  But  with  this  my  story  has  nothing 
to  do.  This  is  finished  with  the  fall  of  Rome's 
great  Phoenician  rival. 

*  See   the   account   of  Verres  in   a    classical    dictionary,    and   in 
*"The  Story  of  Rome,"  p.  2e2. 


I 


INDEX  TO    THE    TEXT    AND    THE 

NOTES. 


I 


Acerbas,  3,  6 

Acra,  96 

Adherbal,  157 

Adrumetum,  162 

^gusa,  163 

iEgates  Islands,  battle  of,  163, 
164 

iEschines,  122 

.^sculapius,  temple  of,  297 

^Ethiopians,  97 

i^tna,  eruption  of,  53 

/Etna  (town),  55 

Agathocles,  tyrant  of  Syracuse, 
75  ;  defeated  at  the  Himera, 
76 ;  besieged  in  Syracuse,  77  ; 
escapes,  ib.  ;  lands  in  Africa, 
80;  defeats  the  Carthaginians, 
82  ;  takes  Utica,  85  ;  returns  to 
Syracuse,  ib.  ;  comes  back  to 
Africa,  86;  imprisoned  by  his 
soldiers,  88 ;  escapes,  89 

Agrigentum,  22,  27 ;  taken  by 
Himilco,  41,  67,  122  ;  taken  by 
the  Romans,  132,  133 ;  237, 
298 

Alalia,  battle  of,  14 

Aletes,   117,  180 

Alexander  the  Great,  89 

Allobroges,  188 

Amber,  122 

Anagnia,  234 

Anio,  234 

Antiochus,  254,  266,  268 

Appian,  128,  279,  281,  297 

Arambys,  96 


Archagathus,  85-87 
Archimedes,  236 
Aristotle,  102-108 
Armenia,  269 
Artaxata,  269 
Ashtaroth,   113 
Athenoeus,  125 
Avienus,  100 

B 

Balearic  Islands,  35,  75 

Baltic  Sea,  122 

Beneventum,  battle  of,  230 

Boarding  apparatus,  134 

Bomilcar,  Suffete  of  Carthage,  his 
treachery,  82  ;  attempts  a  revo- 
lution and  is  put  to  death,  83 

Britain,  100,  122 

Bruttii,  226,  253 

Byrsa,  5,  293 


Cabala,  battle  of,  66 

Camarina,  taken  by  Himilco  (i), 

43.  158  ,         .       , 

Cambyses,   king  of  Persia,  plans 

the  conquest  of  Carthage,  18 
Campanian  mercenaries,  37,  129 
Cannne,  battle  of,  218-224 
Capua,  joins  Hannibal,  225  ;  be- 
sieged  by  the   Romans,   232  ; 
surrenders,     235 ;    its    severe 
punishment,  zb. 
Caravans,  118,  119 
Carbuncle,  see  Carthaginian  stone 


304       INDEX  TO   THE   TEXT  AND'  THE  NOTES. 


Caricon,  96 
Carthaginian  stone,  121 

Carthalo.  13 

Catana,  53 

Catapults,  newly  invented,  49 

Cato,  the  Elder,  273,  277,  286 

Catulus  (Lutatius),  163 

Censorinus,  277-286 

Cercina,  266 

Cerne,  97, 98 

Chretes,  97 

Chronos,  see  Moloch 

Cineas,  89,  90 

Clastidium,  200 

Claudius  (Appius),  131,  132 

Claudius  (Appius),  2,  236 

Claudius  (Nero)  in  Spain,  241  ; 
marches  to  join  his  colleague 
Livius,  249 ;  defeats  Hasdrubal 
at  the  Metaurus,  250-252 

Claudius  (Publius),  157,  158 

Clubs  at  Carthage,  109 

Clypea,  147,  152 

Common  meals,  106 

Corinth,  mother-city  of  Syracuse, 
70 

Corsica,  25,  122 

Cothon,  296 

Crete,  268,  269 

Crimessus,  battle  of,  72-74 

Crispinus,  247 

Crocodiles,  98 

Cronium,  Dionysius  defeated  at, 
67 

Crotona,  226,  253 

Customs-duties,  116,  117 

Cyprus,  4 

Cyrene,  117 


Dagon,  113,  114 

Daphnseus,  38,  39 

Deinocrates,  75 

Demeter,  worship  of,  at  Carthage, 
60 

Dexippus,  37,  41 

Dido,  3-8 

Diodonis,  117 

Dionysius  (the  Elder),  attempts  to 
relieve  Gela,  43  ;  makes  peace 
with    Carthage,    44 ;    declares 


war  against  Carthage,  47  ;  at- 
tacks Motya,  t'd.;  takes  it  by 
storm,  50 ;  defeated  by  Himilco 
at  Catana,  53  ;  retreats  to  Syra- 
cuse, 55  ;  makes  successful  at- 
tack on  Himilco,  57 ;  allows 
Himilco  to  escape,  59  ;  declares 
war  with  Carthage  and  defeats 
Mago,  64  ;  renev  s  the  war,  66 ; 
is  defeated  at  Cronium,  67  ;  his 
death,  68 

Dionysius  (the  Younger),  tyrant  of 
Syracuse,  70 

Drepanum,  battle  of,  157,  158, 
160,  163 

Ducarius,  209 

Duilius,  137 

E 

Ecnomus,  battle  of,  138-140 

Egesta,  28,  298 

Elba,  122 

Elephants,  121.  See  also  accounts 

of  battles 
Elissa,  see  Dido 
Entellus,  68 
Eryx,  36,  68,  159-165 
Etruscans,  14,81,  117 
Eumenes,  269 


Fabius,  appointed  dictator,  212; 

his  policy  of  delay,  212,   213; 

outwitted    by    Hannibal,    id.  ; 

his  unpopularity,  id.  ;   recovers 

Tarentum,    246 ;   crowned    at 

Rome,  260;  dies,  ib. 
Fair  Promontory,  14,  15 
Flaminius,  defeated  and  killed  at 

Trasumennus,  207-21 1 
Flaminius  (ambassador  to  Prussia)^ 

270 
Fregellae,  234 
Fulvius,  234,  245 


Gades,  186 
Gala,  240 
Gauls,  81 


INDEX    TO    THE    TEXT  AND    THE   NOTES.      305 


Gela,  taken  by  Himilco  (i),  43; 
besieged  by  Hamilcar,  76 

Gelon,  of  Syracuse,  defeats  Hamil- 
car (2),  26,  27 

Cisco,  166-175 

Gisco,  father  of  Hannibal  (i),  29 

Ciisco,  father  of  Hasdrubal,  240 

Gisco,  218 

Gorillas,  99 

Gracchus,  Tib.  S.,  230 

(iracchus  (the  Younger),  301 

Gulussa,  286,  289,  295 

H 

Halycus,  river,  67,  74 

Hamilcar  (i),  son  of  Mago,  con- 
quers Sardinia,  17 

Hamilcar  (2)  invades  Sicily,  22-27 

Hamilcar  (3)  commands  Cartha- 
ginian army  against  Agatho- 
cles,  75  ;  is  victorious  at  Himera, 
76  ;  besieges  Syracuse,  77  ;  his 
death,  82 

Hamilcar  (4),  commander  at 
Ecnomus,  138 

Hamilcar  Barca  (5),  appointed  to 
command  fleet  and  army,  160; 
holds  Hercta,  id. ;  holds  Eryx, 
ib.  ;  maintains  war  against 
Romans,  161-164  ;  makes  fa- 
vourable terms  of  peace,  165  ; 
takes  command  against  merce- 
naries, 171  ;  breaks  blockade  of 
Carthage,  172;  defeats  merce- 
naries, ib.  ;  attacks  camp  at 
Tunes,  176;  finishes  war  with 
mercenaries,  177  ;  crosses  into 
Spain,  178  ;  his  conquests  and 
death,  179 

Hannibal  (i)  nivades  Sicily, 
28-34  ;    invades  it  again,  35  ; 

dies,  38  , 

Hannibal  (2),  commander  in  Sicily, 

132,  I33»  134.  137 

Hannibal  (3),  lieutenant  m  mer- 
cenary war,  176,  177 

Hannibal  (4)  swears  hatred  against 
Rome,  181  ;  his  character,  181  ; 
campaign  against  Spanish  tribes, 
182;   besieges  Sagunlum,   ib.; 


takes  it,  184;  in  winter  quarter? 
at  New  Carthage,  185  ;  crosses 
the  Ebro,  186  ;  his  dream,  ib.  ; 
crosses      the     Pyrenees,     ib. ; 
crosses  the  Rhone,  187  ;  crosses 
the   Alps,    189-194 ;  descends 
into  Italy,  194  ;  his  losses,  ib. ; 
attacks  the  Taurini,  195  ;  con- 
quers     the     Romans     at     the 
Ticinus,      196-199;      at      the 
Trebia,    201-205  ;    winters    in 
Liguria,   206  ;   in  peril  of  his 
life,   ib. ;    crosses  the  marshes 
of   the    Arno,    ib.  ;    loses    an 
eye,  207;  defeats  the  Romans 
at     Trasumennus,      207-209  ; 
repulsed    at    Spoletium,    210; 
rests     at     Hadria,    211  ;     his 
policy,  ib. ;  his  campaign  with 
Fabius,     212-216  ;     wintering 
at     Geroniuni,     217  ;     defeats 
Roniiins  at  Canniv,  222;  refuses 
to  marcli  on  Rome,    223  ;  gains 
Capua,    225  ;    sends   Mago    to 
C^arthage,    227 ;    neglected    by 
the    home    government,    228 ; 
winters  in  Capua,  ib.  ;  besieges 
Nola,    ib.  ;    attempts    to   seize 
Tarentum,   229  ;   gains  Taren- 
tum,  231  ;  attempts  to   relieve 
Capua,  232  ;  marches  on  Rome, 
233  ;  retires,  235  ;  defeats  Ful- 
vius at  Herdonia,   245;   hears 
of  Hasdrubal's  death,  252;  his 
masterly  generalship   in  South 
Italy,  253  ;  recalled  home,  259 ; 
defeated  at  Zama,  262  ;  advises 
peace,  263  ;  in  power  at  Car- 
thage,  265  ;    his  reforms,   ib.  ; 
flies,  266 ;  at  the  court  of  An- 
tiochus,   267  ;    his    answer    to 
Antiochus,    268;     possibly    at 
Crete,  269;     with    Prusias    of 
Bithynia,  269,   270;  his  death 
and  character,  270,  271 

Hanno  (l),  Suffete  of  Carthage, 
killed  in  battle,  82 

Hanno  (2),  the  navigator,  95-100 

Hanno  (3),  131 

Hanno  (4),  132,  I33»  139,  HO 

Hanno  (5),  163,  164 


306      INDEX  TO  THE  TEXT  AND   TtiE  NOTMS. 


Hanno,  the  Great  (6),  1 71-177 
Hanno,  leader  of  peace  party  at 

Carthage  (7),  183,  227 
Hanno  (8),  187 

Hanno  (9),  defeated  at  Beneven- 

tum,  230 
Hanno  (10),  commands  in  Sicily, 

237  ^ 
Hanno  (11),  commands  in  Spain. 

238  '^ 

Hasdrubal  (i),  sonof  Mago,  16, 17 
Hasdrubal     (2),     (son-in-law    of 
Hamilcar  Barca),  his  campaigns 
m    Spam,     179,    180;   assassi- 
nated, 180 

Hasdrubal,  lieutenant  of  Hanni- 
bal (3),  219 

Hasdrubal,  brother  of  Hannibal 
(4),  left  in  command  in  Spain, 
186 ;  his  campaij,ms  with  the 
Scipios,  238-241  ;  eludes  Nero, 
241 ;  defeated  by  Scipio  Africa- 
nus,  243 ;  crosses  into  Italy, 
248 ;  defeated  and  slain  at  the 
Metaurus,  250 

Hasdrubal,  son  of  Cisco  (O.  240- 
289  ^'     ^ 

Hasdrubal  (6),  commands  in  the 
last  siege  of  Carthage,  280-300 
Hebrew  names,  11 

Hebrews,  their  relations  to  Tyre 
10,  II  "^    ' 

Helisyki,  Volscians  (?j,  25 

Hercta,  160 

Hercules,  3,  4.     See  Melcarth 

Hercules,  Pillars  of,  96,  118 

Herodotus,  113,  118 

Hiera,  163,  164 

Hiero,  130-132,  176,  229 

Hieronymus,  229,  236 

Himera,  first  battle  of,  26,  27  ; 
second  battle  of,  32  ;  destroyed 
by  Hannibal  (i),  33;  third 
battle  of,  76 

Himilco  (i)  invades  Sicily,  35-45  ; 
operates  against  Dionysius,  48- 
49 ;  returns  to  Carthage,  49  ; 
agam  appointed  to  command, 
51 ;  takes  Massana,  marches  on 
Syracuse,  besieges  the  city,  re- 
duced  to    extremities,    52-58; 


escapes  to  Carthage,  59 ;  com- 
mits suicide,  60 

Himilco  (2),  discoverer,  too,  loi 

Himilco  (3),  154 

Himilco  (4),  236 

Hippo,  168,  286 

Hippopotamus,  98 

Horn,  Southern,  99 

Horn,  Western,  99 

Horace,  149,  250 

Human  sacrifices;  28,  3^,  ^8,  86, 


larbas,  6 

Iberians.     See  Spanish  troops 

Iberus  (Ebro),  180 

Illilurgis,  239 

Intibilis,  239 

Iron,  122 

Isere,  188 

Italian  mercenaries,   25,  29,    35, 

37^ ,  55.   65.      See    also   Cam- 

panian  mercenaries 
Ivory,  122 


Junius,  158 


Kings  of  Carthage,  102,  103 


Lgelius,  258,  262 

Laelius  (the  Younger),  295 

Laevinus,  237 

Leather  money,  122,  123 
Leontini,  44 

Leptines  (brother  of  Dionysius), 
53.  54.  57  ;  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Cronium,  67 

Leptis,  115 

Liby- Phoenicians,  96 
Ligyes  (Ligurians),  25,  206 
Lilylx-eum,   fort  of,    besieged  by 
Dionysius,  68,  72 ;  attacked  by 
Pyrrhus,      91  ;     besieged     by 
Romans,  154-165 
Lilybaeum,  promontory,  72 
Lipara,  122,  134 


INDEX   TO   THE   TEXT  AND   THE  NOTES,       307 


Liris,  river,  234 

Livius  (colleague  of  Nero),  248, 

249 
Livius  (in  command  at  Tarentum), 

230,  231,  246 
Livy  (historian),    128,    181,    184, 

193,   222,   234,  238,  253,  259, 

264, 276 
Lixitae,  97,  98 
Lixus,  river,  97 

M 

Macar,  river,  171 
Macedonia,  272 
Magnesia,  battle  of,  268 
Mago  (I),  king  of  Carthage,  13 
Mago  (2),  Admiral,  53 
Mago  (3),   Carthaginian  general, 
attacks  Dionysius,  64  ;  defeated 
by,  id.  ;  invades  Sicily,  65 ;  is 
killed  at  Cabala,  66 
Mago  (4),  writer  on  agriculture, 

124 
Mago  (5),   brother  of  Hannibal, 
201  ;   sent    to    Carthage    with 
news  of  Cannae,  227  ;  in  Spain, 
240-244 ;  goes  to  Liguria,  tl>.  ; 
takes   Minorca,    254;    recalled 
home,  259  ;  dies,  ?A 
Maharbal,  210,  223 
Malchus,  12,  13 
Malgernus,  3 
Malta,  17 

Mamertines,  130,  131 
Mancinus,  286,  289 
Manilius,  282,  286 
Manlius,  138,  142 
Marcellus.  appointed  to  command 
army  after  Cannte,    227  ;    re- 
lieves    Nola,     228 ;      besieges 
Syracuse,  236  ;  takes  it,  237  ; 
campaigns  with  Hannibal,  245- 
247  ;  his  death,  248 
Marcius,  241 
Massilia,  122 

Masinissa  defeats  Syphax,  240; 
goes  with  Hasdrubal  to  Si)ain, 
id. ;  with  Scipio  in  Africa,  257  ; 
destroys  the  camp  of  Syphax, 
257,    258 ;    at    variance    with 


Carthage,  266 ;  encroaches  on 
Carthaginian  dominions,  274 ; 
defeated  by  Hasdrubal,  275  ; 
is  victorious,  id. ;  triumphant 
over  Carthage,  277  ;  dies,  286 

Matho,  167-179 

Megara,  the,  293 

Melcarth,  110-I13,  186 

Melita,  96 

Menander,  120 

Menes,  19 

Messana,  44,  130-132 

Metaurus,  battle  of,  249-252 

Mines,  117 

Minucius,  215,  216 

Moloch,  38,  108,  109 

Motya,    besieged    by   Dionysius, 
47-51;  recovered  by  Himilco, 

51 

Mutines,  237 

Myh«,  battle  of,  137 

N 

Naravasus,  176 

Native  Carthaginian    troops,  66, 

72,  74.  75.  82,  85,  146,  262 
Naxos  (Sicily),  21 
Nemausus  (Nismes),  186 
New  Carthage,  180 ;  captured  by 

Scipio,  242 
Nola,  228,  260 

O 

Olympias,  89 

P 

Pachynus,  158 

Panormus  (Talermo),  25,  67,  153, 

160 

Paulhis  (/Emilius)  appointed  Con- 
sul, 217  ;  slain  at  Cannae,  222 

Pelorum,  52 

Pentarchies,  105 

Pergamus,  269 

Periplus  of  Hanno,  95-100 

Persephone,  worship  of,  at  Car- 
thage, 60 

Pc-tilence,  38,  44,  56,  67.  236 

Phalaris,  298 

Phamxas  (Himilco),  286 

Phidias,  120 


308  INDEX  TO   THE    TEXT  AND   THE  NOTES. 


Philip,   king    of  Macedon,   229, 

254 
Phoenicians,  10,  11,  18 
Phocneans,  see  Alalia 
Pillars  of  Hercules,  96,  1 18 
Placentia,  199,  202 
Plutarch,  109,  218 
Politics,  the.    See  Aristotle 
Polybius,  128,  146,  153,  222,  258, 

262,  279,  281,  297 
Prusias,  269 
Pyrrhus,  89-91 


Regulus,  commands  fleet  at  Ec- 
nomus,   138  ;  lands   in  Africa, 
140  ;    vanquishes     JIasdrubal, 
143  ;  occupies  Tunes,  144 ;  de- 
mands    impossible     terms     of 
peace,      ib.  ;     conquered      by 
Xantippus  and  taken  prisoner, 
147 ;  sent  as  envoy  to   Rome, 
148 ;  his  counsel,  149  seq.  ;  his 
death,  151 
Rhodes,  fleet  of,  268 
Rhone,  passage  of,  187,  188 
Rome,  early  treaties  with,  14-16 


Saguntum,  180 ;  besieged  by  Han- 
nibal, 182  ;  taken,  184 

Sahara,  121 

Samnites,  226 

Sardinia,  invaded  by  Malchus, 
13  ;  belongs  to  Carthage,  17  ; 
supplies  provisions  to  Carthage, 
63,  65  ;  lost  by  Carthage,  177 

Saturn,  see  Moloch 

Scipio,  Cnaeus,  sent  into  Spain, 
189;  defeats  Hasdrubal,  238; 
defeats  the  fleet,  ih.  ;  joined 
by     Publius,     ib.     (see   Scipio 

^  Publius) ;  his  death,  241 

Scipio  (Publius),  sent  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Rhone,  186  ;  misses  Han- 
nibal, 189  ;  returns  to  Italy, 
ib.  ;  marches  against  Hannibal, 
195  ;  defeated  and  wounded  at 
the  Ticinus,  199  ;  moves  to  the 
Trebia,  ib. ;  returns  to   Spain, 


258  ;    his    campaigns  in    that 
country,  239-240;  his  death,  240 
Scipio,  Africanus     Major,    saves 
his  father's  life  at  the  Ticinus, 
199;    appointed    to   the    com- 
mand in  Spain,  242  ;  takes  Car- 
thage,   ib.  ;  defeats  Hasdrubal 
(Barca),  243  ;  comes  into  Africa, 
ib.  ;  returns  to  Spain  and  com- 
pletes conquest,    244 ;    comes 
again  to  Africa,  254;  besieges 
Utica,  257  ;  burns  the  camp  of 
Syphax,   258;   vanquishes    Sy- 
phax  and  Hasdrubal,  259  ;  de- 
feats Hannibal  at  Zama,  261, 
262  ;   makes   peace   with   Car- 
thage, 263 
Scipio,  Africanus   Minor,  his  de- 
scent, 275  ;  arbitrates  between 
Massinissa  and  Carthage,  276  ; 
distinguishes     himself    in     the 
siege,     286 ;    administers    the 
effects    of   Masinissa,   ib.  ;  ap- 
pointed   to    the    command    at 
Carthage,    289;    rescues   Man- 
cinus,  290 ;   restores    order   to 
the  camp,  ib.  ;  storms  the  Me- 
gara,  293  ;  institutes  a  blockade, 
294;   attacks  the   Upper    City 
and   captures   it,   297  ;   his  re- 
flections, 298;  his  disposal  of 
the  spoil,  ib. 
Scipio,  Nasica,  273 
Seleucus,  267 

Selinus,    26,   27;    at    war    with 
Egesta,    28  ;    taken    by   Han- 
nibal (I),  48,  67,  68 
Sempronius,    2cxd  ;    defeated    at 

Trebia,  201-205 
Senate  of  Carthage,  104,  105 
Servilius,  211,  213 
Ships  built  by  Rome,  134,  162 
Shophetim,  103 
Sikel  tribes,  44,  47,  59,  65 
Smuggling,  117 
Soloeis,  96 
Sophonisba,  244 
Spanish  troops  of   Carthage,  25, 

29,  33^  35»  59,  185,  186,  202, 
205,  219 

Spendius,  167-179 


INDEX    TO    THE    TEXT  AND    THE   NOTES.      309 


Spoletium,  210 

Suffetes,  103 

Syphax,  239,  243,  257-259 

Syracuse,  ruled  by  Gelon,  26 ;  by 

Dionysius,  42  et  seq.  ;  besieged 

by  Himilco,  53-5S 
Syrtis,  115 


Tanit,  113,  114 

Tarentum,  229,  230,  246 

Taurini,  195 

Tauromenium,  64 

Terence,  120 

Taet)es,  119 

Thermopylse,  267 

Theron,  26,  38 

Thymiaterium,  96 

Ticinus,  battle  of,  196 

Tifata,  Mount,  233 

Timoleon,  sails  to  Syracuse,  71  ; 
declares  war  against  Carthage, 
ib.;  defeats  Carthaginians  at 
the  Crimessms,  72-74 ;  his  death, 

75 


Trasumennus,  battle  of,  207-211 

Tribute,  115,  116 

Triton,  113 

Troglodytae,  97 

Tunes  (Tunis),   12,  60,  144,  168, 

172,  176 
Tusculum,  234 
Tyre,  3,  10,  11,266 

U 

Utica,  5,  12,  168,  176,  257,  277: 
290 

V 

Varro,  217,  221,  222,  226 
Venus.     See  Ashtaroth 
Venusia,  247 

Virgil,  his  legend  of  Dido,   79, 
121 

X 

Xantippus,  145,  146 


Zama,  battle  of,  260-262 


The  Story  of  the  Nations 


Messrs.  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS  take  pleasure  in 
announcing  that  they  have  in  course  of  publication,  in 
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GREECE.  Prof.  Jas.  A.  Harri- 
son. 

ROME.    Arthur  Gilman. 

THE  JEWS.  Prof.  James  K. 
Hosmer. 

CHALDEA.    Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

GERMANY.    S.  Baring-Gould. 

NORWAY.  Hjalmar  H.  Boye- 
sen. 

SPAIN.  Rev.  E.  E.  and  Susan 
Hale. 

HUNGARY.  Prof.  A.  Vamb^ry. 

CARTHAGE.  Prof.  Alfred  J. 
Church. 

THE  SARACENS.  Arthur  Gil- 
man. 

THE  MOORS  IN  SPAIN. 
Stanley  Lane-Poole. 

THE  NORMANS.  Sarah  Orne 
Jewett. 

PERSIA.    S.  G.  W.  Benjamin. 

ANCIENT  EGYPT.  Prof.  Geo. 
Rawlinson. 

ALEXANDER'S  EMPIRE. 
Prof.  J.  P.  Mahaffy. 

ASSYRIA.    Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

THE  GOTHS.    Henry  Bradley. 

IRELAND.  Hon.  Emily  Law- 
less. 

TURKEY.  Stanley  Lane- 
Poole. 

MEDIA,  BABYLON,  AND 
PERSIA.     Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

MEDIiEVAL  FRANCE.  Prof. 
Gustave  Masson. 

HOLLAND.  Prof.  J.  Thorold 
Rogers. 

MEXICO.    Susan  Hale. 

PHCENICIA.    Geo.  Rawlinson. 

THE  HANSA  TOWNS.  Helen 
Zimmern. 


EARLY  BRITAIN.    Prof.  Al- 
fred  J.  Church. 

THE  BARBARY  CORSAIRS. 
Stanley  Lane-Poole. 

RUSSIA.     W.  R.  Morfill. 

THE  JEWS  UNDER  ROME. 
W.  D.  Morrison. 

SCOTLAND.  John  Mackin- 
tosh. 

SWITZERLAND.  R.  Stead 
and  Mrs.  A.  Hug. 

PORTUGAL.  H.  Morse  Ste- 
vens. 

THE  BYZANTINE  EMPIRE. 
C.  W.  C.  Oman. 

SICILY.     E.  A.  Freeman. 

THE  TUSCAN  REPUBLICS. 
Bella  Duffy. 

POLAND.    W.  R.  Morfill. 

PARTHIA.    Geo.  Rawlinson. 

JAPAN.     David  Murray. 

THE  CHRISTIAN  RECOV- 
ERY OF  SPAIN.  H.  E. 
Watts. 

AUSTRALASIA.  GrevilleTre- 
garthen. 

SOUTHERN  AFRICA.    Geo 
M.  Theal. 

VENICE.    AletheaWiel. 

THE  CRUSADES.  T.  S. 
Archer  and  C.  L.  Kingsford. 

VEDIC  INDIA.  Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

BOHEMIA.     C.  E.  Maurice. 

CANADA.    J.  G.  Bourinot. 

THE  BALKAN  STATES. 
William   Miller. 

BRITISH  RULE  IN  INDIA. 
R.  W.  Frazer. 

MODERN  FRANCE.  Andr4 
Le  Bon. 


Heroes  of  the  Nations 


EDITED  BY 


EVELYN  ABBOTT,  M.A., 
Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 


A  Series  of  biographical  studies  of  the  lives  and  work 
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With  the  life  of  each  typical  character  will  be  presented 
a  picture  of  the  National  conditions  surrounding  him 
during  his  career. 

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Nelson,  and  the  Naval  Supremacy  of  England.    By  W.  Clark  Russell,  author  of 

"  The  Wreck  of  the  Grosvenor,"  etc. 
Gustavus  Adolphus  and  the  Struggle  of  Protestantism  for  Existence.    By  C.  R. 

L.  FLETCHhR,  M.A.,  late  Fellow  of  All  Soul^  College. 
Pericles,  and  the  Golden  Age  of  Athens.     6y  Evelyn  Abbott,  M.A. 
Theodoric  the  Goth,   the   Barbarian    Champion  of  Civilisation.      By  Thomas 

HoDGKiN,  author  of  "Italy  and  Her  Invaders,"  etc. 
Sir  Philip  Sidney,  and  the  Chivalry  of  England.    By  H.  R.  Fox  Bourne,  author 

of  "  The  Life  of  John  Locke,"  etc. 
Julius  Caesar,  and  the   Organisation   of  the  Roman   Empire.     By  W.  Warde 

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John  Wyclif,  Last  of  the  Schoolmen  and  First  of  the  English  Reformers.     By 

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Napoleon,  TVarrior  and  Ruler,  and  the  Military  Supremacy  of  Revolutionary 

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Henry  of  Navarre,  and  the  Huguenots  of  France.    By  P.  F.  Willert,  M.A.,  Fel- 
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Beazlev,  Fellow  of  Merton  College,  Oxford. 
Julian  the  Philosopher,  and  the  Last  Struggle  of  Paganism  against  Christianity. 

By  Alice  Gardner. 
Louis  XIV.,  and  the  Zenith  of  the   French  Monarchy.    By  Arthur  Hassall, 

M.A.,  Senior  Student  of  Christ  Church  College,  Oxford. 
Charles  XII.,  and  the  Collapse  of  the  Swedish  Empire,  1682-1719.    By  R.  Nisbet 

Bain. 
Lorenzo  de'  Medici,  and  Florence  in  the  15th  Century.    By  Edward  Armstrong, 

M.A.,  Fellow  of  Queens's  College,  Oxford. 
Jeanne  d'Arc.     Her  Life  and  Death.     By  Mrs.  Oliphant. 
Christopher  Columbus.     Hie  Life  and  Voyages.     By  Washington  Irving. 
Robert  the  Bruce,  and  the  Struggle  for  Scottish  Independence.    By  Sir  Herbert 

Maxwell,  M.P. 
Hannibal,  Soldier.  Statesman.  Patriot ;  and  the  Crisis  of  the  Struggle  between 

Carthage  and  Rome.    By  W.  O'Connor  Mokris,  Sometime  Scholar  of  Oriel  Col- 
lege, Oxford. 
Ulysses  S.  Grant,  and  the  Period  of  National  Preservation  and  Reconstruction, 

1823-1885.    By  LiEUT.-CoL.  William  Con  ant  Church. 
Robert  E.  Lee,    and    the   Southern   Confederacy,    1807-1870.     By  Prof.  Henry 

Alexander  White,  of  the  Washington  and  Lee  University. 
The  Cid  Campeador,  and  the   Waning  of  the  Crescent  in  the  West.    By  H. 

Butler  Clarke,  Fellow  of  St.  John's  College,  Oxford. 

To  be  followed  by  : 

Moltke,  and  the  Military  Supremacy  of  Germany.  By  Spencer  Wilkinson,  Lon- 
don University. 

Bismarck.  The  New  German  Empire,  How  it  Arose  and  What  it  Displaced. 
By  W.  J.  Headlam,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  King's  Collage. 

Judas  Maccabaeus.  the  Conflict  between  Hellenism  and  Hebraism.  By  Israel 
Abrahams,  author  of  the  "  Jews  of  the  Middle  Ages." 

Henry  V.,  the  English  Hero  King.  By  Charles  L.  Kingsford,  joint-author  of  the 
"  Story  of  the  Crusades." 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS,  New  York  and  London. 


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